In all cases of unconscious identification, the individual is in effect hiding behind someone else's broad shoulders. The preamble is an inner conflict which has been solved through acquisition of a "bodyguard." Typically, the identification is performed in two layers, "leading" and "misleading." (This was first pointed out in my study, "The Leading and Misleading Basic Identifications, The PA Review, 32: 263-295, 1945.) The "leading" identification pertains to the solution of the specific infantile conflict, secondarily bolstered through an identification; the stabilization is permanent and unchangeable during the individual's life time, except through clinical analysis. The "misleading" identification is more superficial, though still unconscious. It is performed under pressure from the superego, and its purpose is acquisition of new shield to deflect or prevent the superego's attacks on the specific basic conflict, which has been petrified in the "leading" identification. Subsidiary and exchangeable defenses are thus created and concretely expressed in changing identifications. That process frequently impresses the untrained observer as indication of "changing" personality; it proves only that a specific defense has worn through and has had to be replaced.

For example, a promiscuous "wolf" has his "leading" identification with a masochistically mistreated person, whereas his "misleading" identification is with a hyper-He-man.

In the last few years, I have frequently been confronted with patients who had consulted me on basis of my writings on psychic masochism. These patients were fascinated by that phenomenon. They had acquired a strange conviction (one could nearly call it a seemingly unshakable conviction) of the universality of that inner scourge. In a rather self-flagellatory manner, they applied these principles to themselves.
When they came into analysis, it turned out that these patients were with exception of two types. Either they were severe psychic masochists, orally regressed neurotics, or they were schizoid personalities. The latter group was easier to understand than the former; schizoid people prefer to see themselves as neurotics rather than as half-psychotics.

The majority of these patients, however, were neurotic. In this group, typical masochistic “injustice collecting” predominated; inner passivity was combined with strong pseudo-aggressive malice; bitter self-reproaches were in the forefront; irony was openly used in most of them, covertly in some.

One gathered the impression that the newly-acquired book knowledge of the existence of psychic masochists procured them some kind of diminution of tension, as though personal responsibility had been lessened by the discovery that this was a universal phenomenon. At the same time, that very knowledge was used as added self-reproach and self-deprecation.

In the transference neurosis, the typical projections of the “bad, cruel mother” on to the analyst were observable. Working through this transference and consecutive resistance had the usual beneficial effect.

Still, these patients differed in one respect from the run-of-the-mill patient of that type: they had difficulties in identification. What it amounted to, practically speaking, was that attempts to identify with the “corrected, good, mother-image” came into conflict with the defensive irony and malice already present. These patients had established, early in life, their only “productive” technique of warding off reproaches of conscience: irony, debunking, depreciation of any authority. The debunking technique develops into the tendency to try to cut authority down to “proper size,” as elaborated in my recent book, LAUGHTER AND THE SENSE OF HUMOR. The only unproductive technique of counteracting the constant stream of reproaches from the inner conscience known to them was psychic masochism.

In analysis, after a very short-lived enthusiasm for the newly and transitarily established ego ideal—the analyst, the latter was subjected to the identical ironic process of “debunking,” which weakened his protective role in the “battle of the conscience.”

The result was unstable, and therefore ineffective “misleading identification.”

The reason for that phenomenon became obvious the moment one clarified for oneself the fact that the newly-established “analytic witness for the defense” could not be used as a weapon against the cruel, anachronistic, tyrannical part of the superego (“daimonion”). The paradoxical fact emerged that both the newly-acquired ego ideal and the daimonion had one point in common: both brought into evidence the masochistic enjoyment in the patient’s ego. True, daimonion did so maliciously and for punitive purposes, the analyst detachedly and for curative purposes. Presentation and purpose differed, but the contents were identical.

During this stage a specific factor became clear: Exchange of ego ideal in “misleading identifications” presupposes an inner helper whose face value fully corresponds to the opposite of the daimonion’s accusation. Exactly that quality of total disparity was lacking.*

Here is an example from the analysis of a patient of this type, a man who came to me for treatment because of his enthusiasm for my books, THE BASIC NEUROSIS and THE SUPEREGO.

To describe the background of the situation: I had been asked to deliver a lecture at a course given at Columbia University. My talk was entitled “Seven Paradoxes in Shakespeare’s HAMLET”; I was frankly proud of having been able to find, after studying the immortal play, seven points that had not yet been elaborated on in the analytic literature. My main point was that Hamlet had committed suicide by provocation and proxy, having decided his fate in the player-scene which prompted the King to order Hamlet’s death (the mission to England) and subsequently the poisoned rapier and poisoned drink.**

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* One could object that every analysis unearths facts corresponding to the superego’s reproaches, so that this lack of disparity is typical. The argument is spurious. When partial identification with the analyst sets in, in typical cases the newly-acquired “witness or defense” is not immediately demoted, as happens with the cases discussed in this paper. Moreover, since the deepest of all mortal dangers, psychic masochism, is only rarely explained in present-day analyses, all possible (more superficial) interpretations are more acceptable, and therefore the analyst is usable as protective ego ideal.

** To be published in The PsAn Review.
The clean copies of the manuscript reached me from the typist early one morning. I reread the talk, and found that I was (perhaps childishly) proud of the title, so proud indeed that I repeated it to myself several times. In doing so, I found that I had changed the figure; I had said "eight" instead of "seven." After catching myself on that "mistake," I began to laugh. The superego, being incapable of preventing subjectively enjoyed "success," devalued that success by ironically pointing out—the "Sc what?" principle—that eight points would be more than seven. Through this ironic "overbidding" the "success" was nullified.

I used this incident as an example in two successive appointments that morning. In telling the story to the first patient, Mr. A., a deeply depressed and analytically very ignorant person, I stopped short before telling him my reaction (laughter, which devalued the superego's attack) and asked what his own reaction would have been in such a situation. Without hesitation, Mr. A. answered, "I would have run for Shakespeare's play to find out whether I had really missed something." I answered that he misunderstood the superego's intentions: these were not pedagogic but punitive.

My second appointment was with Mr. B., the man who interests us in this connection. I related the incident, my reaction, and Mr. A.'s reaction. My purpose was to demonstrate the thesis, just discussed in his analysis: "You cannot win against the superego; it either prevents success or—if that cannot be done—devalues it. The whole problem centers around the ego: one can reject the indictment (for example, by laughing at it) or submit to it masochistically (Mr. A.'s reaction)."

Some time later, I delivered the lecture. Mr. B. was in the audience. I used this identical example in explaining some of the techniques of the superego.

The next day, Mr. B. told me ironically: "When you told me that story you said the title mentioned five paradoxes, and you repeated it as having six. But in your lecture you mentioned the figures seven and eight. It seems that when the pinch came you just like that other patient, had run to the volume of Shakespeare's plays."

It could be proved that Mr. B. had unconsciously on purpose "misheard" the figures. Since I acted out the little scene after receiving my manuscript from the typist, and had not changed the typescript afterwards, it was obvious that it could not have been my mistake and had to be Mr. B.'s.

The little incident made it possible to show again how Mr. B. (and he is but a representative of a type) could live on the exclusive basis of disparagement, and how unstable his identifications were, though he still enthusiastically accepted the "basic neurosis."

The question arises: how are these people to be helped? Modified elaborations of a new ego ideal are typically observable in successful analyses; with these are coupled a strengthening of the ego. The former is poorly established in the patients under discussion, though the latter process may take place.

Before answering the question, it is necessary to clarify the fact that only a specific group of psychic masochists can be "convinced" by reading books masochism. The typical reaction is rejection of the whole deduction; the exceptional reaction is acceptance. Why does that small group react paradoxically?

It turns out that only "hyper-masochists" consciously accept the precept, and then only under the influence of the punitive superego and its telling accusation: "That's you."

These hyper-masochists are extremely severe cases from the start. It seems that one has more difficulty with them in analysis than with the typical doubter.

The severity of these neuroses leads to one of two results, even in cases that are therapeutic half-successes. One result is that—years after conclusion of analysis—these people begin to doubt again whether "that damned masochism really exists"; hence continuation of treatment is advisable. The second possibility is that despite poor identification ego has become strong enough to reject unjustifiable reproaches of conscience and to reject the masochistic pre-analytical submission.

On the other hand, the real danger with orally, masochistically regressed neurotics lies in the possibility that they fall into the classification I have described in a previous publication as the "empty bag type." ("The 'Empty Bag' Type of Neurotic," The...
These patients cannot live without their pseudo-aggressive defense, and therefore they adhere to their provocative technique in spite of analysis. Building up that defense from early childhood on has sapped all their inner energy; the removal of the defense would leave them completely deflated. To avoid that specific danger, of which they are unconsciously aware, the defense is perpetuated, and any therapy defeated.

The difficulty in establishing identifications without automatically correcting the new inner helper is one of the problems in treating severely masochistic neurotics. They are helpless, and cannot find props for identification. They really have "nowhere to hide."

