

# Two Concepts of Secularism

## Reason, Modernity and Archimedean Ideal

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*In these times of ineradicable modernity, secularism of the Nehruvian kind, which has even lost its claims to be founded on the dubious notion of implicit negotiation between communities, is bound to seem an imposition. However, in reaction to this imposition it would be a mistake to formulate an alternative vision of secularism which harked back nostalgically to the idea of a pre-modern India, especially when this imposition has not so much to do with modernist intrusion as with its rarefied non-negotiable status.*

MY subject is the familiar dialectic between the concept of nation and that of religious community;<sup>1</sup> and, though many of the conclusions drawn here are fundamentally generalisable,<sup>2</sup> I will, for the sake of precision and detail, restrict my focus to India. The twin elements in the dialectic conspire toward my eventual theme of secularism, about whose precariousness in India I want to offer a philosophical diagnosis, and the very rudimentary beginnings of an alternative conception. I will approach these tasks with some indirection, via a consideration of the work of two recent influential writers.

It is a disadvantage to begin a paper with a sense of fatigue, but that is exactly the state summoned by my overworked starting-point: the nation. Its distinctively modern status as a category and a fact has made it seem natural that it should be implicated in any critique or even investigation of the modern, indeed of any other modern fact or category, ranging from the literary (the 'novel') to the economic ('advanced capital'). This spreading thin of the concept of the nation has had the effect of inflating the ambitions of those who have made it their historical analysandum in ways that have made the most acute analyses fall short of their advertised goals. It is this necessary theoretical slippage that I want to begin with.

In a historical work unusual for its analytical rigour and sense of argument, Partha Chatterji undertook to uncover in the discourse and the development of Indian nationalism a contradiction in the very deepest sense.<sup>3</sup> He will show, he says, that nationalism "produced a discourse in which even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of modernity on which colonial domination was based", by which he means that the "cunning of reason", the distinctively post-enlightenment conception of knowledge and its systematising social and technological fall-out have, as he puts it, "seduced, apprehended and imprisoned" nationalism. The ambition of the book's analysis is clear: what critique it will offer of nationalist discourse will *eo ipso* be a

critique of a certain conception of reason itself.

Since this book has been studied closely by so many who have been working on these subjects, I will not spell out the details of Chatterji's analysis, except in the broadest stroke. Chatterji applies a framework for his investigations, which derives from Gramsci's dynamics of the coincidence of what he called the 'war of position' with the revolution of capital. The 'war of position' is a piecemeal reorientation by the bourgeoisie of the state and its various elements, and it is done on two fronts by different strategies of co-optation of both the previously powerful classes and the popular element, thereby neutralising both. For Gramsci the role (the movement and adjustments) of capital are central to the understanding of these changes, for it is a sign of capital's sway over the state that the state and its exercise become the necessary condition of capitalist development itself. The oxymoron 'passive revolution' is appropriate for this coincidence because there is a mobilising of the masses into a new-found consciousness of their political role in this transformation; it is nevertheless constrained by the fact that the transformation is 'molecular', to use Gramsci's term, in which the role of the masses never extends to an attack on either the fundamental economic institutions or the structures of political authority. This framework of the passive revolution was applied with great illumination by Gramsci to the Italian Risorgimento, and Chatterji sees in it a parallel illumination of the ways in which the nationalist movement in India undertook an anti-colonial revolution and transformation which was also thoroughly passive in just the sense that the bourgeoisie and its representative political and intellectual figures in the last phase of the colonial period mobilised the masses and adjusted the previous ruling classes to form a nationwide nationalist anti-colonial alliance, while leaving just the requisite space for the restorative post-colonial integration of state control and capitalist development.

Though some may wish to quarrel with this use of Gramsci, I do not.<sup>4</sup> It does seem to me to be clarifying and instructive. My

question has entirely to do with its self-description. What does Chatterji think the account is ultimately in the service of? It is clear from the outset and the conclusion, that is from the first two and the last chapters of the book, that the account is not merely intended as a sketch of the scope and limits of the nationalist movement. As I said, the account is explicitly meant to show the deep conceptual tie between the discourse of a nationalism that amounted to a passive revolution and the ultimate target of the enlightenment paradigm, within which it sometimes consciously, mostly unconsciously, worked out the cunning of reason. But that conceptual tie is not delivered by the book's analysis, illuminating though it is in other ways, and in the rest of the paper, even when I move away from Chatterji to focus on Ashis Nandy, I will be arguing that that conceptual tie may, for reasons that are broadly philosophical, be undeliverable.

Chatterji, as I said, is interested in the dynamics of the process of passive revolution, which is only right since, given the necessarily guerilla manoeuvres of the 'war of position', its ideological aspect (or what Chatterji calls its 'thematic') is bound to have a slowly developing dialectic. Chatterji tracks this development in three salient moments, which he calls the moments of 'departure', 'manoeuvre', and 'arrival', each with their representative ideological figures, Bankimchandra, Gandhi and Nehru. In this three-fold succession, it turns out, I believe, that the moment of manoeuvre, the Gandhian ideological intervention, is the moment where Chatterji's advertised aim of tying the unfolding narrative to a critique of the enlightenment paradigm has the most chance of uptake. I say this because, for all their anti-colonial nationalism, Bankimchandra and Nehru are too evidently and avowedly shaped by the arguments, knowledges and sloganised ideals of the enlightenment and its political revolutions. Gandhi's anti-modernist rhetoric is equally evidently and avowedly repudiating of these features of the enlightenment paradigm. Chatterji provides a useful summary sketch of this repudiation, showing that Gandhi laid stress on a commitment to a concept of truth in the moral and

experiential sense rather than on the liberal commonplaces of rights and political emancipation on the one hand, and, on the other, the deliverances of science, including both technology and political economy.

But despite this exposition, it turns out that in this crucial chapter of the book, where Chatterji might have kept the ultimate pledge of his overall theoretical enterprise, he is in the end far too focused on Gandhi's place in the developing Gramsci-derived dialectic, to redeem that pledge. It turns out that Gandhi was after all just the moment before the culminating assertion of state capitalism in Nehru's statist vision, feeding into that final moment by a capitulation to the demands of capital, and even by a capitulation to the formal institutions of modern democracy. I quote him on both these points: "Gandhian ideology... could not admit that capitalists must be coerced into surrendering their interests" and "the same problem appeared when the question of suggesting a concrete structure of self-government for the village arose. Despite his fundamental disbelief in the institutions of representative government, Gandhi suggested the election by secret ballot was perhaps the only practicable step"

What I am pointing to here is a gap created by this particular way of framing the limitations of the Gandhian ideological intervention. For notice that the framing of this criticism is entirely dictated by the demands of the dialectic of the passive revolution's war of position. And that dialectic has no ingredient in it which by itself is sufficient to deliver a critique of the generality of the enlightenment paradigm of reason and its consequences. For all the dialectic says, these criticisms of the discourse of Indian nationalism, these discussions of even the most anti-enlightenment figure in the nationalist discourse, issue in the end entirely from a perspective that coincides with a roughly Marxist critique of capitalism and its (occasionally) accompanying democratic formalities; a critique, which we must remember has been roundly and repeatedly taken to task for being too squarely within the enlightenment paradigm. Thus the gap in Chatterji's argument that I am insisting on being recorded.

I do not doubt that the particularly Gramscian profile of the criticisms makes their coincidence with the Marxist critique uneven at the edges, if we are used to viewing Marxism along thoroughly determinist lines with no independent force for ideological interventions in the way Gramsci affords. But my point here is not to observe a perfect coincidence. Even an approximate coincidence is enough so long as its properties of mere approximation rather than coincidence do nothing to spoil the observation of the gap in Chatterji's argument. Nothing in the theoretical move of allowing ideology to share an analytic position on centre-stage with the structural aspects of political eco-

nomy will help fill the gap between the fact of his essentially Marxian critique and his claims to a critique of the enlightenment.

Here I should point out that if I am right about this then Aijaz Ahmad in some recent passing comments on Chatterji has mislocated the fault-line.<sup>3</sup> Ahmad suggests that Chatterji's too great emphasis on a cultural nationalism and also his bitter hatred of Nehru leads him to defend obscurantist positions and this spreads over generally to induce in him (and others) a myopia about the possibilities of a Marxist critique of the nationalist movement, which Ahmad himself favours. But that is exactly what I am denying. In my reading, Chatterji has no such consistent position, and in fact the parts of the book which actually contain a sustained argument (as opposed to a rhetorical statement of his eventual theoretical goals) contradict Ahmad's assessment. In my reading, then, there is a gap between the proclaimed aims and claims of the book in its flanking chapters and what the dialectical critique in the body of the book delivers. The crucial chapter to focus on I think is not the chapter on Nehru, which Ahmad's comments stress, but the one on Gandhi. It is the latter in which Chatterji reveals the fact that he is essentially dominated and overtaken by the dialectic of the passive revolution and the argument of the incipient demands of an eventually state-managed capitalism. So by the time we come to the chapter on Nehru, there is no other way to read the anti-enlightenment stance in the bitter remarks on Nehru's modernism except as a veneer of rhetoric which hides the fact that the basic underlying critique is essentially a critique from the point of view of the unfolding of the demands of capital, a critique whose terms fall fully within the paradigm of enlightenment categories of criticism.

Chatterji's text (by which I merely mean the words on all its pages) thus simply underdetermines what his own position is, for its aims are large and philosophical but its deliverances are a well worked-out critique of the conspiratorial role of nationalist thought in a very specific sort of shifting formation of political economy. To put it very crudely, I am saying that at just the point he might have said that Gandhi should have been more Gandhian, he says, and is forced to say by his unfolding dialectic, that Gandhi was not Marxian enough. The rhetoric of his overall aims and the direction of his dialectic lead to different theoretical places, and by the end of it the text provides no basis for a determinate interpretation.

Perhaps Ahmad will find the Marxian element in Chatterji's critique too idiosyncratic for his taste, and there may be an issue here of genuine interest about the applicability of Gramsci's framework along Chatterji's lines. Even so, I think the fact that Chatterji's critique is coincident with a somewhat non-canonical Marxism does

nothing to avert Chatterji's failure to deliver on a thorough-going critique of the enlightenment paradigm that he had promised to do. And this failure is, in its way, a rather instructive one. By creating a gap between the sort of critique which is offered in the book and the more distant philosophical target it had hoped to hit, it urges upon us the task of constructing some general schema by which that gap might be filled. I will return in the last section of this paper to this general question and will suggest that both historical and philosophical considerations suggest that any such schema will really be *too* schematic to fill that gap in any convincing detail, and that perhaps the ideal that that gap must be filled is a misguided one.

## II

I turn now to the other twin component in my dialectic, that of religious community, and to the work of another recent influential scholar for whom the question of the vexing gap that we have been considering does not so much as arise. Ashis Nandy is nothing if he is not consistent. The words on his pages leave nothing underdetermined; there are no elements in his work running counter to his undistracted animus toward modernity.<sup>6</sup> Even when Nandy is not talking explicitly of Nehru, Ahmad's charge of obsessive anti-Nehruism applies far more deeply to Nandy than to Chatterji. This focused consistency makes him less interesting than Chatterji but much more influential among the general intelligentsia, who, struck by the extremity of recent communalist tendency, want that extremity to be matched in an exaggeratedly radical explanation of it, which turns out to be on offer by the unambiguous anti-modernist historical analysis Nandy provides.

What is it that we want explained? The answer on the surface seems obvious. For 17 initial years the leadership of independent India fell into the hands of Nehru and the Congress Party. Nehru's vision of a modern, secular India is usually conceded by even his most vocal critics to be a genuine and honourable commitment. A comparison with the long stretches of either anti-secular or undemocratic regimes in Pakistan after the untimely death of Jinnah (who after leading a communal nationalist movement adopted much the same vision as Nehru's for the newly created Muslim nation), and also a comparison with what might have happened if other leaders such as Vallabhbhai Patel had been at the helm in India instead of Nehru, must allow the conclusion that, to a considerable extent, Nehru did succeed. But if we took around us today in the period before and after the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya, we can only judge the secular success of his long rule as, at best, a holding process. To describe Nehru's success in terms of a holding process is of course to describe it as a success of a very limited sort. So the explanandum for which Nandy derives his

historical analysis is just the following question: Why is it that the Nehruvian vision of a secular India failed to take hold?

