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Noise

The Political Economy of Music

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Translation by Brian Massumi

Foreword by Fredric Jameson

Afterword by Susan McClary

Theory and History of Literature, Volume 16



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Chapter Three

Representing

Make people believe. The entire history of tonal music, like that of classical political economy, amounts to an attempt to make people believe in a consensual representation of the world. In order to replace the lost ritualization of the channelization of violence with the spectacle of the absence of violence. In order to stamp upon the spectators the faith that there is a harmony in order. In order to etch in their minds the image of the ultimate social cohesion, achieved through commercial exchange and the progress of rational knowledge.

The history of music and the relations of the musician to money in Europe since the eighteenth century says much more about this strategy than political economy, and it says it earlier.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, ritualized belonging became representation. The musician, the social memory of a past imaginary, was at first common to the villages and the court, and was unspecialized; he then became a domiciled functionary of the lords, a producer and seller of signs who was free in appearance, but in fact almost always exploited and manipulated by his clients. This evolution of the economy of music is inseparable from the evolution of codes and the dominant musical aesthetic. Although the economic status of the musician does not in itself determine the type of production he is allowed to undertake, there is a specific type of musical distribution and musical code associated with each social organization. In traditional societies, music as such did not exist; it was an element in a whole, an element of sacrificial ritual, of the channelization of the imaginary, of legitimacy. When a class emerged whose power was based on commercial exchange and competition, this stabilized system of

musical financing dissolved; the clients multiplied and therefore the distribution sites changed. The servants of royal power, despite the occasional efforts of revolutionary institutions, were no longer in the service of a singular and central power. The musician no longer sold himself without reserve to a lord: he would sell his labor to a number of clients, who were rich enough to pay for the entertainment, but not rich enough to have it to themselves. Music became involved with money. The concert hall performance replaced the popular festival and the private concert at court.

The attitude toward music then changed profoundly: in ritual, it was one element in the totality of life; in the concerts of the nobility or popular festivals, it was still part of a mode of sociality. In contrast, in representation there was a gulf between the musicians and the audience; the most perfect silence reigned in the concerts of the bourgeoisie, who affirmed thereby their submission to the artificialized spectacle of harmony—master and slave, the rule governing the symbolic game of their domination. The trap closed: the silence greeting the musicians was what created music and gave it an autonomous existence, a reality. Instead of being a relation, it was no longer anything more than a monologue of specialists competing in front of consumers. The artist was born, at the same time as his work went on sale. A market was created when the German and English bourgeoisie took to listening to music and paying musicians; that led to what was perhaps its greatest achievement—freeing the musician from the shackles of aristocratic control, opening the way for the birth of inspiration. That inspiration was to breathe new life into the human sciences, forming the foundation for every modern political institution.

Representation, Exchange, and Harmony

From the Musician-Valet to the Musician-Entrepreneur

The minstrel, a functionary, only played what his lord commanded him to play. As a valet, his body belonged entirely to a lord to whom he owed his labor. If his works were published, he would receive no royalty, nor was he remunerated in any way when others performed his works. A piece in the ideological apparatus, charged with speaking and signifying the glory of the prince—a simulacrum of the ritual—he would compose what the lord ordered him to compose, and the lord had use of and ownership over both musician and music.

The court musician was a manservant, a domestic, an unproductive worker like the cook or huntsman of the prince, reserved for his pleasure, lacking a market outside the court that employed him, even though he sometimes had a sizable audience. Bach's work contract, for example, is that of a domestic:

Whereas our Noble and most gracious Count and Master, Anthon Günther, one of the Four Counts of the Empire, has caused you,

Johann Sebastian Bach, to be accepted and appointed as organist in the New Church, now therefore you are, above all, to be true, faithful, and obedient to him, His above-mentioned Noble Grace, the Count, and especially to show yourself industrious and reliable in the office, vocation, and practice of art and science that are assigned to you; not to mix into other affairs and functions; to appear promptly on Sundays, feast days, and other days of public divine service in the said New Church at the organ entrusted to you; to play the latter as is fitting; to keep a watchful eye over it and take faithful care of it; to report in time if any part of it becomes weak and to give notice that the necessary repairs should be made; not to let anyone have access to it without the foreknowledge of the Superintendent; and in general to see that damage is avoided and everything is kept in good order and condition. As also in other respects, in your daily life to cultivate the fear of God, sobriety, and the love of peace; altogether to avoid bad company and any distraction from your calling and in general to conduct yourself in all things toward God, High Authority, and your superiors, as befits an honor-loving servant and organist. For this you shall receive the yearly salary of 50 florins; and for board and lodging 30 talers.⁵⁰

The same features are found in the majority of musicians' work contracts of the period. Another example in Haydn's contract with Prince Esterházy, signed May 1, 1761, which makes him a conductor, composer, administrator, and the inheritor of his predecessor's debts.⁵¹ The contract thus constitutes a relation of domesticity and not one of exchange.

Tool of the political, his music is its implicit glorification, just as the dedicatory epistle is its explicit glorification. His music is a reminder that, in the personal relation of the musician to power, there subsists a simulacrum of the sacrificial offering, of the gift to the sovereign, to God, of an order imposed on noise. Lully, in his dedication of *Persée* to Louis XIV, writes:

It is for Your Majesty that I undertook this work, I must dedicate it only to you, Sire, and it is you alone who must decide its destiny. The public sentiment, however flattering it may be for me, does not suffice to make me happy, and I never believe I have succeeded until I am assured that my work has had the good fortune of pleasing you. The subject seemed to me of such beauty that I had no difficulty developing a strong fondness for it, I could not fail to find in it powerful charms; you yourself, Sire, were kind enough to make the choice, and as soon as I laid eyes upon it, I discovered in it the image of Your Majesty. . . . I well know, Sire, that on this occasion I should not have dared publish your praise; not only for me is your praise too elevated a topic, it is beyond even the reach of the most sublime eloquence. However, I realize that in describing the true gifts Perseus received from the Gods, and the astonishing deeds he so gloriously

accomplished, I am tracing a portrait of the heroic qualities and prodigious actions of Your Majesty. I feel that my zeal would run away with me if I neglected to restrain it.⁵²

Never has the political discourse of music seemed so strong, so linked to feudal powers, as in this period, when Molière had his music master say "Without music no State could survive,"⁵³ when the cord attaching music to royal power was so strong.

However, cracks were starting to form and irony was beginning to show through the praise. The domestic, knowing that he could begin to depend on other economic forces than the courts, wanted to be done with this double language of order and subversion. The philosophers of the eighteenth century, moreover, provided a political ally and ideological foundation for the revolt of the artist against his guardian, for the will to artistic autonomy. Marmontel, in one of his furious articles in the *Encyclopédie*, violently attacks musicians who play the game of the dedicatory epistle, which was a symbol of submission to the feudal world, an occasion for the domestic to beg for his reward:

The signs of kindness one boasts of having given, the favorable welcome he made perceptible, the recognition that moves one so, and about which he is so surprised; the part that one is supposed to have had in a work that put him to sleep when he read it; his approval, the often imaginary history of which one recounts to him; his fine actions and sublime virtues, left unmentioned for good reason; his generosity, which one praises in advance, etc. All of these formulas are stale.⁵⁴

They had grown stale because the economic role of the epistle had diminished. At the end of the eighteenth century, it was no longer praise sung for the lord and master, but one way among others for an independent artist to obtain funds from a financial, feudal, or capitalist power. The epistle was thus the last link between music and a declining feudal world whose domination of art would soon come to an end, at least in France. Artists even wrote to the mighty with an impertinence that antecedes and foreshadows the political rebellion of the bourgeoisie.

In 1768, Grétry wrote sarcastically to the count of Rohan Chabot: "I also request that you give me a flat refusal, if you have reason to do so, for example, to avoid the crowd of importunate authors who doubtless seek to dedicate their works to you."⁵⁵ This same Grétry later wrote, with very great analytic insight: "I saw the birth and realization of a revolution by artist musicians, which came a little before the great political revolution. Yes, I remember: musicians, maltreated by public opinion, suddenly rose up and repulsed the humiliation weighing down upon them."⁵⁶

Of course, patronage did not disappear with the eighteenth century; it still exists, as we shall see. But music was already in contact with a new reality; it refused to stay tied to a camp whose power was dwindling. It ceased to be writ-

ten solely for the pleasure of the idle and became an element in a new code of power, that of the solvent consumer, the bourgeoisie. It became an element of social status, a recollection of the hierarchical code whose formation it encoded. In the beginning, it was a mere possession: *one "had" music, one did not listen to it*. Mozart, writing of his reception in Paris in 1778, described this moment of transition in the status of music as "detestable," because music was no longer the sign of power now lost, and not yet the abstract sign of a new force: "So I had to play to the chairs, tables, and walls."⁵⁷

Everything was reversed: art was no longer a support for feudal power; the nobility, after it lost the ability to finance music, still tried for a time to use its culture to legitimate its control over art:

The count, afterwards the duke of Guines, played the flute exceedingly well. Vendelingue, the greatest flautist of the time, conceded that they were of equal skill. The count of Guines had a whim to play with him one evening in a public concert; they played twice, alternating on first and second flute, and with exactly the same success.⁵⁸

Similarly, in 1785, Prince Lebkowitz, who had been appointed regent in 1784, played second violin in a quartet formed by his chapel master, Wranitzky, who inspired Beethoven's quartets. This prince was also one of three patrons who, after 1809, guaranteed Beethoven an annual allowance. Still others tried to go into business, for example, the count of Choiseul, who conceived the project of making the Opéra-Comique profitable by means of a commercial gallery. Thus before the transition in political institutions from divine right to political representation, the rupture had already taken place in music.

The first concerts to draw a profit took place in London in 1672; they were given by Bannister, the violinist and composer. Entrepreneurs organized concerts for the bourgeoisie, in whose dreams they were a sign of legitimacy. The concert hall appears at this time as the new site of the enactment of power. Up until the seventeenth century, music financed by princes was heard in churches and palaces; but now it was necessary to make people pay to hear music, to charge for admission. The first concert hall we have record of was established in Germany in 1770 by a group of Leipzig merchants who began in an inn called "Zu den drein Schwanen" ("At the Three Swans"); then in 1781 they converted a clothier's shop into a concert hall—music was literally confined within the walls of commerce.

Handel, one of the first composers to seek financial support outside the royal courts, described this transition as it was taking place in England. In a letter written in 1741, considerations of decorum prevail over his concern for profit:

The Nobility did me the Honour to make amongst themselves a Subscription for 6 Nights, which did fill a Room of 600 Persons, so that I

needed not sell one single Ticket at the Door. . . . The Audience being composed (besides the Flower of Ladyes of Distinction and other People of the greatest Quality) of so many Bishops, Deans, Heads of the Colledge, the most eminents [*sic*] People in the Law as the Chancellor, Auditor General, &c. all which are very much taken with the Poetry. So that I am desired to perform it again next time. I cannot sufficiently express the kind treatment I receive here. . . . They propose already to have some more Performances, when the 6 Nights of subscription are over, and My Lord Duc the Lord Lieutenant (who is allways present with all His Family on those Nights) will easily obtain a longer Permission for me by His Majesty.⁵⁹

In France, the opposition of Lully and the Royal Academy of Music, which monopolized all power in the name of the king and prohibited the diffusion of music, was not overcome until 1725. Philidor's *Concert spirituel* ("Spiritual Concert") followed by Gossec's *Concert des Amateurs* ("Concert of Amateurs") in 1769, brought the music of power to the bourgeoisie of France, after that of England. The privilege granted the Royal Academy of Music was in fact so exclusive that no one could organize a performance for which admission would be charged or a public ball without the authorization of the director. This was taken to such an extreme that Italian comedians were ordered to pay a fine of 10,000 livres to the Royal Academy of Music for including song and dance in a public performance of *Fêtes de Thalie* ("Festivals of Thalia"); the following year, they were fined 30,000 livres for adding ballet to *La Fête Ininterrompue* (The Continuous Festival"), *Nouveau Monde* ("New World"), and *L'Inconnue* ("The Unknown Woman").

Everything changed once this monopoly was broken. The musician received a new status, causing a shake-up in the economic status of the musical work and the entire economy of music. When music entered the game of competition, it became an object from which income could be drawn without a monopoly; it fell subject to the rules and contradictions of the capitalist economy.