The difficulty in establishing identifications without automatically correcting the new inner helper is one of the problems in treating severely masochistic neurotics. They are helpless, and cannot find props for identification. They really have "nowhere to hide."

When we come into touch with a scientific or artistic work we feel how, through it, little by little, the personality of the man who created it begins to acquire life. Through and behind the content in itself, traits of the author's spirit and character arise one after another until they form an image. Thus it was that all of us, as we became progressively acquainted with Freud's writings, also became acquainted with Freud the man. Needless to say, according to our own individual structure, we shall have seen and lived his personality in different ways; we shall have perceived more one aspect or more another. There are, however, some traits that are so outstanding that it is unlikely that any of us will have failed to feel them. Allow me, to begin with, to recall once again some of these well-known traits on this commemorative occasion.

It is, I believe, above all his unconditional and unswerving love of truth, a love that will not be seduced by any personal interest. Freud seeks, finds, and proclaims the truth against everything that opposes it, whether coming from within or without. He never hides the imperfections of his findings and even emphasizes how far his work has remained incomplete. There is in him, in this sense, a deep devotion to reality. Freud himself refers to this attitude, when he speaks, in all modesty, of his back being used to bowing before the facts. It is also Freud himself who mentions the patience that had to assist him in his arduous research work. We well understand that these two virtues, devotion and patience, were present together, for the two are closely connected: patience as a readiness to accept things as they are, and in the time they demand, is nothing else, in essence, but an expression of devotion to reality, an expression of a silent veneration, in this case, of

* Lecture delivered in commemoration of the Centenary of Freud's Birth, at the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association, June 1956.
reality in its spiritual aspect, that is to say, of truth. Equally
united to these two qualities by bonds of psychological kinship is
tenacity, which is active patience or patient activity, capable of
contending with many difficulties, a characteristic highly developed
in Freud. And there is another virtue as well, also a sister to
in Freud. And there is another virtue as well, also a sister to
devotion, that we have all felt in reading his writings: it is Freud's
devotion, that we have all felt in reading his writings: it is Freud's
definition, here again the fidelity to reality, to the facts, which we felt
fidelity, here again the fidelity to reality, to the facts, which we felt
through the confidence that arose within us as regards what Freud
describes and relates.

Such fidelity is not to be taken for granted in great thinkers.
There were those who lacked it or possessed another kind of fidelity.
It is stated, for instance, that the great Haeckel, the discoverer
of the fundamental biogenetic law could not resist the temptation
of the fundamental biogenetic law could not resist the temptation
to "comb" the facts on which his conclusions were based, that is
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the empirical sciences, in philosophy and in literature, there were
some few spirits, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who had
already intuitively sensed something of what was to become scientific
and objective psychoanalytic knowledge. But it was more a matter
of sporadic penetration into psychological depths, and, besides, Freud
knew very little of these philosophers. He did not want to know
much about them because, I think, it was so important to him to
discover man by himself.

Various psychoanalytic considerations suggest themselves here,
in the first place concerning Freud's relationship with his father.
We know something more about this to-day, thanks to Freud's
correspondence with Fliess and the biography by E. Jones. Never
the less, even these data only allow us a measure of conjecture.
Freud discovers the boy's ambivalence towards his father through
his self-analysis, traversing the conscious level of his mind in which
there was almost exclusively admiration and love for his father. I
think that his undogging will to know and create by himself is an
expression of his desire to be a father himself and his need of
confirming his paternity ever and again. The argument, for instance,
that Freud gave to explain why he had not acquainted himself with
the above-mentioned philosophers or with other thinkers who had
anticipated him in one or another of his ideas, was that he wanted
to be free from preconceived ideas in his investigations. One must
recognize a certain objectivity in this argument, but we cannot help
feeling that it was not the only motive. The wish to be unhampered
by preconceived ideas is, in one respect, a sound scientific aim,
but when one believes it is really attainable or has actually been
attained, it becomes an illusion. Illusions spring from wishes, and
I think that the above-mentioned argument also served Freud, in
point of fact, for the fulfilment of a wish. The wish to have no
preconceived ideas is the wish to have no father or, I should say,
to be the father oneself. In general terms, the object of the battle
for knowledge is always, basically, the mother. "Truth is a female",
said Nietzsche, and added: "She loves the warrior". Indeed, since
those distant times in which Adam "knew" Eve (as the Bible says,
in consequence of which she gave him his no less famous sons),
gnosis and genesis have been one and the same thing. Knowledge
is the union of love with the object of investigation and we
may accept Freud's warrior courage and his great self-confidence
as regards his work was largely based on the experience having
been his mother's favourite.

As we have said, in Freud's case this object of knowledge
—the mother for whose conquest he fought—was above all, the
past i.e. the origin of the facts. E. Jones, in posing the question
of what childhood circumstances had incited to such a high
degree this search for the genesis of things, points out the
extraordinarily 'complex character of Freud's family setting which
must have greatly troubled the mind of the young Sigmund.
The complexity of the situation lay in the fact that Freud found
himself with two stepbrothers, the offspring of his father's
former marriage, twenty-odd years older than himself, one of whom
already had a son when Freud was born. Freud thus came into
the world an uncle, and this nephew, who had the advantage of
him in age, was the main companion and rival in his play
during early childhood. The younger of Freud's stepbrothers,
Philipp, was the same age as Freud's mother. It was upon Philipp
that the little Freud seems to have placed the image of his sexual
father but this phantasy clashed with the fact that it was another
man, his father, who slept with his mother. The early appear-
ance of younger siblings—the first was born before Freud was
one year old and died when Freud was one and a half, the
second, a sister, was born a year later—the repeated trauma,
then, of the mother's pregnancy and the birth of these and other
rival siblings must have greatly stimulated the boy Freud's search
after the genesis of "things", complicated as they were by the
family constellation I have described.

However, the intensity and multiplicity of external stimuli
do not explain genius. As Freud himself affirmed, we have not
as yet sufficient access to this enigma. What, on the other hand,
the data set forth and the brief analytic considerations do indeed
show us is how a characteristic—as the urge to uncover the
past—may be understood in its roots or else in its instinctive
and infantile expressions. In a similar manner we may assume
that the death of the first brother-rival, which caused a great
deal of unconscious guilt feelings in Freud, served to stimulate
to a high degree his desire to make repair through creative action.
Let us now continue with our attempt at building up and defining the image of Freud from the glimpses his work has afforded us. We have seen how Freud felt called upon to explore the history of the facts and we have seen how wide this sphere of interest was for him. Yet we cannot fail to note that there was one main object in his field of investigation, namely, man's psychological suffering and its genesis.

When Freud describes the path he followed, from his choice of profession to the creation of psychoanalysis, and, in particular, when he tells of the gradual shifting of his interest from neurology to psychopathology, he draws attention to a series of external factors, such as the financial problem, the fact that he could not maintain his growing family on what was to be earned from his very limited neurological consultations. He also stresses his desire to know the nature and causes of pathological phenomena and his aversion to blindly applying unspecific therapeutic methods such as hydro- or electro-therapy or suggestion technique of hypnosis. But these two factors, the financial and the scientific ones, do not suffice to explain this evolution in Freud. His evolution and his work point to one further inclination and one further capacity: the inclination to identify himself with those who suffer in the spirit and the vocation and capacity to understand and aid them. In several of his writings Freud denies in some measure this concern for therapy and it is true that it was not predominant in him. But it is no less true that psychoanalysis could only have been created by someone who tended strongly towards psychological union with others, and perhaps even towards suffering with them, and who through this union desired to be and was able to be an understanding, strong, and kind father, who never condemns and can therefore help, protect and guide. His works and especially his clinical case-histories speak clearly of this power of being the kind father whom one can confide in and trust in spite of all Freud's attempts at modestly covering up this capacity and these affective motives and in spite of a certain dampening they do indeed undergo on account of another psychological factor in his nature. I refer to Freud's so-called pessimism, a trait that will concern us later.

Freud's capacity for empathy with another's feelings and passions also leads us to another of his capacities: that of empathy with the thinking of his fellow men. Although these two capacities are associated by their quality of empathy, we are, as a matter of fact, dealing with two quite different factors of Freud's personality. The former had much of vocation about it (though an unconfessed and dampened vocation) whereas the latter, the intellectual empathy, was merely a gift, one more talent among several but a particularly marked one. One of its most delightful expressions we find in those parts of his writings where he makes the reader or listener speak, for instance, in raising objections to what Freud has just stated. You will remember how frequently these passages recur in the "Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis" or in "Lay Analysis", this latter book being almost entirely a dialogue between Freud and an imaginary opponent. This empathy with the other's thinking is the consequence of a bent towards dialectic reasoning, i.e. towards reasoning in thesis and antithesis, towards inner intellectual duality, that is to say, doubt. This inner intellectual struggle renders him familiar with the most diverse intellectual standpoints, just as his own emotional and instinctual struggles opened the way for him to the psychological depths in others. When Freud makes a statement, there stands next to it, with remarkable frequency, an antithesis which, as the case may be, he either expresses as a doubt of his own or projects onto the reader. Hence the "intellectual empathy" which confers upon him, at the same time, such extraordinary intellectual universality, skill and ease. This is, moreover, one of his capacities that, together with his artistic gifts, make the reading of his works a feast for the spirit.

