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

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SCHIZOPHRENIA

SIMONIL FORBES

It has been perceived that no other condition in human pathology has perplexed and challenged the human mind more than schizophrenia.

Briefly, schizophrenia is a form of psychosis (not apparently due to organic mental disorder), which lasts more than six months and whose active phase begins usually before the subject is 45. Its typical features include: thought disturbances (often including misinterpretation of reality, misperceptions, loose associations, delusions, and hallucinations), mood changes (inappropriate affect, blunted emotions, inability to empathize, and ambivalence), communication problems (incoherence or poverty of speech content), and behaviour patterns that may be bizarre, regressive, or withdrawn.

Depending on specific symptoms, many subtypes of schizophrenia have been identified, including hebephrenic (disorganized), catatonic, paranoid, and undifferentiated. Each type has its intermediate forms and common features. In the catatonic-hebephrenic type, delusions and hallucinations are less conspicuous. There is negativism, disinterest, self neglect and cognitive anomalies. In tranquil states given time and favourable circumstances, patients describe a variety of delusions the content of which may be simple or complex. These delusional contents only emerge during the course of the illness and are not present at the onset.

In cases where the end state is of the paranoid type with minimal cognitive disorganization, the delusional content is little changed from that observed at the onset of the psychosis. Illustrative in the case of the paranoid type is the man who believes that he is sexually abused and victimized by known persecutors. This delusion may remain unaltered over years.

The prognosis for complete recovery is extremely rare and, in fact, Freud gave up on trying to treat schizophrenia, believing that the patients were beyond help (he was known to say 'psychotics are a nuisance to psychoanalysis'). However, as Eugene Bleuler said, 'Errors are the greatest obstacle to the progress of science ; to correct such errors is of more practical value than to achieve new knowledge.' Hence, since Freud, there has been much work done with schizophrenics and treatment has proved successful.

The earliest formulation of the psychoanalytic theory of schizophrenia was presented by Karl Abraham. He said that the factor common to all forms of the illness is its destruction of the 'capacity for sexual transference, i. e., for object love.' In fact, these people 'never had a proper capacity for transferring their libido to the outside world.' The schizophrenic individual boycotts the world, reacting to it abnormally or not at all. Although many of his symptoms resemble those associated with hysteria, he demonstrates a morbid tendency not observed in hysteria—a blocking of feelings, which suggests that he has never 'completely overcome' his infantile auto-erotism. Abraham attributed this anomaly to an inhibition in development at this early state.

According to early analytic theories, the massive narcissistic regression of the suchizophrenic indicates serious fixation at the early oral phase. The ties to reality are weak because of the libidinal impoverishment of the ego due to the early fixation of the libido, and when objects are relinquished, regression to the earliest developmental stages follows. A major reason for such hypothetical frames of reference follows the reasoning of Abraham, that schizophrenia, as the most profound disorganization of the ego, indicates the most profound regression. The symptoms indicative of later developmental stages are considered clear evidence of restitutive attempts to restore object relationships. Occasionally, regression to an infantile psychological state may be understood as a self-imposed control

against the discharge of a lifelong accumulation of rage.

Thus, schizophrenia may be characterized as a pathological way of neutralizing aggression in the absence of adequate insulation against action impulses. The individual may go to the extreme of destroying his perceptions of his object and his ego, but this is not inevitable. If he succeeds in releasing aggression without damaging these perceptions, his interest in the outside world reasserts itself. Sudden improvements and the appearance of restitutional symptoms suggest that the quantity of aggression has diminished so that it can be neutralized to the extent necessary to resume contact with objects.

However, to communicate the idea that the patient should be less aggressive is a good way to make him more schizophrenic. The aggression has to be expressed. In a sense, its expression does neutralize it somewhat ; but the analytic task is to remove the obstacles to the discharge of mobilized aggression. When these are resolved, the psychotic symptoms disappear and the patient can learn more healthful ways of dealing with aggression.

Freud conceptualized schizophrenia as entailing a fixation point in very early development (the auto-erotic stage) with later regression to that stage precipitated by frustrating and conflicting object relations. Under conditions of conflict with objects, cathexis is withdrawn from both the conscious and unconscious representations of the object, and the displaced cathexis is shifted to the ego. In so doing, the schizophrenic not only severs his ties with external objects but also abandons psychological representations as a whole. The schizophrenic's attempts to regain connection with his objects are only partially successful, and it is in these restitutive attempts that the schizophrenic symptomatology is generated.

It is usually found in the history of schizophrenics that both parents have failed the child, often for different reasons. Frequently the combination is as follows : A domineering, nagging and hostile mother, who gives the child no chance to assert himself, is married to a dependent, weak man, too weak to help the child. Similarly, a tyrannical father is married to a weak mother, who has solved her problems by unconditionally accepting her husband's rules. These rules do not allow her to give enough love to the child. Sometimes, one parent dies or is away because of divorce, separation, war, etc. and the child is completely at the mercy of the destructive parent.

generally the mother.

In these very unhealthy home atmospheres, a state of intense relatedness exists between the pre-schizophrenic child and his parents, especially the mother. The child is actually overwhelmed with feelings. but this relatedness, these feelings, are extremely anxiety-provoking and destructive (which will be elaborated on later).

A crucial event of the oedipal phase for children of both sexes is the achievement of sexual identity as a male or female. The boy has the difficult task of overcoming the primary identification with the mother, and the ambivalent fear and hostility directed toward the father, to enable identification with his father and thereby feel lovable to women in his male role. If the father is realistically jealous and hostile to the boy, if he is a weak figure, completely subservient to the mother, or if he is unacceptable to the mother, who constantly derogates him, then the assumption of a workable male role can be extremely difficult for the boy. Lack of warm social contacts induces in these children a rich fantasy life, and excessive brooding about certain subjects, one of them being their own sex identity.

In recent times, there has been a lot of progress in analytic knowledge on splitting processes, especially through Melanie Klein's work with children. From her clinical observations, Mrs. Klein describes how the child from earliest infancy projects his libidinal impulses on to a breast which he feels to be good and his aggressive impulses on to a breast which he feels to be bad. Both the good and the bad breasts are introjected and are felt to be outside and inside the infant at the same time. The good breast forms the prototype of all later good objects, while the bad breast, which is felt to be persecuting, becomes the prototype of all later persecutory objects.