The Emergence of Commodity Music

In order for music to become institutionalized as a commodity, for it to acquire an autonomous status and monetary value, the labor of the creation and interpretation of music had to be assigned a value. Next—and this happened much later—it was necessary to establish a distinction between the value of the work and the value of its representation, the value of the program and that of its usage.

This valorization of music took place in opposition to the entire feudal system, in which the work, the absolute property of the lord, had no autonomous existence. It was constructed on the basis of the concrete existence, in an object (the score) and its usage (the representation), of a possible commercial valoriza-

tion. Music, then, did not emerge as a commodity until merchants, acting in the name of musicians, gained the power to control its production and sell its usage, and until a sufficiently large pool of customers for music developed outside the courts, for which it had been formerly reserved. The history of copyright in France, where creators' ownership over signs was first affirmed, is fascinating in this context. In the beginning, the purpose of copyright was not to defend artists' rights, but rather to serve as a tool of capitalism in its fight against feudalism. Before a September 15, 1786, ruling of the Conseil du Roi ("The Council of the King"), musical composers had no control over the sale or representation of their works, with the exception of operas; in principle, only the director of the Royal Academy had such rights. In fact, the music publishing industry grew out of the bookmaking industry, itself the result of the existence of a market for books. Even the law protecting books had not been easily elaborated, since it ran counter to the interests of the copyists, who had controlled the production of copy-representations of writing until the discovery of printing. The copyists, who had a monopoly over the reproduction of all manuscripts regardless of type (text or score), were for a time successful in opposing printing, which created the foundation for repetition and the death of representation in writing. They obtained, by decision of the Parlement of Paris, authorization to destroy the presses. Their success was fleeting. Louis XI, who had need of a press to assure a wide audience for Arras' treatise, annulled the decision, and bookmakers were granted privileges for literary publishing for the first time.

The political repercussions were immense: the printing press was the downfall of the fixed word of power, proposing a schema of generalized reproduction in its stead. It destroyed the weight of the original. It detached the copy from its model. A distribution technique that began as a harmless support for a certain system of power ended up shattering it instead.

In music, printing gave meaning to the advent of polyphony and the scale, in other words, the advent of harmonic writing and standardized scores. The publisher created a commercial object, the score, to be sold by the lord, not the musician. Then in 1527, music publishing received the same rights accorded literary publishing; that is, the publisher of the work was given exclusive rights over its reproduction and sale. But this privilege was still limited to the material reproduction of the score and did not apply to the work itself, which was unprotected against piracy. In particular, all popular music was excluded from copyright protection and would remain so until the nineteenth century: in the absence of a solvent market, it occurred to no one to commodify it or protect its ownership. Thus a musician or his master could sell a work, whether a song or an instrumental work, just like any other possession. But once it was sold, it belonged to the publisher, who could market it as he saw fit, with no possibility of the musician's opposing it. Copyright thus established a monopoly over reproduction, not protection for the composition or control over representations of it. In

the beginning, the author only had control over written reproductions; this is an indication of how little weight was given to performances. The space of communication was strictly limited to printed characters. Outside the written reproduction, valueless.

Of course, certain especially well-known musicians obtained privileges for certain of their works at a very early date. But they had little impact, and the monopoly of the copyists was replaced by a monopoly of the publishers. The publishers, organized as a guild, had the exclusive right to print and sell scores and, if they wished, to combat piracy, imitations, plagiarism, and unauthorized performances. Writers and composers were thus totally dependent upon their publishers. The creator, whether a salaried worker or an independent, minstrel or jongleur, remained powerless in the face of the transformation of his labor into a commodity and money.

In France, two publishers dominated the market for a century: Le Roy and Ballard. They became partners in 1551, and on February 16, 1552, were granted both the permanent privilege to publish any vocal or instrumental music for which earlier privileges had expired, and the privilege to be the exclusive publishers of the king's music. Unlike booksellers, who could live off their backlists, music publishers did not have numerous scores of earlier music to exploit, since the language of music had just stabilized. Therefore, they were quick to publish, for the benefit of provincial notables and with the court's consent, the works of contemporary musicians, who thus fell totally under their control.

But publishers' control, which barred the musicians from receiving any compensation, did not outlast the status of the minstrel. Little by little, as they dissociated themselves from the courts, musicians obtained part ownership of their labor; in other words, they succeeded in separating ownership of the work from the object manufactured by the publisher—even though they sold the right to publish it, they retained ownership of it and control over its usage. In addition, publishers in the provinces revolted against the monopoly granted to Paris to publish and sell a work over the whole of France. Although music publishing was not at the forefront of the struggle against the Parisian monopoly, it reaped the benefits. Thus emerged—and this is of capital importance—the immateriality of the commodity, the exchange of pure signs. Even though the written form was to remain for a long time the only form, the only reality of music that could be stockpiled, the sign was already for sale.

Little by little, the power of the publishers was dismantled. First, the Conseil du Roi ruled on August 13, 1703, that any privilege that had been granted for an indefinite period was legally void. Then in 1744, the provincial publishers won, in the form of an extension to the provinces of the bookseller's statute of 1723, an end to the monopoly Parisian publishers enjoyed over the publication of a work. In battling their competitors at the center, the reproducers of the periphery pioneered the concept of the work, thus serving the interests of the composers.

Finally, authors and composers succeeded in winning from the publishers a portion of the revenue drawn from the sale of publications and performances to the bourgeoisie.

Lully, despite his omnipotence, was unable to obtain the right to publish his own works from the royal powers, who were at the time very responsive to the interests of the publishers. A ruling of June 11, 1708, explicitly states that he does not have the right to publish his own works or draw income from them. The situation turned around a bit in 1749, when Louis XV refused to issue the Ballard press a general privilege for music engraving. This constituted a mutation in the balance of power: the musician earned a new share in the ownership of the work. The work as commodity became separated from its material support. Control over its sale and unauthorized use was explicitly granted to the musicians themselves. At least, this was the case for what the law chose to designate as a "work" of music, which at the time meant a score of sufficient stature to be performed before a solvent audience, not songs or works destined for a popular audience, in other words, an audience not confined in a concert hall.

On March 21, 1749, the Conseil du Roi recognized the intangibility of musical works, and a ruling in 1786 finally formulated a general regulation, still in effect: since "the piracy of which the composers and merchants of music were complaining was injurious to the rights of artists and to the progress of the arts, and ownership rights were daily becoming less respected, and the talented were deprived of their productions," it was decided that the privilege of the seal required for publication under the terms of the bookselling laws would "only be granted to commercial publishers after they have justified the transfer of rights that will be made to them by the authors or owners." The regulation also specified the form and terms of the declarations and registration necessary to assure ownership rights, and lastly prohibited "under penalty of a fine of 3,000 livres, the unauthorized use of any piece of music, as well as of engravers' stamps and trademarks." Thus the ownership rights of authors over their "works" was finally recognized.

Shortly afterward, the Revolution began; it at first merely codified this protection granted to the property of composers, as independent entrepreneurs, against the capitalist publishers. During a particularly troubled period, it in effect reenacted all of the measures promulgated by the courts of the monarchy: a law of January 13-19, 1791 and a decree of July 19-24, 1793 prohibited the pirating of musical "works" and performances not authorized by the author. This test regulated the musical economy of representation. It assigned the publishers the function of valorizing music, the ownership of which remained with the composers.

But out of a desire to extend the protection given to music and musicians against the effects of money, the French Revolution later tried to nationalize music; it was an incredible attempt (possibly unique in history) at rationally

organizing the production of music, a project conceived as a voluntary apparatus for the elaboration of a State ideology and for the standardization of cultural production.

The Centralized Planning of Music

In the same year, 1793, the Convention tried to transfer ownership of music to the State, and to return to a political control of music even more extreme than that practiced under royal power. In this, music is indicative of the contradictions of the period, of the instability of the control exerted over social relations, and of the simultaneity of incoherent political projects at the end of the eighteenth century. On the one hand, the Revolution sanctioned the conquests the bourgeoisie made in the eighteenth century and affirmed the right of the individual to ownership of his labor; on the other hand, it returned control over ideological production to national and popular State political power, with the explicit goal of resisting the bourgeoisie and the dangers money poses for music.

The history of this attempt to construct a centrally planned and monopolistic tool for the production of music is edifying, and undoubtedly unique in the worldwide history of music.

In 1793, the National Convention created the National Institute of Music in a move to give the revolutionary State rights over musical production still more totalitarian than those the royal State ever had at its disposal.

The objective of this institution, according to its impassioned proponent Gossec, was to assemble the "premier artists of Europe"⁶⁰ in the category of wind instruments—about three to four hundred musicians—and put them to work "annihilating the shameful torpor into which [the arts] have been plunged by the impotent and sacrilegious battle of despotism against liberty."⁶¹ The aim was to produce music that would "support and bestir, by its accents, the energy of the defenders of equality, and to prohibit that music which softens the soul of the French with effeminate sounds, in salons or temples given over to imposture."⁶² The role of music, he said, is to glorify the Republic at celebrations, to take music where the people can hear it, rather than immuring it at the places of power: "Our public squares will henceforth be our concert halls."⁶³ Leave the church and palace, those feudal inventions, behind—but also the concert hall, the invention of the bourgeoisie.

This musical corps was to create works of music and perform them at public celebrations throughout the Republic. To make its revolutionary vocation all the more clear, it was incorporated into the National Guard, created in 1789. Music was thus intended to be the guardian of the State against the bourgeoisie itself: "Then the nation will more easily create the kind of musical corps which rouse our republican phalanxes to battle."⁶⁴

The Institute was created in Messidor, year II, along very bureaucratic lines. It was placed under the direction of some of the best musicians of the time

(Mehul, Cherubini, Gossec), and was divided into schools, of 80 students each, with a total of 115 instructors. The only things banned were the chant and the harpsichord, which were undoubtedly too closely associated with the ancien régime. The Institute, then, was called upon to “regulate all music everywhere, to arouse the courage of the defenders of the fatherland and increase the ability of the *départements* to add pomp and appeal to civil ceremonies.”⁶⁵ Each month, it had to furnish the Public Health Committee at least one symphony, one hymn or chorale, one military march, a rondeau or quick march and at least one patriotic song, all of which added up to a 50-60 page notebook, 550 copies of which had to be made; it also had to send 12,000 copies of patriotic hymns and songs to the various armies of the Republic each month. The Institute’s musicians were *salaried and had no rights over performance of the works. Finally, the Institute was given two economic objectives. First, “it will effect the naturalization of the wind instruments, which we are obliged to import from Germany; this neutralizes an important branch of industry in France, deprives a portion of the large population of the Republic of its livelihood,”*⁶⁶ and causes musicians to leave the country. Second—and this is the essential idea behind the institution—it was a way for the revolutionary State to prevent the bourgeoisie from laying hold of music and debasing it: “*Who then will encourage the useful sciences, if not the government, which owes them an existence that in times past was procured for them by the rich and powerful, amateurs in taste and tone? Can we overlook the fact that the new rich, who emerged from the dregs of the Revolution, are crapulous and ignorant, and only propagate the evils produced by their insatiable and stupid cupidity?*”⁶⁷

This revolutionary dream of preventing money from dictating the course of music soon crumbled. Despite the fact that the Institute was retained (after 1795, under the name of the Conservatory), music was to become the property of the “new rich,” and what could be characterized as a project in *militaro-musical nationalism* was to collapse as industry expanded. The bourgeoisie would organize the essentials of production and representation, and control musical inspiration for the length of the nineteenth century.

The Conservatory, in the beginning generously funded, quickly became a low priority. As early as year V, its administrators had to resist a proposal to reduce its support; in year VIII, after a violent campaign was waged against its productions, they were unable to prevent the reductions. Under the Empire, the Conservatory increased in size again. But in the Restoration period, the title Royal School, originally given to the Academy of Music in 1784, was readopted; its sole function was to supply music for the Opera. All other music was thus abandoned to commercial exchange. The bourgeoisie and publishers would control its commercialization, limiting protection to works consumed by the bourgeoisie. For example, the Penal Code of 1810 only protected “dramatic works,” and thus excluded from protection popular songs and music, unless a judge ruled

otherwise.⁶⁸ Bourgeois law for bourgeois music—music that was rarely played, and the piracy and performance of which was easily controllable.