Doubt appears in Freud in yet another form, deeper but graver. Not only as talent, play and art but also as burden, need and sorrow. I refer to a certain compulsion to doubt and for this I find support in part in Freud himself who was of the opinion that, in the event of his ever having developed a full neurosis, this would have been an obsessional neurosis, an illness in which, as you know, doubt plays a central part. This compulsion to doubt is expressed in various aspects; in its mildest form in his scepticism and in its extreme form in what some of his adverse...
critics have called his “pessimism”. Against this criticism, E. Jones rightly points out the many expressions of Freud's optimism and accepts the term “pessimism” only insofar as this may mean one's being free from illusion i.e. as realism. But it is plain that this is not what those critics mean and I believe that they did indeed point to something that really existed in Freud, only that it was greatly moderated by other characterological components of a different and more optimistic nature. Further: thanks to his creative powers, Freud converted this burden, this pessimism, into a stimulus (like a physical resistance may act as a stimulus to our muscles) and it even became a factor that codetermined the direction that Freud's investigations took. For I think that it demanded a considerable dose of scepticism and mistrust as regards everything that is usually called “higher” in human nature to discover the unconscious and, in particular, its instinctive part. This mistrust is at the same time a mistrust of higher things in general so that it was not a matter of chance that Freud should have repeatedly taken as the subject of his research ideas about God and religion, i.e. beliefs about something higher than man. To this mistrust and pessimism we owe, then, the deepest insight into the origins of religion and infantile religiosity in the collective and individual history of man. It was a scepticism made fruitful and Freud was, as he himself said, a “gay pessimist”.

Yet in certain respects he had something of the lack of faith that characterizes true pessimist. Take, for instance, to cite but one example, the following words from his book “The Man Moses and the Monotheistic Religion”, in which Freud refers to the question of the nature of “higher things”: “Perhaps,” says he, “man proclaims as higher what is more difficult to achieve, and his pride in this is no more than his narcissism of having overcome a difficulty.” We see then, how Freud, thanks to his great scepticism, obtains a new psychological understanding: narcissism determines our evaluations. But at the same time we feel—or I do at least—a certain absence of faith, a lack of hope for the existence of objective values, which even implies a certain despair. Furthermore, if we accept in its full bearing what Freud says, his words imply something like a spiritual suicide. For if there are no objective values, if the “higher” is only the “more difficult” and our striving for it is merely a product of our narcissism, then all the works of culture, science, and art, and among them Freud's own achievements are devoid of objective worth.

It might be said that objective values become at times the terrifying spectre of a conscience smitten by neurotic guilt, where the ego feels safer under the shelter of relativism. For if everything is relative, so is what we unconsciously deem our unforgivable sins and our irreparable, i.e. absolute, misdeeds. In this sense our lack of faith would spring from a fear of punishment and would be a protection against it. Nevertheless, I have the impression that the lack of faith is even more the punishment itself, an unconscious self-punishment. If this is so, then we fear the faith in objective values and we repress it in the same way as the moral masochist fears and represses anything good, since what is bad, i.e. punishment, offers him greater safety. On the other hand as happens with neurotic symptoms, here as well the repressed returns in the defence, for faith returns within scepticism and relativism itself, the faith in something absolute, indubitable, this faith in values, which is a reflection of love itself that lets us know what is good, even if this knowing begins so modestly with the knowledge that the good is the mother's milk. I say that faith returns in the scepticism itself for now it is relativism that is taken as objective truth par excellence, as the absolute. That is to say that, in reality, even the relativist and pessimist continues to believe. To return to Freud, we have already mentioned that there acted upon him intense unconscious guilt feelings, increased by the death of his first younger brother, and I think that it was the fear and need of punishment that entailed, that overshadowed his profound faith in objective values and submerged it, in part, in his unconscious. The passing attempt at spiritual suicide I cited above as an example confirms it, for it is murder that is paid with one's own death. In Freud’s physical life there was, besides, something similar: some fainting-fits after certain personal triumphs, which Freud himself connects with the death of his little brother. We may say once again that they were passing suicide attempts, here on the bodily plane. And in fact in the physical we find what we supposed, about the spiritual suicide: it is self-punishment and
the same time a protection against the punishment, a protection prompted by the motto: “Better a horrible end than an endless horror”. But in Freud it was, in both the spiritual and the physical respects, no more than a transitory phase, a partial and secondary component of his psychism. Even in the above-mentioned example, he puts a “perhaps” at the start of his “pessimistic” affirmation. The doubt, the scepticism, induced perhaps by the repressed faith, avails itself of this very scepticism and opens to more optimistic thoughts, “gayer ones” (as he said), access to the faith in objective values, to enthusiasm for truth and beauty, to which his mind heart—thanks to many other qualities of his rich nature—were open to the highest degree.

So we may celebrate the day on which, one hundred years ago, a a man was born who not only devoted his life to striving for the victory of truth over falsehood, of love over hatred and of health over sickness, but also found it in him to bring to light a work that was destined to be one of the most precious gifts to humanity that one man alone has ever been able to offer. This gift is the knowledge that has been sought by many since man has existed, the knowledge that frees humankind from the worst enemy of his happiness and of what he feels to be his true destiny. This enemy is anxiety and the whelp of anxiety, hatred, which bar man’s path to his innermost self, to his capacity for creation and to his love for his neighbour. Hitherto it has been given to few to enjoy this great gift well. Much remains to be done for all to partake fully. But the great harvest will come, for the seed has been cast and the first fruits have already ripened. Our thanks for what this sowing has yielded us, and has yet to yield us, go out to the great sower—Sigmund Freud.

THE YOGA SÜTRAS
(Continued from Previous Issue)