Nandy's answer and the general sense of the intelligentsia, including but not by any means exhausted by most in the academic community is that there was something deeply flawed in the vision itself. On this there is a mounting consensus, and indeed I think it would be accurate to say that in the last few years there is widespread and accumulated deflation of Nehru's stature, to be found in the intellectual and political mood of the country.<sup>7</sup> Though I have no particular interest in defending Nehru's achievements, nor even eventually his way of thinking about the secular ideal, which is in many ways muddled and mistaken, I want to briefly assess this mood because I think that there is much that is excessive in its main claims. I do also think that there is a strand of truth in it which may prove to be an instructive basis for how to re-think the methodological and philosophical basis for secularism in India; but I will not be able to substantially develop any positive suggestions in this brief discussion.

The contemporary critique of Nehru (and I will focus mostly on Nandy's work) usually begins by laying down a fundamental distinction in the very idea of a religious community, a distinction between religions as faiths and ways of life on the one hand and as constructed ideologies on the other. This is intended as a contrast between a more accommodating, non-monolithic and pluralist religious folk traditions of Hinduism and Islam, and the Brahmanical BJP and the Muslim League versions of them which amount to constructed religious ideologies that are intolerant of heterodoxy within themselves as well as intolerant of each other. The critique's target is by implication modernity itself, for its claim is that it is the polity in its modern conception of *nationhood and its statecraft* which is the source of such ideological constructions that distort those more 'innocent' aspects of religion which amount to 'Ways of life' rather than systems of thought geared to political advancement. The critique then suggests that once one accepts the inevitability of these ideological constructions, then there is nothing left to do in combating sectarian and communal sentiment and action than to formulate a secular vision which itself amounts to an oppressive nationalist and statist ideology. Thus Nehru. As they would describe his vision, it is one of a modernist tyranny that just as surely (as the narrow communalisms) stands against the pluralist and tolerant traditions that existed in the uncontaminated traditions of religions as faiths and ways of life prior to modernity's distortions. That was Nehru's primary contribution then: a perversely modernist and rationalist imposition of a vision that was foreign to the natural tendencies of Hinduism and Islam

in their traditional pre-modern spiritual and societal formations, a vision accompanied by all the destructive modern institutional commitment to centralised government, parliamentary democracy, not to mention heavy industry as well as metropolitan consumption and displacement of traditional ways of life. The echoes of Gandhi here are vivid, and Ashis Nandy is explicit in describing this alternative secular vision in Gandhian terms.

This critique of Nehru is careful (though perhaps not always careful enough) to be critical also of contemporary Hindu nationalism in India, as was Gandhi himself despite his Hinduism and his traditionalism. Nandy makes great dialectical use of the fact that Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu nationalist, arguing that Gandhi's politics and pluralist version of Hinduism posed a threat to the elitist pseudo-unification of Hinduism which flowered in the ideology of upper-caste Hindus and in orthodox brahmanical culture, as represented paradigmatically in the Chitpavans, the caste to which Nathuram Godse (his assassin) belonged.

Now it should be emphasised that what is novel and interesting about this critique of Hindu nationalism is that it is intended to be part of a larger critique in two different ways. First, it is intended as part of a general diagnosis in which Hindu nationalism is to be seen as a special instance of the more general wrong that is identified in nationalism itself—which is a modern state of mind in which the very ideal of 'nation' has built into it as a form of necessity the ideal of a nation-state, with its commitment to such things as development, national security, rigidly codified forms of increasingly centralized polity, and above all the habit of exclusion of some other people or nation in its very self-definition and self-understanding. There is apparently no separating these more general wrongs<sup>9</sup> of nationalism from what is wrong with Hindu nationalism, for otherwise we would have missed the more hidden explanatory conceptual sources of this particular movement. And second, the critique of Hindu nationalism is intended to be *of a piece* with the critique of Nehruvian secularism. Such a communal nationalism, itself a product of modernity, owes its very existence to the oppositional but at the same time *internal* dialectical relation it bears to that other product of modernity, Nehruvian secularism. The claim is that the latter is an alien imposition upon a people who have never wished to separate religion from politics in their every day life and thinking, and therefore leaves that people no choice but to turn to the only religious politics allowed by modernity's stranglehold, i.e. Hindu nationalism. Thus secular tyranny breeds Hindu nationalist resistance, which threatens with the promise of its own form of tyranny. Such are the travails that modernity has visited upon us.

There is something convincing about this argument but its explanatory virtues are greatly marred by its narrowing and uncritical anti-nationalism, its skewed historiography, and its traditionalist nostalgia. What is convincing in it is much more theoretical and methodological than anything that surfaces explicitly in the critique's articulation. But before I get to that, let me first say something by way of scepticism about some of its central diagnostic claims.

First of all, though there is no gainsaying the humanism inherent in Gandhi's politics, it is also foolish and sentimental to deny the brahmanical elements in it. There is the plain and well known fact that Gandhi, no less than the Chitpavan nationalist Tilak (however different their nationalist sensibilities were in other respects), encouraged the communal Hindu elements in the national movement by using Hindu symbolism to mobilise mass nationalist feeling. As is also well known, his support of the reactionary Muslim Khilafat movement had exactly the same motives and the same communalist effect on the Muslim population. I will not say a word more about this since this point is very well understood by many who have studied the national movement, even cursorily.

More importantly, there is some strenuous simplification in the critique's insistence that nationalism was the bad seed that turned a more pristine Hinduism and Islam into communal ideologies in India.

To begin with, there is the hardly deniable fact that Lenin pointed out quite explicitly. In a curious way Nandy shares with the Hindu nationalists he criticises an idea that nationalism is a single and transparent thing, the very thing that Lenin denies. In fact, nationalism is far more omnibus and frustrating to analyse than either Nandy or the Hindu nationalists allow, and for that reason it is unlikely that it can be an explanatory concept at all. The variety of nationalisms, indeed the variety of ingredients that go into particular nationalisms at different stages and sometimes even at the same stage, makes this inevitable. As we have been routinely and rightly reminded in other contexts, it would serve no purpose, for instance, to lump together, say, Palestinian nationalism with Zionist nationalism; or to lump together German nationalism in the following four periods: before 1848, after 1918, under Bismarck, and under Nazism. Closer to our specific area of interest, it would be pointless, for instance, to integrate in any explanation, on the one hand Jinnah's and the Muslim League's nationalism in its first two decades with, on the other, his nationalism after several frustrated dealings with the Congress Party in the 20s and his return to India after his failures in England. Even just these three examples respectively show that nationalism can displace a people from their homeland or strive to find a state for a displaced people; it can have an intrinsic tie to social

democracy, liberal democracy, autocracy, or fascism; it can work harmoniously with other communities and its representatives in an anti-imperialist struggle; or it can be as divisive of a people in its anti-imperial struggle as the imperialism it struggles against is in the policies by which it rules over the same people. All of these ingredients of nationalism are themselves explained by underlying economic and social forces and interests in different periods, or sometimes waiting with one another in the same period. The Indian National Congress, almost throughout its long history, has provided a home for most of these ingredients of nationalism and has, not surprisingly, represented a variety of the underlying social and economic interests. We cannot therefore assume that the failures of Nehru's secularism are going to be usefully and illuminatingly diagnosed in any terms that give a central and clear place to some transparently grasped notion of 'nationalism'.

There is a sort of desperate last-ditch retort of those who resist the Leninist insight I am invoking here against Nandy's generalised anti-nationalism. The insight, remember, is not merely that not all nationalisms are bad, but that 'nationalism' is not transparently characterisable. The retort is that for all this lack of transparency, there is an undeniable defining exclusivity in nationalism.

The significance of this claim is highly questionable. One of the frustrating features that go into making 'nationalism' the compendious and opaque notion it is, is that some of its most narrowing and tyrannical aspects are a product of it being neurotically inclusivist (as for example in the national image of Pakistan during Zia's regime). To say, in these contexts, that nationalism is defined upon exclusivity rings false because the fact that it excludes some people or other is innocuous and academic, when compared to the fact that what is most salient about it is that it produces a tin ear for the demands of regional autonomy because of its *inclusivism* (in the name of Islam, in our example). In these contexts, that inclusivism is its defining feature, the exclusivism is peripheral.

Now it is possible to respond in defence of Nandy, and in a sense respond correctly, that in most cases of such inclusivism there is an *underlying* exclusivity having to do with the fact that a set of dominant economic interests at the centre find it necessary to *exclude* regional interests, particularly the interest of the regional masses, even as they insistently *include* them *superficially* into the ideal of the nation (in Pakistan's case via an appeal to Islamist ideology). That is to say, the inclusivist, unifying nationalist image is an ideological perpetration in order for an underlying exclusivist agenda for a dominant, centrist, Punjabi ruling-elite to maintain their hold over the bureaucracy (and the military), and thereby eventually of the investible

resources of the economy and the various elements which concentrate it in their hands. In Pakistan these elements had more to do with system of land-ownership that yielded agricultural surpluses which was siphoned into the metropolises to keep the economy attractive for comprador capital. There was also in recent years the more maverick element of surpluses generated by a thriving sub-economy of gun- and drug-running. In the erstwhile Soviet Union (to take another example) the rampant inclusivism that gave no quarter to regional demands for autonomy was also based on an exclusivism of dominant Russian interests at the centre, though the elements of the economy that made for this exclusivism were more purely those of a fantastic-sized state capitalist apparatus.

I have no quarrel with this interpretation of the inclusivity in nationalism that I was pointing to, as harbouring a deeper and underlying exclusivity in the agenda of ruling elites (in our examples, a Punjabi-dominated or a Russian-dominated ruling elite). But notice that in granting its essential correctness, we are granting something that takes the burden of the exclusivism away from *nationalism* to one or other set of economic interests, that is to say from nationalism to capitalism in its less and more statist forms. This shift in emphasis however is a concession to my overall criticism that the real work here is not being done by nationalism in the way Nandy requires, but by the quite different categories by which exclusivism is now being explicated. If that is what is doing the real work, it makes no *distinctive* point to say that it is nationalism that is the bad seed and that accounts for the failure of Nehru's secularism. With such exclusivism, we have come such a distance from Nandy's critique that we cannot recognise it as his position any more. I do not doubt that Nandy has it in mind to *integrate capitalism too* with statism, nationalism, modernity, and secularism in a single apocalyptic diagnosis. But this does not mean that this interpretation of an exclusivist element in nationalism can be assimilated to his critique. Even if there is no denying the fact that the economic interests surrounding capital which give rise to the exclusivism are distinctly interests of the modern period, and even if they are often accompanied by secular postures, the weight of analysis in Nandy's integrated diagnosis is not on these interests but on very different elements. As a result, this interpretation which stresses these interests need not in any way be implicated in his overall critique of modernity and secularism at all.

So I will return to his position proper rather than this defence of his position, which is no defence at all, but its abandonment.

These roughly Leninist remarks, though highly relevant, only begin to uncover the misidentifications in Nandy's diagnosis of the failure of Nehruvian secularism. Lying behind the uncritical anti-nationalism is a

specific sort of naivete in the critique's historiography, which is altogether missing in Chatterji once he proceeds with the Gramscian framework in the body of his book. Nandy's historiography hides the fact that all the basic elements in the construction of brahminism (especially in north India) were in place well before the deliverances of modernity. This should give us general pause about the somewhat glib tendency to say that communalism like nationalism is a purely 'modern' phenomenon.

The idea of a monolithic, majoritarian, pseudo-unifying Hinduism is, as we tend to say today, a 'construct'. This is indeed what Nandy says about it. But as construction often will, the process goes back a long way into the recesses of Indian history and has helped to perpetuate the most remarkably resilient inegalitarian social formation in the world. It is the product of a sustained effort over centuries on the part of the upper castes to sustain their hold not only on the bases of political power but on the Hindu psyche. Brahminical ascendancy had its ancient origins in a priesthood which made its alliances with kings and their officials as well as with the landed gentry. Through the control of religious ritual and the language of ritual—Sanskrit—and with the force of the kshatriyas (the predominantly military caste) behind them, it gradually created a nationwide hegemony for the upper castes. Under both the feudal rulers during the period of Muslim rule and later in the colonial state, upper caste Hindus flourished in the state apparatus. And in the colonial period this abiding hold over the centres of power, aided by the codifications of language and custom in the Orientalist discursive space, allowed this brahminical ideological tradition to co-opt all efforts at the reform of Hinduism, from the Arya-Samaj movement in the north to the Brahma-Samaj movement in Bengal; even intellectual and social movements which started with the avowed intention to raise the status and the political consciousness of the lower-castes deteriorated into either elitist or anti-Muslim organisations.