In representation, the musician no longer sold his body. He ceased to be a domestic, becoming an entrepreneur of a particular kind who received a remuneration from the sale of his labor. The musician’s economic status and political relation with power changed in the course of the great political upheaval of the time, as did the aesthetic codes and forms in which the new audience wished to see itself reflected.

Thus delimited, music became the locus of the theatrical representation of a world order, an affirmation of the possibility of harmony in exchange. It was a model of society, both in the sense of a copy trying to represent the original, and a *utopian representation of perfection*.

The channelization of violence became more subtle, since people had to content themselves with its spectacle. It was no longer necessary to carry out ritual murder to dominate. The enactment of order in noise was enough.

Music as the Herald of the Value of Things

Thus a change in the nature of listening changed the code: up until that time, music was written not to be represented, but to be inscribed within the reality of a system of power, to be heard as background noise in the daily life of men. When people started paying to hear music, when the musician was enrolled in the division of labor, it was bourgeois individualism that was being enacted: it appeared in music even before it began to regulate political economy. Until the eighteenth century, music was of the order of the “active”; it then entered the order of the “exchanged.” Music demonstrates that exchange is inseparable from the spectacle and theatrical enactment, from the process of *making people believe*: the utility of music is not to create order, but to make people believe in its existence and universal value, in its impossibility outside of exchange.

Music makes audible an obvious truth which, though never explicit and too long forgotten, has formed the foundation for all political thought since the eighteenth century: *the concept of representation logically implies that of exchange and harmony. The theory of political economy of the nineteenth century was present in its entirety in the concert hall of the eighteenth century, and foreshadowed the politics of the twentieth.*

As we have seen, charging admission for representation presupposes the sale of a service, in other words, the expression of an equivalence between musical production and other commercial—and no longer domestic—activities. This idea of the exchangeability of music is disruptive, because it places music in the context of abstract, generalized exchange, and consequently of money.

This new context is of considerable theoretical consequence.

On the one hand, representation entails the idea of a model, an abstraction, one element representing all the others. It thus relates to the spectacle of the

political and the imaginary, but first of all to money, the abstract representation of real wealth and the necessary condition for exchange. The idea, which was very new at the time, that it is possible to represent a reality by a form, a semantics by a syntax, opened the way for scientific abstraction, for the attainment of knowledge through mathematical models.

On the other hand, the entrance of music into exchange implicitly presupposes the existence of an intrinsic value in things, external and prior to their exchange. For representation to have a meaning, then, what is represented must be experienced as having an exchangeable and autonomous value, external to the representation and intrinsic to the work.⁶⁹ Western music, in creating an aesthetic and instituting representation, implies the idea of a value in things independent of their exchange, prior to their representation. The work exists before being represented, has a value in itself. This brings up the central problem of political economy, that of measuring the value of things, and gives us an insight into the Marxist response: for labor is the only common standard for all of these representations, and it is the labor of the musician that forms the basis of their value.

Representation requires a *closed framework*, the necessary site for this creation of wealth, for the exchange between spectators and productive workers, for the collection of a fee. Music, meaningless outside of religion, takes root in representation, and therefore in an exchange of labor allowing a comparison between representations to be made. Music is judged with reference to the musical code that determines its complexity. This gives us insight into the entire labor theory of value: the schema for the determination of ticket prices for a representation requires the comparability of musical works according to criteria external to their representation, in other words, the existence of a standard for determining an autonomous value of the spectacle. This standard can only be the labor of the musicians. Thus by replacing barter with a standard, representation empties exchange-time and, in an extreme irony, the very person who is remunerated as a rentier is the one who provides the insight into labor-value as the standard for capitalist exchange.

The enactment of music by the bourgeoisie, represented and then exchanged according to criteria of deritualized usage, thus contains in embryonic form the entirety of nineteenth-century political economy, particularly that of Marx—to be exact, the theory of exchange, and the most solid foundation for value as the labor incorporated in the object. It also implies the existence of ineluctable laws, like a score unfolding before each man and each class, spectators of the contradictions of society. Music announces—shouts it out, even—that the political economy of the nineteenth century could only be theater, a spectacle trapped by history.

But at the same time as music appears as having a value outside exchange, at the same time as it announces exchange as the transformation of value into money, it designates this standard as indefensible, because music is outside all

measure, irreducible to the time spent producing it. The impossibility of comparing two exchange-values on the basis of the labor of the composers and performers announces the impossibility of a differential pricing of music, but also of the impossibility of relegating the production of signs in representation to labor-value. Moreover, the use-value of music is in the spectacle of its operativity, of its capacity for creating community and reconciliation; it is in the imaginary of the simulacrum of sacrifice. This use-value has no relation to the labor of the musician considered separately, since it only has meaning in, and by, the “labor” of the spectator. Thus usage and exchange diverge from the start.

Nevertheless, representation was able to make people believe, for two centuries, that it was meaningful to have a measure for value, that exchange and usage existed and came together in value. Music announced this mystification, made it potentially legible: in representation, music is exchanged for what it is not and is used as a simulacrum of itself. All of the rest of production is also a simulacrum of order in exchange, of harmony.

Exchange and Harmony

All of this could have been heard, for representation doubly implies harmony. First, as spectacle, representation is the creation of an order for the purpose of avoiding violence. It metaphorizes the simulacrum of the sacrificial channeling of violence. It enacts a compromise and an order society desires to believe in, and to make people believe in.

Second, classification presupposes a topology and mathematical model: the mathematics available at that time was necessarily based on theories of the machine in equilibrium, in harmony. Here again, music prefigured the trap into which the major part of political economy was to fall, and where it would remain to the present day.

The way in which music elaborated the concept of harmony and laid the foundation for social representation is fundamental and premonitory. We may hazard the hypothesis that the emplacement of the musical paradigm and its dynamic foreshadowed the mutation that ushered in social representation as a whole. More precisely, it foreshadowed the mutation in exchange, which accompanied representation and affected the entire economy, particularly in the way in which the search for harmony as a substitute for conflict and as simulacrum of the scapegoat would come to dominate it.

Music, from the beginning transected by two conceptions of harmony, one linked to nature, the other to science, was the first field within which the scientific determination of the concept would prevail; political economy would be its final victory. Of course, music has been conceptualized as a science as far back as the day Pythagoras supposedly heard fourths and fifths in the pounding of the blacksmith. But, simulacrum of the sacrifice in its most basic form, of the natural ritualization of the channelization of violence, it was first theorized in its

relation with nature. Originally, the idea of harmony was rooted in the idea of order through the endowment of noise with form.

The order of motion is called "rhythm," while the order of voice (in which the acute and grave tones are blended together) is termed "harmony," and to the combination of these two the name "choristy" is given.⁷⁰

Harmony is thus the operator of a compromise between natural forms of noise, of the emergence of a conflictual order, of a code that gives meaning to noise, of a field in the imaginary and of a limit on violence. Harmony theorizes its usage as a simulacrum of ritual by affirming that it has a pacifying effect: *the less of one it has, the more it must say it has one*. Harmony is in a way the representation of an absolute relation between well-being and order in nature. In China as in Greece, harmony implies a system of measurement, in other words, a system for the scientific, quantified representation of nature. The scale is the incarnation of the harmony between heaven and earth, the isomorphism of all representations: the bridge between the order of the Gods (ritual) and earthly order (the simulacrum). "Music honors harmony; it spreads spiritual influence and is in conformity with heaven: when the rites and music are clear and complete, heaven and earth fulfill their normal functions."⁷¹ This explains the fundamental political importance of music as a demonstration that an ideal order, the true image offered by elemental religion, is possible.

This is why the sages of ancient times, believing that by nature all things move, turn, and tend toward and by means of others of their kind, used Music and encouraged its use, not only to give pleasure to the ears, but principally to moderate or stir up the passions of the soul, and appropriated it for their oracles in order to softly instill and firmly incorporate their doctrine in our minds and, by awakening them, elevate them further.⁷²

This conception of natural harmony, an inevitable order in the world, is found as late as Rousseau, who argued in favor of natural, Italian music, against the artificial, contrived music of the French; music, according to him, should be a language, it should be evocative of conversation and thus preserve political order.⁷³ For Grétry and Villetaue, the model for music is declamation. The link between harmony and representation is here clearly evident: harmony presupposes represented dialogue; it leads to the Opera, the supreme form of the representation by the bourgeoisie of its own order and enactment of the political.

But it was at this same time that modern theorizing about the foundations of harmony was born. The idea was no longer to conceptualize music as a naturally ordered whole, but to impose upon it the reign of reason and the scientific representation of the world: harmonic order is not naturally assured by the existence of God. It has to be constructed by science, willed by man.

Theorizing then became the basis for production. The introduction of bar lines in musical notation, of thoroughbass and equal temperament, made music the representation of a constructed, reasoned order, a consolation for the absence of natural rationality.

Music, in its ambivalence, in its all-embracing hope, is simultaneously heard, reasoned, and constructed. It brings Power, Science, and Technology together. It is a rootedness in the world, an attempt to conceive of human creation as being in conformity with nature: "The word *harmony* sweeps its semantic zone with precision: number, artifact, well-being, language, and world" (Michel Serres). Representation would seize upon this vague concept and make it the linchpin of the order it implies. In this way, the bourgeoisie of Europe finessed one of its most ingenious ideological productions: creating an aesthetic and theoretical base for its necessary order, *making people believe by shaping what they hear*.

Consequently, by observing music at the end of the eighteenth century, or at latest toward 1850, one could have made a serious prediction about the subsequent evolution of the system and about its limits. To make people believe in order through representation, to enact the social pyramid while masking the alienation it signifies, only retaining only its necessity—such was the entire project of the political economy of the last two centuries. The aesthetics of representation could no longer find acceptance as a natural fact. So it disguised itself as a science, as a universal law of perception, as a constructed system of thought.

Thus in the eighteenth century, reason replaced natural order and appropriated harmony as a tool for power, as proof of the link between well-being and science. To those who availed themselves of it, music made harmony audible. It made people believe in the legitimacy of the existing order: how could an order that brought such wonderful music into the world not be the one desired by God and required by science? The two harmonies, the divine and the scientific, combine in the image of a universe governed by a law both mathematical and musical. A law of gravitation and attraction, the melodies of which were calculated by Kepler himself.

An ideology of scientific harmony thus imposes itself, the mask of a hierarchical organization from which dissonances (conflicts and struggles) are forbidden, unless they are merely marginal and highlight the quality of the channelizing order. This idea also figures in the political economy of the period, and later in the theory of general economic equilibrium: exchange is the locus of order, a means for the channelization of discord. Representation entails exchange, which is legitimate only if it creates harmony. In music, harmony was conceived as conciliator of sounds, an equilibrium in the exchanges of sound matter; in the economy, it was theorized as an equilibrium in exchanges of flows. In political economy, as in music, conciliation was an end in itself, independent of the usage of the flows, represented as abstract and objective quantities. Before political economy, then, music became the bourgeoisie's substitute

for religion, the incarnation of an idealized humanity, the image of harmonious, nonconflictual, abstract time that progresses and runs its course, a history that is predictable and controllable. This order is subtle: it does not operate by compelling uniformity, but is on the contrary indissociable from difference and hierarchy. The harmonic system functions through rules and prohibitions: in particular, what is prohibited are repeated dissonances, in other words, critiques of differences, and thus the essential violence. Harmony lives by differences alone, for when they become blurred there is a potential for violence. Difference is the principle of order.

Ulysses' monologue in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* brings out these relations of necessity between harmony and music, between differences and hierarchy. The text's much-quoted musical metaphor clearly defines order as a system of vibrating chords separated by intangible differential intervals. Without differences, the strong prevail and the weak are crushed; harmony is the hierarchical system that protects the weak, while maintaining the fixed differences distinguishing them from the rich:

Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark what discord follows!⁷⁴

In summary, representation leads to exchange and harmony. It requires a system of measurement, an autonomous value for the work, and hierarchy. Even though representation may lead to the enactment of a conflictual classification of social realities (divided, for example, into social "classes"), their representation in the theater of politics inevitably leads to the organization of harmonious exchange, fixed borders, compromise, and equilibrium. No system of representation can find a lasting foundation in the absence of harmony. To make people believe in what is represented in such a system, it is necessary at a certain point to put an end to dissonance, to announce compromises. Representation thus excludes the possibility of a triumph of dissonance, which would be an expression of lack and the failure of the channelization of the imaginary. Entrapping the social form in exchange is just another way of drawing the theoretical debate into the Manichaeism of representation, and at the same time toward compromise. Marxism did not escape this confinement. Trapped within representation, it culminates in speculative abstraction and conflict between social classes—themselves abstract representations of the real—and leads ineluctably to compromise and order.