During the first few months of life, which Klein calls the paranoid position, the infant keeps the good breast separate from the bad breast. Occasionally states of integration occur, when love and hate can be experienced towards one and the same breast with constructive impulses mitigating and controlling the destructive ones. Under certain external and internal conditions when aggressive impulses temporarily predominate, states may arise in which love and hate impulses and good and bad objects cannot be kept apart and are

thus felt to be mixed up or confused. These infantile states of confusion are states of disintegration and are related to the confusional schizophrenic states of the adult. The confusional state is associated with extreme anxiety, because when libidinal and destructive impulses become confused, the destructive impulses seem to threaten to destroy the libidinal impulses. Consequently the whole self is in danger of being destroyed. The only escape from this danger lies in the ability to differentiate again between love and hate. If normal differentiation cannot be achieved, splitting mechanisms become reinforced.

To put it simply, splitting is the earliest defence mechanism that the infant uses to deal with acute emotions. For example, the infant may have a fear of dying. This sort of anxiety is split off and pushed (projected) into the object (mother). The mother, through her care and love receives this projection, thinks about it, holds it, and moderates the anxiety. The baby then *takes in* the experience of a mother who could deal with the fear, along with the now moderated anxiety. Since the baby has the experience of a mother who could cope with such projections and since this sort of mother becomes part of the baby, since her capacity to cope is taken in by the baby, gradually the splitting lessens and the baby can be enabled to tolerate the anxiety since "he has internally" a mother who could deal with it.

However, if the mother is not able to receive the baby's projections (for example, a mother who panics at the baby's screams) he then has no object to contain his fears and he takes in someone who has no capacity to moderate the anxiety. Therefore the baby is left with no alternative but to continue splitting and projecting, because as Grotstein says, 'In order to defend himself against pain the schizophrenic attacks his own ability to feel.' The splitting increases to the point where mental processes are actually shattered and fall into bits and pieces. Nothing now has any meaning since there are no links and no connections, hence the splitting and projection continue.

Bion too, feels that projective identification is the principal form of connection between mother and infant, and that the mother's refusal to accept and contain the infant's projective identifications is perceived as an attack on that connectedness (that linkage between

mother and infant). The mother's refusal to contain the infant's projective identifications may take the form of a denial of the infant's feelings or perceptions, an enactment of induced feelings, an effort to evacuate the induced feelings via further projective identifications, etc. The effect of the mother's refusal to contain the infant's projective identification is to strip the infant's thoughts and feelings of whatever meaning they had held previously. The linkage-attacking mother is then internalized and this introject is seen by Bion as central in the development of schizophrenia. The infant's experience with the mother's rejection of his projective identification is the model for the infant's response to unacceptable reality wherein he attacks his internal processes of linkage, specifically his capacity to link perception with meaning (to create experience) and to link thoughts together in the process of thinking.

After the splitting becomes activated, the confusion and anxiety disappears, but there is clinically a deterioration in the patient's state, since the splitting causes progressive disintegration of the ego. An acute confusional state is apt to occur when splitting processes lessen, either spontaneously or through analysis, and both libidinal and aggressive impulses may temporarily predominate and interfere with the attempt at recovery.

(To state briefly another view put forth by some analysts is that schizophrenia is not just caused by a bad environment, that it is possibly constitutional. i. e. one is born with it. For example, it may be that a constitutional aspect in the baby may make his projections particularly difficult to be received by any mother. They may be so intense, for example, continual screaming no matter what anyone does, that the mother may feel it impossible to deal with.)

Freud discovered that omnipotence of thought was typical in psychotics. For example :

> In a mental hospital ward a patient said, 'I'm Napoleon.' Another patient asked 'Who told you that ?' The man answered, 'God told me.' A voice from another bed was indignant, he said, 'I did not !'

Identification as wish fulfilment is seen in cases of remitting schizophrenia where wish (grandiose) delusions precede or accompany the persecutory experiences. The patient has become the

person he wishes to be. He now possesses the attitudes belonging to the object of his admiration and envy—virility, power, etc. A wish for the future is fulfilled in the present. The persecution is the result of fear of retribution. Persecutory experiences may arise from within himself or from without. In the former, the figure who he has become is dangerous to himself and others. In the latter, the object is externalized having acquired through the fusion of self and object (the identification) the envy and hatred inherent in the original wish fantasy.

In female patients, wish delusions may have their origin in an identification with a sister or female cousin, envied and idealized for her feminine charms. In the psychotic attack the patient believes that she is as beautiful and attractive as the admired sister. She may even fashion her hair and wear her sister's clothes, however ill-fitting, to emphasize the identity. Again the persecutory fears arise from the dread of retaliation which her envy and acquisitiveness have provoked.

Of course, omnipotent phantasy processes in psychotic thought is very complicated—the whole idea is that thought processes become extremely powerful. This is shown in delusional thinking and hallucinatory processes. Phantasies are felt as all powerful, believed to be real, and the individual lives in this 'schizophrenic world' which is a world all its own and has its own characteristics and functions. This is what makes analysis of schizophrenia very difficult. The rules and meanings of this real world do not apply. For example :

> A patient was talking of murder, with gory details of people killing each other. If the patient was merely neurotic one would understand it as aggression manifested by the patient and that he knew what he was saying. However being schizophrenic this patient was quite mad and was 'talking' about a world which was terrifying, frightening and dangerous. In fact the analyst in the psychotic transference becomes part of that world, often the analyst becomes a frightening and dangerous person to him. If the analyst does not understand this and starts to find meaning in what

the patient says it could terrify the patient and lead to him breaking down.

During analysis, one must acknowledge transference and deal with it adequately. The reason why Freud thought narcissistic and psychotic persons could not be analysed was because they would be unable to form a transference relationship to the analyst—since in psychosis the ability to relate to people is damaged. Although Freud was wrong, he was right in a way, for, psychotics do form very intense transference relationships, but of a psychotic nature.

It is anticipated, since the significant impulses to be liberated are libidinal, that the patient will develop a basically positive attachment to the analyst. As these impulses are reactivated in the course of the relationship, the primarily loving attitudes that the patient developed from his parents early in life are transferred to the analyst. Klein expressed the view that transference originates in object relations in the first year of life, and reflects the presence of hatred as well as of love—'the mechanism, anxieties and defenses operative in earliest infancy.'

As the narcissistic transference develops, the schizophrenic patient begins to reveal the basic object hunger of his personality. The transfer of the residue of disturbing feelings experienced by the patient in early ego states is achieved as expeditiously as possible, and in a non-damaging manner. The patient is helped to relate to the analyst as an object like the ego, someone he can hate and love as he hates and loves himself. The defective ego is externalized so that it can be analyzed as it appears to exist in the transference object.