This general analysis may be familiar by now. But my reason for invoking it, as I said, is to stress that the construction began to take shape much before the onset of modernity. And it does no favours to historical understanding to let the periodisation inherent in the very category of 'modernity' and its opposites (however we describe them, whether as 'pre-Enlightenment' or 'post-modern') shape *from the outside* how we must diagnose and explain particular social phenomenon. When any such political or social phenomenon (such as brahminism) has a deep and longstanding antecedent strain, it is better to adopt a historiography that places upon it particular and different historical explanations for why the phenomenon with some abiding core characteristics shifts its salencies or takes

on new complexions (e.g., in the case of nationalism, from Weimar to Nazism, from Jinnah's early phase to his later phase, etc); or why it increases its levels and thresholds of urgency in different historical periods. To take an example of the latter: despite the long history of the brahminical construction, the particularly frenzied communal passion of the Hindu nationalists that has been unleashed in the last three years can partly be explained as a violent, and in many respects fascistically modelled, effort to arrest the quickly accumulated ideological effects of recent efforts to *undermine* brahminical hegemony, and to expose the dissimulations of a unified, majoritarian Hindu society by adopting affirmative action policies in favour of the backward castes. I make this point with a very specific theoretical end in mind, which is to show that local historical explanations can be given for the changes and the rise and fall of intensity in what is a longstanding social phenomenon. Nandy's own appeal to various aspects of the modern and colonial period in the understanding of Hindu nationalism should, I believe, be read as local in precisely this way rather than in the way he presents them (though obviously it is a good deal less local than the particular explanation I have just rehearsed of the *most recent* communal outbursts). This reading lowers the high-profile given to periodisation in Nandy's implicit historiography, and hence allows us to say something very different from his main claim. It allows us to say that to the extent that categories such as 'modernity' have explanatory force at all, it is only because this or that aspect of modern life and polity offer *local* explanations of *local* changes in non-local phenomena (such as brahminism) that often pre-date modernity.

Now this last point has no small effect on how we must think of Nandy's own alternative to the Nehruvian secular ideal, for which he is right to resist the label 'secularism'; in fact which he is happy to call 'anti-secularism'.

If the construction of a unified, brahminical version of Hinduism, which (on Nandy's own account) is the basis of Hindu nationalism, pre-dates modernity, a question arises as to what new complexion it did acquire in colonial and post-colonial India? The answer is that what electoral politics in the provinces under the last many decades of British rule, as well as certain forces in the national movement, brought into this construction is a growing mass element. And industrialisation in a domestic and comprador capitalist framework introduced a more variegated caste-complexion through a co-opting of the commercial castes into the constructed hegemony of a unified Hinduism. This answer is by no means complete, but the instructive underlying moral I want to stress is that once we give up the primacy of periodisation and accept the fact of the accumulation and consolidation of long-present tendencies in our understanding of

Hindu nationalism, we are less likely to think of these modern consolidations of it as effaceable for a return to a more traditional Hindu mentality that Nandy favours. The current idiom which has it that such social phenomena as brahminical Hinduism are *constructed*, and to which I have succumbed, must now have its bluff called. 'Construction' implies that there are constructs. And constructs are *not figments*, though the anti-objectivist philosophical commitment that leads to the rhetoric of 'constructivism' in the first place may tempt us to think so. They cannot then be thought of as effaceable, nor even easily malleable, simply by virtue of having been diagnosed as constructions. They are as real and often as entrenched as anything that any more traditional idiom and objectivist philosophical tendency described. So the more subdued and low-profile understanding of historical periodisation suggested above should instruct us that we would do better to recognise constructs, not as figments, but as fused into the polity, and into the sensibility of citizens, and increasingly consolidated by modern developments; and therefore instruct us in turn to look instead for *constraints to be placed upon them* rather than to think in terms of their eradication or effacement.

The separatist electoral politics which were first introduced by the British and whose vote-bank mentality is now entrenched in a functioning formal democracy, as well as all the other institutions of modern statecraft and an increasingly modern economy, are not exactly disposable features of the Indian political sensibility. It goes without saying that there may and should be fruitful and sensible discussion about enormously important matters regarding the deliverances of modernity—about matters such as: should there be so much stress on capital-intensive technologies; should there be so much centralised government, etc. But even if we laid a great deal more stress on labour-intensive technologies, even if we stressed decentralised local government and autonomy much more than we have done so far, this would not coincide with Nandy's conception of a pre-modern political psyche where there will be no potential for the exploitation of one's communal identity in the political spheres of election and government. These spheres are by now entrenched in Indian society and just for that reason the sense in which religion is relevant to politics today cannot any longer be purely spiritual or quotidian and ritualistic as Nandy's somewhat selectively Gandhian politics envisages. It is, in turn, just for this reason again that Nehruvian secularism thought it best to separate religion from politics, because given the existence of these spheres it thought the linking of politics with religion could only be exploited for divisive and majoritarian ends. It seems to me quite one-sided then to place the blame for Hindu nationalism on its

internal dialectical opposition to Nehru's secularism, for it seems quite wrong under these circumstances of electoral democracy that are here to stay to see a yearning to bring religion back into politics as something that is an 'innocent' protest against the tyrannies of Nehru's secularism. It misdescribes matters to say that the yearning *itself* is innocent but modernity disallows the yearning to be fulfilled by anything but a divisive communalism. The right thing to say is that in these circumstances of an ineradicable modernity, particularly if one views modernity as a fallen and sinful condition, the yearning of a religious people to bring their religion into politics cannot, simply cannot, any longer be seen as obviously innocent. For its entry into politics is fraught with precisely the dangers that Nehru and his followers saw, dangers that have been realised in scarcely credible proportions of menace in the last three years.

Though the underlying flaw in the prevalent anti-Nehru intellectual climate is to misdescribe the sense in which religion may enter politics in India, given the realities of a slowly consolidating bourgeois democracy and modern state, this is by no means to suggest that the Nehruvian insistence on a separation of religion from politics is feasible either. Indeed, my acknowledging that his secularism amounted to no more than a holding process is an acknowledgement of the un-Teasability of that separation in a country with the unique colonial and post-colonial history of communal relationships that India has witnessed. Neither the pre-modern conception of an innocent spiritual integration of religion and politics, nor the Nehruvian separation of religion and politics can cope with the demands of Indian political life today.

### III

What I see as a strand of truth in the contemporary critique of Nehru is roughly this: Nehru's secularism was indeed an imposition. But the sense in which it is an imposition is not that it was a modern intrusion into an essentially traditionalist religious population. It is not that because as I said the population under an evolving electoral democracy through this century willy-nilly has come to see religion entering politics in non-traditionalist modern political modes. It is an imposition rather in the sense that it assumed that *secularism stood outside the substantive arena of political commitments*. It had a constitutional status; indeed it was outside even of that: it was in the preamble to the Constitution. It was not in there with Hinduism and Islam as one among *substantive* contested political commitments to be *negotiated*, as any other contested commitments must be negotiated, one with the other.

I should immediately warn against a facile conflation. It may be thought that what I am

doing is pointing to an imposition by *the state* of a doctrine of secularism upon a people who have never been secular in this sense. And in turn it may be thought that this is not all that different from Nandy's (and others.) charge of an imposition made against Nehru, since states which impose entire ways of life upon a people are wholly a project of modernity.<sup>10</sup> Let me leave aside for now, in any case dubious, the idea that only modern states impose ways of life upon people, dubious because it seems to me a wholly unjustified extrapolation to go from the fact that the *scale* of imposition that modern states are capable of implementing is larger, to the idea that it is a *novelty* of the modern state to impose ways of life. That is not the conflation I had in mind. The conflation is the failure to see that in charging Nehru with imposing a non-negotiated secularism, I am saying something quite orthogonal to the charge that his was a statist imposition. Perhaps his *was* a statist imposition, but that is not what my charge is claiming. Rather it is claiming that what the state imposed was not a doctrine that was an outcome of a negotiation between different communities. This critique cannot be equated with a critique of statism, leave alone modern statism, because it may be quite inevitable in our times that, at least at the centre, and probable also in the regions, even a highly negotiated secularism may have to be adopted and implemented by the state (no doubt ideally after an inflow of negotiation from the grass roots). There is no reason to think that a scepticism about Nehru's secularism along these lines should amount in itself to a critique of the very idea of statehood, because there is nothing inherent in the concept of the state which makes it logically impossible that it should adopt such a substantive, negotiated policy outcome, difficult though it may be to fashion such a state in the face of decades of its imposition of a non-negotiated secularism.

Proof of the fact that my critique of Nehru does not coincide with a critique of statehood lies in the fact that the critique applies to a period before independence, i.e., before statehood was acquired. It is very important to point out that Nehru's failure to provide for a creative dialogue between communities is not just a failure of the immediate post-independence period of policy formulation by the state. There are very crucial historical antecedents to it, antecedents which may have made inevitable the post-independent secularist policies whose non-substantive theoretical status and non-negotiated origins I am criticising. For three decades before independence the Congress under Nehru refused to let a secular policy emerge through negotiation between different communal interests, by denying at every step in the various conferrings with the British, Jinnah's demand that the Muslim League represents the Muslims, a Sikh leader represents the

Sikhs, and a harijan leader represents the untouchable community. And the ground for the denial was simply that as a secular party they could not accept that they *not* represent all these communities." Secularism thus never got the chance to *emerge* out of a creative dialogue between these different communities. It was *sui generis*. This archimedean existence gave secularism procedural priority but in doing so it gave it no abiding substantive authority. As a result it could be nothing more than a holding process, already under strain in the time of its charismatic architect, but altogether ineffective in the hands of his opportunist familial heirs. It is this archimedeanism of doctrine, and not its statist imposition, that I think is the deepest flaw in Nehru's vision and (as I will continue to argue later) it has nothing essential to do with modernity and its various Nandian cognates: rationality, science, technology, industry, bureaucracy...

Though I believe it with conviction, given the brevity with which I have had to make this criticism of Nehru I should add several cautionary remarks in order to be fair to Nehru's position. For one thing, I do not mean to suggest that Jinnah and the Muslim League represented the mass of the Muslim people at these stages of the anti-colonial movement; he only represented the urban middle class and was not in an ideal position to play a role in bringing about the sort of negotiated ideal of secularism that I am gesturing at. Nor am I suggesting that these various elitist for a at which Jinnah demanded communal representation could be the loci for the sort of creative dialogue between communities that would have been necessary. However, neither of these cautionary remarks spoil the general point of my criticism of Nehru's position. That general point was to call attention to the horizon of Congress high command thinking about secularism in the pre-independence period, a horizon on which *any* conception of a *negotiated* ideal of secularism was not so much as visible. Putting Jinnah and the elitist conferrings aside, the fact is that even *Congress* Muslim leaders such as Azad were never given a prominent negotiating voice in a communal dialogue with their Hindu counterparts in conferrings within the supposedly *mass* party of which they were members. The question of the need for such a dialogue within the party in order to eventually found a substantive secularism in the future never so much as came up. The transcendent ideal of secularism Nehru assumed made such a question irrelevant.

However, the last and most important of the cautionary remarks I wish to make might be seen as attempting to provide an answer to this line of criticism of Nehru. It is possible that Nehru and the Congress leadership assumed something which to some extent is true: that the Congress Party was a large and relatively accommodating and (communally

speaking) quite comprehensively subscribed nationalist party in a way that the Muslim League had ceased to be. And on the basis of that premise, they could draw the conclusion that an *implicitly and tacitly* carried out negotiation between the component elements in the subscription was already inherent in the party's claims to being secular. In other words, the secularism of a party, premised on the assumption of such a comprehensive communal subscription, had *built into it* by its very nature (that is what I mean by 'tacitly' or implicitly) the negotiated origins I am denying to it. This is a subtle and interesting argument which I think had always been in the back of Nehru's mind in his rather primitively presented writings and speeches on secularism. And I think the argument needs scrutiny, not dismissal<sup>12</sup>

I say that this argument was at the back of Nehru's mind partly because it was often pushed into the background by the rhetoric of a quite different argument that Nehru voiced, which was roughly the argument of the left programme, viz, that a proper focus on the issue of class and the implementation of a leftist programme of economic equality would allow the nation to bypass the difficulties that issued from religious and communal differences. Speaking generally, this argument is a very attractive one. However, except for a few years in the 1930s even Nehru did not voice this argument with genuine conviction; and in any case, if he were thinking honestly, he should have known that it would have been empty rhetoric to do so since he must have been well aware that the right-wing of the party was in growing ascendancy in Congress politics despite his central presence, and there was no realistic chance of the programme being implemented. Given that fact, the negotiative ideal of secularism became all the more pressing. And it is to some extent arguable that it should have been pressing anyway.

