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
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**A STUDY OF INFANTILE PHANTASIES RELATED TO
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH LIVED OUT IN THE TRANS-
FERENCE DURING THE TERMINATION PERIOD OF AN
ANALYSIS**

S. FORBES

The aim of this paper is twofold. I propose to show the activation of infantile phantasies to do with pregnancy and birth which actually led to a woman conceiving in the last year of her analysis. In addition, I wish to demonstrate through the clinical material the different ways these phantasies were communicated to the analyst and worked through in the transference. I hope to convey that the patient's primitive relations to her internal objects could only be properly understood as it revealed itself in the transference relationship, and that without this internal 'drama' unfolding and coming alive within the transference framework and experienced with the person of the analyst the treatment would have been reduced to ineffectual intellectual explanations. As Freud wrote in his paper on 'The Dynamics of Transference' (1912): "This struggle between the doctor and the patient...is played out almost exclusively in the phenomena of transference. It is on that field that the victory must be won—the victory whose expression is the permanent cure of the neurosis. It cannot be disputed that controlling the phenomena of transference presents the psycho-analyst with the greatest of difficulties. But it should not be forgotten that it is precisely they that do us the inestimable service of making the patient's hidden and forgotten erotic impulses imme-

diate and manifest. *For when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie.*"

What an analyst says to a patient is not a simple conveying of information. James Strachey in his classic paper 'The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis' (1934) was among the first to review what a therapeutic interpretation is. According to Strachey an interpretation becomes the agency of change when it is specific about the point of urgency in the transference, i. e. the patient's impulses and anxieties at that moment active towards the analyst. This Strachey called a mutative interpretation, which enables the patient to change his archaic internal figures by introjecting the interpreting analyst.

More recently Langs (1976) made a study of the vast discussion about analysts' interpretations and patients' communications. It was found that there is still agreement among analysts that a mutative interpretation is a verbalization of the immediate emotional transference.

Moreover, over the past 50 years psychoanalysts have changed their view of their own method. It is now widely held that, instead of being about the patient's intrapsychic dynamics, interpretations should be about the interaction of patient and analyst at an intrapsychic level. Sandler and Sandler (1984) address themselves to the problem of at which level the conflict should be interpreted. They say; "This problem disappears if we direct our interpretations of conflict to the here-and-now, guided by what we assess to be predominant affect as shown in the material (and also often in one way or another in the countertransference). Because the patient's conflicts are always related to the present, it is the current form that is important."

Melanie Klein's work has been the most powerful single influence for this shift in perspective, because her work leads clinically to an object-directed, interactional view of the transference. It is now generally accepted that the interchange between analyst and patient is wider than verbal; as well as words there are other transmissions by projection: feelings like anxiety, sexual excitement, hatred; mental images; sensations of drowsiness or rigidity; and so on. The understanding of the defensive function of these processes was made poss-

ible by Melanie Klein's (1946) discovery of projective identification her name for a group of early defence mechanisms in which the infant in omnipotent phantasy projects parts, sometimes even the whole of himself, into his objects, for his own safety or to control or to stimulate objects, etc.

Through highly original research, W. R. Bion (1962) extended Melanie Klein's work. He found that projective identification is not only a defense mechanism, but is also simultaneously an infant's first way of communicating with his objects. Bion's theory is that projective identification is the earliest mode of defence and communication which needs to be understood by the nurturing object. From this primitive form of communication and understanding there develops, in his view, more sophisticated forms—ultimately language and verbal thought.

Clinically these are very important findings. They show that in the transference words and what words unconsciously express are not all that is happening—important events are also occurring beyond words, communicated in more primitive modes. In the following clinical material I will try to describe how my patient needed to communicate both by words and more primitive means.

Clinical Material

I have taken material from the final year of an analysis of a woman, Jane. This analysis unavoidably ended short, after two years, since I was shifting residence to another country.

Jane, a rather pale and soft-spoken woman aged 30, was referred to me for analysis by a colleague. Jane said her husband was in analysis and she felt she needed it too. I must mention that she knew from the start that the analysis would end after two years.

Jane has two sons 7 and 9 from a previous marriage. She married again and had a baby daughter of 7 months. Jane herself was the eldest of three children—a brother 2 years younger and a sister 4 years younger.

In the analysis Jane revealed herself to be a rather ill woman. Clinically she could be described as a woman with severe emotional immaturity. The transference relationship to me revolved around both erotized and homosexual phantasies. There were constant attempts at seduction and softening of me into a sexualized flowery

feminine object inside whom she could endlessly reside and find bliss forever. These masturbatory phantasies defended her against feelings of non-existence, emptiness and dreadful deprivation. As the analysis progressed we found that the developed and adult Jane was just a thin covering, and that hidden behind this was a vulnerable and rather ill baby. This baby self often made its presence felt as dying, muddled, confused and panicky. And it soon became clear that it was chiefly for this that Jane came into analysis.

The last year of the analysis began with my moving my consulting room to a new address. I had given Jane detailed instructions to get to this new place. The following day she brought a dream: She and her baby were both dressed and ready to go out. They found themselves in a house which looked rotten, soggy and wet. The house then began to collapse, the floor-boards gave way and the baby screamed as she dropped right through a hole. Jane rushed towards the hole and saw the baby down in the bottom. She felt panicky and helpless not knowing what she could do to help her baby. But then she noticed there were steps leading down into the hole so that she could reach down and help out her baby. She woke out of this dream feeling relieved, it was not that frightening.

This dream vividly illustrates the type of anxiety she experienced at my moving to a new consulting room. It appeared to trigger a birth phantasy, of being pushed out of mother at birth. However the dream also showed an awareness in her that I had shown concern by giving her step by step instructions on how to get to me. This showed her internalising in the transference a more reliable object thus mitigating to some extent the anxiety situation and giving her relief.

A week later she brought me the news that she was pregnant. Her doctor told her she would be due on 15th June which, she said, surprised her, she was expecting it later (she knew that the analysis was to end on the last day of July). She said in any case she had always delivered late, by about 2 weeks. Then she asked anxiously whether this would affect our ending. Would it spoil the ending? At the delivery of her baby-girl she was quite confused and muddled. Her sons were away for 2 weeks with her ex-husband and she had felt worried that he would poison their minds against her and her boys would hate her.

I spoke to her of her worry that I would hate and criticize her for ending the analysis earlier and thus leaving me; turning my leaving her into the complete opposite. And that her hatred and jealousy about the ending of the analysis would now be managed by being pushed into 'little boy'—myself.

She admitted that she had felt I would say she had purposely engineered becoming pregnant to get away from me. And then she remembered that when she was 2 years old her mother had taken her to the park. When they returned she refused to enter her house and began screaming non-stop. She was taken to the doctor who thought the cause could be because mother was pregnant. Her mother tried to sit her down and talk to her about the pregnancy to calm her down, but Jane continued screaming.