GIRINDRASEKHAR BOSE

TEXT

134 First quarter

Samādhipādaḥ

L. 1 atha yogā-nuśasanam
L. 2 yogāś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ
L. 3 tādā draśṭāḥ svārāpe vasthānam
L. 4 vṛtti-sārāpyani-tarata
L. 5 vṛttayaḥ pāñcatayaḥ kliṣṭa-kliṣṭaḥ
L. 6 pramāṇa-viparītya-vikalpa-nādiḥ-śmrtaḥ
L. 7 pratyakṣa-samāsthā-gāṁbhī pramāṇaḥ
L. 8 viparītyaṁ mithyā-jñānam-aśrūpa-pratisēṭham
L. 9 abāda-jñānā-nupāti vastuvānayo vikalpaḥ
L. 10 abhāva-pratyayā-lambanā vṛtti-nīdāṛ
L. 11 anubhāta-viṣyānta-sampramoṣṭaḥ smṛtiḥ
L. 12 abhiṣeka-vairāgyaṁ bhīṣyaṁ tan-nirodhaḥ
L. 13 tatra sthitau tattvam bhīṣyaḥ
L. 14 sa tu dirgha-kāla-nairantaraya-saṅkāra-sevita-dhāḥ-bhūmib
L. 15 dhīma-nuśravaṁ-viśaya-viṣyāti-vaiṣṭikāṁ samyakā vāyāgamaṁ
L. 16 tat pariṇā puruṣa-khyāter-guṇā-vairāgyaṁ
L. 17 viśeṣa-viśeṣā-vikalpa-rānti-nuṣṭhāṇī samprajñātāṁ
L. 18 viśeṣa-pratyayā-bhīṣyaṁ-pārvah saṃkāra-sāgaṅbhyāṁ
L. 19 bhāva-pratyayā vṛdeha-prakṛti-lâyannāṁ
L. 20 śraddhā-vitrā-samāthi-prajñā-pārvaka itareṣāṁ
L. 21 tvāra-saṅvegānāma-saṁbhāṁ
L. 22 mṛdū-madyā-dhīmatrataṁ tato’pi viśeṣaḥ
L. 23 śvāra-praṇidhiḥ-nāḥ-vāṁ
L. 24 kliṣṭa-karma-vipākā-saivair-aparamāṁśaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣā śvavah
L. 25 tatra niratīśayam sarva-vṛtthā-bijam
L. 26 pūrveṣāṁ pārurah kālena-navačchedat
L. 27 tasya vīcakāḥ praṇavaḥ
L. 28 taj-jāpa-ra-aṁśa-bhāvanam
II. 38 brahma-carya-pratishtubham virya-labhah
II. 39 aparigrha-sthirye janma-kathantii-sambodhah
II. 40 saucite svag-a-jugupsa paraic-asamsargah
II. 41 sattvauddhi-saumanasayai-kagreye-ndriyajaya-tma-darshana-
yogayatanii ca
II. 42 sampasad-anuttama saukha-labhah
II. 43 kaye-ndriya-siddhir-asuddhiksayat-tapasab
II. 44 svadhyayad-ista-devatii-samprayogalj
II. 45 sthira-sukham-samadhi-siddhir-lsvara-pranidhanat
III. 12 tatah punah kanto-ditau tulya-pratyayau cittasyai-kagratik-
pariijnah
III. 13 etena bhate-driyesu dharme-lakshanaa-viirtha-paripamama-
yuktyste
III. 14 kanto-ditii-vyapadesa-dharma-nupatii dharmi
III. 15 kramam-nyatvam pariijnah-nyavte hetub
III. 16 pariijnama-traya-samyamad-atita-nagata-jijnam
III. 17 abdha-ndriya-pratyayamii-tate-tara-dhuyate samyakrasat-tat-
pravibhaga-samyamart sarvabhumata-ruta-jijnam
III. 18 samskara-saksa-karanat perva-jisti-jijnam
III. 19 pratyasya para-citta-jijnam
III. 20 na ca tat sambhavam tasya-viisayty-bharatvat
III. 21 karyatpa-samyamtr tad-grahya-dakta-stambhe caktra-prakaata-
samprayoge 'ntardhinam
III. 22 sopakramam nirupakramam-ca karma tat-samyamad-aparantr-
jijnama-ristebhyo va
III. 23 maityy-sidhu balani
III. 24 balestu hasti-tala-'jini
III. 25 pravrttya-loka-nyasate sakte-svayahita viprakrti-jijnam
III. 26 bhuvana-jijnam sakte svayamtr
III. 27 candre tii-vaivthe-jijnam
III. 28 dhruve tad-gati-jijnam
III. 29 nahi-cakte kaya-vaivthe-jijnam
III. 30 kaunthakape kuta-pipasa-nivrttiub
III. 31 karma-nadyam sthiryam
III. 32 mirdha-jyotiiji siddha-darshanam
III. 33 pratibhavd-v sarvam
III. 34 bdaye citra-sapujit
III. 35 satiiva-purasayor-atyontii-samjtrnanii mithajayo pratyayaa-
viisogho bhoga pariizhvatii samyakrasat purusha-jijnam
III. 36 tatah pratibhav-dwvana-vedanii-darsh-svada-varta jayante
III. 37 te samadhii-vupasarjii vyuththane siddhahay
III. 38 bandha-karma-sthalithiyat pracrra-samvedanii cittasya para-
sharitii-veisah
III. 39 udana-jayat-jala-paka-kajaniik-dviv-asangaa : utkramiti-ja
III. 40 samana-jayat-jivalanam
III. 41 srotra-kasayogam sambandha-samyamad-divyam srotram
III. 42 kaya-kasayogam sambandha-samyamal-laghau-ruha-samapattes-cii-
kaa-gamanam
III. 43 bahir-akalpitā vṛttir-mahāvidehā tataḥ prakāśa-varanakṣa-yah
III. 44 sthāla-svarūpa-sākṣāt-nvaya-rthavattva-saṁyamād-bhāta-
III. 45 jayaḥ
III. 46 tato niṃā-dī pṛddurbhāvāhā kāya-saṁpattī tuddharmā-nabhi-
III. 47 ghūta-ca
III. 48 tāpā-lāvanya-balā-vajā-saunahanantarvānā kāya-saṁpatt
III. 49 graha-pā-svarūpa-smitā-nvaya-rthavattva-saṁyamād-indriya-
III. 48 tato manojavitvam vikarna-bhavalj pradhana-jayas-ca
III. 50 sattva-puruṣā-nyata-kṛkṣi-mātrasya sarva-bhāva-dhiśha-t-
III. 51 tva sarvajñāttvam-ca
III. 52 tato manojavitvam vikarna-bhavalj pradhana-jayas-ca
III. 53 jāti-lakṣaṇa-deva-aranyatvā-nivacschet tulyoṣo-tatāh prati-
III. 54 pattiḥ
tāraṃ sarva-vidyām sarvāhā viṣayama-kramam-cet-i
tīcveka-jātām jñānam
III. 55 sattva-puruṣayoh śuddhi-sāmyyo kaivalyameti

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Kaivalyapādaḥ

IV. 1 janmau-śadhi-mantra-tapah-saṁadhīhāh siddhiyāt
IV. 2 jāty-antara-parīṇāmāh prakṛty-āparīṭtā
cet
IV. 3 nimitrāṇa-prayojakaḥ prakṛtirnām vaṇā-bhedas-taṁat
tārāvīrīr kṣetrikāvāt
IV. 4 nirmanā-cittān-sāsmāta-gaṁrāt
IV. 5 pravṛtti-bheda prayojakām cittāme-kama-nekeṣām
IV. 6 tatra dhvānajāma-nāśayām
IV. 7 karma śukla śṛṇam yogina-trividhami-tareṣām
IV. 8 tatas-tad-vipākā-nugunāname-vā-bhīvayakar-vāsanānām
IV. 9 jāti-deśa-kālā-vyavahātenām-pu-śānta-svāṁśa-svāṁsakāryay-orāt-vat
IV. 10 tātu-nādiyam-cēṣo niṣayati
IV. 11 hetu-phalā-śrayā-lambanaiḥ saṁgrha-tattvād-ṛṣi-māha-
tad-abhīvaḥ

IV. 12 atītā-nāgyataṁ svarūpāto sva-adhva-bhedād-dharmaṁ
IV. 13 te vyakta-sākṣāt guru-mānāh
IV. 14 parīṇāma-katvād vastu-tattvam
IV. 15 vastu-sāmyyo cītta-bhedāt-tayor-vibhaktaṁ pārthāḥ
IV. 16 na cai-kacita-tantraṁ vastu tad-apramāṇākam tada kim syāt
IV. 17 tad-uparāga-pekṣāć-cittasaṁ vastu jñāna-jāraṁ
IV. 18 sada jñāna-cītta-vṛttiya-tat-prabhō puruṣāsya-parīnāmītāt
IV. 19 na tat svā-bhāsya drīyatvāt
IV. 20 eka-samaye co-bhāya-navañdhārañṛn
IV. 21 cītta-ntāra-dṛṣye buddhi-buddhar-atiprasāṅgaḥ-smṛtis-
saṁskāra-śa
IV. 22 cītta-apratikramāyāḥ tad-kāraṇputra svabuddhi-
saṁvedanam
IV. 23 draśṭā-dṛṣye-parakramā cittāṁ sarvāṛtham
IV. 24 tad-asamkhyeyā-vāṣanābhiś-cīttrā-paṁrārtham saṁbhatya-
kārtīvāt
IV. 25 viśeṣa-darśāma atma-bhāva-bhāvanā-viniściritāh
IV. 26 tātā viveka-nīnaṁ kaivalya-prāgbhāram cīttrāṁ
IV. 27 tata-chidreṇu pratypaṇa-parānti saṁskāreṇbhyāṁ
IV. 28 hāname-śām kleśavad-uktām
IV. 29 prasāṃkhyeyā 'py-akusṭābhyāva sarvāḥ viveka-khyāter-dharma-
meghah saṁadhīh
IV. 30 tadā kleśa-karma-nivṛttītāh
IV. 31 tataḥ sarvā-varena-mala-petasya jīlānasyāh-narṣya-jñeya-
layām
IV. 32 tataḥ kṛṣṇa-cīttrā parīṇāma-krama-saṁśākrit-saṁvit
IV. 33 kaśa-prativigya parīṇāmarāṇa-nirgrahaṁ kramāḥ
IV. 34 puruṣā-bhāvo-gundānā prati-prasāvaḥ kaivalyaṁ
svarūpā-pratikṣhāḥ vā cīt-faktirītī
The Yoga-sutras are divided into four padas or quarters.

The first quarter of the book deals with samādhi or engrossment.

I. 1 atha yoga-nūsasanaṃ
Now begins the instruction in yoga.

I. 2 yogas-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ
Yoga is the suspension of the functional modifications of
the citta.

By the term citta is meant both citta and buddhi, i.e., both
the receptive and the acting or deciding functions of the
mind. The citta together with the ahām-kāra, the indriyas
and the tanmātras go to form the ‘mind’ of the western
psychologists minus the element of consciousness. The citta
becomes self-conscious when it is united with the ahām-kāra
and reflects the consciousness of the puruṣa. In explaining
the sūtras I have often used the word mind in place of citta
for the sake of simplicity.

I. 3 tada draṣṭub svarupe' vasthānam
Then, i.e., when yoga is attained, the experiencing agent
exists in its own unmodified and pure form.

The experiencing agent in its own form is identical with
pure consciousness, not consciousness of this or that but
consciousness pure and simple. Consciousness according to
this view may be compared to light the function of which
is to show up things.

I. 4 vṛtti-sārayāmi-tatātra
On other occasions the experiencing agent or consciousness
takes the form of the functional modification that the citta
undergoes, i.e., of the mental content, or in other words
it assumes the form of consciousness of this or that.