Another difficulty in the analysis of psychotic persons is their inability to form symbols. Symbol formation and symbolic thinking is a very important process for development in children. As children develop, their interest in their own bodies or parents' bodies slowly extends to other things around them. And then the original connection is repressed. (Psychoanalysts believe that the patient's disturbance is rooted in the repression of painful sexual ideas.) For example, food may symbolise the breast—food is the symbol but the connection with the breast is repressed in psychotics because the original interest is never given up, there is no development of movement, thus there is an inability to form symbols with the result that food cannot become the symbol for the breast—*it is the breast.*

This is very important in psychotic thinking.

Another important thing that is necessary to realise while treating schizophrenics is the use of language. Language by which we learn to communicate depends on our ability to form symbols. Since psychotics cannot symbolise, language and words have a different meaning for them. What the analyst says to a psychotic and what the psychotic hears are two different things. For example :

> During analysis, the analyst was trying to get a psychotic patient of his to understand what he was saying. He happened to get a bit impatient, for, the patient could not grasp what he was conveying. The analyst asked the patient if he could pick himself 'off from this confused state and look at what he (the analyst) was trying to tell him. The patient with great effort picked himself off the couch, stood in front of the analyst and stared at his face for a few moments before lying down once again. There was no hint of mockery in this action. The patient took his analyst dead literally and exactly performed the painful task the analyst he felt had forced him into. There was little concept of metaphorical thinking.

Bion has linked the schizophrenic's peculiar language difficulties to his relationship to objects, notably his tendency toward severe object splitting which interferes with his "ability to grasp whole objects."

Before the treatment draws to a close, the illusory aspects of the transference figure should have been resolved. Invariably, the patient has some awareness of the practitioner as a real person. Usually too, the patient entertains strong feelings of appreciation for the skill and dedication of the treatment partner who helped him achieve a monumental victory over emotional illness. Some degree of identification with the analyst is generally a powerful factor in the establishment of a new object field reflective of emotional maturity.

We have seen how an extreme state of anxiety, originated in early childhood, produces a vulnerability which lasts for the whole life of the individual. How desperately the patient attempts to maintain contact with reality, and how, under certain conditions of

stress, his defenses become increasingly inadequate. Confronted with overpowering anxiety, he finally succumbs, and the break with reality occurs. When he cannot change himself any longer, not even in a neurotic way, he has to change reality. But reality cannot change, and he has to change himself again in order to see 'reality' in a different way.

Psychoanalysis then has to break down the schizophrenic's defences and make him perceive the true reality which is not all destructive. As Freud said, 'The mental life of a person who cooperates successfully with the rules and requirements of psychoanalysis is permanently changed, is raised to a high level of development and remains protected against fresh possibilities of falling ill.'

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THE GENESIS OF THE SUPER-EGO

ERNEST JONES

[This is the second in the series of significant articles from the first year of Samiksha to be republished. Ernest Jones here delves into the origion of the super-ego and the work done since freud, notably by Melarie Klein, to provide futher insight into the concept of super-ego.]

In a paper[1] published some twenty years ago I laid stress on the tentative nature of the contribution I was offering to what was then an entirely new concept, one of the most important that Freud ever made. There is no reason for surprise, therefore, that the experience since gained makes me welcome the opportunity for revising some of those tentative conclusions or extending them in the light of further knowledge. Most of what I wrote concerning the functions and structure of the super-ego still stands, though very much could be added to it, so I propose to confine myself here to the more obscure problem of its genesis.

There can be no more fascinating problem than this in the whole of psychology or anthropology, and that for two reasons. We have good grounds for supposing that to the activity of the super-ego we are mainly beholden for the imposing structure of morality, conscience, ethics, aesthetics, religion—in short to the whole spiritual

"The Origin and Structure of the Super-Ego" *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.* 1926. Reprinted as Chapter VII in the Fourth Edition of my "Papers on Psycho-Analysis."

aspiration of man that sunders him most strikingly from the beast. The well-nigh universal belief that man is qualitatively *different* from other animals in possessing a divine and immortal soul itself emanates from this source. Anything, therefore, that can throw light on such a remarkable, and indeed unique, aspect of humanity must needs prove of the highest interest to the student of man and his institutions.

In the second place, the super-ego possesses a further and equally important claim on our interest. There is a darker side to it. The super-ego is man's foe as well as his friend. It is not only concerned with promoting man's spiritual welfare, but is also responsible for much of his spiritual distress and even for the infernal activities that so deface the nature of man and cause this distress. In the obscure depths of the unconscious the super-ego plays a vital part in the conflicts and turmoil characteristic of that region. It is no exaggeration to say that man's mental life is essentially composed of struggling efforts either to escape from or to support the claims of the super-ego. Superficially regarded our life appears to consist of a small section concerned with more or less abstract speculations and reflections and a far larger one concerned with more directly material interests and activities. The subjective element in the former is not very hard to perceive, although it is often denied. But it is seldom understood that even with the latter subjective, and more usually irrational, elements play a very large part also. Were our reason free to function, it would probably not be very difficult to arrange our lives and our institutions so as to provide a vast increase of happiness, achievement and security. But the inexorable claims of the super-ego, irrational as they mostly are, are more urgent than our real interests, which are commonly subordinated to them. And so we have to suffer.

Before coming closer to our problem it is necessary to be clear on one or two prelusive matters. The super-ego has several conscious derivations for instance, conscience, ego-ideal, etc., but it itself has to be carefully distinguished from them. Thus the essential super ego is an institution of the unconscious, so much so that to make a patient aware of its activities is often an extremely difficult task.

Then we have to be specially careful when we use the word "morality", for it is just with the early genesis of this conception

that we are concerned. The conscience is plainly the guardian of morality in the fully developed sense of that term : what is socially right (according to the mores) and ethically laudable. Now the super-ego is certainly not moral in that sense in extreme cases, for example, it may even dictate an act of murder as both desirable and commendable—and yet it possesses one important attribute that closely mimics it. That is the sense of urgent "oughtness", a categorical imperative. Actually this "oughtness" in the super-ego may get attached to attitudes that are either moral or immoral as judged by our reason and conscience, although in both cases it is at least as strong and compelling as any corresponding dictate of the conscience. If, therefore, it is to be called moral it can only be in an extended-irrational-sense of the word. Furthermore I have been able to trace this pseudo-moral feeling of "oughtness" to an earlier stage in development that antedates any sense of right and wrong, one to which I have given the name of "prenefarious inhibition". It would seem to be in this dark region that we have to search for the beginnings of what later becomes a moral attitude.