Harmonic Training

Making people believe in something so contrary to the contradictory reality of society, making musicians who came from the common people into the spokesmen for a harmonic order—this required a fantastically efficient process of normalization, a training process, a marking of the creator and listener alike. The normalization of the musician, for the purpose of turning him into the pro-

ducer of an order and an aesthetics, was to be the dominant trend of this period. The normalization of music meant first of all the normalization of musicians, performers, and composers, who up to that time had remained undifferentiated. In fact, at the beginning of the period, surveillance and training was very rigorous and very efficient. This memorandum addressed to Bach by the consistory of Leipzig on February 16, 1730, gives something of an idea of the type of control that was exerted over creators of all kinds in the first days of tonal music:

Whereas attention has been called to the fact that in the public divine services during the past Advent Season the chanting of the Nicene Creed has been omitted and it has been desired to sing and introduce new hymns, hitherto unknown, but such an arbitrary procedure is not to be tolerated. Now therefore . . . we herewith require same that he shall arrange that in the churches of this town, too, matters shall be regulated accordingly, and new hymns, hitherto not customary, shall not be used in public divine services without . . . our previous knowledge and approbation.⁷⁵

A little later, control over musicians' production was assured not through strict control over musical production itself, but through the supervised freedom of the producers. Thus, the conservatories were charged with producing high-quality musicians through very selective training. Beginning in the eighteenth century, they replaced the free training of the jongleurs and minstrels with local apprenticeship, as evidenced by the following notes from a conversation held in 1771 between Burney and Piccini on the subject of the Conservatorio de Sant' Onofrio, near Naples:

Boys are admitted from eight to ten to twenty years of age . . . when they are taken in young they are bound for eight years. . . . After boys have been in a conservatorio for some years, if no genius is discovered, they are dismissed to make way for others. Some are taken in as pensioners, who pay for their teaching; and others, after having served their time out, are retained to teach the rest. . . . The only vacation in these schools in the whole year is in autumn, and that for a few days only: during the winter, the boys rise two hours before it is light, from which time they continue their exercise, an hour and a half at dinner excepted, till eight o'clock at night. . . . In the common practising there was a "Dutch concert," consisting of seven or eight harpsichords, more than as many violins, and several voices, all performing different things, and in different keys: other boys were writing in the same room; but it being holiday time, many were absent who usually study and practise in this room.⁷⁶

It might be thought that this confinement in the conservatory ended and freedom was attained in the nineteenth century. Nothing of the kind happened. The confinement lasted as long as representation did; to be convinced of that, it is

sufficient to read this extract from a report prepared by Charles L'Hôpital, inspector general of public instruction, for the Commission for the Renovation of Musical Studies (1928-31), dated October 24-31, 1931:

So, do you not think that in our day and age, now that our ideas have become more liberal and less burdened by conventional fears, as the result of the general evolution of minds and morals—not what it presents in the way of excess, but what it offers that is most reasonable—it would be strongly desirable that we combine on more than one occasion our groupings of male and female students for the practice and performance of truly choral works, that is to say *mixed works*, it being well understood that study in detail would be pursued separately. I believe that with prudence and vigilance—excepting, of course, cases where there is a counterindication, and that could happen—these gatherings, the very idea of which would have been a shock to the imagination a mere forty years ago, in our time would quickly gain favor due to the singular intensity of the artistic attraction they would surely exert over the performers and those around them.

Harmonic Combinatorics and Economic Development

Harmonic representation created a code taking combinatorics as the basis of its dynamic and as frame of its expansion. In reality, the only freedom the order of tonal music left open was the freedom to express oneself within its rules. Thus harmony necessarily implies a combinatorics—a system governing the combination of authorized sounds, from the simplest to the most complex, the most abstract, the longest. This combinatory dimension may seem to be absent in political economy; in fact, though it is accurate to say that it is not often found in theoretical discourse itself, it is present implicitly at every turning point in the history of the economic and political sciences of representation.

In 1785, when the first reflections on the possibility of political representation and the electoral system of decision making were beginning to appear, Condorcet demonstrated the cardinal importance of combinatorics in the choice of coherent procedures. The classification of possible combinations, and compromises between them, lay at the heart of the debate over choosing between different voting procedures.

In the theory of representation combinatorics also plays a role in the analysis of conflictual strategies: game theory, the confrontation and arbitration of strategic combinations (discrete or continuous), the foundation for compromise in development. Tuning to the oboe's *la* before beginning to play is a prior compromise made by the musicians in an orchestra, one that is shielded from subsequent challenges by the orchestra leader.

Thus by listening to music, we can interpret the growth of the European economy and the political economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not

as an incomprehensible and miraculous accumulation of value, but in the context of the idea of *combinatorics*: eighteenth-century science made possible a broader range of combinations of available materials; it allowed the exploration of larger aggregates and their representation in simple terms. All of the theoretical and material dimensions of the field opened were thus accessible, allowing growth by the combination of simple elements. From this point of view, we are led to the hypothesis that the major theoretical discovery of the nineteenth century, from the point of view of economic growth, was the mathematical discourse that made possible a combinatory representation of the quasi totality of functional relations, namely Fourier's serial decompositions of 1800. Once each function is decomposable into a polynomial, each noise becomes decomposable into elemental sounds and recomposable into large-scale aggregates of instruments. Capitalism was to translate this proposition into: "all production is decomposable into a succession of simple operations and recomposable into large-scale factories"; efficiency required, for a time, gigantism and the scientific division of labor.

As in music, combinatorics in production is thus central to the search for and formation of compromises, of harmony between divergent interests. But combinatorics is only possible in the limited field of discrete and controllable sounds. Beyond that, it gives way to statistics, macroeconomics, and probability; before the economy did, music demonstrated that combinatory growth explodes in the aleatory and the statistical. Harmony—order in exchange, the creator of a form of growth—was to produce the conditions for its own undermining. This form of music, then, itself produced the processes that were to destroy its codes when it reached its limits. Once again, music was prophetic; it experienced the limits of the representative mode of production long before they appeared in material production.

Similarly, the emergence of large orchestras and the limitations on their growth would have offered the system, if anyone had cared to listen, a premonitory indication of its evolution: the orchestra—an idealized representation, in the field of the sign, of the harmonic economy and the order implied by the orchestra leader—also reached the outer limits of the functioning of harmonic production.

The Metaphor of the Orchestra

The representation of music is a total spectacle. It also shapes what people see; no part of it is innocent. Each element even fulfills a precise social and symbolic function: to convince people of the rationality of the world and the necessity of its organization. In accordance with the principles of exchange, the orchestra in particular has always been an essential figure of power. A specific place in the Greek theater, it is everywhere a fundamental attribute of the control of music by the masters of the social order. In China, the emperor alone had

the right to arrange his musicians in four rows in the form of square; important lords could have theirs on three sides, ministers on two, and ordinary nobles in a single row.⁷⁷

The constitution of the orchestra and its organization are also figures of power in the industrial economy. The musicians—who are anonymous and hierarchically ranked, and in general salaried, productive workers—execute an external algorithm, a “score” [*partition*], which does what its name implies: it allocates their parts. Some among them have a certain degree of freedom, a certain number of escape routes from anonymity. They are the image of programmed labor in our society. Each of them produces only a part of the whole having no value in itself. For a long time, the leader who directed them was just one of the musicians (*Haydn directed on violin or harp*), or was one element in the spectacle, as in Indian orchestras:

He [beats time] by tapping with his fingers on each side of a sort of drum tightly braced. As he beats, his head, shoulders, arms, and every muscle of his frame, are in motion. He rouses the musicians with his voice, and animates them with his gestures.⁷⁸

The orchestra leader did not become necessary and explicit until he was legitimated by the growth in the size of orchestras; he was noise at first. Later he was symbolized in abstract signs, at the culmination of a very long process of the abstraction of regulatory power. Up to and including Beethoven, even symphonies were performed by a small number of musicians (twenty-three for the Ninth),⁷⁹ with no leader. But combinatorics entails growth, and growth entails the leader. After 1850, when the size of the audience and the halls made it feasible, the same works were played with over one hundred musicians, with duplication of instruments. Berlioz, the “organizing conductor,”⁸⁰ was one of the first to mount the rostrum and, beginning in 1856, gave theoretical expression to this power. In the theory, the orchestra leader appears as the image of the legitimate and rational organizer of a production whose size necessitates a coordinator, but dictates that he not make noise. He is thus the representation of economic power, presumed capable of setting in motion, without conflict, harmoniously, the program of history traced by the composer. The theory elaborated by Berlioz is, moreover, a theory of power; only a few words of the following text would have to be changed to make it pure political theory:

The obligation on the part of the performers to look at the conductor implies an equal obligation on his part to make himself visible to all of them. Whatever the arrangement of the orchestra may be, whether on steps or on a horizontal plane, the conductor must select his place so that he can be seen by everybody. The greater the number of performers and the larger the space occupied by them, the higher must be his place. His desk should not be too high, lest the board carrying the score hide his face. For his facial expression has much to do with the

influence he exercises. If a conductor practically does not exist for an orchestra unable or unwilling to see him, he exists just as little for one unable to see him completely. Noises caused by striking the desk with the stick or by stamping feet are to be banned completely; they are not only inexpedient, they are barbaric.⁸¹

This notion of the conductor as a leader of men, simultaneously entrepreneur and State, a physical representation of power in the economic order, has since that time never been absent from the discourse on music. Lavignac and Laurencie's *Encyclopédie de la musique* presented the conductor this way in 1913: “In summary, the orchestra leader must possess the qualities of a leader of men, an always difficult task that is more particularly delicate in the case of artists.”⁸² Or again, more recently:

And where dictators want robots, captains look for responsive and responsible mariners. The leader is second in command, the strings hoist the sails, the kettledrum beater is the helmsman. (This, by the way, disposes of often attempted experiments in the “conductorless orchestra.” Uncommanded crews, if competent, will do well enough in the quiet waters of routine; but on the high seas somebody has to take command, for previous planning of the voyage will be of little avail—or else immoderately careful sailing will make the proudest ship cut a sad figure.) Our hero, we confide, will be of the captain type: a good sailor, a good drinker, and a good curser, and on the whole the most pious—that is, the least megalomaniac—of men.⁸³

Thus, the legitimated leader gradually loses his most visible attributes: the baton shrinks and even disappears. The necessity of power no longer needs to be established. Power is; it has no need to impose itself; and the technique of conducting evolves from authority toward discretion.

The ruling class—whether bourgeois industrial or bureaucratic elite—identifies with the orchestra leader, the creator of the order needed to avoid chaos in production. It has eyes only for him. He is the image it wishes to communicate to others and bestow upon itself. But all of the spectators cannot easily identify with him, and his monologue can become unbearable unless representation can provide a wider field of identification. Other figures are then necessary and, I think, one can toy with the idea that this is the essential role of the concerto in representation: the leader is no longer alone; the soloist emerges, the enactment of the individual who has risen above the crowd. Despite his localized task, he can address the leader and the other musicians as a group on an equal footing; he can, in his turn, direct the entire social apparatus, look upon and master the world of which he is a part, play his role and dominate the group as a whole, without, however, aspiring to the ponderous totality of power. He saves the spectator from having to choose between identifying with the anonymity of the musicians and the glory of the leader.