I. 5 vṛttayaḥ paścātayāḥ klīśā-klīśōḥ
The functional modifications of the citta are of five kinds;
they can be further classified into two classes as (1) leading
to pain, i.e., leading to action resulting in bondage in the
shape of rebirth and (2) not leading to pain, i.e., where
there is true realization or awareness of the situation only
without any tendency towards action and consequently no
bondage.

I. 6 pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtyāyaḥ
The citta-vṛttis or the functional modifications of the citta
are concerned in the acquirement of (i) pramāṇa or
correct knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is not upset by
any subsequent experience of anybody; of (ii) viparyaya
or false perceptual knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is upset
by other experiences; of (iii) vikalpa or fanciful conceptual
knowledge of objects not existing in reality; of (iv) nidrā
or knowledge of non-existence as realized in one’s own
knowledge of sleep; and of (v) smṛti or knowledge depending
on past experience and brought up by the exercise
of memory.

The principle underlying the five-fold classification of
the citta-vṛttis lays stress only on what may be called
the receptive functions of the mind and neglects alto-
gether its executive or deciding activities, i.e., the buddhi
aspect of the mental apparatus. The reason lies in the
supposition that action is secondary and is dependent
on knowledge of some sort. Reflex actions and acts
executed during sleep or unconscious states are to be
explained as the results of stimuli perceived by the receiv-
ing mental apparatus activating past sanātana-samskāras
which include memory impressions. Unconscious receptive
activities have been admitted in the Yoga-sūtras as in
the postulation of knowledge of one’s own sleep, even when
there are no dreams and also in the concept of latent
sāṃskāra. Vacaspati Miśra says in his commentary on sūtra
11, that citta includes buddhi, i.e., the executive mental
apparatus.
The different forms of pramāṇa or correct knowledge are derived from perception, inference and reliable verbal information. Verbal information includes written information and information conveyed by gesture.

Viparyaya or illusion is false knowledge resting on perception that does not correspond to reality. Viparyaya is contradicted by subsequent correct perception either of the person who experiences it or of other normal people. It is identical with the 'illusion' of the psychiatrists.

Vikalpa or fanciful concept is derived from the knowledge of a combination of words representing an object which is non-existent in reality. The concept of a three legged snake is an illustration of vikalpa.

Nidra or 'sleep' is that modification of the citta that has for its object the perception of non-existence. As sleep is the state in which the knowledge of non-existence is best realized, this particular modification of the citta has been named sleep; c.f., principle of naming of the mahabhutas and the indriyas.

Smiṭi or memory is not losing the subject matter of a cognition. The vyās-bhaṣya translates the sūtra as follows: Smiṭi or memory is not losing an object or situation that has been cognized. Anubhāta-viśaya-saṃpramocakṣaḥ smiṭih

Vicāra refers to the meaning of the subjective perception which can be considered only by the experiencer himself in terms of localization in place and cause; see I.42; III.17. Ānanda refers to the pure sensory aspect of the perception without any meaning attached to it. When the attention is riveted upon the manifestations of the sense organ only there is also modification of consciousness without any meaning element. Manifestation pure and simple is sattva and it is described as a pleasant experience.

Asmiṭa refers to the situation in which the attention is directed to the perceiver and not to the pure sensation without meaning, neither to the subjective nor to the objective aspect of the perception.
I. 18 virāma-pratyaya-bhyasa-purvaḥ sansākara-sesānyah
That caused by the suspension of all cittavrittis including
argumentation, deliberation, etc., and attained through practice
and having only the latent impressions as residuum is the
other form of samādhi that is called asamprajñāta or non-
cognizant, i.e., without the cognitive factor.

See 1.50
Virāmapratyaya means caused by virāma or suspension,
c.f., bhavapratyaya in the next sutra, also upāyapratyaya in
the Vyās-bhāṣya of 1.20. Virāmapratyaya stands for the
cause of virāma according to Vacaspati Misra.

I. 19 bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layanam
In the case of those who have been resolved into the bodily
elements or into the subtler prakṛtic elements the asamprajñāta
samādhi has bhava, i.e., the force creating the worldly
manifestations or avidyā as its cause.

When samādhi is attained the yogi may be said to resolve
into the object of his samādhi and become engrossed by
or merged in it. This is laya, prakṛti as distinguished from
puruṣa has different modifications; they can be broadly
classified under two heads, viz, gross and subtle. The five
mahābhūtas and the eleven indriyas may be called the gross
modifications while the 5 tanmatras, the ahāmākāra, the
mahat and the avyakta may be called the finer manifesta-
tions. The gross modifications may also be described as
bodily elements since they go to make up the body. Samādhi
obtained by concentration on any of these gross bodily
elements may be said to be identical with the resolution
into these elements. This is videhalaya. Samādhi in the
subtler or finer prakṛtic elements is prakṛtilaya. Both
these forms of samādhi having prakṛti or avidyā as their
root cannot give final salvation which can only be attained
by samādhi in the puruṣa.

According to the current explanations of 1.19 videhalaya
and prakṛtilaya mean disembodied personalities that continue
to exist even after death; these are celestial beings
enjoying a state very much similar to salvation with
the difference that it is a temporary one and after the
expiry of a definite period the disembodied personalities
are born again as corporeal beings. The sūtra says that
bhava or avidyā it-self leads those who have attained
videha or prakṛti laya to asamprajñāta samādhi.

I. 20 āśraddhā-virya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā-pārvaka itaretām
For the others asamprajñāta samādhi has to be preceded by
due devotion, strength, proper course of action, engrossment
and correct knowledge of things.

The expression samādhi prajñā in this sutra may mean
samprajñāta samādhi. According to this interpretation
asamprajñāta samādhi has to be preceded by samprajñāta
samādhi.

Smṛti means here proper course of action as laid down in
śāstras, c.f., Bhagavadgītā, smṛtivibhramah in 2.63. Accord-
ing to Vacaspati Misra samṛti means dhyāna or concen-
tration.

I. 21 tīrtha-samvega-vāṇāma-sannāh
In the case of those with powerful drive samādhi is attained
early.

Samvega means drive. According to Vacaspati Misra
samvega means vairagya or non-attraction. According to
Bhojadeva and Vijnana Bhikṣu samvega is energetic
exertion.

I. 22 mūḍu-madhya-dhimatratvāt tato' pi viśeṣāh
In judging the time required for the attainment of samādhi
a further distinction is to be made according as the power-
ful drive is comparatively mild or medium or extraordinarily
great.

I. 23 iśvara-pranidhanad-va
Early samādhi is also attained by devotional contemplation
of iśvara or God.

I. 24 kleśa-karma-vipāka-aparamārthaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa tāvam.
Iśvara is that special puruṣa (soul or being) who is un-
touched by the painful bondage of avidyā, actions and their
results and corresponding innate desires.
I. 25 tatra niratāyaya sarvajña-bijam
In him is to be found in the most perfect form the past-present-future-knowing seed or faculty.

The usual explanation is as follows: In him is to be found in its absoluteness or the highest extent the seed of the omniscience.

Sarvajña-bijam means the past-present-future-knowing seed or faculty. Sarvajña cannot refer to omniscience as there cannot be degrees of omniscience. Sarvajña is the agent that has knowledge of sensible and supersensible objects existing in all the three states, viz., past, present and future. There can be gradations in such knowledge and hence different degrees of capacity of knowing the past, present and future. I should therefore like to translate sarvajña-bijam as the seed or the latent faculty of knowing the past, present and future that is present in every individual to some extent.

This latent faculty is capable of being developed hence it is called a seed.

Sarvajña is identical with trikalajña i.e., one who knows the past, the present and the future.

I. 26 pūrveṣāma-pi guruh kālenā-navacchedat
He is even the revered of all the old or early ones, i.e., of the first instructors of yoga, because of his being unconditioned by time.

I. 27 tasya vacaḥ prāṇavab.
His designation is the prāṇava or the word 'om'.

I. 28 taj-japaḥ-tad-artha-bhāvanam
Its repetition and the contemplation of its meaning has to be practised.

I. 29 tataḥ pratyak-cetana-dhigam'py-antarāyān-bhāvas ca
Through this one has access to the inner self or consciousness that is apprehended by the inward turning of the sense organs, and also through this results the disappearance of obstacles.

I. 30 vyādhi-styāna-samāya-pramāda-āśaya-virati-bhrāntidarśanā-
labdhabhāmikatva-navasthitatvāni citta-vikṣepā-śe'ntarāyah

Disease, incapacity for mental functioning, doubt, want of interest, laziness, want of abstinence from sensory enjoyment, false notions, failure to maintain a yogic state even when it is reached are the distractions of the mind that are called obstacles to samādhi.

I. 31 duḥkha-dauryanasya-jayatva-āśasā-prāsvāsā vikṣepa-sahabhā-

These distractions are accompanied by pain, mental disturbance, trembling and movements of parts of the body and irregularities of inspiration and expiration.