A paradox that must be faced is that we are able to describe the super-ego only by using two apparently incompatible terminologies, one static, and the other dynamic. There is an analogy to this in the dilemma of modern physics which has to describe its ultimates both as particles and as waves, neither alone being able to comprehend all the data. Presumably with psychology as with physics it indicates the imperfection of our knowledge. On the one hand it seems necessary to describe the super-ego as an object, an entity which can be offered to the id to love or hate or fear, in place of an external object, originally a parent. And on the other hand, we know that this internalised object has no corporeal existence but emanates from a process of phantasy which is itself the expression of some instinctual drive : here, therefore, we can describe the super-ego only in the dynamic terms of a *process*, a trend with sexual, aggressive or "moral" aims If it is a thing it is a very *living thing*, full of activity : watching, warning, guarding, threatening, punishing, prohibiting, ordaining, encouraging, and so on.

The attention paid in the last twenty years by a number of London analysts, notably Melanie Klein, to the processes of introjection and projection in infancy has led to a deeper insight into the

origins of the super-ego. In the light of this experience Freud's formulations concerning it now seem to me to call for an important extension in two others.

The first of these points relates to Freud's picture of the super-ego as the resolution of the oedipus complex. The child, faced with the hopelessness of his oedipus wishes, both because of the inexorable privation and because of the fear of punishment, effects a renunciation of them on condition that he permanently incorporates something of the parents within himself. This image of love and dread, derived from both parents, though more especially from the one of the same sex, then constitutes the super-ego, which continues to exercise its function of watching, threatening and if necessary punishing the ego when there is any likelihood of its listening to the now forbidden and repressed oedipus wishes of the id. Freud thus termed the super-ego the heir of the oedipus complex: its derivative and substitute. Now if all this refers to the fully developed and finished product, the super-ego as it will on the whole remain through life, and also if one reserves the term super-ego exclusively his this finished product, then Freud's formula still stands. But if it means that nothing of the super-ego is to be discerned until the oedipus wishes are renounced—according to Freud at about the age of four or five—then the conclusions based on later experience widely depart from it. It is partly a matter of nomenclature, though only partly. Freud would restrict the term super-ego to what I have called the finished product, and he would attach the greatest importance in its genesis to the oedipus conflicts between the ages of three and five. But he would certainly have also agreed that there is some further pre-history both to the oedipus complex itself (pre-genital difficulties, etc.) and perhaps even to the anxieties and fear of punishment antedating the classical oedipus situation and preparing the ground for the guilt attributes of the super-ego.

Before taking up the modern modification one is impelled to make to this formula of Freud, I will briefly mention the two other points alluded to above. One concerns the dating of the whole matter. We have now much reason to think that both the oedipus complex itself, with all its characteristic features (carnal desire for the mother, jealousy and hatred of the father, fear of castration, etc.) and the super-ego in a sufficiently developed form to be clearly

recognizable long antedate the period in which Freud envisaged them and reach back certainly to the second, and perhaps even the first, year of life. Secondly, the fear of punishment and also other sources of anxiety which play such an essential part in the genesis of the super-ego do not by any means all emanate from the oedipus situation itself, but have still deeper origin. To put it plainly, the boy has other reasons for anxiety besides the dread of punishment at the hands of his paternal rival; they spring more directly from the relation to his mother alone.

As was mentioned above, the reasons for these extensions and modifications of Freud's formula come from closer study of the processes of introjection and projection. Thanks mainly to the work of Melanie Klein, we have become familiar, not merely with the early age at which they operate, but with the extraordinary and quite continuous interplay between them at every moment of the infant's experiences of life. The introjections are what constitute the super-ego, but—and this is a most essential point—they are far from simple incorporations of erternal reality, but are to a greater extent incorporations of the infant's projections as well. Once this point is grasped one understands that the infant's own contribution to its future super-ego is more important than those made by the outer world (essentially the parents), a conclusion to which Freud would perhaps have demurred.

We may now return to Freud's view concerning the relationship of the oedipus complex to the super-ego. He would undoubtedly have agreed that the child's picture of the prohibiting and threatening parent is an exaggerated or distorted one. Though fathers may kill or castrate their boy children they very seldom do: nevertheless every boy feels these eventualities to be likely ones and is in consequence terrified of them. When, therefore, Freud says that the super-ego gains its power of affecting the ego from its representing reality demands', one certainly has to add "and unreality demands as well"; more accurately, the demands of psychical reality as well as those of physical reality. In my opinion these additions made by the child's imagination to the picture of the parent are more important and have a longer and more complicated history than Freud believed

1. Freud: "Collected Papers", Vol. II, pp. 251-253.

likely. And, as I pointed out many years ago[2], the earliest phantasies and conflicts exercise a decisive importance on the form taken by the oedipus complex, its course and outcome.

It is, however, agreed on all sides that these additions exist, so at once we are presented with the problem of their origin. Rather to our surprise we find to start with that the child has a motive in magnifying external dangers, *i.e.*, in picturing the parent as stricter and more dangerous than he or she actually is. The child can find in this way relief from its fears of internal dangers, which are more intolerable and are less assuaged by the reassurance given by the knowledge that the external object (parent) after all has some love and that there are limits to his anger. It achieves this. of course, by the familiar mechanism of projection. The matter, however, is not so simple as this, since the child oscillates in his estimate of internal versus external dangers, especially when the latter includes the projected ones. The external bogey may become so fearsome that the child, evidently with the aim of securing better control over it, introjects it (into its super-ego). Once inside, however, it again becomes intolerably dangerous and the child is compelled to look around for a suitable object in the outer world on whom it can once more project it. This double process is continually and perhaps endlessly repeated in the endeavour to procure some relief from the anxiety. These desperate expedients show that the child has within itself extremely formidable sources of anxiety, for which the formation of the super-ego is one attempted mode of salvation. This defensive function of the super-ego is the main theme of the present paper.

Whence come all these fearsome bogies and with them the need for such desperate defences? The super-ego is certainly, among other things, a cruelly persecuting agency which the ego has good reason to dread. But, after all, the super-ego is only in small part thrust on to the growing child by outer prohibitions and condemnations. It is in a larger part its own creation. Why does it have to create such a very unpleasant institution inside itself? There must be a good reason for its doing so strange a thing. Or, put more objectively, the super ego must fulfil some highly importnant function

2. "Papers on Psycho-Analysis", Fourth Edition, Chapter XXI, P. 457.

of value to compensate for its obvious disadvantages.