The Genealogy of the Star

Once the code was in place, the loudest voices used it to make themselves heard. The combinatory game of music became tied in with economic growth and the contradictions of capitalism, and exchange appeared for what it is: a mask for possession and accumulation. For in introducing music into exchange, representation submitted it to competition. It thus necessarily entailed the triggering of the process of selection and concentration—the durability of those who adapt the best to the system's rules of functioning—and made it impossible to preserve a localized, nonhierarchical usage of music. Selection and universal consumer access to the same music set a process in motion whereby the market expanded for certain musicians, and disappeared for others. In representation, localization quickly became incompatible with exchange. Production for a wide market became the rule, paving the way for mass production, after replication became possible. Thus if the star preceded repetition, both were a consequence of the entry of money into music. Ruthlessly, the logic of political economy accelerated the process of the commodification of music, the selection and isolation of the musician, enriching those who were “profitable”—in other words, the stars—and producing a new kind of consumer good, necessarily implied by the very rules of competitive exchange—*success*. The characteristics of success would be dictated by the economy: brevity (reduced labor costs), quick turnover (planned obsolescence), and universality (an extensive market).

The nineteenth century created the technical conditions for this process: the star and copyrights. In the twentieth century, the phonograph record would complete the process and disrupt the network of music. The genealogy of these phenomena is of cardinal importance: the grinding deformation of the social position of the musician, the rerouting of usage toward the spectacle in the interests of exchange. But it is not all that simple; the process of competition alone cannot explain the mysteries of fame. Even if the musician must bend to the rules of capitalist production to be easily heard, he very often knows how to play a double game and make himself heard despite the silent partner. But when he is caught in the act of willful blasphemy, he is destroyed, or else recuperated and travestied.

The genealogy of the star is one of the very first manifestations of the deterritorialization of representation, the disordering of competition in space, and later even in time.

The Genealogy of the Classical Interpreter

The star system, the outcome of competition, began in the middle of the nineteenth century, when a repertory was constituted, in other words, when Liszt, in 1830, began to play the music of other contemporary composers in concert, and Mendelsson played Bach (on the occasion of the centenary of the *Saint*

Matthew Passion in 1829). Liszt gave repertory a spatial dimension and Mendelsson, a temporal dimension. These two dimensions were necessary to the expansion of the music market, for there is no broad outlet without syncretism or universalism. At the same time, this representation confirmed the onset of a fear: society was attempting to rediscover the music of past centuries, sensing perhaps that its own systems of protection against violence and for the channelization of the imaginary were losing their effectiveness. Thus the process of the emergence of the star in classical music was based on the valorization of a stockpile: the market expanded not only through the creation of new products better adapted to needs, but also through an increase in the number of people who could consume old products. As if the proletarians who were gaining access to music hoped to revive the past power of the lords and an ersatz bourgeois spectacle.

Music's mode of financing then completely shifted, making publishers partial substitutes for patrons. Interested in the production of new works, they took the risk of sponsoring them for a rapidly expanding market of amateur interpreters. The bourgeoisie, unable to afford a private orchestra, gave its children pianos. There was a need, therefore, for productions that could be played on them. Works for a small number of instruments, or adaptations of that kind, were thus preferred by publishers.

The breadth of the piano repertory of the nineteenth century is quite clearly connected to the place it occupied in the salons of the bourgeoisie of the time, as an instrument of sociality and an imitation of the Parisian salons and the courts. Power continued to address the musician haughtily. But the tone was no longer one of conquest; it was the tone of the grocer:

By a little management, and without committing myself, I have at last made a complete conquest of that *haughty beauty*, Beethoven. . . . I agreed with him to take in MS. three Quartets, a Symphony [the Fourth], an Overture [*Coriolan*], a Concerto for the Violin, which is beautiful, and which, at my request, he will adapt for the pianoforte, with and without additional keys; and a Concerto for the Pianoforte, for *all* which we are to pay him two hundred pounds sterling. The property, however, is only for the British Dominions. Today sets off a courier for London through Russia, and he will bring over to you two or three of the mentioned articles. Remember that the Violin Concerto he will adapt himself and send it as soon as he can. The Quartets, etc. you may get Cramer or some other very clever fellow to adapt for the pianoforte. The Symphony and the Overture are wonderfully fine, so that I think I have made a very good bargain. What do you think? I have likewise engaged him to compose two sonatas and a fantasia for the pianoforte, which he is to deliver to our house for sixty pounds sterling (mind I have treated for Pounds and not Guineas). In short, he has promised to treat with no one but me for the British Dominions.

In proportion as you receive his compositions you are to remit him the money; that is, he considers the whole as consisting of six articles, viz. three quartets, symphony, overture, pianoforte concerto, violin concerto, and the adaptation of said concerto, for which he is to receive £200.⁸⁴

No one experienced the insecurity of the musician-entrepreneur more intensely than Mozart, a victim of ruthless economic censorship his entire life, one of the first prisoners of abstract, anonymous money, blackcoat money.

Just a few months before his death, he was still writing letters like this:

Instead of paying my debts I am asking for more money! . . . Owing to my unfortunate illness I have been prevented from earning anything. But I must mention that in spite of my wretched condition, I decided to give subscription concerts at home in order to be able to meet at least my present great and frequent expenses, for I was absolutely convinced of your friendly assistance. But even this has failed. Unfortunately fate is so much against me, *though only in Vienna*, that even when I want to, I cannot make any money. . . . A fortnight ago I sent round a list for subscribers and so far the only name on it is that of the Baron van Swieten!⁸⁵

Mozart died several months later. His fortune amounted to 60 florins, according to Constance.⁸⁶ He was 3,000 florins in debt (1,000 of which was owed to Puchberg). Baron van Swieten paid for the least costly burial possible. Constance, before remarrying, succeeded in selling eight manuscripts to the king of Prussia for 800 ducats.

It thus became almost impossible to have one's music heard without first being profitable, in other words, without writing commercial works known to the bourgeoisie. To be successful, a musician first had to attract an audience as an interpreter: representation takes precedence over composition and conditions it. The only authorized composers were successful interpreters of the works of others. The spectacular, the exploit, took center stage. It was necessary to sell oneself to have the right to create. Chopin, who, unlike Liszt, made his living from his lessons far more than from his rare concerts, analyzed this process very lucidly:

Today, having lost all such hope, I have to think of clearing a path for myself in the world as a pianist, and I must put off until later those higher artistic aims your letter so rightly presents. . . . There are many talented young men, pupils of the Paris Conservatoire, who are waiting with folded hands for the performance of their operas, symphonies, cantatas, which thus far only Cherubini and Lesueur have seen on paper. . . . In Germany I am known as a pianist; certain music journals have mentioned my concerts, expressing the hope that I

may soon take my place among the foremost virtuosi of that instrument. . . . Today I find an unequalled opportunity to fulfil the promise innate in me; why should I not seize it? . . . Ries found it easier to obtain laurels for his *Braut* [*Bride*] in Berlin and Frankfurt because he was known as a pianist. How long was Spohr known only as a violinist before he wrote *Jessonda*, *Faust*, and so on?⁸⁷

In the same period, Wagner expressed his irritation at the growing status of interpreters:

Every musical composition has had to resign itself, in order to win the approbation of the public, to serving as the instrument and pretext for the capricious experiments of the performers. . . . The musician who today wishes to win the sympathy of the masses is forced to take as his point of departure this intractable pride of the virtuosos, and to reconcile the miracles expected from his genius with such servitude. . . . It is particularly in the singing profession that the abuse we are drawing to attention has built a pernicious empire.⁸⁸

"I play the piano very well," wrote Bizet to an unidentified Belgian composer, "and I make a paltry living at it, because nothing in the world would convince me to be heard by the public. I find this trade of the performer odious! Yet another ridiculous aversion that costs me on the order of fifteen thousand francs a year. I play now and then at Princess Mathilde's and in a few homes where artists are friends and not employees."⁸⁹

The nineteenth century was the period when concerts were at their height. *Le Ménestrel*, a musical journal of the time, was constantly repeating that it was impossible to print a complete listing of the multitude of concerts taking place. Finding work was thus not a problem for musicians, which explains their subsequent opposition to the phonograph record. The virtuosos (Paganini, Gottschalk, Liszt) commanded a considerable fee, usually fixed, but sometimes proportional to receipts, at least in part. These stars (*vedettes*) worked hard: in 1844, Liszt gave six concerts in fifteen days in Lyons. Gottschalk gave between seventy and eighty concerts a year.

But in time the relation between the interpreter and the work would change. At the time Chopin was composing, the number of professional interpreters was still small, and their market restricted; traveling was time-consuming and a tour gave the artist free time to write and get to know his audience. The audience, which would never hear more than one or two interpretations of a work, did not have standardized criteria for choosing. Today, the process has evolved considerably. Musical representation has made a selection from the huge stockpile passed down from earlier centuries, a stockpile to which additions are still being made, but only to a very slight extent. Musicians who were very well known

in their time have disappeared. Others less renowned have survived. Still others reappear with the changing rhythm of fashion. Some interpreters have played the role of a memory—transmitting interpretation and technique, intermediaries of music, actors in a play they did not write, guardians of music—until the mutation of recording, repetition.

Actually, the definitive birth of the star took place when popular music entered the field of the commodity. The evolution of the star is what really developed the economy of representation and necessitated a guarantee of remuneration, an exchange-value, for popular production, which had been overlooked by the creators of the copyright.

The Genealogy of the Popular Star

The process of the selection and emergence of stars in the popular song of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries relates to same dynamic of musical, cultural, and economic centralization. Up until that time, popular song found expression mainly in the street, the traditional domain of the jongleurs. Its confinement and pricing, first in the cabarets, then in the café concerts, was the precondition for its entry into the commodity market and competition. In the middle of nineteenth century, these halls became the heart of the economy of music; they were an essential source first of exchange, then profit, and gradually replaced the other sites of musical expression, whose capacity to realize surplus-value was insufficient.

The singer-musician gradually ceased to be also an acrobat. The division of labor did its work and, beginning in the seventeenth century, and particularly in the eighteenth, the two professions became completely separate. Acrobatics was confined to the circus, as were practically all spectacles of the body. The popular musician sought other outlets for his work. Music publishing seemed to offer one. However, prior to the eighteenth century, popular music was the object of very few published editions, due to the small market for it. The only published editions that existed were those for distribution by street hawkers, the only possible channel of distribution among the people, whose right to assembly was severely limited. In addition, pirated editions were only suppressed if they were of "dramatic works," not songs.

Musical invention was thus practically nonexistent, and what little there was consisted essentially of texts to be sung to a few *timbres*, or popular tunes, which were engraved in the social memory like a residue of musical ritualization. In 1811, in the journal *La Clé du Caveau (The Key to the Cabaret)* we find a list of *timbres* numbering 2,350, but most were rarely used.

Neither the law of 1791 nor the Penal Code of 1810 protected these works, considered petty and unworthy of protection. This form of expression was still strictly controlled in order to prevent songs from becoming vehicles of subversion. Publisher's privileges prevented singers "from having anything published

in their name"; "songs could only be printed by a bookseller-publisher." But the police were never able to ensure the enforcement of the law, and numerous clandestinely published songs were circulated: the monopoly over music was one of the first destroyed by the people, before they tackled the others. In order to control these publications, so dangerous for order and the economy, certain eighteenth century publishers proposed to give official status to street singers, as had been done with book hawkers. This would have allowed the selection of a certain number of duly authorized singers, and then the establishment of corporatism, the control of those unable to enter the capitalist mode of production. In the absence of such a status, the police early began keeping these singers under surveillance. Noise-making, subversive, they peddled news that power wished to hide from the people. In a police report of 1751, we read:

Most disreputable people, like beggars and women of ill repute, when they meddle in singing, do contortions in the streets, and, sometimes sodden with drink, expose themselves to the ridicule of the public, and often add things that are not in the song.⁹⁰

In the nineteenth century these musicians would be gradually driven off. It would only be possible to make music in a fixed-price performance, in other words, in a concert hall. All arguments were valid in the effort to destroy these singers. E. Fétis, director of the *Revue musicale*, which played an important role in the taming of popular music, wrote in 1835:

Under the government of the Restoration, organ players were accused of having shameful ties to the political police of the kingdom; it was claimed that they were paid to station themselves in front of places the authorities wanted to spy on.⁹¹

This article provides interesting information on the situation of street musicians at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The police found it hard to tolerate them, and they were increasingly barred from the courts on the pretense that thefts had been committed. The repertory was meager, and the tunes were given little diversity (the tune of "Cadet Roussel" or "Fanchon" ["Kerchief"]), to make it possible for the musically illiterate public to commit them to memory. The singers would sell the lyric sheet for ten centimes. Popular songs were thus extremely impoverished musically. Among the instruments in use that Fétis mentions, the most common were the barrel organ, more or less well tuned, mechanical organs with miniature figures dancing on a little scene, and the bird organ, or *serinette*. The mechanical nature of these instruments is an indication of how limited was the musical repertory in use. The clarinet was essentially the instrument of the blind (with their little dogs). There were in addition a few flageolet players. The violin was high on the list, followed by a small number of harps. Fétis remarks that what he calls the "Aristocracy of the street sing-

ers," the Italians who accompanied themselves on the guitar and sang *cavatinas*, was little appreciated by the public. He concludes:

The government could greatly improve the street music of Paris and exert a powerful influence on the direction of the moral pleasures ambulant musicians procure for the people. This is its duty. For a very modest recompense, it would have in its pay a considerable number of musicians equipped with always well-tuned instruments, who would only play good music. The singers, blessed with manly and virile voices, would sing for the people exclusively patriotic hymns and songs whose lyrics, sternly chaste, celebrate the noble virtues and generous actions for which the people have a natural feeling. Instead of singing about being drunk on wine and the pleasures of the brute passions, the people would hear praise for the love of labor, sobriety, economy, charity, and above all the love of humanity.