I. 32 tat-pratishedha-rthame-katātvā-bhīyāṣaḥ
To prevent these distractions one must practise concentration on a single principle, entity or element.

I. 33 maitri-karunā-mudito-pekṣanām sukha-duḥkha-puṇya-viśayānām
bhāvanānās-citta-prasādanām.

Mental calm can be attained by developing the attitudes of friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference respectively towards persons placed in situations of pleasure, pain, virtue and vice.

For the method of attainment of mental as well as physical calm see 1.47.

I. 34 pracchārāna-viḍhāranābhyāp vā prānaśya
Or by the proper regulation of expiration and retention of breath.

I. 35 viśayavatī vā pravṛttir-uppanā manasāh sthitī-nibhandhati

The development of a pure objective mental functioning is also conducive to static fixity of the mind, i.e., when the mind takes the form of an object in being fully engrossed in it there develops the capacity for mental steadiness.

This refers to samādhi with reference to the raja aspect of the mind. In the next sutra samādhi with regard to the sattva aspect is indicated.

I. 36 viḍokā vā jyotimati

The development of the sorrowless effulgent mental functioning also leads to steadiness, i.e., when the mind functions
only in its sattvic aspect which is the pure revealing aspect, and hence called effulgent, mental steadiness is achieved.

The effulgent function is free from all action attitudes which is devoid of pain and pleasure; therefore it is also called sorrowless. The mental condition is one of perfect peace or śānta.

I. 37 vitarāga-visyaṃ và cittam
Mental steadiness may also be gained by concentrating on the mind of a person free from all attractions for objects or worldly things.

I. 38 svapna-nidrā-jīvā-laṃbanaṃ và
Or by having as the object of concentration the perceptual experience of dreams or deep sleep.

Deep sleep gives us the perceptual knowledge of negation, see I. 10.

I. 39 yathā-bhima deva-dhyānārām-va
Or by concentration on any desired object.

I. 40 paramāḥ-paramāḥ-mahattva-nto'sya vaśikāraḥ
By these means one attains mastery of static fixity of the mind on objects ranging from the minutest particle to the biggest material element.

I. 41 bāna-vṛtti-abhijātasya-va maṇer-grahāḥ-grahaṇa-grāhīyesu

tatstha-tadañjanaśa samāpattīḥ
When its ordinary functions are attenuated the mind, like a pure crystal, reflects or assumes the form respectively of the apprehender or the means of apprehending or the thing apprehended according as it rests on one or other of these; the assumption by the mind of the form of the object on which it rests is known as samāpatti or identity of mental form.

Samāpatti is equivalent to exclusive ‘tadākāra-kārita’ or ‘assumption of that form’.

I. 42 tatra śabdartha-jīvā-vikalpaḥ saṃkṛtaḥ savitarkā samāpattiḥ
When the samāpatti is characterized by admixture of the elements consisting of the word, the perception of the object denoted by the word and the idea conveyed by the perception or the word it is called savitarkā samāpatti or argumentative identity of mental form.

See note on I. 17.


When the samāpatti or identity of mental form appears only in the object itself free from all memory images and when it seems, so to say, bereft of its own identity, it is called nirvitarka or non-argumentative.

I. 44 etṣṭayai-va savicārade nirvicārā, ca sākṣā-vidyaḥ vṛtyāya

Savicāra and nirvicārā i.e. deliberative and non-deliberative identities of mental form pertaining to subtle objects are also explained by these, i.e., by argumentative identities described in the previous sūtra.

When the object is gross it can be perceived by several people at the same time and thus can be discussed with others. With subtle objects, e.g., the subjective aspect of a perception of tanmatra or ego-feeling every one has his own special perception; its features therefore can only be deliberated upon, they cannot be discussed with others.

I. 45 sākṣā-vidya-vartinā ca-linga-parvāya-vāsamā
And subtle objectivity attains its limit in the alīṅga or the one without any characteristic mark, i.e., the undifferentiated prakṛti.

See note on I. 19.

I. 46 ta eva sabijah samādhīḥ
All these four types of samāpatti constitute sabija samādhī, i.e. engrossment with a core.

Distinctions are to be drawn between nirodha, samādhi and samāpatti. Samāpatti refers only to the forms of sabija samādhi. Suspension of any particular cittavritti may be called its nirodha. See summary of First Quarter and the table attached to the end of that chapter.

I. 47 nirvicārā-vaiṣṭātrayāṁ dhyāma-praśālab
The clearness and purity of the non-deliberative identity of mental form leads to bodily and mental calm.

See I. 33
The knowledge that is gained in this stage is truth-bearing.

This knowledge, because it deals with the concrete, has for its object something different from the objects with which the knowledge derived from reliable information and that derived from inference are concerned.

The latent residual impression or samskāra derived out of this is contradictory to the impression otherwise.

With the suspension of this also, all mental functioning being suspended, there is nirbija samādhi, i.e., engrossment without any core.

According to some control over the indriyas means lack of attraction for sound, vision and other sensory objects; according to others sensory experience without feelings of pleasure and pain and without any accompanying attraction and repulsion constitutes control over indriyas; others hold that control is identical with no appreciation of sensory objects resulting from the direction of mind to a single point.

**Sūdhānāpādāḥ**

*The Section on Means*

*I. 1* tapah-svādhyāye-svara-praśajānāni kriyā-yogāḥ
Voluntary austerities, repetition to oneself or recitation of sacred texts and devotional contemplation of God constitute what is called kriyā yoga or yogic performances.

The performances mentioned above lead to the attainment of the yogic state; hence they have been called yogic performances.

*II. 2* sa samādhi-bhāvane-rthāḥ klesa-tanukarāṇa-rthāḥ-śca
I.e., the yogic performance is meant for promoting engrossment and also for attenuation of pain, i.e., of the bondages of actions that lead to pain.

*II. 3* avidyā-smita-ṛga-dveśa-bhiniveśaṁ pañca-kleśāṁ
Avidyā, ego-feeling, attraction, repulsion and the innate desire to live are the five bondages leading to pain.

For the definition of avidyā, etc., mentioned in this sutra see the sutras following.

*II. 4* avidyā kṣetramu-ttareṇa prasupta-tanu-vicchino-dāraṇaṁ
Avidyā is the field of origin of these four bondages mentioned after it whether they remain in a dormant, attenuated or in a manifest form.

Avidyā is the source from which ego-feeling, attraction, repulsion and the desire for life spring. Avidyā is that which produces a sort of attachment between the pure, eternal puruṣa or consciousness on the one hand and matter on the other. The ego-feeling as expressed by the words 'I', 'my' 'mine', etc., the attraction for pleasurable objects and the repulsion for painful ones as also the desire for life arise out of avidyā and are referred to the self which thus loses its immaculate character for the time being. 'Dormant' refers to that state in which the urge for expression is absent; 'attenuated' refers to that state in which the bondages are weakened as a result of practising yogic rites or performances; in the 'interrupted' state one particular form of bondage remains overpowered by a contrary one, e.g., non-emergence of anger during the state of love; in the 'manifest' form bondages are in actual operation.

*II. 5* anitya-suci-dubhā-natmasu-nitya-suci-sukha-tma-khyātir-avidyāṁ
Avidyā is that which causes what is really impermanent, impure, painful and not belonging to the self to be looked upon as permanent, pure, pleasurable and pertaining to the self.

*II. 6* dṛg-darśana-daktya-ekā-tmate-vā-smita
Ego-feeling is the apparent identity of the agent that experiences and the means of experiencing.

The experiencing agent is the puruṣa while the means or instrument of experience is the citta or mind minus its consciousness.
II. 7 sukha-nusayi raga
Attraction is that which follows as a consequence of pleasure.

II. 8 dukhna-nusayi dvesha
Repulsion is that which follows as a consequence of pain.

II. 9 sva-rasa-viha viduye’pi tatha-rasago bhinvaseha
The innate flow of desire for maintaining life that is present in the lowliest of beings and that is known to exist even in the wise as well is called abhinivesa.

II. 10 te pratiprasava-hayas saksma
These attenuation bondages disappear by regressing to their original state.

The five bondages mentioned before are attenuated by yogic performance; see II. 2. After attenuation they are destroyed, i.e., they disappear by regression to their original state; when the functional modifications of the mind are suspended the klesas or bondages suffer extinction. The means by which the bondages in their attenuated state can be made to disappear is discussed in the next sutra.

II. 11 dhyana-hayas-tadvattaya
These functional modifications of the mind are to be discarded by dhyana or concentration.

II. 12 kleasa-mula karma-sayo drsastu janma-vedaniyai
The latent mental deposit of merit or demerit resulting from previous acts has its root in klesa or bondage and has to be experienced or actually lived through when it ripens in a birth seen or unseen, i.e., either in the present birth or in a future one.

II. 13 sati mule tad-vipaka-jaty-ayur-bhogah
So long as the root exists it will mature and lead to fructification in the shape of birth, life and experience.