There can be little doubt that the sense of "oughtness" characteristic of the super-ego, the source of what later will be a moral attitude, is derived from an earlier sense of "mustness." Put in other words, the super-ego's threat to the ego: "You ought not to do that and I will punish you if you do" is a replacement of an earlier: "You must not do that for it is harmful (or dangerous)." How is this transformation effected from fear into the earliest traces of morality, and what is the nature of the fear in question? The earliest fears of the child are on the material rather than the spiritual plane: they are fears of damage to its interest (privation, deprivation, bodily injury, and so on). But in the first year of life love and the need for love begin to play an increasingly important part. This brings with it a new possibility, the fear of losing love by offending or injuring the loved and loving object—partially the mother. And it is this extension of its needs from the bodily to the spiritual plane that effects the transformation from mustness to "oughtness". To provoke the risk of castration is still a non-moral situation: to run the risk of offending the mother and losing her love becomes a "wrong" thing to do. And in time, as the relationship with the parents becomes more complex, it becomes quite as important to abstain from doing wrong things as to avoid doing dangerons ones. Perhaps the most important region in which this takes place is that of sphincter control, the earliest "moral" training of the infant and one which takes place long before, according to Freud, the oedipus complex is in action, or at all events when it is only in the stage of inception. Ferenczi, with the intuition of genius, spoke of "sphincter morality", sensing that here was to be found the dawn of moral attitudes. But he had little comprehension of the rich meanings the infant can attach to its excretory activities. They are not simply physical needs, though they derive much of their compulsive nature from this fact, nor simply important components of the sexual instinct (urethral and anal erotism). They are also vehicles of aggressive and destructive impulses, and are still further connected with the cannibalistic incorporations of the parents that precede or accompany them. When to soil the bed signifies to defile, posion or destroy the mother and at the same time to reveal that one has swallowed and killed the father then one begins to understand in

what *weighty* terms the nurse's "normal" training can be conceived.

The super-ego may profitably be regarded both as a barrier against those forbidden and harmful impulses and also as an indirect vent for them. Traces of all sexual components can be found in its activities even if they are imperfectly desexualized. The scopophilic impulse reveals itself in the alert watching and guarding attitude of the super-ego; the anal-erotic component reactively in the need for orderliness and most important in the sense of duty; while the sadistic one is all too obvious in the cruel torturing the super-ego can *inflict* on the ego. The reaction to the more developed genital impulse is shewn later in the moral condemnation of incest, but besides this is the more positive love towards the parental substitute (*ego-ideal, etc.*).

We have now traced the super-ego back to a pre-moral stage, one which I have previously termed a stage of prenefarious inhibition, where its main *function* would seem to be that of a simple barrier against the id impulses, or rather against the intolerable anxiety that these produce in the ego. At this point it becomes merely one defence among others, though one with a peculiar history. Its special features are due to its formation through introjection of parental objects. We may inquire further into the nature of the anxiety in question and of the danger arising from the id impulses. These are problems I have discussed at some length elsewhere.s but I will summarise the main conclusions I have reached concerning them.

Whether there is a separate aggressive instinct in man or not it *is certain* that the sexual one is, especially in its primordial stage, essentially aggressive in its nature, far more so than psycho-analysts originally thought. So far as I can judge, there appears to be no *satisfactory evidence* of aggression occurring apart from some libidinal impulse, which would seem to be always the starting point. There is good reason to suppose that these aggressive components are *felt by the infant* to be in themselves harmful or dangerous, quite directly so and apart from any effects on either the infant or the loved object. The response to them is anxiety, and at first what may be called pre-ideational anxiety, *i.e.,* without any sense of the nature of the danger. It is we who have to construct from various clues what this danger is. We know that physiologically and psycho-

logically the result of sustained tension from the absence of relief or gratification leads to exhaustion. Some parents take advantage of this knowledge to leave an angry baby alone "to cry itself out", in my opinion a very harmful procedure at that age. The dread of this total exhaustion of the libido I have termed the fear of aphanisis, and it is in my opinion the important starting point of the anxiety against which the super-ego, as well as other defences, is instituted.

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HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN PSYCHOANALYTICAL SOCIETY*

GLAUCO CARLONI

[The past president of the Italian Psychoanalytical Society, Professor Glauco Carlini, traces the chequered growth of the society, detailing the many hurdles and risks it faced reaching its present position of strength and eminence.]

The Italian Psychoanalytical Society ranks numerically sixth in the world today, tenth when the ratio to the population of the country is considered, but probably first if the continuity of its yearly growth is taken into account: we may therefore look back with some good-natured irony at Freud's apparent distrust regarding the possibilities for psychoanalysis to establish itself in Italy, if we are to believe his confidential comments to Dalma and those of Jones to Musatti; Italians, in fact, were in his eyes more uninhibited and inclined to cultivate the pleasures of life. In spite of his acquaintance with Italy and Italian art, and although he had a superficial knowledge of the language, he believed in the stereotype of the Italians as lively but inconsistent, intelligent but superficial people, hardly inclined to a serious investigation into the depths of the psyche.

The first work written in Italy in which psychoanalysis is specifically mentioned goes back to 1908. The author was a young

* Reproduced from the IPA Newsletter 1988.

German-speaking psychiatrist, Doctor Luigi Baroncini, who was later to become Director of the Imola psychiatric hospital and acquired a certain reputation for the modernity and humaneness of the pioneering techniques he adopted in the treatment of mental disease. Neither Baroncini nor the few others who had read Freud during the first twenty years of this century left any significant trace of their curiosity for the new science. We must wait therefore until 1915 to read the first Freudian essay in Levi Bianchini's translation—the five conferences held in September 1908 at Clark University, Worcester. Except for a few occasional and inconstant followers, such as Baroncini, Modena and Assagioli, Freud's Italian interlocutors were only three at that time: De Sanctis, a strict scientist who was not a psychoanalyst; Levi Bianchini, a quasi-psychoanalyst; and Weiss, a true psychoanalyst.

Sante De Sanctis (1862-1935), a professor at Rome University and undoubtedly the keenest psychiatrist and psychologist of his time, had the honour of being mentioned with respect by Freud for his book *The dreams* published ten years before Freud's book on the same subject. Nevertheless he was merely an influential sympathizer and supporter of the earliest attempts to spread psychoanalytical thought and organize a handful of Italian students.