Soon we discovered another phantasy behind Jane's pregnant state. In this phantasy she gives herself to me sexually since she feels that if she gives me a baby I will never leave her and we will be together for always. She brought a dream: She is sitting at the dining table and asks me to sit next to her. We then have sex. I am also blind in this dream. She then discovers that her piano is dirty since on one side of the keys there is a layer of dirty white stuff, like fat, turned into lumpy hard stuff. She has to chip away at it, to clean each key so as to get at the key board underneath.

In this dream she shows how she and I have sex together with me turned blind to the fact of being the feeding mother/analyst. The lumpy white stuff, like fat, seems to refer to pregnancy. However, the dream also showed that she knew it was dirty and she hoped I would be an analyst and analyse this. Although she wished that if she gave me a baby I would never leave her she also knew it to be dirty and unrealistic.

Later we could also observe certain unfortunate consequences for her of what she was doing to the analysis. The child her in need of the analysis was the mother now. And so there would be no record of being with me in the analysis. For instance she spoke of how, now it would be her mother who would take over everything to do in the house since she was pregnant. She would tell me how mother and her were the same in so many ways. Her husband said her baby-girl should be taught her mother-tongue, but she cannot teach the baby this language because then she, Jane, would become

her own mother, who had taught her, and lose herself. People might think she was mad to have another baby, but she felt so enthusiastic, as if floodgates were removed. Jane also told me of hiding her last pregnancy, she did not think about it and almost did not know till the baby was born.

And during this period a peculiar thing was happening to me. I had great difficulty in remembering what she had said and found it an awesome task to make proper notes after the sessions. I think there was a projective identification into me of a child-her who is no longer able to make notes of our being together, there was now no record of the analysis. This was a real threat of loss, of gain and progress in the analysis. There was now a child-her who no longer knew what happened between us because she was a grown woman having a baby. She was really her mother having a baby. This kept her from having a psychic record. I strongly suspect that this sort of phantasy in her inner life, conveyed vividly in the transference, has contributed greatly to her retarded development and severe immaturity.

The more persecutory aspects of her pregnancy appeared the day after a session where we both felt some particularly good work had been done. She said she had a bad stomach ache. This worried her and she thought she might bleed and get her period. She said maybe it was a reaction to yesterday's session, but that now this was a real worry. She went to see her doctor even though she felt silly, but it was silly not to since she would be reassured. As she continued talking I began to feel both hopeless and angry that a rather productive last session had been got rid of and that my existence was forgotten.

She then related 2 dreams: In the first dream she was in her session but it was not this room, could have been any room. Dr J (the consultant who had referred her to me), or some other man, was present. It was not like a session but a casual meeting. Coffee, which she was asked to make, was served, and they drank it together.

The next dream continued after she left the session in the first dream. She finds that there is a war on. A bomb falls and starts a huge fire with buildings burning. With her husband's help she begins to evacuate children who are in a helpless state.

She then commented on my recently giving her the telephone number of the consulting room and suddenly asked why I was showing such interest and concern about her, why do I bother, and she does not know why she bothers to come to the analysis. After a pause she spoke of parking her car here yesterday and later found that 2 cars had parked close to her so that she had to manoeuvre to get out.

Through this material it appeared that to her I was the pregnant mother going off after 2 years—very similar to her own mother who, when she was 2, became pregnant with her brother. She manoeuvres to get out of this situation in using certain ways of making me, as mother, lose her child. She gets inside mother to bomb out the baby. She wants to get into me and wants to have the baby herself. Thus she resorts to a manic denial—that now she is the only one—no existence of a productive analyst.

But her manic denial only leads to an increase of persecutory fears, since in identification with a bombed-out mother she fears she will also miscarry and lose her own baby. There is an anxiety that we will both bleed, and as her own dream shows there are helpless babies everywhere. However, the dream shows something more, it also shows a more grown-up part of her which is worried at what is happening and does attempt to help.

Moreover, although upto now I have described rather negative aspects of her various phantasies in being pregnant. I think there was also an important and more positive reason for her becoming pregnant. This was her feeling that this time she wanted to get it right. She wanted, through the help of the analysis, to experience pregnancy and giving birth. In all her former pregnancies she had hardly felt pregnant. There were numerous breaks in the experience, and during the deliveries she was unconscious, ill and heavily drugged. This time she wanted it to be different, using the analysis to feel life growing inside her and to 'give it birth'. This would be, in all senses, the baby of the analysis.

As the date of her delivery neared we did not know how it would affect the end of the analysis. It seemed more or less implied that the end of the analysis would now be in June, as soon as she was due to deliver, and not at the time we had previously arranged which was

the end of July. However, I will describe a session, which brought the analysis back into proper perspective, and which showed that *although she could not directly voice her need, it was very important to her that I wait for her to deliver and return to the analysis. She wanted me to wait for her and end properly on the last day of July.*

For some time she had been bringing a pink coat to the sessions, which she would drape over a chair, and it always induced in me a mental picture of skin, and I began to realise that it represented a protective skin covering. In the following session which I describe this coat was for the first time, absent.

Her smile was a bit forced as she entered, although she looked bright and pretty. She mumbled something about it being difficult to start again. She said she was panicky about the baby arriving. The midwife had visited her and reminded her that last time with her baby-girl she had been in hospital for 2 days and Jane felt this time the midwife wanted her to stay longer. She was depressed and panicky but felt it might be different this time since she was in analysis. She does not know when the baby will arrive, she pretends to be in control but isn't really. Then she related a dream in 2 parts.

In the first part, children were playing with toys strewn all over the place. The toys were broken and messed up. Jane found herself tripping them over and breaking them. She felt both angry and depressed. Her mother tried to reassure her but it did not work.

In the second part of the dream there was no depression. A man, either her husband or a lover told her he loves her. It was very romantic.

Her associations were memories, when she was a child, of breaking things, messing them up, and always blaming her brother or sister. She felt guilty about this but was never able to confront mother and tell her the truth. She said the toys in the dream reminded her of faeces. She also remembered that the other day her baby girl and another little boy were strewing plastic cups and spoons all over the place and she had asked her sons to pick up the mess. She remarked that her sons were usually quite good at picking up the mess they hadn't made.

She suddenly began crying and said she felt sad that her mother would not be here during the delivery. She remembered the day her

last baby was being born, she was wheeled down the hospital corridor and passed her mother who was waiting for her. Mother had taken her hand and kissed it. While Jane was talking she was also communicating rather intense feelings to me of sadness and worry.