II. 14 te bhuta-parintha—phalii punya-punya-hetuvat
They, i.e., birth, life and experience yield pleasure and pain according as they spring from merit and demerit.

II. 15 parinama-tapa-samskara-dukhkha-guna-vyvitti-virodhac-ca dukhthame va sarvaang vivekanah
But to the discerning person all these, including the pleasurable states resulting from merit, are really pain because of their resultant effects, the attendant afflictions and the latent karmic impressions they leave behind and also because of the innate opposition that exists among the fluctuations produced by the gunas.

II. 16 heman duhkham-nigatam
The pain that is not come yet is to be avoided.

Pain that occurred in the past has already been experienced so there is no question of avoiding it, the pain that is being experienced at present is already there so effective measures can only be taken against pain not yet come.

II. 17 drsastu-drsyas-taya sampyo-bheyo-hetuvah
The union of the experiencer and the experienced is the cause of that which is to be avoided.

The expression 'that which is to be avoided' refers to pain mentioned in the preceding sutra.

II. 18 prakasa-kriya-sthitam bhute-nidriya—makaap bhoga-pavargam—drsyam.
That which is characterized by the capacity of being manifest, by activity and by inertia, i.e., that which comes within the purview of the three gunas, sattva, raja and tama and which has for its constituents the bhutas or the five primary elements and the indriyas and which has for its purpose the worldly experience and emancipation of beings is called drsyam or the object of experience.

II. 19 vihsya-vyasa lingam—lingani guanaparvapi
The concrete, i.e., the five mahabhutas and the eleven indriyas, the subtle, i.e., the five tanmatras and ahumkara, that with the differentiated mark, viz, the mahat, and that with no differentiation of mark or character, i.e., the prakriti are the segmental divisions of the gunas.

II. 20 drsasa drsyam—mtrah suddho’pi pratayaya—nupaaya
The experiencer is nothing but the power of experiencing and although pure and immutable it apprehends things in the wake of pratayaya or intellect.

II. 21 tad-artha eva drsaya-tm
The very nature of the object of experience is meant only for his, i.e., the experiencer's sake.
II. 22 krśrthaṃ prati naṣṭama-py-anāṣṭam tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvat
Although it i.e., the object of experience, ceases to exist for him that has achieved his end it does not cease to be because it is concom to others.

II. 23 sva-svāmi-sāktyoh sva-rūpo-palabdhi-hetuḥ saṃyogah
Union is the cause of realization of the true nature of its (of the object) own power and that of its master's i.e., the experiencer's.

When union between the experiencer and the experienced leads to the realization of objects bhoga or experience results and when such union leads to the realization of the experiencer apavarga or emancipation results. It is for this reason that in sutra II. 18 it has been said that the object serves the purpose of both worldly experience and emancipation.

II. 24 tasya hetur-avidyā
Its (of the union) cause is avidyā.

II. 25 tad-abhavat samyoga-bhavo hanam tad-drṣēb kaivalyam
From its absence results the absence of union; with the avoidance of union there is isolation of the experiencer which becomes established in its own nature.

II. 26 viveka-khyātir-aviplava hano-payah.
Unwavering discriminative knowledge is the means of avoiding union.

II. 27 tasya saptadha prānta-bhāmih prajñā
For him, i.e., for one who has unwavering discrimination knowledge reaching to highest stage is sevenfold.

The Vyāsa-bhasya explains the sevenfold knowledge as follows:

(1) That which is avoidable is known and there is nothing more to be known.
(2) The causes of that which are to be avoided are attenuated and there is nothing more requiring attenuation.
(3) The avoidance is directly perceived by engrossment leading to suspension of mental functions
(4) The means of avoidance in the shape of discriminative knowledge is mastered.

These four ensure the freedom of knowledge. The following three ensure freedom of mind.

(5) The function and office of the intellect are fulfilled.
(6) The gunas merge in their cause and attain their dissolution and do not rise again for want of any necessity.
(7) In this stage the puruṣa is beyond the contact of the gunas and appears in its own true form and is undefiled, effulgent and isolated.

The person experiencing the sevenfold highest stage of knowledge is called an adept. Even if the mind only regresses the person is freed and become an adept because he goes beyond the range of the gunas.

II. 28 yoga-nga-nusthanad-asuddhi-kāye jiīna-diptir-aviveka-

The impurities are attenuated as a result of the practice of the expedients to yoga knowledge brightens up till it becomes discriminative knowledge.

The expedients are described in the next sutra.
an unmarried religious student; here it means sex abstinence.

II. 31 jäti-deśa-kītā-samayā-navacchinnāḥ sārvabhaumā mahāvrataṁ
When these restraints are practised under all conditions uninterrupted by any proviso regarding particular class, place, time or convention, they constitute what is called 'mahāvrata' or the great code of life.

II. 32 śauca-saṅtoṣa-tapah-svādhyāye-şvara-praṇidhānāni niyamāḥ
Cleanliness, contentment, voluntary austerity, repetition to oneself or recitation of sacred texts and devotional contemplation of God constitute the rites.

Cleanliness refers to both bodily and mental cleanliness. In sutra II, 1, voluntary austerity, recitation of sacred texts and devotional contemplation of God have been called kriyāyoga.

In Vṛṣṇa-bhāṣya tapa has been explained as austerity practised to develop the power of enduring situations that occur in pairs, e.g., heat and cold, hunger and thirst etc.

II. 33 vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhavānam
When during the practice of restraints and rites obstructions arise from vitarkah or the questionables, i.e., from those mental functions against which the restraints and rites are directed, the other side of the question should be thought of and developed.

For instance, in the case of a wish arising in the mind to do injury to one’s enemy one should think of the desirability of maintaining non-violence under all conditions for the attainment of yoga and also of the undesirability and harmfulness of violence and so on.

II. 34 vitarka hīṃsālayaḥ kṛtā-kāriṇā-numodāt lōḥa-krodha-mohapūrvaka mūḍa-madhyā-dhimārthā duḥkha-jñāna-nantaphalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanām
By the expression vitarkah or questionables is meant the tendency to do injury to others and the rest referred to in sutras II, 30 and II, 32, i.e., those mental functions against which the restraints and the rites are directed; whether those are indulged in or caused to be indulged in, or approved and further whether they arise from greed, anger or biased judgement and also whether they are mild, moderate or intense they eternally bear fruit in the shape of pain and ignorance. This is how the other side is to be thought of, i.e. by such way of thinking the questionable mental functions are controlled.

II. 35 ahimsā-pratiṣṭhāyāṁ tat-saṁnidhau vaīra-tyāgah
When the steadfastness of the restraint of the tendency do injury to others is attained by any person there is cessation of hostility on the part of all beings in his presence.

In the presence of the yogi who is established in non-violence the aggressive feelings of all living beings disappear; even the natural hostility existing between certain animals, e.g., the snake and the mongoose, is suspended.

II. 36 satya-pratiṣṭhāyāṁ kriyā-phalā-grāvatvam
When the truthfulness attains steadfastness in any person the capacity to act as the repository of the fruits of all action comes to him.

Ordinarily coveted things are obtained only by following certain definite courses of action but the person who is established in truthfulness can by his mere word make possible for anybody to get anything the latter wants without his having to strive for it.

II. 37 asteya-pratiṣṭhāyāṁ sarva-ratno-pasthanām
When the restraint of the desire to get other people's property by unlawful means attains steadfastness in any person all riches approach him.

II. 38 brahmacarya-pratiṣṭhāyāṁ virya-lābhaḥ
When the restraint of the sexual organ attains steadfastness in any person there is acquisition of strength.

II. 39 aparigraha-sthāyāṁ jānana-kathāra-sambodhāḥ
When the restraint of the desire for possession attains steadfastness there is perfect knowledge of all problems regarding the why and the wherefore of birth.

II. 40 śauca-saṅga-jugupsa parair-asaṁsargāḥ
From cleanliness, i.e., when cleanliness attains steadfastness,
there is disgust at one's own body and cessation of intercourse with others.

II. 41 sattva-suddhi-saumanasyai-kārye-ndriya-jayā-tma-darsanayogatvāni ca

There result also purification of the sattva guna, clear understanding, capacity to direct the mind to a single point, subjugation of the senses and fitness for the realization of the self.

II. 42 saṁvata-anuttamab sukha-lābhah

From contentment results the attainment of the pleasure of the highest degree.

II. 43 kāye-ndriya-siddhir-asuddhikṣaya-taṃ-tapasab

From voluntary austerity results special powers of the body and of the indriyas through attenuation of impurities.

According to Vyāsa-bhasya the special powers consist in the capacity to assume minute forms, etc., and also in the capacity to hear and see things at a distance, etc. The term siddhi is a technical term denoting supernormal bodily capacities, see note to III, 45.

II. 44 svādhyāya-īśa-devata-saṁprayogah

From repetition to oneself or recitation of sacred texts results union with one's chosen deity.