To return to what I am calling Nehru's argument from 'implicit' negotiation for his secularism, I strongly suspect that scrutiny of the argument will show, not so much that its premise (about the Congress Party's comprehensive communal subscription) is false, but that the very idea of Implicit or tacit negotiation, which is derived from the premise and which is crucial to the argument, is not an idea that can in the end be cashed out theoretically by any conformational and evidential procedure. As a term of art or theory, implicit negotiation (unlike the real thing; negotiation) yields no obvious or even unobvious inferences that can be observed which will confirm or infirm its explanatory theoretical status. Hence the argument is not convincing because there is no bridge that takes one from the idea that an anti-colonial movement and a post-colonial party is 'composite' (a favourite word of the Congress to describe its wide spectrum of communal

representation) to the idea that it stands for a substantive secularism.<sup>11</sup> My point is that to claim that the *mere fact of compositeness* amounts to an *implicit* negotiation among the compositional communal elements which would yield such a secularism, is a sophistical move which does nothing to bridge that gap in the argument. It is a mere fraudulent *labelling* of a non-existing bridging argumentative link between compositeness and, what I am calling, a 'substantive' secularism. The label 'implicit' just serves to hide the fact that the commitment to genuine negotiation (which alone could build the necessary bridge from the party's compositeness to a substantive secularism) was manifestly avoided by the Congress Party.<sup>14</sup>

In any case, even if the argument was justified at some point (which is highly doubtful), even if it was justified up to a point three and a half decades after independence, the fact is that since the 1980s it has become very clear that the *premise* underlying the argument simply fails to be true of the Congress Party. Since that period it can no longer claim to represent a wide spectrum of religious communities. In the 1980s Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi after her, because they could not count on a populist and comprehensive secular base after the manifest and predictable failure of the 'Garibi Hatao' platform, slowly but more or less openly cultivated the support of the majority community to replace that base of support, first by turning against the Sikhs and then more subtly against the Muslims. As a result today the premise, and therefore the argument itself, sounds hollower than ever. Today more than ever, secularism of the Nehruvian kind which the Congress Party has inherited from its past as a sort of incantation sounds utterly unconvincing because it has even lost its claims to be founded on the (in any case dubious) notion of implicit negotiation among different elements in a heterogeneous umbrella organisation. In such circumstances, with no locus where negotiation between communities, however implicit, can be found or carried out, the very idea of secularism is bound to seem an imposition in the special sense I have claimed.

In reaction to this imposition it would be a mistake to formulate an alternative vision of secularism which harked back nostalgically to the idea of a pre-modern India. Since the sense in which it is an imposition has not so much to do with modernist intrusion as with its rarefied non-negotiable status, the right reaction to it should be to acknowledge that secularism can only *emerge* as a value by negotiation between the substantive commitments of particular religious communities. It must emerge from the bottom up with the moderate political leadership of different religious communities negotiating both procedure and substance, negotiating details of the modern polity from the codification of law primarily to the

distribution of such things as political and cultural autonomy, and even bureaucratic and industrial employment, education, etc.

So, just to take one example in the vital domain of the law, negotiation among leaders and representatives of the different communities may deliver the conclusion that Muslims have better laws for orphans, say, while Hindus have better laws for divorce and alimony; and so on. A civil code had it emerged in this way would very likely have pre-empted the present controversy surrounding the idea of a 'uniform' civil code. By giving participatory negotiating voice to the different communal interests, it would have pre-empted Muslim fears about the idea of a 'uniform' civil code and Hindu resentment at Nehru's failure to endorse that idea. Because of the archimedean rather than emergent character of India's adopted secularism, Nehru and other leaders found themselves inevitably providing special status to Muslim law. It was the *internal logic* of its non-negotiated methodological character that it found this special status the only fair treatment of India's most substantial minority, thus yielding aggressive resentment among the Hindus which in turn bred reactionary fear of giving up the special status among the Muslims.

An alternative secularism, emergent rather than imposed in the specific sense that I have defined, sees itself as one among other doctrines such as Islam and Hinduism. Of course there is still a difference of place and function in the polity between secularism and Islam or Hinduism. But once we see it as a substantive doctrine, this difference can be formulated in quite other terms than the way Nehru formulated it. In my conception, what makes secularism different from these specific politico-religious commitments is not any longer that it has an archimedean and non-substantive status, but rather that it is an outcome of a negotiation among these specific commitments. This gives secularism a quite different place and function in the polity, and in the minds of citizens, than Islam or Hinduism could possibly have. Yet this difference does not amount to wholesale transcendence from these substantive religious commitments in politics. If secularism transcends religious politics in the way I am suggesting, it does so *from within*, it does not do so because it has a shimmering philosophical existence separate from religious political commitments, nor because it is established by constitutional fiat by a pan-Indian elite unconcerned and unrealistic about the actual sway of religion in politics. It does so rather because *after* climbing up the ladder of religious politics (via a dialogue among acknowledged substantive religious commitments in politics) this emergent secularism might be in a position to kick that ladder of religious politics away. There is no paradox here of a doctrine emerging from its opposite, no

more so than in any movement of synthesis, for the point is essentially Hegelian. Unlike the pure liberal fantasy of a secularism established by an historical, philosophical ('transcendental', to use Kant's term) argument, the argument being proposed is essentially dialectical, where secularism emerges from a creative playing out (no historical inevitability is essential to *this* Hegelian proposal) of a substantive communal politics that is prevalent at a certain historical juncture.

When it is hard won in these ways, secularism is much more likely to amount to something more than a holding process. And this is so not merely because (unlike Nehru's secularism) it acknowledges as its very starting-point the inseparability of religion from politics, but also because, at the same time, it does not shun a realistic appreciation of the entrenched facts of modern political life, which Nehru (unlike his contemporary critics) was right to embrace wholeheartedly. This way of looking at things gives a philosophical basis to the widespread but somewhat vague anti-Nehru feeling (shared by a variety of different political positions today) that in a country like India we cannot any longer embrace a secularism that separates religion from politics. And it does so without in any way ceding ground to those who draw quite the wrong conclusions from this vague feeling: it cedes nothing to the Hindu nationalist, nor to the Muslim communalist,<sup>15</sup> nor even to Ashis Nandy's nostalgia for a by-gone pre-modernism. The crucial importance of seeing things this way lies precisely in the fact that it counters what is a dangerously easy and uncritical tendency today, the tendency to move from this vague but understandable feeling of the inseparability of religion from politics to one or other of these conclusions. It counters this tendency by a very specific philosophical consolidation of this feeling, so that these conclusions which are often derived from it now no longer seem compulsory. Or, to put it more strongly (and more correctly), this philosophical consolidation of this understandable feeling allows us to see these conclusions derived from the feeling as simply, *non-sequiturs*.

I have talked much of a negotiated rather than archimedean secularism, but barely said anything in positive detail about the nature of the negotiation that is implied. That will have to be (and is) the subject of another paper. But its worth spending just a word to note one or two questions and problems that need particularly to be addressed.

It is worth noting that there were moments in colonial India and in the national movement, when such negotiations were approximated, such as (to take just one example) during a stretch of the Swarajist period in Bengal under the leadership of Chittaranjan Das, culminating in the Bengal Pact. I say 'approximated' because here too



the merchant and professional classes were much more the represented voices in the negotiation; and even if that is to some extent going to be inevitable in most of the realistically envisageable contexts of the near and middle future, that is no reason to abandon sight of the higher ideal of a more grass roots negotiation. On the other hand, qua negotiation, it fell short in the quite opposite sense also of not having been echoed at the more centralised levels of the Congress Party. So there is the opposite pitfall of negotiated secularisms emerging at provincial levels, but failing to abide because they do not suit centralised interests.

There is also the palpable fact today that the centrage (in terms of both vocal strength and influence) in communal politics tends to be held by an extremist leadership which is unlikely to find any appeal in the kind of negotiation that is necessary. That does mean that negotiation will have to be preceded by a confrontation with Hindu nationalist forces primarily (because of their greater numbers and strength) but also the reactionary leadership in Muslim communities. This will be no easy struggle, and will depend on the patient integration of different marginalised interests. That is, it is unlikely that the conflicted communities will throw up a strong and sustained moderate leadership prepared to negotiate the details of a secular ideal, without the prior formation of diverse alliances against the rising power of brahmanical Hindu nationalism and the reactionary Muslim response to it. The aspirations of the backward castes, of the scheduled castes, of the tribal communities, of women, and of moderate Muslims, amount to the aspirations of a substantial majority of the Indian population and it is their alliances which will have to be fashioned. No doubt an essential part of this progressive effort will be made in the formal political arena, as it always has, by the political parties of the left.<sup>16</sup> But the very acknowledgement that these alliances will have to be as diverse as I have catalogued them, suggests that the left itself will mean something that is not altogether recognisable in the traditional and often exclusively 'class' analyses that have defined the platforms of the traditional left parties. The wholehearted adoption and pursuit of the Mandal commission recommendations (*and its wider implications for political and economic power*) by the left parties will, I believe, be a crucial first step in this process.<sup>17</sup> The report and its aftermath have no doubt had the effect of sidestepping the strict primacy of a class analysis,<sup>11</sup> and have also raised the prospect of immediate struggle along caste lines, but that is an unavoidable part of the overall struggle against brahminical orthodoxy and nationalism. The fact is that it has directly called into question the infinite survival of one of the most fantastic forms of social evil in the history of the world. It is the first step

in opening up the possibility of a Muslim/lower caste axis and, in doing so, has revived the possibility of many cultured, grass roots political alliances which alone could eventually unsettle the myth that India's secularism *can only* be imposed non-negotiably by a pan-Indian ruling elite.

#### IV

I have tried in this paper to distinguish between two notions of secularism by criticising the Nehruvian vision from a quite different angle than Ashis Nandy's. Unlike Nandy, I did not argue that the failure of Nehru's secularism flowed from its being an enlightenment-laden ideological imposition. I have argued that it was characterised more by a deep methodological flaw, which made it an imposition in a far more abstract sense. It was a failure in the quite different sense that it pretended, both before and after independence, to stand outside of substantive and contested value commitments, and was thus not able to withstand the assault of the reactionary and authoritarian elements in the value commitments that never pretended to be anything *but* substantive and contested; the commitments, that is, of the nationalist Hindu, the communalist Muslim and the nationalist Sikh. I want to close by drawing out a theoretical implication of this difference between Nandy's critique and mine; this will also allow me to briefly recover a point I left hanging at the close of my discussion of Partha Chatterji in Section I.

In a very important sense, an aspect of Nandy's critique of Nehru, which I have not focused on, inherits a muddle that it uncovers in Nehru's thinking. There is a strand in Nehru's thinking that Nandy emphasises, which is Nehru's apparent linking of the scientific temper with a secular attitude. I have instead restricted my attention to Nandy's discussion linking Nehru's secularism with the modern phenomenon of nationalism and its accompanying statism. But this might seem unfair since his discussion makes so much of modernity and the enlightenment, and essential to the idea of these things, it might be said, is Nehru's optimism about the scientific outlook's power to overcome communal commitments. That is, it might seem unfair that in failing to take up this facile optimism in Nehru, I have left out an integral part of Nandy's critique of Nehru's modernism, and therefore rejected Nandy's outright scepticism about secularism too easily. My only excuse for not taking up this aspect of Nandy is that it seemed to me obvious that this optimism on Nehru's part was based on a dumbfounding, though common, confusion. There is simply no dependable connection between communalism and the lack of scientific temper, because communalism is a *political* phenomenon (with economic underpinnings and cultural consequences) and not a matter of having an unscientific outlook. There is

about as much connection between belief in the power of science and secular attitudes as there is between belief in god and moral behaviour. That is to say, none. The most scientific-minded can be party to a cynical adoption of religion in politics, and the most devout can be suspicious of the mix of religion and politics. Nandy is so obviously right to think that the canonisation of science and its method, and perhaps even its technological consequences in large-scale capital-intensive investments have failed to promote a secular polity, that it seemed to me hardly worth noting. That is why I focused on Nandy's more controversial and interesting argument against Nehru which linked his secularism *internally* with its opposite, Hindu nationalism, and in turn situated the latter too as a special instance of a general phenomenon of distinctly modern times. It does nothing to improve the genuine interest of this argument (nor to alleviate its dubious viability) to *throw into* the argument what is a quite separable strand, viz, these considerations critical of Nehru's commitment to science. Nandy, however, may not see it this way. For him, Nehru's wrongs regarding secularism are perhaps inseparable from the wrongs of that other commitment of modernity and the enlightenment, the fetishistic commitment to scientific knowledge. Thus for him to reject one is to reject the other as well.