In this session we can understand that she wants me to wait for her. She is saying that it would be a great comfort for her to know that I would be there. She shows more openness in this session, she is able to cry and communicate, not have her usual protective 'rain-coat skin covering'. She is aware of 'messy' feelings in her, not really being in control of them, and that they might take over which could disturb and disrupt her responsibility of looking after her own children. She needs to have a place, her analysis, to bring this 'mess' so it can be picked up and understood. She also shows a picture of her internal parents—a mother who only reassures, says everything is all right; or a romantic picture of a father who says 'you are so bright and pretty, everything is all right'. What is missing is someone who will face and confront that she is scared. If the brightness collapses she wants to know that I will be there and will be waiting. In fact when this was conveyed to her she was quite relieved. (This, incidentally, also pinpoints an important need for anxieties, desires, impulses, and phantasies to be gathered and focussed, as much as possible, in the transference relationship with the analyst, so that the patient's outside life and relationships remain relatively unimpaired and less disturbed.)

Jane delivered a baby boy, and after a 2 week break returned to the analysis. On the first day back she said so much had happened that she did not know where to start. She felt funny to be back, almost like there was no break. Her new baby boy had a rash last night, he wasn't well and she slept late. Her husband was looking after him till she got back. She was worried about leaving him. Her other baby-girl was with the child minder for the day. Listening to all this I was struck at what a tremendous responsibility Jane had at home with 4 children to look after. In fact she confirmed through this and subsequent sessions how one of her greatest comforts in continuing the analysis was that phantasies, which might intrude into her heavy responsibilities, now had a place where they could be brought.

She said it was ironic that the baby came a week early when she

thought it would be late. Her waters broke and she phoned the hospital to ask whether she should come in. Perhaps this happened because she had rushed around the day before. There was a long labour, harder than with the last baby. She wrote to her parents describing it and wished her mother had been there. Her husband had been looking after the chaos at home. Her mother-in-law was supposed to arrive and when she didn't they wondered whether there had been an accident, but later she turned up. Her sister did not come and she wished she had. Although her husband looked after things at home she wished he had come more often to visit her in hospital. She was in hospital for 48 hours. Her sons visited but looked upset.

I commented that although she felt relieved that I was waiting she also felt neglected that I wasn't near her when she felt so alone and lost. She replied that her husband had asked her to phone me to change her time but she did not want to. However, she had felt angry that I probably wouldn't have agreed anyway, yet she felt determined to come.

She said her baby-girl is demanding, the new baby-boy she hardly knows is around. She is worried that her baby-girl might wear her down and she will then have no milk left for the new baby. When she came here today she wished it could have been different, wished I was a friend and she could bring her new baby here. She said she keeps wanting to cuddle her new baby. She is so depressed in the evenings. She cries when she sees her beautiful boy-baby.

This session showed her post-natal depression. A rather drifty and muddled session which showed her experience of giving birth as an elemental event, mixed and muddled. One begins to wonder what it really means, at a delivery, to lose the baby from within. Jane shows how much she herself is in need of her own mummy and how lost she feels. And now she has to face losing me since we had only a few weeks left for the end of the analysis.

Jane ended with me on the due date. She now continues her analysis with someone else. I recently heard from her analyst that she makes satisfactory progress.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper I described certain clinical material from the

analysis of a woman faced with a final separation from her analyst. I have tried to present the internal situation of my patient as it appeared in the transference, and how it affects the analyst. I have attempted to demonstrate the different ways I was affected by my patient's projections and how this could be used by me to enhance my understanding of the whole communication. I have tried to show the patient's anxieties, the defences which were mobilized, and how the interaction between patient and analyst produced shifts which permitted a view of how defences operated, and probably how and why they had originally been built.

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PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL INTERPRETATION OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR*

G. BOSE

[In this unusual study, G. Bose posits the view that several aspects of animal behaviour can be better understood if investigated from the psycho-analytical standpoint.

This article is the first in a series of significant articles which appeared in 1947, the first year of Samiksha's publication. These articles are being reprinted for the benefit of present and future psycho-analysts as there is just one issue of Samiksha of 1947 in existence.]

At a time when psycho-analytical interpretations of human behaviour are yet a matter of controversy amongst psychologists it may seem an unjustifiable venture to try to extend the field of psycho-analysis to the domain of animal psychology. It is essential, therefore, to clear up the theoretical position to prevent any misconception.

I have often stressed the difference between a fact and a theory. A fact is something that can be apprehended by the senses whereas a theory, although it may be considered as a general proposition, is merely a form of inference or a deduction drawn from observations of the factual type. A fact remains always a fact but a theory or a deduction may change when new facts accumulate. No theory should ever be regarded as sacrosanct. It is no evidence of weakness of

science that its theories change from time to time. Ancient theories regarding the universe were upset by Newton's formulation which in its turn was superseded by that of Einstein. It is not at all improbable that Einstein's theory will some day undergo a fate similar to that of its predecessors. It is evident that a fresh theory that supplants an older one has no justification unless it can be regarded as a better explanation of facts.

If we remember the distinction between facts and theories as defined here, and if we always keep in mind that theories are but interpretations of facts, we shall steer clear of many difficulties. It is necessary to emphasize that our mental experiences are our special properties. They cannot be shared by others. It is only my mental experience that can be called a psychological fact in the strict sense of the term. When I ascribe wishes, emotions, feelings, etc., to any other person it is merely on grounds of analogy. We can surely observe the behaviour of others but we cannot by any means have a direct knowledge of the mental states experienced by other persons. The statement, therefore, that human beings besides myself have mind and have perceptions, images, feelings, wishes, etc., is really based on a sort of inference; as such it is to be regarded as a theory. That other people assert by gesture and language that they experience wishes, emotions and feelings is no direct evidence to me of the presence of such states in them. Language and behaviour are after all not mental processes. They are simply special types of behaviour from which the existence of a mind or its functionings can be inferred. If anybody says to me that he has got a headache and if I accept his statement, it means that I ascribe on the basis of analogy with myself, a mental constitution to him and the experiencing of a pain that I call headache. His headache can never form a subject matter of my direct observation. Similarly when I say that wishes, emotions, feelings, ideas and images exist also in persons other than myself it is to be noted that I am really theorizing. Such a theory, however, is extremely useful in my practical life and without a conception of this order I cannot go at all with my social activities. In fact a theory of this type is so necessary and so important that one mostly forgets that it is not a fact in the sense that I have defined the term. Psychologists, with the exception of the behaviourists, if they may at all be called psychologists, do not object to admit the existence of mental states in persons other than themselves

* Read before the Indian Psycho-analytical Society on 29th November, 1939.

because it is easier and far more profitable to say that a particular person is angry with another than to describe his behaviour in terms of his facial contortions, his rising blood pressure and other observable manifestations. When we describe a particular conduct of a person in mental terms we do not of course deny the concomitant physical and physiological changes that accompany such supposed mental states. An analogy will help us to understand the situation. It is certainly more convenient to describe a gramophone record in terms of music, although such music is merely a subjective experience of the listener, than to indicate the nature of the minute depressions and elevations that are to be found in the spiral groove on the disc. As we are justified in describing human behaviour in terms of mind so also we can consider animal behaviour in a similar way. If in doing so, we have to ascribe wishes, ideas, images and other mental processes to animals, we do not go beyond the limits of legitimate theorizing.