II. 45 saṁādhi-siddhir-īśvara-pranidhanah

From devotional contemplation of God results success in engrossment.

II. 46 sthīra-sukhamā-sanam

Āsana or posture is that which is steady and comfortable.

The word āsana in the sūtra is a technical term. In practicing yoga the body should be kept in a steady and comfortable position.

II. 47 praṇayāna-śaithilyā-nanta-saṁkṣiptabhyām

Asana is achieved when all active efforts to maintain it cease and by engrossment in Ananta, i.e., sesānāga who holds the earth steadily on his hood.

So long as one has to make a conscious effort to keep the body in the yogic posture the mind remains distracted and yoga becomes impossible. With practice one may learn to maintain the yogic posture without any conscious effort.

Samāpatti is engrossment with a core.

Ananta or sesānāga is believed to support the earth on his hood. The popular idea is that when Ananta moves his head earthquake results, so Ananta has to be exceptionally careful in maintaining the steadiness of his posture. Engrossment in the steadiness of Ananta leads to the steadiness of posture in the aspirant.

II. 48 tato dvandvā-nabhighātah

From that, i.e., as a result of achievement of āsana one remains unassailed by situations that occur in pairs, i.e., by heat and cold, hunger and thirst etc.

II. 49 taṁ sati śvāsa-prāśvāsayor-gati vicchedah praṇāyāmaḥ

Praṇāyāma consists in interrupting the natural course of inspiration and expiration in that situation, i.e., when āsana has been mastered.

śvāsa here means inspiration and praśvāsa expiration.

In ordinary usage however śvāsa stands for both inspiration and expiration; niśvāsa has also the same meaning while praśvāsa means expiration only. The connotation of the term śvāsa in the Yoga-sutras does not conform to ordinary usage.

II. 50 bāhyā-bhāyantarā-stambha-vṛttir-deśa-kāla-sāpphyābhiḥ pari-dṛśitaṁ dhāraṇa-sākhām

Praṇāyāma is considered long or subtle according as its external, internal and arrested functional modifications are differently conditioned by space, time and number.

The functional modifications of prāṇāyāma is called external when the course of respiration is stopped or interrupted after expiration; it is called internal when the interruption is made after inspiration; it is called arrested when both inspiration and expiration are stopped. Conditioned by space: the expired air may be felt a longer or a shorter distance away from the nostrils. The inspired air or the arrested air is said to occupy greater or less space according as it is subjectively felt to spread over a larger or a smaller area inside the body. The
aspirant may feel a creeping sensation spreading over his limbs during inspiration. The question of space occupied by the inspired or the arrested air is entirely a matter of subjective experience.

Conditioned by time: the different phases of prāṇāyāma may take varying time to be completed.

Conditioned by number: the expiratory, inspiratory and the stationary phases of respiration or the external, the internal and the arrested phases of prāṇāyāma may be related to one another in certain time ratios expressed by numbers, e.g., 1:2:4, i.e., if the expiration is completed in 2 seconds the inspiration has to be completed in 4 seconds and breath is to be held for 8 seconds before the cycle is repeated.

II. 51 bahya-bhyantara-visayakṣepāt caturthāth
The fourth functional modification of prāṇāyāma is that in which the limiting conditions of the external and the internal forms are considered and transcended.

The meaning of this sutra is difficult to follow. Apparently it is advised that the aspirant should concentrate his mind on the perceptions experienced during the practice of the external and the internal modifications, i.e., during the phases of expiration and inspiration. With practice these perceptual experiences gradually go out of mind, i.e., they are transcended and the kumbhaka that results is said to be the fourth form. This type of kumbhaka comes only with practice while the ordinary kumbhaka which is the third modification of prāṇāyāma can be executed at once by stopping the flow of respiration without paying any heed to the accompanying subjective perceptions and without having the necessity of transcending them.

II. 52 tataḥ kṣiyate prakāśā-vaṇanam
As a result of the mastery of pranāyama the obstructive covering of the revealing capacity or sattva aspect of the mind is attenuated.

Sattva is identical with prakāśa. The sattva guna of the mind is responsible for making things manifest.
Psychiatric Aspects of Juvenile Delinquency by Lucien Bovet, M. D.

Dr Bovet's monograph is the outcome of his "temporary contract to prepare a memorandum for UN on the psychiatric aspects of the aetiology, prevention, and treatment of juvenile delinquency."
"Preparatory to this report consisted of a tour of several European countries and America," during which he consulted over 150 specialists of all kinds in juvenile delinquency and visited 60 institutes, of diverse nature.

The end product of this labour is an extraordinarily well documented, concisely and tersely written monograph that defies summarizing—a rare feat of achievement in psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing, for the past decade has witnessed a plethora of books and journals in a language that has become increasingly esoteric and mystical.

Bovet quoting Rubin gives the legal definition of delinquency as "juvenile delinquency is what the law says it is." Juvenile delinquency, then, is "an artificial concept, legal and social in origin. It involves a social 'disadaptation' but all socially maladjusted people are not delinquents and all delinquents are not socially maladjusted."
Nevertheless, to be brought before a juvenile court and to be subjected to various measures creates a number of psychological reactions which delinquents have in common and which give a secondary psychological homogeneity to an otherwise heterogeneous group.

Commenting on much of the 'conscientious and scientific' number-juggling research he states: "The subject does not lend itself to experimentation, and statistical procedures, such as the comparison between 'normal' and 'abnormal' groups, are full of pitfalls for the unwary." A timely reminder for the workers in this complex field of human endeavour so that we need not ape blindly the "scientific techniques" that serve the natural sciences so well.

What we then need is a bold imaginative application of our present available knowledge using the very tools that Aichhorn gave us over three decades ago. Except for sporadic efforts here and there Aichhorn's tools have not been systematically applied on a vast enough scale to yield the fruits of his insights.

It is indeed a paradox of our times that psychoanalytic and psychiatric research in delinquency has not made any significant gains since the pioneering efforts of Aichhorn in the early thirties. Without patient gathering of data derived from actual work with offenders there is little to be gained from armchair theorizing. Zilboorg once aptly called the present period of passionate internecine struggles in the psychoanalytical movement a "political decade" and contrasted the late twenties and early thirties as the "erudite period." Small wonder then, while we idolize and deify Freud and Aichhorn we are not willing to follow there example and plant our feet firmly in clinical work.

The section of aetiology weaves through the complex fabric of all probable causative factors in delinquency thus once again warning us that there is no one single panacea for our understanding and treatment of delinquent behaviour. "A large proportion of children and adolescents appearing before the courts have no major physical or psychological abnormality. They are simply the victims of adverse external circumstances, characterized by social insecurity or a too low standard of living or a combination of both. But for such social factors to cause delinquency, they must set in motion a number of psychological processes." After a careful review of research on the physiology of the autonomic nervous system, the increasingly refined techniques of the electroencephalograph, recent advances in the incompatibility of blood factors, foetal infections, anatomical or physiological traumata at birth, he concludes, "in general, organic disease is not of overwhelming importance in the aetiology of antisocial behaviour."

Bovet's use of psychoanalytic concepts shows once again a remarkable mastery of the field and for probably the first time incorporates into an integrated whole work of Freud and Piaget. It cannot be overstressed that a mature sensitivity to variations of the psychology of 'normal' growing-up is very important to the proper utilization of presently available psychiatric tools in treatment of offenders. The dubiousness of applying psychotherapeutic techniques, valuable as they are in the treatment of adult
psychiatric patients to delinquents can be traced in part to the profound resistance to consider the different economic structure of psychic drives in an offender. The astounding frequency with which the delinquent group of disorders diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’, ‘just psychotic’, ‘hyper-aggressive’, ‘feeble-ego’ is both logically and clinically untenable. The quote Bovet, “the diversity of the aetiological factors leads to the classification of juvenile delinquency as a bio-psychosocial phenomenon.

The multiplicity of factors causing delinquency and the consequent diversity of therapeutic methods in use make observation and examination of the juvenile delinquent an absolute necessity. Currently in vogue is the tendency to offer therapy, psychoanalytic or otherwise without making a careful differential diagnosis, and as such the therapy fosters a pattern of symptomatology thereby clouding the true aetiology of delinquency. To describe this secondary reinforcement of pathology, psychoanalysts have taken to inventing terms such as ‘counter-delusional distortions’, ‘hypertrophic egos’, ‘ego Nutrition’, etc., such a naivete cannot be condemned too strongly.

To sum up: Bovet’s monograph is a work for those who are working with offenders for in no other volume written in the last decade has an author been able to portray without sham and empty verbiage the present knowledge about delinquency—an increasingly disrupting social phenomenon. It does not offer comfort to anyone to realize that despite our vast technological advances man and his children continue to present a challenge to all those willing to be humble and accept the difficulties inherent in the field without wishing for the illusions of “inter-disciplinary” saving of humanity.

C. V. Ramana

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