But this is simply to buy into Nehru's confusion. The right criticism would have been to notice that Nehru confused the two things. And if that is so, that leaves it open (such is the beauty of confusions) that each of those two things is right, or that one of them is right or even that both happen to be wrong. But to say that both things are wrong and *necessarily wrong together* (because they are both part of a post-enlightenment paradigm) is simply to have failed to see the strength and point of uncovering a confusion in Nehru's thinking. A critique of something as being confused should not then go on to inherit the confusion in its criticism. It is perfectly possible then to leave out of his critique of Nehru's commitment to secularism, his critique of his modernist commitment to science and technology, on the ground that these two commitments that are the targets of two separate critiques have no inherent inferential link and were only linked by a confusion in Nehru's thinking. But Nandy, and others who follow him,<sup>19</sup> do not leave these separable things separate, and see their critiques of them as essentially linked. In doing so, they make essentially the same confusion. If we relieve Nandy of this inherited confusion, then we can distil from him the leaner and more interesting argument against Nehru that I have focused on in the paper, and found wanting.

Chatterji's ambitions of linking a critique of nationalist discourse with the theme of the



enlightened paradigm are not guilty of this inherited confusion, because when he writes about Nehru there he is not really concerned with his secularism as he is in the articles I am discussing.

All the same, it is tempting to think this. In the last section, I criticised Nehru for a philosophical failure to see secularism as anything less than an archimedean ideal. This archimedeanism, it might be said, is just another feature of the idea of reason as we find it in the enlightenment, so my critique is not coming from so different an angle as Nandy's, or from what Chatterji had promised to deliver in his first chapter. Indeed, it may be said that once we stress the secular strain in nationalism of the time of what Chatterji calls its "moment of arrival", the Nehruvian phase, this criticism of mine may be seen as just the supplementary element needed in Chatterji's dialectic that will allow him to fill the gap I had registered in Section I. But this thought, though tempting, is just wrong. There is nothing specifically post-enlightenment about the archimedeanism I am inveighing against. Any one who has any acquaintance with the history of political theory, say even through a good secondary source such as Quentin Skinner's survey, will find it in various mediaeval doctrines, in various republican doctrines prior to the enlightenment, not to mention in every sentence expressing every central or passing thought that Plato ever had on the polis.

Quite apart from this, let us just ponder the matter for a minute purely conceptually rather than produce evidence from intellectual history. Let us just ask what it would take for the tempting thought I am rejecting to be true. Answering this question would bring out a little why it was so difficult for Chatterji to bridge the gap between his initial statement of aims and the deliverances of his actual argument. For the tempting thought to be true, it would have to be the case that there is a determinate and determining conceptual tie between the paradigms of objectivist notions of reason on the one hand and the specifically technological and controlling frames of mind that are exercised in the modern states and societies we have so appallingly and uncritically constructed. I am not here contesting the finding of wrongs either in the claims of objectivist conceptions of reason, or in the technological frames of mind that shape modern societies. I am only expressing a scepticism about their *assumed connection*, i.e., that these wrongs we find in them both issue from some common source of fallacy. So far as I know no epistemological or philosophical position has satisfactorily made out a case for this connection. Heidegger in some late works made the bare claim that if one took truth to be so objective, and nature to be so external to us, as reason under a certain conception demands (and it is worth notice that he too has rightly placed this

conception as beginning in the west, not in the enlightenment but in everything that followed the pre-Socratics), then we will have no choice eventually but to wish to control and master nature in ways that amount to this technological frame of mind that governs modern societies. This connection is made by bald assertion. Leave alone the lack of an argument, it does not even, with any assurance, capture an intuition I can imagine someone finding it just as intuitive to say that "if nature was indeed so external as objectivism and reason demands, perhaps we will never do anything with it except see it as a wondrous and exotic object to be handled with the utmost unassumingness." So no such bald, abstractly drawn, hand-waving, claim will bridge the gap between a satisfying analysis of nationalism within a Gramscian framework, and the overweening goal of finding it a special instance of all the flaws of the enlightenment conception of reason and knowledge; nor will it help in linking my criticism of Nehru with a general critique of post-enlightenment modernity. Each of these pairs of things are composed of unbridgeably distinct propositions, and sometimes we should acknowledge that it is far more interesting to register a distinction than to make implausible connections.

And this is so not merely for the sort of remote philosophical reasons I have just given, but because these philosophical reasons have significant consequences for political understanding and action. As is well known, a good deal of the recent attacks on post-enlightenment conceptions of reason have emerged under the influence of Foucault's fascinating historical analyses of various concepts and institutions of the modern Europe. Here again, we may acknowledge the power of these historical analyses at the same time as we express scepticism of their claimed inherent link with the paradigms of reason and science. (I repeat that the point of this scepticism is not to find entirely coherent certain metaphysical notions of objective truth and reason and representation. This essay is not intended as a familiar kind of rearguard support for the enlightenment—for if it were that, it would be *participating* in a familiar debate, whose framing methodology and premises I reject as resting on unjustified extrapolated connections made by both sides to the dispute. The point is that even if these metaphysical notions are not coherent, that incoherence is self-standing, and has no inherent link with the detailed critiques of nationalism and secularism, or for that matter with the critiques of modern institutions of crime and punishment or of mental health.) Foucault's claim to such an inherent link came from his conviction that the idea of power underwent a transformation after the enlightenment as a result of the *codifications* of ways of life and, thinking, which came from the general intellectual drive for system and order that constituted

the enlightenment's commitment to reason and science. As a result of these codifications, what was a relatively humane and discretionary exercise of power, when power was more arbitrary, became a monstrously distant and alienating phenomenon, no longer resident in identifiable personages who participated in such a range of discretionary practices, but written rigidly into the public texts of governance, and eventually into larger, unapproachable, even unidentifiable, bureaucratic machines in different sections of society. To take just an example, and to put it very crudely, for him the provincial magistrates of old regime France, for all their arbitrariness and cruelty, were party to a far more discretionary and humane exercise of the law upon criminals, than the alienating and uncompromising rigidities emerging from the newly formulated penal codes in the enlightenment.

I think this transformed conception of power, which flows at least partly from cognitive sources and reinforces cognitive control, over and above earlier forms of political control, has been of great underlying influence in the writings of Chatterji and some of his colleagues in the subaltern school of historians. At any rate, the evidence of the influence is pervasive in those chapters of Chatterji's book that I have been criticising, and it also coincides with much of Nandy's writing. Once again, even-if we acknowledge that there is an important role for the cognitive element in power, I think it would be hard to make out the requisite inherent connections being claimed by Foucault. And on roughly analogous philosophical grounds as the one I gave above. But I want now to stress instead the more immediate political reasons for not fetishising this opposition to codification so that it becomes *not just a critique of particular consequences of particular sorts of codes, but a critique of codification as such*. In other words, not just a critique of this or that exercise of power in the post-enlightenment period, but a critique of power which was inherent in the very idea of codification that issued from post-enlightenment conceptions of reason and knowledge.<sup>20</sup> It is politically vital to resist this tempting generalising intellectual transition because at our historical juncture of unalterable post-enlightenment modernity, there is no possibility of political agency left that does not build upon counter-codes or *resistance*. (Ironically—and it is an irony that flows naturally from the gap in his argument that I noted in Section I—implied by Chatterji's own Gramscian critique of nationalist discourse is precisely such a counter-code of resistance, a code that is not hard to tease out of Gramsci's writings.)

The dismissal of the very idea of resistance that builds upon its own counter-codes to particular statist and capitalist exercises of power, is one of the more glib and Uncritical

legacies of Foucault's influence on current thinking; and it yields unconstructive, nostalgic theoretical positions to counter the specific forms of power that he and those influenced by him have themselves often usefully analysed. The dismissal is based on a very deep-going and underlying misunderstanding of the conditions of political and communal agency, but that must remain the detailed subject of another overlong paper.

I am not using the term 'nostalgist' as a term of abuse. At any rate if I am, then there are many cases of self-abuse, because something like that term has become part of the self-description of some writers who are party to the dismissal I am criticising. At the end of his paper 'Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?',<sup>21</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty proudly describes the anti-modernist strategy he is proposing as based upon *dreams*. I quote: 'To attempt to provincialise this 'Europe' is to see the modern as inevitably contested, to write over the given and privileged narratives of citizenship other narratives of human connections that draw sustenance of *dreamed-uppasts* [my emphasis] and futures, where collectivities are defined neither by rituals of citizenship nor by the nightmare of 'tradition' that 'modernity' creates. There are of course no (infra)structural sites where such dreams could lodge themselves. Yet they will recur so long as the themes of citizenship and the nation state dominate our narratives of historical transition, for these dreams are what the modern represses in order to be.'

Chakrabarty gets self-conscious about two things before he writes these words. He says that the rest of his paper would have made clear that his "is not a call for cultural relativism or for atavistic nativist histories". But these slightly embarrassed caveats misplace where someone should find his position to be implausible. The issue is neither about cultural relativism nor about nativism, despite the long and tired history of the debates surrounding these. Rather, as I said, this position and others of this sort have not properly thought through what the conditions of the possibility of political agency are. As a consequence, another caveat he announces before writing the words I have quoted fails to carry conviction. This is his remark: "Nor is this a programme for a simple rejection of modernity, which would be, in many situations, politically suicidal". I am not sure what a *simple* rejection of modernity would be, but, as I have been saying, it does seem to me that the Foucault-inspired transition from a critique of specifically codified exercises of power in modern societies to a critique of codified conceptions of reason in politics, whether it is a simple rejection or not, is philosophically ungrounded and, *indeed* 'politically suicidal' since it can have no proper account of political agency.

(I cannot say with absolute confidence whether in the passage I quoted, Chakrabarty is making the transition that I find untenable in other writers, for his theme in that essay is somewhat different from what we have been discussing in them, but to my ear it sounds very much as if he is.)<sup>22</sup>

I regret having to close the paper with a criticism that will not be able to elaborate much on a central point that it relies on, viz, the point about what goes into the notion of political agency. The subject is too large and too integrated with other subjects not raised in this paper for me to pursue it here in detail. I can only hint here (what will seem paradoxical, but is only superficially so) that no account of political agency can afford to leave out an ingredient which is a refinement of the theoretical phenomenon that is abusively dismissed by various writers (including some in the subaltern school of historians) under the label 'sociological determinism'.<sup>23</sup> Their dismissal is based on an untenable dualism between determinism and agency, a dualism no doubt encouraged as a form of reaction against careless and unsophisticated versions of sociological determinism, which should quite properly be dismissed. But the right response to these dismissible doctrines is to offer an account of agency which allows precisely for agency's emergence out of practical rationality and the power of communities for reflective criticism, in which much of what counts as criticism and resistance both to authority and to one's own history is based inevitably on the counter-codes of resistance that one shapes out of what one's own history has made available at given times.

When Chatterji and others have tabled their objection to what they call sociological determinism, they have found that it views political phenomena, such as nationalism, to be "invariably shaped according to contours outlined by given historical models", and they find in it all the rhetoric of necessity, some of which Chatterji catalogues: "objective, inescapable, imperative, too-marked deviations,...impossible", etc. And soon after, he asks: "Where in all this is the working of the imagination, the intellectual process of creation? ...the problem does not arise, because even when nations are 'invented', it is out of necessity...Like religion and kinship, nationalism is an anthropological fact and there is nothing else to it." There is, as he says, no place for "thought" and "agency".

Against this sociological determinism, he demands that in the study of nationalism we also study its discourse and seek out, in particular, the possibilities of the autonomy of nationalist discourse. His eventual brief, as I said earlier, is that anti-colonial nationalist discourse in India never really achieved autonomy from the enlightenment categories of the colonial masters, and this is perhaps not surprising

since the discourse itself was a reflection of its own legitimising of the "marriage between reason and capital". And so for him the ideal remains the transcendence of discourse and of the cultural and spiritual productions of nationalism from the enlightenment ideal of reason.