Marco Levi Bianchini (1875-1961), on the other hand, although endowed with enthusiasm rather than with a profound knowledge of Freud's thought, strove to make it better known through his sometimes excessive activism, his open-mindedness and the fame he had come to acquire as a director of a number of psychiatric hospitals, of a psychiatric magazine bearing in its title the word "psychoanalysis", as well as a series of publications in which other texts by Freud and two books by Rank and Pfister appeared during the 'twenties. Being an omnivorous and insatiable reader, an eclectic therapist, and an inexhaustible writer on current public topics, Levi Bianchini publicized rather than convinced. Thus his efforts to introduce psychoanalysis into Italian psychiatry were without results, and his breakthrough in arranging that a session at the Psychiatric Conference in Trieste in 1925 be devoted to psychoanalysis bore no results either.

The third and by far the most important interlocutor was Edoardo Weiss, a psychiatrist, born in 1889 in Trieste which was

then still part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. He had been trained at the University of Vienna and had got in touch with Freud in 1908. Freud had sent him for a personal analysis to Paul Federn. After treatment for two years, a period which was considered fairly long at that time, and being still a student in his fifth year of medical training, he had been accepted as a member of the Vienna Society and had started his career as an analyst by discussing, on Wednesday, 14th May 1913, a "Contribution to the mechanism of forgetting names". He had then remained in the circle of Freud's close friends, thanks to Federn whose most faithful and promising pupil he had been. He returned to Trieste at the end of World War I and started his professional activity as a psychoanalyst and physician at the local psychiatric hospital—in absolute scientific isolation, but constantly in touch with Freud through an exchange of correspondence and periodic visits to Vienna. Most valuable evidence of this relationship is given by the letters under the title *Sigmund Freud as a Consultant* (1970) in which the master expresses himself to his pupil in an absolutely natural way and with a frankness which is not to be found in any of his other letters.

In 1925 two exceptional events occurred in the narrow-minded Italian psychiatric environment: the publication of a pretentious treatise on psychoanalysis in two volumes by Enrico Morselli, the most important follower of Lombroso; and the foundation by Levi Bianchini of an Italian Psychoanalytical Society at the psychiatric hospital of Teramo (a small provincial town). Morselli was at that time probably the most important Italian psychiatrist, but his inherent ambivalence vis-a-vis psychoanalysis appeared through a number of distortions, criticisms and errors, to the point that Freud in a letter to Weiss called Morselli "a pompous ass", "with a varnish of deceitful politeness which in the Austria of old times was considered typical of Italians (I hope your partiotic feelings will not be hurt by this reminiscence)."

The rather elusive Society founded by Levi Bianchini had, however, been recognised by Freud, just as its founder had been accepted as a member of the Viennese section. It led a wretched life also because of the scepticism which Weiss clearly expressed to Freud. Snubbed as it was by De Sanctis, and endured by Weiss, it managed to scrape up barely 23 members, during its five-year life, most of

them quite unprepared and tied to Levi Bianchini as assistants. It held very few scantily-attended meetings, and disappeared without leaving any mark on the culture of the time.

Resistance to the spread of psychoanalysis

We must recognise today that the difficulties encountered by psychoanalysis in Italy were not due to the national traits of Italians, as might have been thought at the time; but, as appeared more clearly later, rather to four specific cultural resistances. In order of importance these were: **scientific, religious, philosophical** and **political**. In fact, in each of these four areas, Italian culture possessed very specific traits which made the psychoanalytic message disturbing and unacceptable. Twenty years after these four resistances were overcome, now that the moderate expansion of the Italian Society proceeds unimpeded, these resistances may be assessed with unbiased objectivity.

Scientific resistance was due to the lack of originality of psychiatry in Italy, which depended on its elders in Germany and France and shied away from innovations lacking international repute. After being dominated during the second half of the nineteenth century by Cesare Lombroso (1855-1909) with his extra-ordinary and disproportionate reputation, after his death and over the subsequent fifty years it had become the neglected servant of neurology to which it was closely linked in academic teaching, and from which it tried to derive indefensible foundations for an organic basis for psychic suffering. In no other field of culture was psychoanalysis considered with so much contempt.

Religious resistance derived not so much from the fact that Italy was the seat of the Papacy—actually the ruling classes were rather secular and anticlerical—as from the fact that Catholicism, especially after the Counter-Reformation, had profoundly influenced the habits of Italians and the then current morals—or, better, the double-faced morals—which were officially rigid but in fact more tolerant than those of the traditional Austria of old times. The pansexualism of the earlier Freud especially, the determinism, the materialism, and his book *The future of an illusion,* created serious obstacles to an honest popularization of Freudian thought, let alone the fact that psychoanalysis might appear as a serious competitor to those who for

thousands of years had monopolized the "cure of souls".

Philosophical resistance was a direct consequence of the absolute triumph, over the rather poor and mediocre Italian positivism, of the idealistic philosophy represented by the two greatest philosophers of their time, Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. Croce, who was called the "lay pope" of Italian culture, considered psychology as subservient to philosophy, or as a pseudoscience; his rejection of experimental psychology was strengthened in its practical effects by the fact that Gentile, as first fascist Minister of Public Education was able without a qualm to remove psychology from the curricula of secondary schools and reduce the independence of the University, where only two Chairs of the despised form of psychology—experimental psychology—were saved. Since psychoanalysis, whilst consisting in a specific treatment in the psychiatric environment was however an enlargement of psychology, consisting in a new way of exploring the depths of the psyche, condemnation of psychology involved psychoanalysis also, although Croce himself did not reject all its discoveries.

Political resistance was weaker and belated. Before fascism, in a liberal era, this resistance was nothing more than a general distrust of a nationalistic nature in an Austrian science—Austria being by tradition the enemy of Italy's unity and freedom. With the advent of fascism (1922) it turned into a solid opposition by the allegedly healthy Latin genius inspired by clarity and rationality to German morbidity, the devilish spirit of the north, the romantic feeling of guilt. Finally, as a result of the alliance with the Nazis, it became persecution—albeit a mild one, in the Italian style—of the Jewish science and of its few followers, mainly Jews.