On analysing the various theories current in the different fields of scientific thought we can distinguish two definite and distinct trends in their formulation. There are certain theories that aim at getting information about a hitherto undiscovered fact or facts that may stand in causal or some other form of relationship with an observed and a known group of phenomena; an example of this type of theory formulation is to be found in astronomy in connection with the discovery of Neptune. Astronomers found that certain observed astronomical occurrences could be explained on the supposition of the presence of a hitherto unobserved planet at a definite distance from the sun. This statement when it was first made was certainly of the nature of a theory. Later a planet was actually discovered at the position indicated by the theory. This planet is Neptune. Here obviously the theory was no mere explanation but it aimed at the discovery of a hitherto unknown fact. It is with reference to theories of this type that Auguste Comte said that "Prevision is the test of true theory". I propose to call a theory of this type 'factual theory' in contradistinction to the other form which may be designated as a 'conceptual theory'.

The 'conceptual theory' may be regarded as an explanatory formula only for observed facts. Such a theory enables us to remember easily the different phenomena of a specific type and the relation they

bear to one another; it is comparable to a mnemonic, and like a mnemonic may even appear absurd and illogical when judged by itself and without reference to the facts it tries to explain. The theory in physics of an all pervading ether that is forty times denser than steel and yet allows solid bodies to pass through it without any appreciable resistance is an illustration in point. Young remarked, "the luminiferous ether, pervading all space, and penetrating almost all substances, is not only highly elastic but absolutely solid!!!" Jevons in his comments on a theory of this type says, "All our ordinary notions must be laid aside in contemplating such an hypothesis; yet it is no more than the observed phenomena of light and heat force us to accept". (W. Stanley Jevons—*The Principles of Science*, 1892, pp. 515, 516). The formulations of Einstein may also be cited as examples of theories of this type. It will be seen that a conceptual theory is really something more than a mere mnemonic. It helps us not only to remember known facts and their mutual relations but also gives us hints that sometimes enables us to discover hitherto unknown facts; without this last characteristic the theory degenerates into a pure mnemonic and is not likely to be of any real use in science.

Directly a new fact is discovered under the guidance of a factual theory the theory ceases to be a theory. The influence of Neptune on the movements of other heavenly bodies is no longer a matter for theorizing. On the other hand the discovery of a fact under the influence of a conceptual theory does not enable us to discard the theory; the theory is really strengthened by it. The observation of the predicted bending of light due to the gravitational influence of the sun has only gone to lend support to Einstein's theory. Some of Freud's theories viz, his views on the endopsychic censor, ego-libido, the super-ego, etc., are of the conceptual order. Any one can find fault with these anomalous and somewhat vague entities, if they are judged as pure formulations only; the concepts of the ego-libido and of the super-ego even show logical contradictions. Nevertheless, as every psycho-analyst of experience will assert, these concepts have been of the greatest use in understanding the peculiarities of the mind and in opening up new lines of psychological investigations.

I do not think I need argue any more in justification of conceptual theories although some of them may appear absurd and illogical when taken out of their context. The distinction between a

factual and a conceptual theory is not so sharp as may appear on superficial observation. At the beginning of this paper I have pointed out that when a psychologist ascribes a mind to another, he is merely theorizing. It is very difficult to say whether such a theory is factual or conceptual. There is no doubt that in the case of human beings most psychologists look upon the mind as a factual entity. It is obvious that a 'fact' of this order can never be an object of direct observation in the sense that physical facts are; a psychologist can merely appeal to analogy and to the law of probability to establish his unobservable facts; he cannot go beyond this. Regarding animal mind the same attitude is to be seen in the majority of workers on the subject. If an animal psychologist has to establish mind in animals as a factual entity he has no alternative but to depend on comparative anatomical and physiological considerations to determine the strength of his analogy that would enable him to draw his conclusions in accordance with the law of economy of hypothesis. It is apparent, that under these circumstances, the factual existence of mind whether in human beings or in animals remains a question of probability only. The probability is strongest in the case of organisms that resemble the psychologist drawing the conclusion, in anatomical and physiological structures, and is progressively weaker as the organism is more and more removed from him in the zoological scale. This uncertainty regarding the existence of mind in others has been one of the important factors that have led behaviourists to give up all considerations of a mental nature from their descriptions of life reactions.

The law of economy of hypothesis is an extremely useful guide in drawing deductions regarding mental functioning from biological behaviour. The law however has its obvious limitations. The simplest explanation is not necessarily likely to be the most correct one in dealing with mental phenomena. The psycho-analyst knows to what extent over-determination plays its role in mental manifestations. Then again in actual practice the law of economy of hypothesis is seldom rigidly observed. It is possible to explain many forms of human conduct, for which psychologists ascribe higher mental processes, in terms of sensory-motor reactions only. The law of economy of hypothesis is naively brushed aside in such instances because the psychologist himself feels that in his own case under similar conditions higher mental functioning is involved. Psycholo-

gists thus often try to explain the same type of behaviour in man and in lower animals in different ways.

Let us suppose that there are three pieces of cake on a table in an open verandah and that there is nobody on guard. A crow comes flying into the verandah and sits on the railings. It looks this way and that and then hops near the table stopping occasionally and looking around with jerky movements of the head. The crow then jumps on the table, takes a piece of cake in its beak and flies away. A little later a child (I purposely refrain from mentioning its age) comes along, looks around and gradually approaches the table, stopping occasionally to look this way and that, and finally gets hold of a piece of cake and goes away into an adjoining room. After the child is gone a newly appointed servant of the house enters the verandah sees the remaining piece of cake on the table; he casts furtive glances around and approaches the table; he too stops occasionally to look this way and that. Ultimately he clutches at the sweet and goes away with it. Let us suppose that a secret observer has been watching the incidents all along. If the observer be an impartial one, free from all psychological bias, he will certainly see nothing to distinguish the behaviour of the crow, that of the child and that of the servant one from another. In fact he will place the three different events in the same category, and he will be justified in assuming that in each of the three cases the behaviour of the subject was determined by the same factor. The impartial observer will not hesitate to say that the crow, the child and the servant each *stole* a piece of cake. An animal psychologist, however, brought up under the present-day traditions of that science will not assert that the crow *stole* the cake as the act of stealing has a certain ethical significance that is not likely to be present in the mind of the crow. He will rely on the principle of economy of hypothesis, and will merely say that the crow *took away* the cake, and that its behaviour can be explained on the supposition of a sensory-motor reaction, and that it will be unjustifiable to assert that anything like a moral significance was attached to the act. In discussing the behaviour of the servant the general psychologist will have no hesitation in saying that the act was one of genuine *stealing*, and that certainly a moral element was attached to the action. He will in this case reject the principle of economy of hypothesis and will depend on the principle of analogy

in arriving at his conclusion ; he will try to put himself in the position of the person committing the theft, and taking into consideration the type of mental state he is likely to experience himself under this condition he will have no hesitation in ascribing a similar mental state to the person committing the theft. Owing to the existence of a great similarity, in physical organisation and in biological reactions under similar conditions, between the person committing the theft and the psychologist himself the principle of analogy in a case of this type gets the better of the principle of economy. The child psychologist in trying to interpret the behaviour of the child in our example will find himself in a fix. Unless he can be sure from other reactions that the moral sense has already developed in the child he will hesitate to describe the act as stealing.