That is what they wanted to do to popular music in 1835. It says everything there is to be said: about aesthetics and political control, about the rerouting of popular music toward the imposition of social norms.

In 1834, a law was passed that organized the profession and realized the project of the eighteenth-century publishers; it required street singers to wear a badge, as a way to keep tabs on them and limit their number. A little later, after the publishers and songwriters had won recognition of their ownership rights over the sale and performance of their songs, they used the street singers as door-to-door salesmen, as sales representatives: they no longer sold simple texts, but "small format" books, popular publications containing the lyrics and the vocal score. Melody was then able to diversify, and representation was no longer confined to the festival, but was already becoming a sales tactic for an immaterial object, which is what it would be entirely after the appearance of the phonograph record. At noontime in the factories the workers, score in hand, would sing under the direction of a street musician. This became the favorite distraction of the dressmaker's apprentices, whose virtues so many verses celebrate, reflecting the market.⁹² Thus there was already a link between the songs of the street and people buying their own idealized image. The "small format" book, the foundation of commodity exchange in localized representation, remained for a long time the sole commercial product of popular music. An entire industry followed in its wake. In 1891, the magazine *Gil Blas Illustré* was founded; each weekly issue contained the text and melody line of an illustrated song.

But street singing did not permit the evolution of the star or an extensive market: the shifting site of the performances prevented a stable market for competing singers from developing. The innovation that truly led to the birth of the music industry was the confinement of popular music in the café concerts and cabarets. Beginning in 1813, on the twentieth of each month, *hommes d'esprit*

("men of spirit") would meet at the Caveau on rue de Montorgueil. During the meal, each person had to sing a song of his own composition. The owner of the cabaret, M. Baleine, rented private rooms to members of the bourgeoisie who wanted to hear these *chansonniers* ("singer-songwriters"). Such associations between singers and cabaret owners multiplied and quickly reached the bourgeois audience. Alongside the café concerts, the *goguettes* developed, in other words, associations of working-class poets, the chansonniers of the people. We find them in particular in Paris and its suburbs. (La Ménagerie, Les Infernaux, Les Bons Enfants, La Camaraderie . . . [The Menagerie, The Infernal Ones, The Good-Natured, Camaraderie].) But while the satire of the Caveau was harmless, the songs of the *goguettes* quickly came under fire. For example, C. Gille of "La Ménagerie" served six months in prison under Louis-Philippe, and his comrades fell at the barricades in 1848. The songs created by the *goguettes* would afterwards serve as an important political catalyst, spread the length and breadth of France by street hawkers. One of the best known *goguettes*, "La Lice Chansonnière" ("The Singer's Arena") stayed open under the Second Empire, uninterruptedly displaying the republican insignia above its entrance.

Since the right of assembly was restricted to solvent consumers, new modes for the distribution of popular music were instituted. The lawmakers of the Second Empire, understanding this danger, banned certain of these forms of representation under the pretense of regulating the right of assembly. Beginning in this period, both the bourgeoisie and the workers listened to songs in entertainment halls, café concerts, and cabarets. Song, which until that time had occupied an essential place in private life, henceforth became a spectacle. Representation set itself up in opposition to lived experience—as had learned music, though a century earlier. Popular music did it in a much more flexible manner, however: silence was not the rule. The representation of popular music suppressed neither festival nor the threat of subversion. The café concert, where the singer was paid as such, was born in 1846, when the "Café des Aveugles" ("Cafe of the Blind") presented the first "concerts" of popular music. Standing on a platform supported by two barrels, the singers received no recompense from the management of the establishment: they passed the hat, sold copies of their songs, and sang by the tables. Representation thus remained interwoven with life. If the author was present, he collected his royalties directly. If not, there was no guarantee. The café concert, originally intended for the bourgeoisie, under the Second Empire became a popular festival, transformed into the *caf' conc'* (in *Viens poupoule* [Come, My Darling], Saturday evening after the work grind, the Parisian worker says to his wife for a treat, "I'll take you to the café concert").⁹³ The *caf' conc'* vogue was due in part to the talent of the artists and composers, but a large part of it had to do with the unrestricted atmosphere (smoking and drinking were allowed) and how cheap the admission fee was, when there was one at all.

Confinement was channeled into festival, and representation remained the locus and pretext for the circulation of ideas. After 1850, the *caf' conc'* began to multiply. By 1870 there were more than 100 in Paris, and the trap of commercial selection closed tightly on popular music. The chansonniers adapted their texts to their audience, and roles were defined. There was success for comics playing dotards (Polin, Dranem, and at the beginning of his career Maurice Chevalier . . .), and for melodramatic songs "in which the unwed mother, the corrupt bourgeois, the sacrificed soldier, the honest worker, the sailor at sea, the infamous seducer and the drunk, in turn tyrant and victim, were central figures."⁹⁴ From 1900 on, singers fell into stereotypes (the off-color comic, the aging lady's man, the singer with a memorable voice) tailored to the audience's tastes. Political songs were also to be heard: the patriotic songs of the Franco-German War of 1870 and of 1886-87 were replaced, during the great economic crisis of 1890-1910, by socialist or openly anarchist verses.

In contrast, the *cabaret*, a variety of the *caf' conc'*, attempted to organize the commercialization of high-quality songs. In 1881, Rodolphe Salis' cabaret, the "Chat Noir" ("Black Cat") was founded; Maurice Donay and Jean Richepin performed there. It was at the cabaret also that the songs of Pottier (whose works were not published until the year he died, 1887), J.-B. Clément, and Nadeau (without a doubt the greatest songwriter of the nineteenth century) were sung. "Temps des cerises" ("Cherry Time") first appeared in a cabaret, later to be circulated in the *caf' conc'*. A great many cabaret songs later became *caf' conc'* successes. The clientele was not the same: that of the *caf' conc'* was the common people, while that of the cabaret was "bohemian," student, or bourgeois. The bourgeoisie also directed much more criticism toward the *caf' conc'*, the "place of debauchery" of the common people, than toward the cabaret: "Song properly speaking, the repository of the age-old essential verve of our national character, popular song, the expression of the informal genius of France, has fallen, in the café concerts, to untold depths of roguish stupidity. The finest lips have lent their audacious grace to this degeneracy, which would be consumed today, in spite of the venerable Caveau, if you and your friends, the poet chansonniers of Montmartre and the 'Chat Noir,' had not triumphantly restored that Parisian gaiety which shines afar," wrote Sully Prudhomme in his epistolary preface to Maurice Boukay's *Nouvelles chansons (New Songs)* published under his real name, M. Couyba. Boukay's "red songs" did not prevent him from becoming minister of commerce under Caillaux in 1911 (demonstrating, as though it were still necessary, the institutional ties between music and money).

The star emerged with the *caf' conc'*, thanks to tours by musicians that created an expanded market in the provinces. The first star was undoubtedly Theresa, toward 1865 (with her "bearded lady"). The *tube*, or hit song, also dates from this period, when it was called the *scie* ("saw"). The stars began to garner large fees, and it suddenly became possible to make a fortune through the practice of

popular art. Paulus acquired a huge fortune before sinking into poverty. This wealth was strongly criticized by the industrial bourgeoisie and the intellectual elite, who were scandalized by such earnings, and only frequented the wings and recesses of the *caf' conc'*. For the working world, on the other hand, these earnings meant dreams of social advancement. Social climbing and the star system have been profoundly interconnected ever since: the image of the group member who made it is a formidable instrument of social order, of hope and submission simultaneously, of initiative and resignation.

There developed around the star an entire array of professions (manager, stagehand, administrator), including the *claque*, whose role was very important: when representation emerged as a new form of the relation to music, it also became necessary to produce the demand for it, to train the spectator, to teach him his role. That is what the *claque* was for. It would disappear only after the public's education had been completed, and the demand for representation was well established.

The Economy of Representation

If commodity representation emerged in eighteenth-century England, it was in nineteenth-century France that the regulatory process for its generalized commercialization was organized. The right of ownership over representation was until that time reserved for the musicians of the courts and salons. Outside of "dramatic works," performances brought no reward for the authors. Authors only received pay as performers or from the direct sale of their scores. The idea of remuneration for the representation of their works had difficulty gaining acceptance. The reasons for this were, first, given the absence of a popular market, such representations remained very rare; second, it was impossible to keep track of street performances of popular music; and finally, for a long time judges were reluctant to call something that consisted only of a melody line with changing words a musical "work." It was not until the confinement of popular music that a market developed and that authors finally created an institution capable of representing them and winning them compensation. The *caf' conc'* gave this kind of music an exchange-value; this was later recognized by judges, and only afterward by legislators.

This anecdote clearly reveals a fracture, the birth of the popular consumption of commodity leisure: E. Bourget, P. Henrion, and V. Parizot attended a show at the "Caf' Conc' des Ambassadeurs" ("Café Concert of the Ambassadors"), where they heard a song written by the first and a sketch by the other two. After the performance, they refused to pay their check, claiming that the law of 1791 applied to these "works": "You use our labor without paying us for it, so there's no reason why we should pay for your service." The magistrate's court agreed, in a decision of August 3, 1848; that decision was upheld by the court of appeals on March 26, 1849; and the law of 1791 was applied to all musical works.⁹⁵

On February 11, 1850, the same three men, in association with the publisher, Jules Colombier, who had assumed the court costs, founded the Union of Authors, Composers, and Music Publishers (Syndicat des Auteurs, Compositeurs, et Editeurs de Musique: SACEM), the first institution of its kind anywhere in the world. Its function was to demand, on behalf of the authors and editors, payment of royalties for every representation of a musical work, regardless of its importance.

This was perceived by the bourgeoisie as an attack on its privileges: formerly, the bourgeoisie alone had had the right to have financial dealings in music. Money was its kingdom. The common people were not supposed to have anything but street music, music that was "valueless." The music press, moreover, did nothing to make the new institution better known. The reactions ranged from the silence of the *Revue musicale* to the contempt of *La France Musicale*, expressed in the following words:

Here is what's new. There was just formed an agency for the collection of royalties for authors, composers, and musical publishers. It was M. P. Heinrichs [sic] who invented this new gambit, the aim of which is quite simply to collect or help in the collection of royalties from ballads, ariettas, light songs, and potpourris used in salons and concerts. So from now on, one will not be able to sing a ballad without the threat of being taken by the collar on charges of violating private property. . . . How can serious men spend their time on such twaddle? Really! At a time when we must loudly proclaim the freedom of thought, when art must enter the hearts of the masses through dedication, and most especially selflessness, they go bringing up an issue that is as childish as it is ridiculous! Taxing baladeers. . . . Truly, the lack of common sense has never been pushed to such an extreme. If this project is pursued, we will fight it until it is reduced to nothingness. If you create operas, symphonies, in a word, works that make a mark, then royalties shall be yours; but taxing light songs and ballads, that is the height of absurdity!⁹⁶

SACEM gave a *value*, in the bourgeois sense of the term, to the music of the people. According to some accounts, Napoleon III allowed the creation of SACEM to thank songwriters for the help they gave him. This interpretation seems to me very hard to accept, when it is well known that during the first years of his reign he imposed a very restrictive law on performances, and the café concerts remained republican for a very long time. In fact, the creation of SACEM seemed harmless (it occupied itself with light songs), and in the spirit of contemporary French capitalism, it helped guarantee respect for the property rights of all.