Though, unlike the sociological determinists, he demands that there be a proper focus in the study of nationalism on discourse and culture, it is not obvious what his own departure from sociological determinism amounts to, when at the end of the study he concludes that the discourse failed to achieve autonomy from enlightenment categories of reason because "ever since the enlightenment, reason in its universalising mission has itself been parasitic upon a much less lofty, much more mundane, palpably material and singularly invidious force, namely, the universalist urge of capital". Chatterji has raised a protest against the doctrine of sociological determinism, but he has not given us any clue as to what it really means to say that we must restore the rightful place of thought and agency against this doctrine. He no doubt steers us to study nationalism more broadly by studying its discourse as well, but apart from that salutary broadening of disciplinary pursuits, he offers no advance in the epistemology of agency except to hint at an ideal of autonomy that discourse must acquire from the capital-driven demands of reason ever since the enlightenment. What *could* this autonomy be but something which amounts to a systematic critique of the "universalising urge of capital"? And how could this critique fail to issue from some more or less systematic and positive theoretical conception ('code') of both culture and material conditions? And, in turn, how could this positive theoretical conception be formulated except with the deployment of some of the concepts and categories that are at hand for us in the midst of our post-enlightenment modernity (reason)? The only alternatives are the nostalgic visions of 'dreamed-up pasts' or of sheer transcendence.

So, my question is, can the notion of political agency be explored in a framework that falls short of this heady brew of ulterior visions? That exploration would have to seek a reconciliation between sociological determinism and agency; and that would require a refinement of what we are used to understanding by the term 'Sociological determinism'. What makes for agency is not transcendence from our histories and material conditions, but reflection and the possibility of self-evaluation and self-criticism. It cannot be a threat to agency that the categories by which such normative assessments of ourselves are made are restricted by our historical position. And these restrictions are not always just a matter of what our histories have made *available*

to us; they also emerge from what we ourselves may *decide* is feasible or efficacious, given local historical circumstance. Of course we may dream with much less restriction, than that, but if the notion of freedom is tied to free *action*, then questions of feasibility and efficaciousness loom large to restrict the range of the concepts we can deploy. When we give to thought and agency the power to resist material and cognitive and cultural domination, it is a *non-cancellable* condition for such thought and agency that it is assessable by the thinkers and agents themselves in the light of codes constituted by the concepts *at hand* (and not at some other place) and shaped by their material conditions. I say this is a non-cancellable condition of agency, and mean it. The point, is intended as analytic, not empirical. But it is not trivial for being so. It is not just a random stipulation about the nature of free agency and thought, but a non-arbitrary philosophical proposal that political agency is related to our determining conditions, not as a whole new field of transcendent exercises of volition but as a normative and reflective point of view which we may bring to bear on our own actions and thoughts, even if those actions and thoughts have determining conditions, and even if these assessments are internal to our own available conceptual resources.

The idea that agency is compatible with determinism in this way yields a liberating theoretical perspective. For it allows us to talk of the possibility of thought and imagination and spirit and their various cultural productions as *both* freely exercised *and* as capable of amounting to *false-consciousness*. The dichotomies embraced by the critics of sociological determinism force a framework in which the very idea of false-consciousness could issue from nothing but a crippling determinism, which leaves no place for agency. In this framework, agency depends upon the idea of a *self-standing* consciousness, and that is precisely what is under threat by the positing of false-consciousness. It is often a necessary condition for some stretch of consciousness being false that it has inextricable links with what is not consciousness, the realm of the material. It is only when consciousness fails to live up to what is demanded by specific aspects of the material realm (e.g., the real and objective interests of a class) according to some theory about that realm and about its determining relation to consciousness, that we will count it as false. For these critics of such sociological determinism, this is a surrender of the self-standingness of consciousness (and spirit and culture) to material determination. But if instead we see agency as turning on normative assessment and reflection, there is no reason to think that a charge of false-consciousness brings with it an agency-threatening determinism. That the social behaviour of a class (say, certain

'economistic' trade-union activities of a section of the working-class in a capitalist society) should be charged with false-consciousness can now be seen as an attribution of responsibility and blame to it, a normative assessment which presupposes its agency rather than denies it. Thus one can accept the fact that consciousness can sometimes be false and accept the presupposition of this fact, viz., that consciousness is not self-standing but often dependently linked with material conditions, and yet make no concession to an agency-threatening and responsibility-threatening determinism. One can have it both ways.

The appropriate categories for the description of the thought that makes possible political agency (say, nationalist resistance) are not ones that describe it as an accumulated stretch of spiritual counters in an *inner* repository of culture—though this is exactly how Chatterji has come around to describing a central strand in anti-colonial nationalism in India in his more recent book.<sup>24</sup> No doubt, there were great spiritual and intellectual contributions to nationalism of the kind Chatterji discusses, but it is distorting of the notion of agency to place these contributions in a descriptive framework governed by a dichotomy between an inner spiritual domain and its outer opposite. Agency and the mentality that makes it what it is, is much more perspicuously described, as I have been saying, in terms of normative assessment. The dualism of agency and determination is not a dualism within the metaphysics of politics, whereby there are separable realms of the inner and outer, but rather it is a dualism of point of view, the point of view whereby we understand ourselves as a product of both conceptual and material causes, and the point of view whereby we reflectively evaluate ourselves. It is only if we redescribe agency in this way that we will find that we have given ourselves the right to say two things that would otherwise have seemed unutterable together: First, to say, as before, that there is no agency without thought and imagination, but, second, also to say that thought and imagination can sometimes all the same be (by the lights of our own codes of assessment, when we adopt a evaluative perspective on ourselves) a bit of false-consciousness. And once we see through to the possibility of saying the second of these things (not that we must always say it; for obviously not all thought and culture is false-consciousness), then that removes the point and rationale for the sort of distinction between the inner and the outer that Chatterji makes. The assessment of falsity of consciousness issues from a code (even if it is a very roughly configured bit of theory) in whose elaboration there are often going to figure descriptions of elements that Chatterji relegates to the outer, material realm. If there are such dialectical links between these two posited realms, then clearly the

realms themselves are crying out for other descriptive categories to describe them than the categories 'inner' and 'outer', and even the category 'two' Here, where we need to record a connection, Chatterji registers a distinction and a gap. This is of course very much *related* to the fact (it is indeed partly *explained* by the fact) that earlier where he should have rested content with a gap between his Gramscian critique and his critique of the enlightenment paradigm of reason, he had announced a connection. I will leave it as an exercise for the reader to spell out that relation and explanation.

Now, I am not denying that there has been an intellectual tradition of social and historical thought that freely attributed false-consciousness *without* framing it in this normative conception of agency, ie, it saw them instead as purely descriptive attributions to a person or class, and therefore as attributions that presupposed no responsibility on his or its part. I am merely saying that, in doing so, it did not give itself the philosophical right to see these (often perfectly just) attributions of false-consciousness as leaving unthreatened the agency of persons, communities and classes. The question of why, contra this tradition, we should attribute responsible agency to agent with false-consciousness is a delicate question, which needs elaborate discussion. Let me only say here that the issue turns on fundamental questions about the very nature of the explanation of the behaviour of persons or communities. The explanation of a social behaviour is, as many philosophers have pointed out, not a purely causal account but the task of *making sense* of people, in a way that *constitutively* requires assessing in the light of norms. This implies something whose significance for political agency is considerable, but which has not been much acknowledged by political philosophers. It implies that it is the nature of such explanations that, when and if one understood such an explanation of *oneself*, one could not be in an *agnostic* position regarding whether one ratified or rejected the normative light in which it placed one. Since norms are constitutive of the explanation (over and above the causes), there is no way to make or comprehend an explanation of oneself and be indifferent to its normative assessment of one. It follows from this that to the extent that agents with false-consciousness are capable of understanding the explanations of their behaviour which assesses it as being so, they are in a position of responsibility regarding it, since they are necessarily in a position of ratifying or rejecting what they have come to see themselves as after having comprehended the explanation. This is not a matter of a measurable step that agents may or may not take after achieving self-understanding. If norms *constitute* the explanations of their behaviour, then their own understanding of such explanations of

themselves, with no additional step, puts them in the position of endorsement or repudiation of what the explanation identifies them as being. That strictly follows from the constitutive nature of norms in these explanations. To say that norms are constitutive of explanation is to say that they are not some extra pieces of value tacked on after a causal explanation has been given; it is to say that the explanation itself, qua explanation, *identifies* the behaviour and the agent as falling under a normatively formulated characterisation. And norms being what they are, they extract commitment in one direction or other, once one comprehends them as explanatory of oneself, that is; once one sees oneself in the light in which they present us to ourselves. I am not of course suggesting that these endorsements or repudiations are easily achieved. Nor am I suggesting that the process by which one achieves them does not occur in stages, or even gradual stages. Reflection and self-understanding are fragile and often painful cognitive and conative achievements. I am merely drawing out the structural consequences for agency and responsibility from the normativity inherent in the study of social and political action. Incidentally, exactly what I have just said about false-consciousness holds of people who are attributed self-deception. We hold cases of both false-consciousness and self-deception responsible in a way that we might not hold cases of psychopathology, precisely because there is no such confidence that there is a capacity for comprehension on the psychopath's part of the norm-involving explanation of himself.

The tradition of social and historical thought that I am criticising, thus, simply failed to see the explanation of behaviour, including false-consciousness, as the task of making normative sense of persons and classes and communities. It saw it as more purely causal explanation (even when it cited their beliefs and their goals) and therefore often fell into a pretentiously scientific and deterministic rhetoric. As a result, this tradition prompted a cumulative dismissive reaction to itself, and made itself vulnerable to such dismissive descriptions as 'sociological determinism'. But this reaction *itself* is party to the same underlying failure to question the false dichotomy of determination and agency, as can be seen in the fact that it finds the need to adopt descriptive categories such as the inner and the outer, the material and the cultural or spiritual. Such a shared underlying failure on both sides makes for a familiar oscillation between what seem irreconcilable positions on the nature of political economy and culture, between which we must choose and line up. But I think a reorientation of our conception of agency as a presupposition of the normative assessment of action shows that this oscillation is quite uncompulsory.

As I have said, this idea needs a good deal more elaboration than I am able to give it here. I will, nevertheless, draw from it the consequence that I had threatened to draw, because its general relevance to the subject of this section are, I hope, now more clearly visible.

The possibility of political agency (such as nationalist thought and action) requires resistance to codes, not transcendence from code. And (if there is to be such a thing as *reflection* at all) such resistances are themselves assessed—for genuine freedom as opposed to false-consciousness—by codes, only because code has not been transcended. (I am stubbornly capitalising here to draw attention to my insistence that we should not be cowed by charges of reification, simply because we wish to resist the wholly unjustified extrapolating generalisations in post-Foucauldian critiques of reason and modernity.) And these codes themselves are conceptually configured by what is conceptually available in our historical and material circumstances. If it is only by these (codified and deterministic) lights that one can make sense of the idea of a community's moral psychology and power to act and resist, then 'dreams' seems altogether the wrong description to put upon the exercises of such a conception of thought and agency. Dreams may have a powerful subversive, and even clarifying, role in moral psychology but they cannot *constitute* moral psychology and agency, or else agency would come apart from reflection. The greatest theorist of dreams was enough of a Hegelian to make clear that he made no such inference against "modernity":

It is precisely this notion of agency, compatible with (indeed *requiring*) low-profile notions of 'determinism' and 'code', that informed my own critique of Nehru's secularism. For, unlike those critiques of Nehru that criticise him for being too situated in the grand paradigmatic concepts of the enlightenment and of modernity, my criticisms acknowledge the determining fact of slowly evolving modern institutions and attitudes. As a result, my conclusions are less ambitious but also, I submit, less preposterously nostalgic and potentially more constructive. My (admittedly primitive and sketchy) proposal for an alternative conception of secularism seeks, by a posited process of reflection and internal negotiation, to arrive at a dialectical outcome uncountenanced either by Nehru or by the extravagantly extrapolative critiques of Nehru that I have been criticising.