It will be noticed that the different explanations put forward by workers in different fields of psychology for an identical behaviour of the subject is really due to the uncertainty that is bound to be inherent in describing psychological functions from the factual standpoint. If we leave aside the factual view and try to describe the psychological experiences whether of animal or of men from the conceptual standpoint we can keep ourselves to the safe path, and we will have no need to bring different explanations for the same type of behaviour in different subjects. A rigid follower of the principle of economy will have to explain the act of the servant in the example also as a sensory-motor reaction while according to the psychologist who believes in a conceptual theory the act in all the three cases could be described as *stealing*. In our investigations of mental life this conceptual attitude is certainly likely to be more fruitful than the factual one. It is true that from the factual standpoint the term 'stealing' as applied to the three cases here has different connotations but this vagueness of the concept need not deter us from using it in our scientific descriptions. In fact it will be an advantage to have a certain amount of latitude in our scientific concepts particularly in biology where the evolution of a mental trait is likely to be a continuous process from the lower to the higher point in the zoological scale. No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn anywhere that will enable us to say, for instance, that the moral sense develops at this point, and that the expression 'stealing' should not be used for a stage of behaviour prior to this. Freud has very aptly observed,

"One dislikes the thought of abandoning observation for barren theoretical discussions but all the same we must not shirk an attempt at explanation. Conceptions such as that of an ego-libido, an energy pertaining to the ego-instincts, and so on, are certainly neither very easy to grasp nor is their content sufficiently rich ; a speculative theory of these relations of which -we are speaking would in the first place require as its basis a sharply defined concept. But I am of the opinion that there is just the difference between a speculative theory and a science founded upon constructions arrived at empirically. The latter will not begrudge to speculation its privilege of a smooth, logically unassailable structure, but will itself be gladly content with nebulous, scarcely imaginable conceptions, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not the basis of the science upon which everything rests : that, on the contrary, is observation alone. They are not the foundation-stone, but the coping of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it. The same thing is happening in our day in the science of physics, the fundamental notions of which as regards matter, centres of force, attraction, etc., are scarcely less debatable than the corresponding ideas in psycho-analysis." (Sigmund Freud—*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 34-35)

I have often stressed the point that language is a sure index of our mental development. The conceptual standpoint that proposes to describe the respective behaviour of the crow, the child and the adult by the same term 'stealing' has linguistic support. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* gives the meaning of the word 'steal' as follows : "(1) Take away (thing, or abs.) secretly for one's own use without right or leave, take feloniously, as *who steals my purse steals trash, stolen fruit*. (2) Obtain surreptitiously or by surprise, as *stole a kiss, a stolen interview* ; (3) (also s. *away*) win, get possession of, (esp. *person's heart*) by insidious arts, attractions, etc. ; s. *a march on*, get the start of anticipate ; (4) (intr.) move (in. out, away, up, by, etc. secretly or silently, as *stole out of the room, mist stole over the valley*." The meanings of the word 'steal' given here cover all the cases mentioned in our example. Language even goes further than the demands of psychology ; with reference to inanimate objects also the word 'steal' may be used as in "mist stole over the valley."

Scientific workers are apt to think that technical terms should have precise meanings capable of only one interpretation. Objection can therefore be reasonably put forward that the use in scientific psychology of concepts that are vague is likely to be detrimental to the progress of the science. It may be pointed out that in psychology many of the phenomena are themselves vague and ill-defined. In describing these a definite concept will unjustifiably restrict the field of investigation; a vague concept in psychology such as 'stealing' to describe an ill-defined and vague group of phenomena is certainly of no disadvantage. As our knowledge progresses the vague concepts can be dispensed with and more definite terms introduced as Freud has suggested.

In taking the conceptual standpoint in psychology one has to leave aside the factual status of mental phenomena as an open question. I have already pointed out that mental states as facts can be established in terms of probability only derived from analogy. There is nothing to prevent a conceptual psychologist from turning to the factual side of his science whenever the opportunity or the necessity occurs. The two attitudes should however be kept distinct. My own ideas are that the conceptual point of view is likely to yield more fruitful results in psychology than the factual one. In fact the conceptual approach will ultimately enrich the factual side also. The conceptual view keeps the problem of evolution of mental traits such as intelligence, thought, conscience, moral ideas, etc., in the forefront. One has no necessity of using different vocabularies for describing the same phenomena in animals, children and adults, phenomena that are fundamentally identical in nature but have reached merely different points in the evolutionary scale in the different cases concerned.

It may be urged as an argument against the conceptual standpoint that in using words having a moral connotation like 'stealing' to describe animal behaviour we are in danger of violating the principle of economy. Lloyd Morgan says, "In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of the higher psychical faculty, if it can be fairly interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale." (*Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, 1903, p. 59) I have already shown that this principle is often overruled by the principle of ana-

logy in explaining human behaviour. I should like to point out that the principle of economy really helps us to find out the least that should be admitted; the possibility of the presence of higher faculties is not really negated when we can explain a conduct by a simpler supposition on the lower mental plane. The principle of economy leaves the question of the existence of higher traits an open one. Although the conduct of the child in our example can be easily explained as a sensory-motor reaction the possible presence of an already developed moral sense should not be excluded. There is nothing in the behaviour itself in the example in all the three cases to enable a psychologist to say whether a moral sense was present or not. If we accept the interpretation of the principle of economy as given here there will be no clash of the doctrine with the conceptual standpoint, and there will be no necessity either of overriding the principle in favour of that of analogy in describing human behaviour.