The first true Italian Psychoanalytical Society

Between 1931 and 1936 three editions of the first original Italian contribution *Elements of psychoanalysis* by Edoardo Weiss were published. The author, who had been forced to resign as a hospital psychiatrist because he had refused to join the fascist party, had moved to Rome where, through the support of De Sanctis, he could rely upon a regular flow of patients. Psychoanalysis, which had entered Italy through the eastern gate of Trieste, had now found its most congenial seat. In 1932 Weiss, together with nine colleagues and pupils, established the Italian Psychoanalytical Society (which was recognised by the IPA in 1935)' founded an Italian Journal of Psychoanalysis, and a series of publications, the International Psycho-analytic Editors which in addition to a number of important translations, published *Agoraphobia—Anxiety Hysteria* by Weiss, and a volume of essays by Italian psychoanalysts to mark the eightieth birthday of Freud.

The Journal did not have an easy life; it was published only for two years, with contributions by Weiss himself, as well as by Musatti, Perrotti and Servadio who had followed his lead in his pioneering work. The Journal was suppressed in 1934 and the Society in 1938, following the persecution of its members, mostly Jews, with fascist Italy's alignment with the racial laws edicted by Nazi Germany. Before then, in fact—whether the story is true or not that Mussolini stepped in (as indicated by Jones) to enable Freud to leave Austria—the fascists knew practically nothing about psychoanalysis, and their former mistrust had been only because of the international nature of the Society and the suspicion that its members, except for Levi Bianchini, were substantially anti-fascists.

What remained of these first psychoanalytical seeds after the permanent emigration of Weiss, to the United States, Servadio's temporary emigration to India, and after all the others had been forced into silence? : an example of earnestness, coherent consistency and anticonformism, which was to bear fruit in the postwar period, as well as a positive influence, especially on a number of avant-garde men of letters. More specifically: a direct influence on a great poet, Umberto Saba, who was one of Weiss's patients, and since then wrote enthusiastically about Freud and psychoanalysis, contributing more than anyone else to its acceptance in cultaral circles; and an indirect influence on Italo Svevo and Carlo Emilio Gadda, the most original prose writers, and Giacomo Debenedetti, the most modern critic.

During the same year that the Society disbanded, an excellent essay was published in a series of popular books; its title was *Psychoanalysis*, and its author Enzo Bonaventura. This was the last message before politics imposed silence. Bonaventura, who died in 1948 during the first Israel war, probably did not have time to appreciate how much his voice had found an echo among those young

intellectuals who were to take a place amongst the protagonists of the analytic revival.

The post-war revival

The formal reconstitution of the Italian Psychoanalytical Society (SPI) occurred in 1947, but the actual renewal of contacts among the few psychoanalysts followed the step-by-step liberation of Italy. It was due mostly to the initiative of a Galician exile, Joachim Flescher, a pupil of Weiss. Before ultimately moving to the United States, Flescher published a book *Psychoanalysis of instinctive life*, in 1945 ; he created a magazine *Psychoanalysis* (1945-1946), and helped to organize the first SPI Congress (Rome, 22-23 October 1946). This Congress was attended by seven full Members of the proposed Society : Perrotti, Servadio, Flescher and Merloni, with Musatti (who from an analytical point of view descended from the psychologist Benussi and through him from Otto Gross and Stekel), Modigliani, a pupil of Perotti, and Princess Alessandra Tomasi di Lampedusa (the wife of the famous author of the *Gattopardo*, who had undergone training with Felix Boehm of the Berlin Institute of Psychoanalysis).

"Meanwhile," as Gaddini recalled, the Italian neuropsychiatrists "were overwhelmed by an avalanche of bulletins and summaries in English or in very bad Italian, edited principally by the American authorities, which furnished them with a completely evolved dynamic psychiatry in a colourless language, which presupposed knowledge which was in reality non-existent". Through the American cinema also the less educated classes received information about a multipurpose psychoanalysis, within anyone's reach. A campaign of information and clarification was therefore necessary, and this was provided by the three more experienced and authoritative members, around whom the young psychoanalytic candidates gathered both in Rome and in Milan. Nicola Perrotti (1897–1970), who had been appointed as a member of the new free Parliament for his political merits, and as a High Commissioner for Health (a rank corresponding to that of Minister), and had been the President of the SPI until 1951, founded an Italian Institute of Psychoanalysis in Rome in 1952, ran the new magazine "Psiche" which was addressed to a wider public, and proposed to act more in depth on the culture of the time, also

through the study and interpretation of social phenomena. He chaired the second Italian Congress, on the topic of *Aggression* (Rome, 20-23 October 1950). Cesare Musatti and Emilio Servadio meanwhile distinguished themselves by their efforts to spread psychoanalysis, through their clear, simple and elegant prose, as well as their capabilities as lecturers and teachers. Musatti directed the new journal with the title *Rivista di Psicoanalisi* (Review of psychoanalysis) which was to become the official organ of the SPI ; publication began in January 1955, and, overcoming initial obstacles and editorial difficulties, came to be issued every three months.

A crisis in development

This occurred at the end of the 'fifties because of some differences of opinion on training problems between some of the leading analysts. It was decided to ask for mediation by the IPA, and through the good offices of a Commission composed of Swiss colleagues Raymond de Saussure, Morgenthaler and Parin, it was agreed to split the teaching functions amongst three Institutes, two in Rome and one in Milan, with an over-all Training Committee to ensure unitary training principles. It may safely be said today that this was a beneficial crisis considering how far its solution ensured the growth and stabilization of the SPI, sheltering it from the conflicts which subsequently troubled other components of the IPA.

The meeting on Countertransference, held in Milan in 1962, may be considered almost a manifesto of the new organization of the SPI, and of the harmony attained. In addition to Parin, the most outstanding analysts of the second generation—Fornari (1921-1985), Gaddini (1916-1985) and Corrao—presented their scientific papers at this meeting. To Fornari especially the SPI owed the introduction in Italy during those years of Melanie Klein's work ("The original affective life of the child", 1963). Gaddini was to develop an original research on the Self and, together with his wife Renata, to spread the knowledge of Winnicott's work. Corrao was to acquaint Italian psychoanalysis with Racker and, particularly, with Bion.

We may also recall, as evidence of the SPI's growing activity, the Trieste Congress of 1968 on "Psychoanalysis and culture"—a meeting of psychoanalysis, literature, cinema and philosophy, in the same city where Freud himself had carried out his first scientific research ;

and the organization of the 26th IPA Congress held in Rome in 1969, when membership of the Society had more than doubled, with 36 full Members and 55 Associate Members. After this Congress, the presidency of the SPI passed from Servadio to Corrao, and the new Executive Committee's agenda provided for new Byelaws which were to take into account the changed condition and social environment of the Society.