#### Notes

[This paper is a fragment of a much longer project. Hence certain points are made rather sketchily here and need much elucidation and qualification on the basis of a closer look at historical detail as well as more elaborate philosophical argument. I am very grateful to

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- 1 I use the expression 'religious community' somewhat recklessly since it is in so many senses in which the Muslims (or Hindus) in India *are* as well as *are not* either religious or a community. So I am hoping that the reader will not unsympathetically over-interpret my use of the term as standing for some sort of social or other kind of reification. Having warned against this unguarded use, I will simply go ahead with it, since it seems to me to make for too awkward an exposition 'to keep warning at each stage against it, and also since it does seem to me to be roughly correct to say that in some sense it is (politicised) religious communities that are involved in the communal conflicts that we have been witnessing in recent years.
- 2 For the most fleeting of examples of such a generalisable conclusion, see note 12 below.
- 3 Partha Chatterji, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Descriptive Discourse!*, Zed Books, 1986.
- 4 In his as yet unpublished Amal Bhattacharji Memorial Lecture, 1992, entitled 'Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the Days of Hindutva', Aijaz Ahmad criticises Chatterji for detaching Gramsci's concept of a 'war of position' from his political project and using it as "an explanatory model for individualist national careers, such as those of Bankim or Gandhi or Nehru". This may be right, but for my purposes I am going to proceed with the more sympathetic assumption that Chatterji had it fully in mind to see these individual careers as representative of larger ideological intervening moments in the development of nationalism in India. I do not particularly want to deny that there may be something very problematic about the notion of 'representative' here, but again I am going to proceed with more sympathy and not see it as an idle interest in individual, nationalist careers.
- 5 See Ahmad, *In Theory*, Verso, 1992, p 321, n 8 and the main text to which it attaches.
- 6 The articles by Nandy I have focused on are 'The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance' in Veena Das (ed), *Communities, Riots and Survivors*, Oxford University Press, Delhi; 'An Anti-Secularist Manifesto', *Seminar*, 314, 1985; and 'Secularism on the Run', *Mantham*, June 1991. There is some overlap with Nandy's position in T N Madan's 'Secularism in Its Place' in *Religion in India*, Oxford University Press, 1991, and I shall refer to this article in subsequent notes, when it needs special mention.
- 7 It is not just the political mood of course. Nehru's economic vision of a compromised socialism, described in that problematic and deliberately evasive phrase 'socialist pattern of society', has been the subject of very different critiques from the left and the right, with the latter overwhelmingly victorious in shaping government policy in the last two years, and less explicitly in the last decade.

- 8 But see also the article by T N Madan cited earlier for considerable convergence with Nandy on some of the points that will emerge below.
- 9 The word 'wrongs' is carefully chosen here to track the didactic tone of Nandy's polemic.
- 10 This charge of statist imposition against Nehru is made very explicitly also by T N Madan in the article cited earlier.
- 11 I do not intend this remark to be in the spirit of recent works written in defence of Jinnah against Congress caricature, useful as that project might be. See next note for the reason why.
- 12 One of the things that the longer project, of which this paper is a part, does look much harder and longer at this argument, particularly on the claims of the Congress that its Muslim leaders were representatives of the Muslim community in a sense that amounted to the community having negotiating status. This is a very controversial and troublesome claim and needs a careful historical look at the role of Azad and others in Congress politics. It is one of the fundamental inadequacies of (the otherwise very useful) recent defences of Jinnah against Congress caricature that they do not look at this issue thoroughly enough, nor demonstrate why the position of Congress Muslim leaders on the shape and direction of the nationalist movement was not superior to his. To demonstrate it would precisely require an assessment of this argument relying on this problematic idea of 'implicit negotiation' within the 'composite' Congress party.
- 13 This point is generalisable to a number of anti-colonial national movements and post-colonial parties in other parts of the world with multi-communal and multi-tribal societies, as the African National Congress is discovering.
- 14 There is scope for misunderstanding here. I have no *general* scepticism against the qualifier 'tacit' or 'implicit' attaching to some theoretical and explanatory notion. I have no doubt that in history and social theory, as elsewhere, such qualifiers have an important role to play in our understanding of various theoretical phenomena. To take one example somewhat far afield from our present concerns, Chomsky's notion of tacit syntactic knowledge' has a very powerful explanatory role in generative grammar. But that role is so secure only because the idea of tacit syntactic knowledge, as Chomsky demonstrates, explains so much of the observable linguistic performance of individual speakers. That sort of demonstration is precisely what is not forthcoming for the idea of 'tacit' negotiation which the argument I am criticising invokes.
- 15 My use of the term 'communalist' here is also risky in roughly the sense that I warned against in note I; and I urge the reader to bear with me in the use of a term, which if I was patient and long-winded enough, I would replace with more elaborate descriptive categories. There is another caveat. The fact is that today more than previously, to a large extent; Muslim 'communalism' is precisely a communalism because it is a defensive posture in a threatening scene, both nationally and in many localities. Clearly therefore it cannot be simply equated with Hindu nationalism in all contexts. But in the general enough context of my somewhat theoretical discussion of secularism, I plead that I be allowed this undifferentiated use of the term.
- 16 In his book, *op cit*, and various important papers since his book, Aijaz Ahmad, among other things, has made a powerful case for this claim, and we would all do very well to study it in this time of frantic political and intellectual abandonment of the left.
- 17 It is a fact, familiar to many third world countries and many other parts of the world, that gender-related affirmative action lags behind the affirmative action tied to racial, communal, caste and tribal minorities. I have only singled out the Mandal commission because as a locus for affirmative action it has had a great deal of public attention and effect in the last few years and is therefore a good starting-point of focus for the struggle against brahminism to fasten and build on. But in doing so I do not at all mean to downplay the need to bring to centre-stage a similar political effort on the gender-related affirmative action front. For, it is hardly deniable that a centuries-old patriarchal mentality as intrinsic to brahminical Hinduism (and orthodox Islam) as is its caste complexion.
- 18 This is not meant to suggest a substitution of one strict primacy with another. The period following Louis Dumont's classic work which fetishised the notion of caste in the study of Indian politics and society is testimony to how such a substitution can run aground. My point in stressing the report is at least partly the pragmatic one of seizing the momentum that was created by V P Singh's decision, and partly one of broadening the left's theoretical stance and represented interests. The work which will integrate the different interests and alliances I mentioned into a single analysis, giving primacy wherever theory and historical context demand it, is yet to be written, and probably never will. But it is very doubtful that any effort at such an analysis will be altogether discontinuous with what the left has always stood for, which is why it is inevitable that the political parties of the left will still be the formal locus for political action along the lines that are needed.
- 19 A rather, blatant example of this is the discussion of Nehru in T N Madan's article cited earlier. Madan, in fact, buys into *yet another* confusion that Nehru was also perhaps guilty of (p 405), which is to throw into the kitchen sink of justifications of secularism not just the argument from the scientific outlook but the argument of the left programme I mentioned earlier, which asks us to concentrate on questions of economic interests and equality. That too becomes part of a single package of inseparable and essentially linked arguments.
- 20 There is also of course the larger question as to whether such codification is a strictly post-enlightenment ideal and whether the concept of 'power' did undergo the sort of radical transformation that Foucault describes.
- 21 *Representations*, 37, Winter 1992.
- 22 This transition is also avowed explicitly (not exactly in the terms that I have formulated it, but in roughly similar terms) by Gyan Prakash in his article 'Can the Subaltern Ride? A Reply to O'Hanlon and Washbrook', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol 34, No 1, January 1992. It should not be inferred from my scepticism about the transition that I would associate myself entirely with the position of O'Hanlon and Washbrook that Gyan Prakash is responding to (O'Hanlon and Washbrook, 'After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism and Politics in the Third World', same journal, same issue). I find the contours of their position a little too unshaded to claim that association.
- 23 See Partha Chatterji's dismissal of some accounts of nationalism along these lines, from which I quote in the main text below. In trying to salvage a modified version of 'sociological determinism' (which in its unmodified version is rightly dismissed), I am not at all defending those accounts of nationalism. I think the accounts of nationalism he criticises are deeply flawed and some of them should be dismissed, and not merely for their sociological determinism. My point, as I argue in the text, is rather that, quite apart from those accounts of nationalism, if one takes too far the rejection of anything that approximates the theoretical phenomenon that in its crude formulations might be called sociological determinism, we would not be able to develop an account of political agency or of the moral psychology of communities. Moreover, it is worth adding that this point does eventually have theoretical consequences for Chatterji's own subject (nationalism) that Chatterji does not consider. I think it is arguable that if there is any insight in the idea of nation as 'imagined community', then only some carefully nuanced and constrained version of what would (now possibly unfairly) be called sociological determinism can be the basis of our assessments of those imagined communities that are plausible and well-grounded in given historical periods and contexts, and those that are not. Just simply contrast Kashmiri nationalism with Baluchi nationalism (or some other contrast, if this does not seem appropriate), and see if the imagined communities of the one that seems more well-grounded can be ratified as being better-grounded without assuming something like sociological determinism. Stalin's famous characterisation of a well-grounded nationalism, which still strikes me as more or less convincing, clearly presupposes features of developing material formations that shape stabilisations of political homogeneity and shared interests (over and above such things as cultural and linguistic commonalities) in ways that amount to a sociological determinism. It would be the crudest and most reprehensible form of intellectual charlatanism not to take this characterisation seriously in putting such constraints on the idea of imagined communities, just because of one's general distaste for Stalin's other political and intellectual wrongs. The piquancy of this last sentence should not have needed saying, but I say it all the same because the last time I gave a talk on the subject, there was a gasp from the audience when I approvingly mentioned Stalin's name in the characterisation of nationalism.
- 24 *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories*, Princeton University Press, 1993.
- 25 In saying this I am not stressing Freud's rather implausible scientific and biologicistic aspects. Those aspects of his thought and rhetoric are quite irrelevant to the issue we are discussing. The most anti-scientific interpretation of Freud makes no such inference. I have written in some more detail about how to position Freud in the large questions of self-knowledge and moral psychology in the chapter entitled 'Self-Knowledge and Resentment' in my book *Self-Knowledge and Intentionality*, Harvard University Press, forthcoming.



**BALANCE SHEET &  
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT**

<i>BALANCE SHEET OF INDIAN OFFICES AS AT 31ST MARCH 1994</i>			<i>PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT OF INDIAN OFFICES FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 1994</i>		
(000's omitted)			(000's omitted)		
Schedule	As on 31st March 1994	As on 31st March 1993	Schedule	Year Ended 31st March 1994	Year Ended 31st March 1993
<b>CAPITAL AND LIABILITIES</b>			<b>I. INCOME</b>		
Capital 1	377,255	0	Interest earned 13	963,911	879,303
Reserves and Surplus 2	296,804	183,142	Other Income 14	177,964	218,448
Deposits 3	6,102,570	5,527,268	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>1,141,875</u>	<u>1,097,751</u>
Borrowings 4	701,950	1,185,022	<b>II. EXPENDITURE</b>		
Other Liabilities and Provisions 5	574,187	456,159	Interest expended 15	446,328	434,884
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>8,052,766</u>	<u>7,351,591</u>	Operating expenses 16	105,088	90,476
			Provisions and contingencies	357,472	423,217
<b>ASSETS</b>			<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>908,888</u>	<u>948,577</u>
Cash and balances with Reserve Bank of India 6	869,135	1,216,812	<b>III. PROFIT</b>		
Balances with banks and money at call and short notice 7	152,918	2,993	Net profit for the year	232,986	149,174
Investments 8	2,210,335	1,897,311	Profit/Loss (-) brought forward	119,324	76,894
Advances 9	4,466,577	3,998,029	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>352,310</u>	<u>226,068</u>
Fixed Assets 10	47,792	49,574	<b>IV. APPROPRIATIONS</b>		
Other Assets 11	306,009	186,872	Transfer to statutory reserves	47,000	29,850
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>8,052,766</u>	<u>7,351,591</u>	Profit of previous year trfd to capital	119,324	76,894
Contingent Liabilities 12	8,000,794	7,774,972	Balance carried over to Balance Sheet	185,986	119,324
Bills for Collection	160,214	225,561	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>352,310</u>	<u>226,068</u>
Notes on Accounts 17			Notes on Accounts 17		
The Schedules referred to herein form an integral part of the Balance Sheet			The Schedules referred to herein form an integral part of the Profit and Loss Account.		
This is the Balance Sheet referred to in our report of even date.			This is the Profit and Loss Account referred to in our report of even date.		
For SHARP & TANNAN Chartered Accountants By the hand of Sd/- (M. P. Narsang) Partner	THE BANK OF TOKYO, LTD. Bombay Office		THE BANK OF TOKYO, LTD. Bombay Office		
	Sd/- (P. L. Rao) Deputy General Manager		Sd/- (K. Oshima) General Manager & Chief Executive Officer for India		
Bombay Dated: 30th June, 1994					