Thus a real economic market developed for musical performance. It was a market that would create musical works, because the publishers, who now had

a direct interest in advancing the musical representation of a work, became promoters. They encouraged the financing and training of performers in order to make a song profitable by having it represented. They even created "courses" in which a pianist in residence would teach new songs to performers, who would then promote them.

France was thus one of the first countries to guarantee copyright protection covering both the written reproduction and the performance of all forms of music. After the Revolution, this right, first recognized by the judges who were the most closely in touch with economic evolution, was later recognized in the law: "The author of a work of the mind enjoys ownership rights over that work by the simple fact that it was he who created it."⁹⁷

Today, any public representation, in other words, one that is not free and takes place outside the family circle, is illegal without the consent of the author or his representative. Once authorized, it earns the author a payment independent of other expenses (the performer's salary, the publisher's fee, taxes), even in the case of a show that is free or loses money.

In the United States, where capitalism took on different forms, the author's ownership of a copyright on performances of his work has not been established as such, and the musician has remained in a weaker position in the face of capital. On all points, copyright protection is not as strong as in France. The Copyright Office fulfills some of the functions of SACEM in protecting property, but a number of competing businesses assure the valorization of the patrimony by picking up reproduction rights. Performances are only subject to the payment of royalties if an admission fee is charged and it is done for profit, which opens the way for all kinds of dodges, since the defining of what is "for profit" can be quite delicate. In addition, when an author works under contract, he loses ownership in favor of the party who requested the work, who is afterward free to have it reproduced as he sees fit.

In the Soviet Union, protection of authors is very weak: royalties are low, and when the "interests of the nation justify it" none at all are paid. The copyright laws were slightly modified by the 1974 ratification of the Universal Copyright Convention, which liberalized Soviet inheritance rights, since it gives heirs post mortem ownership rights for a period of twenty-five years.

The economy of musical representation depends on the effectiveness of authors' associations in detecting instances of representation. No author can alone enforce the payment for his production, because of the multiplicity of possible performance sites. Conversely, no provider of entertainment can deal directly with all of the authors and composers whose repertoires he may use in orchestra performances or on records. Author's associations are thus a substitute necessary to the market in which these transactions take place. They are charged with collecting royalties for the public representation of works on their lists (in France, around three million). They pursue their function in relation to enter-

tainment halls, and radio and television broadcast organizations, as well as dances, jukeboxes, stores, fairs . . . The area they cover is vast (there are over 180,000 dances held in France each year), and an institution of this nature requires enormous oversight powers. Each representation is subject to prior authorization. SACEM has at its disposal a listing of all concert halls, which are required to submit their programs; monitoring them is relatively easy. Every orchestra, then, has to furnish a list of the works it performs. The payments made depend on the nature of the establishment. Establishments in which music plays an essential role pay a levy proportional to their receipts. Those in which music plays a secondary role pay a fixed rate set according to the real volume of music usage (square footage, size of clientele . . .). The amount paid is independent of the fame of the author and the quality of the work. In France, the allotment of the anticipated royalties is theoretically one-third for the composer, one-third for the lyricist, and one-third for the publisher.⁹⁸

In no country is the author put in the position of wage earner. There have been several attempts to create associations for which salaried musicians would work. These associations would buy musicians' works at a fixed rate and then try to exploit them. Such an arrangement presupposes that it is possible for the enterprise to sell the music, in other words, to promote it successfully and collect the royalties. But the consumers of music are very dispersed, and it is not within the power of a single enterprise to keep track of them. Thus for the production of representation to be profitable, there would have to be a very substantial infrastructure that representation alone does not justify. Therefore, all of these projects have ended in failure. The only case of salaried musicians is that of composers of music for films, who often receive upon completion of the work a fixed sum that is considered an advance on future receipts, though the royalty rate is so low that the advance is rarely exceeded. All in all, since those who reproduce musical works have an interest in ensuring that the authors receive appropriate compensation, when a work does succeed in attracting an audience, capitalism grants the creator the legal fiction of ownership over his work and assures him an often considerable reward for its use.

Thus in the countries in which the author is best protected, he is in the position of the holder of an estate who entrusts it to a specialized enterprise and delegates all of his rights to it in order to draw revenue. In the economy of representation, profit is linked to the ability of an innovation to accrue value; the remuneration of the author of the innovation can then be a function of the number of valorizations of his innovation, in other words, of the number of representations of his work. Processes such as this exist in many sectors in which it is still possible to identify the creator, the *molder*. For example, in the early days, automobiles were marked with the signatures of the manufacturers and designers, who produced models in limited numbers and were paid in accordance with

copyright principles. The author occupies a position upstream of the capitalist process, and his labor is remunerated in the form of a rent.

The commodity quickly became an object of spectacle. Already in the eighteenth century, music-turned-commodity was announcing the future role of all commodities under representation: a spectacle in front of silent people. In representation, commodities speak on behalf of those who purchase the spectacle of their order, their glory. Usage, as soon as it is represented, is destroyed by exchange. The spectacle emerged in the eighteenth century, and, as music will show us later on, it is now perhaps an obsolete form of capitalism: for the economy of representation has been replaced by that of repetition, and in Carnival's quarrel with Lent, it is Lent that has taken the upper hand.

The Drift toward Repetition

The Rupture of Combinatorics: Antiharmony

Harmonic combinatorics and the individualist system of representation necessarily led to a Romantic exacerbation of individualism and a rupture in the process of representation, impelling musicians toward an increasingly clear awareness of their relations with the world, of the divergences between creation and reality. Their music signified lack and organized their own solitude. They no longer vibrated in a world over which they had control, but in a reality foreign to their visions. They were the first to become conscious of the impossibility of definitively establishing oneself in harmony and within the constraints of combinatorics. It was no longer possible for the musician to create within this thoroughly explored code, even if it was still possible to sell the by-products. Schoenberg wrote his first quartets while earning his living by orchestrating operettas. Mahler and Satie were writing at the time the first May Day marches in Vienna took place, when Picasso created a scandal with *Les demoiselles d'Avignon* (*The Maidens of Avignon*) and Der Blaue Reiter published *A Call for the Emancipation of Dissonance*. The rupture of harmony's relation of dominance was the beginning of the end of the representative network and the mystical fusion of the middle classes with the social order.

In fact, music at the end of the nineteenth century was highly predictive of the essentials of the ruptures to come. And practically everything that happened took place in Vienna: it was there that music announced a decline, a rupture, and simultaneously a tremendous theoretical accomplishment. Musical creation rose to a fevered pitch, exploding prior to the political discontinuity for which it itself, to a certain extent, prepared the way. The present economic crisis and efflorescence of our decadence were preprogrammed in Viennese music. Wagner, by ignoring the simple melody line, was already moving away from the

representation of harmony. Then Mahler confirmed the end of an age, giving expression to the dissolution of tonality and the fundamental utopia of liberation, the integration of noise into musical organization, the profound but radically new reinsertion of musical labor into the lives of all men. The musical debates of the turn of the century, then, express the desacralization of musical matter, the advent of the nonformal, the noninstituted, the nonrepresentative. Vienna, where all of this was written, heard, and said; the prewar Vienna of the dodecaphonic turning point, about 1910, gripped by a self-destructive fascination, in which the Jewish bourgeoisie, by virtue of its multiple belongings and sense of transcendence, would take art to the limits of its potential; Red Vienna, where the street in revolt would attempt the only organization ever to initiate the self-management of concerts, with Schoenberg's "Society for Private Musical Performances."⁹⁹ Stefan Zweig, in *The World of Yesterday*, memoirs written in the darkest hours of his expatriation, provides an admirable description of this typically Viennese process:

Immeasurable is the part in Viennese culture the Jewish bourgeoisie took, by their cooperation and promotion. They were the real audience, they filled the theaters and the concerts, they bought the books and the pictures, they visited the exhibitions, and with their more mobile understanding, little hampered by tradition, they were the exponents and champions of all that was new. Practically all the great art collections of the nineteenth century were formed by them, nearly all the artistic attempts were made possible only by them; without the ceaseless stimulating interest of the Jewish bourgeoisie, Vienna, thanks to the indolence of the court, the aristocracy, and the Christian millionaires, who preferred to maintain racing stables and hunts to fostering art, would have remained behind Berlin in the realm of art as Austria remained behind the German Reich in political matters. Whoever wished to put through something in Vienna, or came to Vienna as a guest from abroad and sought appreciation as well as an audience, was dependent on the Jewish bourgeoisie. When a single attempt was made in the anti-semitic period to create a so-called "national" theater, neither authors, nor actors, nor a public was forthcoming; after a few months the "national" theater collapsed miserably, and it was by this example that it became apparent for the first time that nine-tenths of what the world celebrated as Viennese culture in the nineteenth century was promoted, nourished, or even created by Viennese Jewry.¹⁰⁰

Political marginality formed the foundation, the infrastructure, of cultural marginality. These two marginalities designated the only two forces that were to survive the destruction of the strength of Vienna: a move toward utopian socialism and a shattering of the constraints on music—as if the cultural powerlessness of Viennese political society to assume its music tolled confirmation of the political death of the entire society of representation. The ruling class, inca-

pable of inventing a music and financing it, would prove incapable of organizing its own economic defense and political survival.

Thus music forced a break with tonality before economic accumulation forced a break with the laws of the economy of representation. Harmony—the repressive principle of the real—after having created romanticism—the utopian principle of the real, the exaltation of death in art—became the death of art and destroyed the real. An excess of order (harmonic) entails pseudodisorder (serial). Antiharmony is the rupture of combinatory growth, noise. At the end of meaning, it sets in place the aleatory, the meaningless, that is to say, as we shall see, repetition.

The lesson taught by music is thus essential and premonitory: with the end of representation, a first phase in the deritualization of music, in the degradation of value and the establishment of political order, comes to a close. Ritual murder recedes behind the spectacle of music. But after the strategy of bestowing form has tried everything, the represented ritual disappears beneath an acceptance of nonsense and a search for a new code. Representation, the substitute for reconciliatory sociality, fails; the rupture of harmony seems to announce that the representation of society cannot induce a real socialization, but leads to a more powerful, less signifying organization of nonsense. If this hypothesis holds true, then modernity is not the major rupture in the systems for the channelization of violence, the imaginary, and subversion that so many anachronistic thinkers would like to see. Not a major rupture, but sadly, boringly, a simple rearrangement of power, a tactical fracture, the institution of a new and obscure technocratic justification of power in organizations.

The probabilist transcending of combinatorics by a code of dissonance, founded on a new mode of knowledge, then announced the advent of a power establishing, on the basis of a technocratic language, a more efficient channelization of the productions of the imaginary and forming the elements of a code of cybernetic repetition, a society without signification—a repetitive society.

Music, exploring in this way the totality of sound matter, has today followed this its path to the end, to the point of the suicide of form. As Jean Baudrillard writes: "In every spectacle (of gigantism), there is the imminence of catastrophe."

The Socialization of Music

Music, seen from the point of view of its codes, heralds a rupture of the representation of harmony, and its political economy is exemplary of that rupture. Three things foster the expectation that representation is becoming an anachronistic form of musical expression incompatible with the requirements of the capitalist economy:

The production of representation has a fixed productivity level, so its costs go up as the productivity of the rest of the economy improves. In itself, there-

fore, the activity of performing cannot be profitable, and capitalists will stop investing in it.

The love of music, a desire increasingly trapped in the consumption of music for listening, cannot find in performance what the phonograph record provides: the possibility of saving, of stockpiling at home, and destroying at pleasure. We must add to that the fact that the disorganization of urban life makes attending any performance an expedition. Representation can maintain itself only by extending its market (a project undertaken beginning in 1920, the date of the first radio-broadcast concert), by making its production multinational (through the coproduction of operas and concerts). In particular, as we will see later, performance becomes the *showcase for the phonograph record, a support for the promotion of repetition*.