A mature Society

During the 'seventies, a very broad vulgarization of Freudian thought occurred, perfectly matched by the spread of student protest and a revolution of morals throughout western society. This became particularly conspicuous in Italy and created a complete and sudden change in the attitude of society at large vis-a-vis psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts now had to defend themselves against new dangers: no more against indifference, contempt or hostility, but rather against confusion, distortion, and attempts at contamination, stemming form the flattery and seduction of the mass media and of political and academic institutions.

The new Byelaws of the SPI (1974), resulting from a long collective gestation, were marked by flexibility in their formulation—with the intention of making them into a useful instrument to meet new situations which might occur in future years—and by a number of original innovations: (a) a strong recommendation to attend the periodic general meeting of the SPI; the Society is guided by an Executive rather than a steering Committee; and Associate Members are eligible to vote, except on matters concerning training and amendments to the Byelaws; (b) there is greater strictness in selection procedures and the organization of training (training analysts are co-opted); and (c) the creation of regional centres as SPI sections for promoting and carrying out scientific activities, whilst training activities are reserved to the three Institutes.

Centres of this kind were immediately set up in Rome, Milan, Bologna, Florence and Palermo, and later in Venice and Naples; whilst Genoa and Turin had to be content with working groups due to a lack of sufficient numbers of analysts locally. All this was easier to accomplish in Italy because of its historically polycentric structure than in more highly centralized countries such as France

and England.

Cultural exchanges with members of other IPA societies became more frequent following the entrance into the SPI of a handful of Latin-American analysts, especially from Argentina, who had taken Italian nationality (as had Professor and Mrs Matte-Blanco twenty years before), as well as the repatriation of a further handful of Italian analysts who had trained at the British Institute of Psychoanalysis, and the seminar activities frequently conducted in Italy by distinguished foreign analysts, mainly from Britain (Rosenfeld, Meltzer, Bion, Joseph, Harris, Brenman, Pick, Segal) but also from Argentina (Grinberg), France (Grunberger, Chasseguet-Smirgel, Racamier) and Switzerland (Spira).

Members of the SPI tried to give rational and consistent orientations to the intensive but disordered editorial activity of those years by launching promotional projects or editing and directing series of psychoanalytical books; most especially Musatti, with his translation into Italian in twelve volumes of Freud's *Ge sammelte Werke* published by Boringhieri, 1967-1980); Gaddini with his series *Psychoanalysis and contemporary society* (published by Martinelli), including the works of Klein, Segal, Jacobson, Greenacre, Winnicott and Brenner; Corrao with his *Serie di Psicoanalisi* (published by Armando) and the works of Bion, Racker and Meltzer; Carloni with *La Sfinge* (published by Guaraldi and Loescher) as well as the works of the Hungarian school (Ferenczi, Roheim, Balint), of Jones, Lewin, Bion, Money Kyrle, Grinberg, Bonaparte and Chasseguet-Smirgel.

All this contributed to making the SPI a lively and eclectic society, where external incentives spurred us on to a non-repetitive and often frankly original production.

Congress activities which had been interrupted during the more critical years now recovered, with three approaches: (a) National Congresses, at first every four years, later every two years—the third Congress in Venice (1976) after a long pause (Psychic Reality: the inner and outer world), chaired by F. Fornari; the fourth in Taormina (1980) (The analytical reality), chaired by E. Gaddini; (b) Multiple Seminars with a fixed or a free theme, held mostly in Bologna, also specifically intended for candidates; and (c) scientific meetings for the members, for example, of two neighbouring centres, or in a single centre on a predetermined theme.

A moderate expansion

The Italian Psychoanalytical Society, with 103 Associate Members and 68 full Members in 1979, 42 of whom were in charge of training for 178 candidates, now has 235 Associate Members, 130 full Members, with 55 in charge of the training of 214 candidates : a moderate growth in that it does not take into account the numerous applications to the Society and its Institutes but only the teaching potential of the SPI as used for strictly-selected candidates. In brief, the SPI has futher strengthened its position, and its influence on the culture and morals of our times can hardly be matched. Psychoanalysts act as appreciated contributors to the press, television and cinema. Whilst avoiding contaminations and compromises, they also act as highly appreciated consultants for public institutions on any psychological or psychiatric problem, also because many are university professors teaching on one or other of these subjects. Multidisciplinary meetings keep growing in numbers, where the presence of SPI members is highly valued. Some of these meetings are organized at the Catholic University of Rome. The former intolerance has undoubtedly been replaced by a respectful attention. Quite appropriately the 5th National Congress was held in Rome (Treatment and knowledge in psychoanalysis) when the 50th anniversary of the SPI (1932-1982) was celebrated with the attendance of the President of the Italian State, S. Pertini, and a whole day was devoted to presentations by the most famous Italian philosophers, critics and men of letters. The President's Welcome Address to participants at the Capitol, and the honours conferred on the senior members C. Musatti and E. Servadio for their pioneering work, bear witness to the success of this meeting.

After the Congress a slow generational turnover took place in the Society, following the untimely deaths of most valued col leagues : F. Fornari, who had taken upon himself the task of representing psychoanalysis in every sector of national culture ; E. Gaddini, who, by his asisiduous presence at every meeting of the EPF and the IPA had become an authoritative spokesman to and from these two organisantions ; and P. Bellanova (1917-1987) who had for twenty years been the invaluable Secretary of the SPI, and the skilful organizer of all its activities.

It was thereafter the task of the Executive Committee, led by

Carloni, to organise the Milan Congress (1984, The psychoanalytical process in its aspects of continuity and discontinuity) and the following Bologna Congress (1986, Mental pain in the psychoanalytical experience), to sponsor two multidisciplinary meetings, a national one in Ancona (Literature and psychoanalysis) and an international one in Trieste (Psychoanalytical culture), to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the *Rivista di Psychoanalisi* through the publication of a General Analytical Table of Contents, but above all to organise an efficacious opposition in scientific circles, in the mass media, and in political quarters, to a bill intended to entrust to the Universities the task of training all psychotherapists, thus reinforcing false vocations and increasing the confusion already existing in this field.

The new Executive Committee, headed by Hautmann, sets itself a number of tasks : promoting the SPI's relations with the EPF and the IPA ; bringing about changes in the Byelaws ; seeking "a common image in which everyone may recognise him or herself as a member of the SPI" ; setting up a training activity for infant analysis ; preparing the SPI 8th Congress (Sorrento, 1988, Psychoanalytical technique : its background and changes), and finally the 36th IPA Congress to be held again in Rome, in 1989.

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