**SCHEDULES FORMING PART OF THE BALANCE SHEET AS ON 31ST MARCH 1994**

(000's omitted)			(000's omitted)		
	As on 31st March 1994	As on 31st March 1993		As on 31st March 1994	As on 31st March 1993
<b>Schedule 1—Capital</b>			<b>Schedule 4—Borrowings</b>		
I. Amount received from Head Office	377,255	0	I. Borrowings in India		
II. Amount of investment deposited with RBI under section 11(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949			i) Reserve Bank of India	0	420,100
Current Year Rs. 171,650			ii) Other Banks	450,000	350,000
Previous Year Rs. 61,650			iii) Other institutions and agencies	251,950	414,922
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>377,255</u>	<u>0</u>		<u>701,950</u>	<u>1,185,022</u>
<b>Schedule 2—Reserves and Surplus</b>			II. Borrowings outside India	0	0
I. Statutory Reserves			<b>TOTAL (I and II)</b>	<u>701,950</u>	<u>1,185,022</u>
Opening Balance	63,818	33,968	Secured borrowings in I & II above	0	0
Additions during the year	47,000	29,850	<b>Schedule 5—Other Liabilities and Provisions</b>		
	<u>110,818</u>	<u>63,818</u>	I. Bills payable	125,439	53,408
II. Balance in Profit and Loss Account	185,986	119,324	II. Inter-office adjustments (Net)	0	47,985
<b>TOTAL (I and II)</b>	<u>296,804</u>	<u>183,142</u>	III. Interest accrued	173,221	146,047
<b>Schedule 3—Deposits</b>			IV. Others (including provisions)	275,527	208,719
A I. Demand Deposits			<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>574,187</u>	<u>456,159</u>
i) From Banks	209,798	29,737	<b>Schedule 6—Cash and Balances with Reserve Bank of India</b>		
ii) From Others	1,123,446	1,002,753	I. Cash in hand (including foreign currency notes)	23,351	18,319
	<u>1,333,244</u>	<u>1,032,490</u>	II. Balances with Reserve Bank of India		
II. Savings Bank Deposits	390,904	337,398	i) In Current Account	845,784	1,198,493
III. Term Deposits			<b>TOTAL (I and II)</b>	<u>869,135</u>	<u>1,216,812</u>
i) From Banks	0	100,000	<b>Schedule 7—Balances with Banks and Money at Call and Short Notice</b>		
ii) From Others	4,378,422	4,057,380	I. In India		
	<u>4,378,422</u>	<u>4,157,380</u>	i) Balance with Banks		
<b>TOTAL (I, II and III)</b>	<u>6,102,570</u>	<u>5,527,268</u>	a) In Current Accounts	1,682	2,784
B i) Deposits of branches in India	6,102,570	5,527,268	b) In Other Deposit Accounts	146,800	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>6,102,570</u>	<u>5,527,268</u>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>148,482</u>	<u>2,784</u>
			II. Outside India		
			i) In Current Accounts	4,436	209
			<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>4,436</u>	<u>209</u>
			<b>GRAND TOTAL (I and II)</b>	<u>152,918</u>	<u>2,993</u>





# SCHEDULES

<i>SCHEDULES FORMING PART OF THE BALANCE SHEET AS ON 31ST MARCH 1994</i>					
(000's omitted)			(000's omitted)		
	As on 31st March 1994	As on 31st March 1993		As on 31st March 1994	As on 31st March 1993
<b>Schedule 8—Investments</b>			<b>Schedule 10—Fixed Assets</b>		
<b>I. Investments in India in</b>			<b>I. Premises</b>		
i) Government securities	1,938,604	1,629,580	At cost as on 31st March of the preceding year	13,500	13,500
Market Value Rs. 1,937,984			Additions during the year	0	0
Previous Year Rs. 1,603,180			Deductions during the year	0	0
ii) Other approved securities	258,105	258,105	Depreciation to date	226	185
iii) Shares	3,733	3,733	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,274</b>	<b>13,315</b>
iv) Debentures and bonds	3,893	3,893			
v) Others	6,000	2,000	<b>II. Other Fixed Assets</b>		
(In Units of Indus Venture Capital Fund)			(including furniture and fixture)		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,210,335</b>	<b>1,897,311</b>	At cost as on 31st March of the preceding year	69,098	55,781
			Additions during the year	5,450	16,092
<b>Schedule 9—Advances</b>			Deductions during the year	99	2,776
<b>A. i) Bills purchased and discounted</b>	1,638,136	1,339,774	Depreciation to date	39,931	32,838
ii) Cash credits, overdrafts and loans repayable on demand	2,489,569	2,493,336	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34,518</b>	<b>36,259</b>
iii) Term loans	338,872	164,919	<b>TOTAL (I and II)</b>	<b>47,792</b>	<b>49,574</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,466,577</b>	<b>3,998,029</b>	<b>Schedule 11—Other Assets</b>		
			I. Inter-Office Adjustment (Net)	1,894	0
<b>B. i) Secured by tangible assets</b>	3,076,347	2,779,747	II. Interest accrued	153,908	125,551
ii) Covered by Bank/Government guarantees	637,851	698,004	III. Others	150,207	61,321
iii) Unsecured	752,379	520,278	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>306,009</b>	<b>186,872</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,466,577</b>	<b>3,998,029</b>	<b>Schedule 12—Contingent Liabilities</b>		
			I. Liability on account of outstanding forward exchange contracts	1,551,699	2,158,198
<b>C. I. Advances in India</b>			II. Guarantees given on behalf of constituents		
i) Priority sectors	923,920	252,398	a) In India	2,178,072	2,651,792
ii) Public sector	0	7,704	b) Outside India	1,129,049	762,593
iii) Banks	0	0	III. Acceptances, endorsements and other obligations	3,141,974	2,202,389
iv) Others	3,542,657	3,737,927	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,000,794</b>	<b>7,774,972</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,466,577</b>	<b>3,998,029</b>			



<b>SCHEDULES FORMING PART OF THE PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 1994</b>					
(000's omitted)			(000's omitted)		
	Year Ended 31st March 1994	Year Ended 31st March 1993		Year Ended 31st March 1994	Year Ended 31st March 1993
<b>Schedule 13—Interest Earned</b>			<b>Schedule 16—Operating Expenses</b>		
I. Interest/discount on advances/bills	664,751	598,558	I. Payments to and provisions for employees	46,063	40,437
II. Income on investments	245,265	218,577	II. Rent, taxes and lighting	13,191	9,367
III. Interest on balances with Reserve Bank of India and other inter-bank funds	49,401	56,094	III. Printing and Stationery	4,616	4,901
IV. Others	4,494	6,074	IV. Advertisement and publicity	253	76
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>963,911</b>	<b>879,303</b>	V. Depreciation on bank's property	7,133	6,713
<b>Schedule 14—Other Income</b>			VI. Directors' fees, allowances and expenses	49	12
I. Commission, exchange and brokerage	79,208	54,496	VII. Auditors' fees and expenses (including branch auditors)	168	133
II. Profit on sale of investments	0	1,121	VIII. Law Charges	568	1,375
III. Loss on sale of land, buildings and other assets	-49	-42	IX. Postage, Telegrams, Telephones, etc.	8,094	7,023
IV. Profit on exchange transactions (Net)	97,895	96,774	X. Repairs and maintenance	4,208	4,031
V. Miscellaneous income	910	66,099	XI. Insurance	3,865	3,324
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>177,964</b>	<b>218,448</b>	XII. Other expenditure	16,880	13,084
<b>Schedule 15—Interest Expended</b>			<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>105,088</b>	<b>90,476</b>
I. Interest on deposits	377,197	346,141			
II. Interest on Reserve Bank of India/inter-bank borrowings	15,764	34,674			
III. Others	53,367	54,069			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>446,328</b>	<b>434,884</b>			



## SCHEDULES

### Schedule 17—Accounting policies and notes forming part of the accounts for the year ended 31st March 1994

#### I. Principal Accounting Policies

##### (1) General

The accompanying financial statements have been prepared on the historical cost basis and confirm to statutory provisions and practices prevailing in the country.

##### (2) Transactions Involving Foreign Exchange

Monetary assets and liabilities as well as outstanding Forward Exchange Contracts are translated half yearly at rates prescribed by FEDAI and the resulting profit/loss is accounted for. Guarantees, Letter of Credits and Acceptances are translated at T.T. (Middle) rates.

##### (3) Investments

Investments are valued at the lower of cost or market value. Where recent market quotations are not available, the investments are taken at book value.

##### (4) Advances

(a) Provisions for doubtful advances have been made to the satisfaction of the auditors in respect of identified advances, based on a periodic review of advances and after taking into account the realisable value of securities and the portion of advance guaranteed by the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation, The Export Credit & Guarantee Corporation, similar statutory bodies and prudential accounting norms laid down by RBI for the asset classification and provisioning requirements thereof.

(b) Provisions in respect of doubtful advances have been deducted from advances.

(c) Provisions have been made on gross basis.

##### (5) Fixed Assets

(a) Premises and other fixed assets have been accounted for at their historical cost.

(b) Depreciation has been provided for on the diminishing balance method at the rates specified in the Income Tax Act, 1961.

##### (6) Staff Benefits

Provision for gratuity/pension benefits to staff has been made on an accrual basis. Separate fund for pension has been created.

##### (7) Net Profit

(a) The net profit disclosed in the profit and loss account is after considering

(i) Provision for taxes on income.

(ii) Provision for doubtful advances.

(iii) Provision for depreciation in the value of specific investments which are valued at lower of cost or market value; but

(b) Without considering interest income in respect of non performing assets taking into account the prudential norms laid down by RBI.

#### II. Notes on Accounts

(1) Capital—Amount received from Head Office represents Rs. 2,579.31 lacs interest free funds remitted by them during the year and Rs. 1,193.24 lacs remittable profit for the year 1992-93 transferred to this account for the purpose of meeting the Capital Adequacy Norm.

(2) In keeping with the past practice, Bank's investments are valued at 'lower of cost or market value' (Refer schedule 17 Principal Accounting Policies—Note 3). However this method with regard to valuation of unquoted current investments in Government Securities is not in keeping with the latest guidelines issued by the RBI for valuation of investments, wherein the market rate for such investments have to be arrived by applying 'Yield to Maturity' basis. Accordingly, the unquoted current investments of the Bank have been stated higher by Rs. 194 lacs.

(3) The Bank has preferred an appeal against the order passed by the Income Tax department resulting in a demand of Rs. 455 lacs. Based on the tax consultant's advice, the Bank is confident of these appeals being decided in its favour since similar issues involved have been decided in the Bank's favour in the past assessments. Accordingly, no provision has been made against this demand.

(4) As in the previous years, some of the operating expenses are being accounted for on cash basis. The effect of these on the profit for the year is, though not ascertainable, will not be material.

(5) Head Office administrative expenses have not been charged in the accounts and provision for taxes has been computed without deduction of such expenses.

(6) Provisions and contingencies include Rs. 3,302 lacs (including prior year 8 lacs) being provision for Income Tax and Rs. 191 lacs towards Interest tax.

(7) Inter-Office balance is net of Rs. 345.73 lacs being amount received from Head Office for the acquisition of residential premises for Bank's Officers.

(8) Previous year's figures have been regrouped/rearranged wherever necessary to conform with the amendments made to the Third Schedule of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.



**Auditors' Report on the Indian Branch of The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.**

We have audited the attached Balance Sheet of the Indian Branch of The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd, as at 31st March 1994 and also the annexed Profit and Loss Account of the Indian Branch of the Bank for the year ended on that date, in which are incorporated the returns from Calcutta and New Delhi branches, audited under Section 228 of the Companies Act, 1956 by other auditors.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, read with the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 211 and sub-section (5) of Section 227 of the Companies Act, 1956, the Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss Account, are not required to be and are not drawn up in accordance with Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956. The accounts are therefore, drawn up in conformity with Forms 'A' and 'B' of the Third Schedule to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

We report that in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949:

- (a) We have obtained all the information and explanations which to the best of our knowledge and belief were necessary for the purpose of our audit and have found them to be satisfactory.
- (b) The transactions which have come to our notice have been, in our opinion, within the powers of the Indian Branch of the Bank.
- (c) In our opinion, proper books of account as required by law have been kept by the Indian Branch so far as appears from our examination of those books.
- (d) The report on the accounts of Calcutta and New Delhi branches of the Bank, audited by the respective Branch Auditors, were received and properly dealt with by us, while preparing our report.
- (e) The Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account of the Indian Branch of the Bank dealt with by this report are in agreement with the books of account and the returns.
- (f) In our opinion and to the best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, the Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account, subject to note 2 regarding valuation of current investments in Government Securities and read together with the other notes in Schedule 17, give the information required by the Companies Act, 1956, in the manner so required for Banking Companies and give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Indian Branch of the Bank as at 31st March 1994 and of its profit for the year ended on that date.

SHARP & TANNAN  
Chartered Accountants  
By the hand of

Bombay  
Dated: 30th June, 1994

Sd/-  
M.P. NARSANG  
Partner