In taking up the conceptual view mental terms serve as a convenient mnemonic for the description of a series of co-ordinated reactions. It is quite possible to describe the behaviour of the crow in the example in the way I have done without reference to mental terms; it is also possible to supply greater details and even to take a cinematographic record of the whole incident and project it on the screen in lieu of a description but certainly the essential feature of the entire behaviour of the crow can be more conveniently and profitably summed up in one single sentence viz., 'that the crow stole the cake.' This conceptual description gives a hint of the inner evolutionary significance of the action which in the full fledged state in adult human beings is attended with a struggle that we call moral. I shall therefore have no hesitation whatever in ascribing a conceptual mind even to the lowest animal in the zoological scale. I am justified in describing the behaviour of all animals in terms of perceptions, wishes and impulses, pleasure and pain; I need not even hesitate to ascribe intelligence, image, memory and thought to animals whenever I find that these terms will easily explain the behaviour. In using these terms I need not concern myself at all with the factual side of the question. I need not therefore feel shy in saying that a jackal may become *rabid* and think erratically, a dog may *dream* and an elephant may harbour *ideas* of revenge. I may go further and say that animals show conflict of wishes, hesitation,

doubt, confidence, etc., that even wishes of the unconscious type are present in animals as in human beings and that phenomena suggestive of repression are to be seen also in animals. In saying that animals dream I do not see any justifiable reason to offer different explanations for animal and human dreams.

In psycho-analysis it is customary to divide wishes into two types viz., conscious and unconscious. Psycho-analysis mainly concerns itself with the workings of the unconscious wish. The distinction between a conscious and an unconscious wish lies in the fact that the former is realizable by introspection by the subject while the latter is not. Since the subject's introspection can never be a matter of direct observation by the analyst the existence of a conscious wish is only to be inferred from a special type of behaviour of the subject viz., his introspective report or speech sounds produced by his larynx. Speech is not the only form of expression; conscious mental states can also be inferred from gestures, various changes in the functioning of the physiological system, changes in the electrical resistance of the tissues and so on. The fundamental principle is identical whether the existence of a conscious mental state in the subject is deduced from his speech or from his gestures or from changes in blood pressure, heart beats, brain rhythm, etc.

The psycho-analyst sometimes assumes the presence of an unconscious wish in his subject by manifestations that are identical in nature with those from which conscious wishes are inferred. A slip of the tongue, a mannerism, a peculiarity in behaviour, a characteristic gesture, a delay in the reaction time, changes in tissue resistance, etc., often enable the psycho-analyst to detect an unconscious wish. From the conceptual standpoint, therefore, there is not much to distinguish between a conscious and an unconscious wish. Both are merely concepts to describe behaviour of somewhat different orders. Judging from this aspect the polarity of conscious and the unconscious has no significance. Since the discovery of the unconscious element in the workings of the censor, psycho-analysts also have given up the idea that the polarity of the conscious and the unconscious plays any dynamic role in mental life. Unconsciousness is not the cause of repression but is the result of it. I have shown in my paper on *A New Theory of Mental Life* that repression and many other mental phenomena can be satisfactorily explained on the

basis of a conflict between opposite wishes. From the conceptual standpoint there is really no need to draw any distinction between a conscious and an unconscious wish; we have merely to assume that two wishes can come into conflict with each other resulting in disturbance of action. We can on this supposition explain the facts of mental life unearthed by psycho-analysis. For the convenience of description the term 'unconscious wish' may be applied to that tendency that stands in opposition to the apparent main trend that may be supposed to determine an observable action. For instance if one finds that a child is surreptitiously approaching to get hold of a piece of cake and stopping occasionally to look around, then it may be assumed, for the convenience of description from the conceptual standpoint, that the wish to eat the sweet is the main 'conscious' trend and that there are opposing wishes that determine the occasional stoppages. The group of wishes opposing the approach to the sweet may be roughly classified under the term 'unconscious.' To describe it in a different way, one may say that in a conflict situation the dominant trend may be described as the 'conscious' and the recessive one as an 'unconscious' wish. From the factual standpoint this classification will be found to be futile and incorrect as many recessive tendencies can also be judged as conscious ones. Factual attitude demands a distinction between a conscious and an unconscious conflict while from the conceptual standpoint this distinction can be absolutely ignored. In the present state of our knowledge it will therefore be desirable not to introduce the terms 'conscious' and 'unconscious' in the domain of conceptual theory. This does not mean that the conceptual point of view is not applicable to the psycho-analytical standpoint. The conceptual position requires a detached objective attitude towards the subject whose consciousness or unconsciousness as factual experience are matters of indifference to the observer. Keeping in mind the full implications of the conceptual standpoint it will be quite justifiable to extend the field of psycho-analysis to the domain of animal psychology. So long as one can detect evidence of conflict, hesitation, doubt and similar manifestations in animals and so long as animals show any abnormal behaviour psycho-analytic concepts will be found to be immensely useful in explaining the situations. The discarding of the terms 'conscious' and 'unconscious' if it is found to be necessary, will not

really affect the value of psycho-analytical interpretations.

Let me now begin with the case of the proverbial ass that is unable to feed himself when placed between two bundles of hay. Although the illustration depicts an imaginary situation it will help us to understand some of our problems. It may be assumed that the forces of attraction, to the left and to the right respectively, exerted by the two bundles of hay are equal and opposite; the ass is thus unable to reach any of the bundles. If we posit wishes corresponding to the actions of turning to the left and to the right, and if we further assume that two such wishes may come into conflict with each other, and that as a result of the conflict the action corresponding to the wishes may be hindered and the fulfilment of a wish may even be entirely suspended we can easily explain the behaviour of the proverbial ass. If the ass shows signs of hunger and yet is unable to turn either to the left or to the right then we may presume that both the conflicting wishes are 'conscious' ones. If however we find that although the ass showed signs of hunger previously he ceased to exhibit any such manifestation after being placed between the two bundles of hay and even allowed himself to remain without nourishment for a long period we may assume that the conflict in the ass's mind took place in the 'unconscious' plane. From the conceptual standpoint however we need not draw any distinction between such 'conscious' and 'unconscious' conflicts. The results in both cases are identical. The finer form of behaviour that we call speech, and that enables us to draw a distinction between a conscious and an unconscious conflict in man, is absent in animals. It will be quite sufficient for our purpose if we merely say that the conflicting wishes in the case of the ass were both dominant, and that they inhibited each other.

Let me now describe an actual case history of animal behaviour as quoted by Lloyd Morgan in his book *Introduction to Comparative Psychology* (pp. 376-378). Lloyd Morgan remarks, "In his work on *The Human Mind* Professor Sully writes as follows, in a footnote: 'One of the clearest examples of canine conscience I have met with,' he says, 'was given me by a friend, the owner of the dog, and the witness of the action. The animal, a variety of terrier, 'was left in the dining-room, where were the remains of a cold supper. He got on the table and secured a piece of cold tongue, but, without eating a

morsel of it, he carried it into the drawing-room deposited it at the feet of his mistress, and then crawled out of sight, looking the picture of abject misery.' I have no wish to say one word which shall detract from the moral excellence, if any one likes so to call it, of that terrier; but I may, perhaps, be allowed to analyse his case. We may suppose he was hungry, poor fellow, but the natural impulse to appease that hunger was checked in the presence of that loyal feeling of subservience to the mistress which is the outcome of the dog's mode of life as the companion of man, and which has probably been developed from certain innate tendencies of the canine, which, like wolves and jackals, hunt in packs. Note, in passing, that the checking of this impulse was incomplete. Had it been complete, he would never have stolen the tongue at all, and would have remained unknown to fame. His is not the only case in which our sympathies go out towards the imperfectly moral more freely than towards those who are beyond reproach. In the case of the terrier, then, the prompting of what we should call a lower impulse, the satisfaction of hunger got the better of what we should call the higher impulse obedience to the mistress; but only for a moment; the higher impulse prevailed, and the dog crept abjectly to his mistress. No one is likely to question—at any rate no one who knows dogs is likely to question—the existence of the higher trait in canine character, that of subservience or obedience to the master or mistress; and few are likely to question that there was in the dog's mind a painful conflict of impulses, resulting in the victory of what we call the higher. All this may be granted. But if some one says, what it should be observed Mr. Sully does not say, that the terrier did what he felt to be right because he knew it to be right, that is a very different matter. That involves a thinking of the *ought*; it involves a more or less definite perception of the relation of a given act to an ideal standard. No action can be perceived to be right or wrong without reflection. The action is compared with a standard, and found either to reach or fall short of that standard. What the standard is does not matter a jot, so far as the individual moral judgment is concerned. My standard of right may be altogether wrong from my neighbour's point of view. But in expressing an individual moral judgment concerning an action, I view the act in reference to my standard, and say that it either approaches thereto or falls short thereof. Such would be the indi-

vidual moral judgment. I may also compare it with the social standard, using this phrase in the sense before defined. The social standard is assuredly not the average standard of mankind. In that case it would be rather a pitiful ideal. It is the standard of the world's best and greatest and purest. Whether the comparison is with the individual ideal, or with the social ideal, it involves a perception of the relation of a given action, performed by oneself or another, to that standard. This is what I think we may, without injustice to them, deny to the brutes. The terrier's conscience, if so we may call it, on this view involved merely the emotional tone of sense-experience; it was not the moral conscience of a rational being.

In spite of Lloyd Morgan's arguments I see no reason why the dog's behaviour should not be described as an illustration of canine conscience involving a judgment of the moral order. An adult human being under similar conditions might have behaved in a similar manner and in his case the action would have been described as one determined by higher mental processes. It will be noticed that Lloyd Morgan uses the word 'steal' to describe the dog's behaviour. From the conceptual standpoint the ascribing of conscience, which implies a comparison with a set standard, to the dog will be quite a justifiable procedure because this term will serve to explain the peculiar conduct of the terrier in a very convenient, accurate and succinct manner, and further it will help us to keep in mind the evolutionary factor. No one can definitely say at which point of animal or child behaviour the rudiments of conscience appear. I have already shown that we will not be violating the doctrine of economy by ascribing conscience to a lower animal. Lloyd Morgan says, "Few are likely to question that there was in the dog's mind a painful conflict of impulses, resulting in the victory of what we call the higher. All this may be granted." Using the conceptual terminology we may assert that during the first phase of the terrier's behaviour the wish to eat got the better of his loyalty and subservience to his mistress, but later on the conditions were reversed; the loyalty wish became dominant, and it determined the final conduct; this was the wish that set the standard for the dog's behaviour and acted as the basis of what we may describe as his conscience. The conscience is no foreign imposition. I have shown

in my paper entitled *A New Theory of Mental Life* that in human beings also the functioning of the moral conscience can be traced to the presence of a wish or groups of wishes opposed to the trend prompting the wrong act. The mechanism of origin of the fully developed moral conscience in adult human beings and that of the canine conscience seen in this example are identical. If one is described as moral there is no reason why the other should not be called so especially if we adopt the conceptual standpoint. Lloyd Morgan did use the term 'canine conscience', although it seems with some reluctance; he must have felt the appropriateness of the expression with reference to the dog's peculiar behaviour. To distinguish between a moral and an amoral conscience is a finesse necessitated by anthropomorphic bias. The type of action to which we ascribe a moral significance in the case of human beings is certainly to be found in some lower animals also; we have no right to place such similar conducts in men and animals under two separate categories. In the human child we can observe the gradual evolution of conscience and other traits from what we may call the animal stage.

If we take up the problem of the terrier's mental state from the factual standpoint it will be difficult to say whether the recessive wishes in the conflict could be described as 'unconscious.' I shall now cite other examples of conflict of wishes in animals that suggest a state of affairs resembling repression in human beings. The recessive wishes in these cases would be factually placed in the same category as the unconscious repressed tendencies in human subjects.

My friend Capt. S. K. Ray had a dog of unknown breed from the North West Frontier Province. The dog was a big shaggy animal very faithful to his master. While Capt. Ray was in active service the dog would sometimes get out of his tent to flirt with stray bitches coming for remnants of food. A sharp rebuke from his master would make the dog forsake his female companions and come back to him. Capt. Ray brought this dog with him when he came to Calcutta. One night the dog saw a bitch standing on the pavement from the first floor verandah; he forthwith jumped from a height of about 18 feet to the ground spraining his feet to reach the bitch. The dog had to be treated for several days before he ceased to limp. It was quite by chance that the injury was not more serious. The demands of sex evidently got the better of discretion. Under ordinary conditions,

free from the urge of sex, the dog would have known the danger he was running in jumping from such a height, and would have abstained from the rash act. The sex urge proved stronger than the urge for self-preservation which was completely at abeyance for the time being. The sex urge was thus dominant and the wish for self preservation became recessive. The recessive wish in this case was very likely of the factually unconscious order. The struggle between the two wishes in the present instance was a temporary one lasting for a short time only. In those human beings who habitually get into dangerous situations, and whom we describe as accident-prone, the conflict between self-preservative and self-destructive wishes is of a more permanent order resulting in frequent rash acts. Psycho-analysis shows that repressed wishes are at the bottom of accidents in accident-prones. The difference between a person who inadvertently commits a single rash act and one who frequently comes in for it is one of degree only, the mechanism being the same. If Shelly's misadventure that resulted in his death could be traced to an unconscious death-wish Capt. Ray's dog's rash action could be similarly explained. Granting the explanation to be true one should expect to come across instances of accident-proneness in animals also. An interesting case of this nature came under my own observation last year.

My neighbour's cat had three kittens. The mother and the young ones used to play in the small plot of land adjoining my ground floor sitting room. One day in the afternoon my daughter's child lowered a piece of stone tied to a string from the first floor verandah facing the plot. The swinging movements of the stone frightened the kittens and one of them, whom I shall call the brown kitten, took shelter inside a rain-water pipe that opened on the surface drain bordering the plot. My grandson then dropped the stone and went away. I did not know anything about the incident till the next morning when my attention was drawn to a plaintive mewing that I could hear in my sleeping room on the first floor directly above the sitting room. Evidently one of the kittens was in distress. I searched all round but could not locate where the sound was coming from. In the afternoon it was discovered that there was a kitten inside the rain-water pipe; by throwing the light of a torch it could be seen behind the grating covering the opening of the drain pipe of the small room attached to the sleeping room on the first floor. This

drain opened into the rain-water pipe. Apparently the kitten got stuck inside the five inch pipe when it entered it in its fright the previous afternoon. It could not move backwards to get out of the pipe, and all clawing movements at escape resulted in its getting higher and higher inside the pipe till it reached the branching drain pipe on the first floor. There was not room enough for the kitten to turn round and work its way downwards and all my efforts to make it go down failed. Ultimately I had to break open the grating by calling in a mason and got the kitten pulled out; it had been fairly firmly lodged inside the pipe. Apart from the pains of hunger and fear that the kitten must have suffered it was none the worse for the adventure. Two days later I heard a plaintive mewing again and on searching I found that the same brown kitten had been entrapped under a mass of planks and bricks that had been stowed away in a narrow passage adjoining my neighbour's house. Apparently the kitten during its playful activities had upset some of the planks and bricks and had been caught in the help and was unable to get out. The planks had to be removed before the kitten could be set free. One week later my driver told me that the brown kitten had entered my garage, and had been sitting on the axle under the body of the car. It narrowly escaped being run over as the car was being taken out. A few days later my driver reported that the unfortunate brown kitten had repeated its rash performance and had been killed under the wheels.

There is no doubt that the brown kitten's behaviour was abnormal. Its two other companions from the same litter did not meet with any untoward incident in the course of their playful activities; in fact they grew up into healthy normal cats and are to be found at present disturbing the quiet of the neighbourhood at night. The brown kitten could certainly be described as an accident-prone. I see no justification to ascribe a different mechanism from that in human beings for accident-proneness to explain the peculiar behaviour of the unfortunate kitten. We might certainly say that a recessive death-wish was present in the mind of the kitten, and this prompted the rash acts. From the factual standpoint the recessive death-wish in the brown kitten can be described as unconscious. Once we explain the behaviour of the brown kitten along this line we are bound to suppose a similar mechanism in other instances of animal

behaviour in which death is apparently courted. The moth that is attracted to the flame, the millions of green flies that get destroyed every year by rushing to naked lights, the male spider that allows its mate to kill it and numerous other animals that meet with a similar fate may all be supposed to be acting under the influence of a death-wish. It may be that the death-wish is only recessive in such cases and the animal's apparent conduct may be from the factual standpoint determined by some other form of conscious urge such as that of sex, etc.

The oedipus situation in human beings is very often sought to be explained by bringing in an analogy from animal behaviour. The oedipus hostility of the son towards the father has its parallel in the killing of the leader of an animal horde by the young male that seeks to possess the female kind and considers the father as a rival. The special findings of the oedipus situation in human beings may be utilised in the reverse direction to explain certain phases of animal conduct. Psycho-analysis often reveals the presence of a hostile wish in the father directed against the son. A parallel is to be found in the behaviour of the tom cat. The male cat whenever it can find the opportunity kills its own new-born offspring. I have myself observed such instances. Careful and experienced observers have assured me that the male cat usually kills the male offspring only and spares the female ones. In human beings, again, the oedipus situation sometimes reveals a splitting up of the father imago into two distinct parts, a hostile and a friendly one. Is it possible that the watch dog's love for his master and his hostility to strangers in spite of their friendly manners is ascribable to a similar mechanism? I have no definite information on this point. One would naturally expect that in animals the love for a member of the same species should be stronger than love for an individual belonging to a different species. Under natural conditions of life in the jungle the statement is very likely true. In domestic animals the love for the master or the keeper is in most cases stronger than the love for any other member of the species. Correspondingly, one finds sometimes that in human beings the love for an animal pet may be stronger than the love for any man or woman; the pet animal often stands as a symbol for the child. Is it likely that the libido of an animal under domestic conditions remains fixed in the infantile oedipus stage, and thus the animal loves

only the parent substitutes although they may belong to a different species?

One frequently comes across evidence of the presence of autoerotic and homosexual love in animals. Manifestations of narcissistic love are not so apparent. Preening in birds may perhaps be considered as a narcissistic form of behaviour. Animals provided with cloaca are likely to exhibit the characteristics of the anal form of libido. All these problems require a thorough investigation, and a worker in this line may reap a rich harvest. Recently an interesting incident of queer animal behaviour was reported in the Calcutta daily papers. I quote the following abridged account from the 'Hindustan Standard' dated Friday, October 27th, 1939. "Four lion cubs were born in the Calcutta Zoo on Wednesday night. The happy event was discovered by one of the night guards who while passing by the lion's cage in the northern part of the garden on his usual round of duty towards midnight heard the sound of new-born babes sucking at their mother's breast in the cage. The mother, an Indian lioness, has been living a happy family in the cage for the last five years with her spouse who hails from the jungles of Africa. Last year she presented her husband with half-a-dozen babes. But they were not destined to live long. It was thought by some that one of the causes of their death might be that they had not a sufficient quantity of milk at the mother's breast. This time special precautions have been taken to ensure a long lease of life to the cubs. Two of the cubs have been removed to the Superintendent's bungalow inside the garden where they are being given a sufficient quantity of milk with the help of feeding bottles. The other two cubs are with the mother in the cage and all the four weighing each about five seers, are doing well." The next day's paper reported; "The Calcutta Zoo is in deep mourning. It has lost three of its four lion cubs within 24 hours of their birth. The circumstances attending the death of two of these cubs are tragic and puzzling. These two cubs had been allowed to remain with their mother in her abode in the northern part of the garden, but on Friday morning these were discovered to have been devoured by their mother. The lying-in-room lay empty, its stillness being broken at times by the plaintive wail of the mother. This was both tragic and puzzling for, according to generally believed stories, it is the lioness which tries her utmost to protect her young ones from the

jaws of her husband. Speaking of the habits of lions, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Fourteenth Edition) states: 'Both parents display the greatest solicitude for their young, which they teach to kill prey.' One explanation offered for this tragic happening is that long captivity has wrought a change in the habits of the lioness. The devouring of the cubs by the mother and her subsequent wailing and grief could be explained on the supposition that for certain reasons the oral libido of the mother developed an abnormal strength and her 'devouring love' caused the unfortunate accident. The mother may be supposed to have eaten her young ones not in hunger, neither in hate, but in love. What are the conditions that may lead to an inordinate increase in the oral libido? This question can only be answered by patient observation and experiments.

I have discussed the psycho-analytical interpretations of animal behaviour in a general way only. I have not touched on any specific question such as the development of modesty, monoandry and monogamy, sexual jealousy and rivalry, unreasonable hostility, etc. All these different problems in animal life are certain to yield very valuable results if they are investigated from the psycho-analytical standpoint.

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