Finally, radio made representation free. A radio station is not a concert hall; it neither pays for the performance nor pays the musicians, on the grounds that the broadcast of a work, live or recorded, gives the work free publicity and is thus advantageous for other forms of the commercialization of music. Not recognizing themselves as a locus of representation, radio stations everywhere wished to be exempted from copyright restrictions and from paying royalties on the objects they use. But the situation varies by country: in France, State radio and television pays the music writers' associations a percentage of the gross profit, minus taxes, earned from broadcast royalties and advertising receipts. Commercial stations pay SACEM royalties proportional to their advertising receipts. In the United States, until the law of 1976, radio stations had succeeded in avoiding payment of royalties to music publishers and record companies. Before 1976, every proposal to impose levies lost under pressure from the radio and television lobby, which is very important at election time. Similarly, jukeboxes, which in the United States are controlled by underworld elements, were exempt until 1976. In the Soviet Union, radio stations do not pay royalties either. Music is thus being remunerated more and more globally, independently of the individual work. But then it becomes impossible to identify the author of the representation. Today, the problem has become almost insoluble: how can authors be remunerated on the basis of the number of representations of their works when the channels and number of representations have been multiplied to such an extent—if not by statistical and aleatory means?

The economic rights and rules invented by competitive capitalism do not apply to today's capitalism of mass production, of repetition. Inevitably, the statistical evaluation of the quantity of the representation will be adopted. The usage of music will be evaluated exclusively by polls determining the quantity of the music broadcast. Musicians will be remunerated according to statistical keys and treated as producers of a stockpile of undifferentiated raw material. This shift relates to a statistical reality: the disappearance of use-value in mass production and the final triumph of exchange-value.

Representation as the Showcase of Repetition

The advent of recording thoroughly shattered representation. First produced as a way of preserving its trace, it instead replaced it as the driving force of the economy of music. Since then, representation survives when it is useful in record promotion or among artists who do not command a significant record audience. For those trapped by the record, public performance becomes a simulacrum of the record: an audience generally familiar with the artist's recordings attends to hear their live replication. What irony: people originally intended to use the record to preserve the performance, and today the performance is only successful as a simulacrum of the record. For popular music, this has meant the gradual death of the small bands, who have been reduced to faithful imitations of recording stars. For the classical repertory, it means the danger (to be discussed later) of imposing all of the aesthetic criteria of repetition—made of rigor and cold calculation—upon representation. Thus, the simulacrum of usage is only retained when it furthers exchange or mimics it. Representation has become a showcase and mimics repetition.

Recording is therefore more than a simple mutation in the technological conditions of music listening. It is also a very deep transformation of the relation to music.

Of course, the mass repetition of the music object leans very heavily upon representation and draws the major portion of its sound matter from it. *Repetition began as the by-product of representation. Representation has become an auxiliary of repetition*. This general phenomenon extends far beyond music itself: the service acts as the showcase and support for the commodity object, after having contributed its structures and inspired it. For example, haute couture, long the model for ready-made clothes, now draws its inspiration from them.

However, when the process of representation is transformed into repetition, there develops a refusal to submit to the norm and a blockage of the identical. This, to my mind, is what was at the heart of the economic crises of the beginning of the twentieth century—*crises of normalization*, of the emplacement of repetition—when mass production began to demand a radical recasting of the industrial apparatus. For recording is indeed inscribed as the death of representation.

Right from the beginning, machines invented to counteract temporal erosion, to constitute a *speech* that would be indefinitely *reproducible*, to overcome the ravages of time by means of the construction of mechanical devices, were moving in the direction of a death blow to representation. Let us listen to the first androids built in the eighteenth century by the Abbot Mical:

The King brings peace to Europe
Peace crowns the King with glory

And peace is the contentment of the people
 Oh cherished King, father of your people, let
 Europe behold the glory of your reign.¹⁰¹

Beginning with the first mechanically produced discourse, the repetitive concretization of the unalterable has always taken the initial form of a renewed affirmation of power and legitimate might.

A revealing situation: recording and the reproduction of speech reconstitute the locus of power. Through the androids, it is authority itself that is speaking. Authority, and simultaneously, *paradoxically*, its *caricatured* double. For in droning the discourse of the established powers, these androids simulate them, mimic them. This raises a scandalous question: are those powers not also copies, simulacra that are themselves susceptible to simulation?

Thus the simulation of the master's word leads to a questioning of the status of the master himself. Mechanisms for recording and reproduction on the one hand provide a technical body, a framework for representations, and on the other hand, by presenting themselves as a *double*, constitute a simulacrum of power, destroy the legitimacy of representation.

The first recording of speech was a representation of the king's legitimacy. But the android of the king, repeating his legitimacy, could not remain a representation of power for long.

Chapter Four Repeating

The power to record sound was one of three essential powers of the gods in ancient societies, along with that of making war and causing famine. According to a Gaelic myth, it was precisely by opposing these three powers that King Leevellyn won legitimacy.¹⁰²

Recording has always been a means of social control, a stake in politics, regardless of the available technologies. Power is no longer content to enact its legitimacy; it records and reproduces the societies it rules. Stockpiling memory, retaining history or time, distributing speech, and manipulating information has always been an attribute of civil and priestly power, beginning with the Tables of the Law. But before the industrial age, this attribute did not occupy center stage: Moses stuttered and it was Aaron who spoke. But there was already no mistaking: the reality of power belonged to he who was able to reproduce the divine word, not to he who gave it voice it on a daily basis. Possessing the means of recording allows one to monitor noises, to maintain them, and to control their repetition within a determined code. In the final analysis, it allows one to impose one's own noise and to silence others: "Without the loudspeaker, we would never have conquered Germany," wrote Hitler in 1938 in the *Manual of German Radio*.

When Western technology, at the end of the nineteenth century, made possible the recording of sound, it was first conceived as a political auxiliary to representation. But as it happened, and contrary to the wishes of its inventors, it invested music instead of aiding institutions' power to perpetuate themselves; everything suddenly changed. A new society emerged, that of mass production,

46. Theodor Adorno, *The Philosophy of the New Music*, trans. Anne Mitchell and Wesley Blomstel (New York: Seabury Press, 1973).
47. Theodor Adorno, *Dissonanzen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1963).
48. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Rhizome," trans. Paul Foss and Paul Patton, in *Ideology and Consciousness* 8 (Spring 1981): 63.
49. Castaneda, *Teachings*, p. 88.

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50. David and Mendel, *Bach Reader* (note 20), pp. 49-50.
51. Karl Geiringer, *Haydn: A Creative Life in Music* (New York: Norton, 1946), p. 52.
52. Dedication to *Persée: Tragédie mise en musique par M^{rs} de Lully, Escuyer, Conseiller Secrétaire du Roy, et Surintendant de la Musique de Sa Majesté*, in Prod'homme, *Ecrits des musiciens* (note 19), p. 209.
53. *Le bourgeois gentilhomme*, act I, scene ii.
54. Jean-François Marmontel, "Épître dédicatoire," *Encyclopédie*, vol. 5 (1751-65), p. 822.
55. Julien Tiersot, *Lettres de musiciens écrites en français du XVe au XVIIIe siècle*, vol. 1 (Turin: Bocca, 1924), p. 99.
56. Albert Lavignac and Lionel de la Laurencie, eds. *Encyclopédie de la musique et dictionnaire du conservatoire*, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1913-34), p. 1565.
57. Letter to his father, May 1, 1778, in *The Letters of Mozart and His Family*, ed. E. Anderson, 2d ed., vol. 2 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 531.
58. Stéphanie de Genlis, *Les soupers de la maréchale de Luxembourg*, 2d ed., vol. 3 (Paris, 1828), p. 44. Cited in Judith Tick, "Musician and Mécène: Some Observations on Patronage in Late Eighteenth Century France," *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* 4, no. 2 (1973): 247.
59. Gertrude Norman and Miriam Shrifte, eds. *Letters of the Composers* (New York: Knopf, 1946), pp. 22-23.
60. *Pétition pour la création d'un Institut national de Musique*, read from the stand by Bernard Sarette to the National Convention on 18 Brumaire, year II (manuscript, Archives Nationales F1007, no. 1279).
61. *Règlement de l'Institut national de Musique* (extract), 1793.
62. "Argumentaire de Gossec et autres" (Archives Nationales, A XVIIIe, 384).
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Règlement de l'Institut national de Musique*.
65. *Ibid.*
66. "Argumentaire de Gossec et autres."
67. *Ibid.*
68. For a long time, the piracy of musical works went unpunished. The Tribunal of the Seine district, on May 30, 1827, looked upon it with indulgence: it found no evidence of piracy "in two or three contredanses based on the score of Rossini's *Siège de Corinthe*, only simple plagiarism, because the author transformed the rhythm to adapt it into a quadrille, which the author of the opera did not himself bring to realization." Rossini had not been wronged "since he published neither fantasia nor quadrille based upon that piece."
69. An outline of this idea can be found in Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 190.
70. Plato, *Laws*, trans. R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 129 (bk. 2, 665a).
71. Ssu-ma Ch'ien (2d century B.C.), *Les mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien*, trans. Edouard Chavannes, vol. 3 (Paris: Leroux, 1895), p. 252 (chap. 24).

72. Jan Pieterszoon Sweelinck, *Cinquante psaumes de David*, dedication to the burgomasters and aldermen of the city of Amsterdam, in Prod'homme, *Ecrits de musiciens* (note 19), p. 102.
73. *Essai sur l'origine des langues* (note 29), chap. 20: "I say that any language that cannot be understood by the people assembled is a servile language; it is impossible for a people to speak such a language and remain free."
74. Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, act I, scene iii, lines 109-10.
75. David and Mendel, *Bach Reader* (note 20), pp. 118-19.
76. From Charles Burney, *The Present State of Music in France and Italy* (1771), quoted in Oliver Strunk, *Source Readings in Music History* (New York: Norton, 1950), pp. 689 and 693.
77. Scriabine, *Le langage musical* (note 17).
78. Abbé Jean Antoine Dubois, *Description of the Character, Manners, and Customs of the People of India: and of their Institutions, Religious and Civil*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: McCarey and Son, 1818), pp. 162-63.
79. See Kinsky's catalog.
80. Hector Berlioz, *Treatise on Instrumentation, including Berlioz' Essay on Conducting*, ed. Richard Straus, trans. Theodore Front (New York: Edwin Kalmus, 1948), p. 420. [Translation modified. TR.]
81. *Ibid.*, p. 416. [Translation modified. TR.]
82. Lavignac and Laurencie, *Encyclopédie de la musique* (note 56), p. 2133.
83. Frederick Goldbeck, *The Perfect Conductor* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1960), p. 113.
84. Letter of Muzio Clemente, London music publisher, to his associate F. W. Collard, dated April 22, 1807, from Vienna, in Norman and Shrifte, *Letters of Composers* (note 59), pp. 65-66.
85. Letter to Puchberg, *ibid.*, p. 79.
86. Jean and Brigitte Massin, *Mozart* (Paris: Fayard, 1971), pp. 577-81.
87. Norman and Shrifte, *Letters of Composers*, pp. 147-48.
88. Richard Wagner, "Du métier du virtuose" (article in the *Revue et Gazette Musicale*, October 18, 1840), reproduced in *Prose Works* (note 16), vol. 7, pp. 127-28.
89. Quoted in Mina Curtis, *Bizet et son temps* (Paris: La Patine, 1961).
90. Document cited by Patrice Coirault in *Formation de nos chansons folkloriques* (Bibliothèque Nationale, manuscript 22116).
91. *Revue musicale* 37 (1835).
92. Georges Coulonges, *La chanson en son temps: De Béranger au juke-box* (Paris: Éditions Français Réunis, 1969).
93. *Ibid.*
94. *Ibid.*
95. "Finding that the law does not measure its protection by the length of the production, and its actions are universal; that these actions have as their object the goal of preserving a man's right to his thought and to compensation for labors that honor the intelligence . . . that this principle merits all the more respect since a possession that a judge could recognize or deny at whim and at a moment's fancy is no possession at all, and that additionally the power conferred upon the courts to take as the criterion of its decision the stature of the usurped work would lead to the most glaring injustices." *Recueil Dalloz*, vol. 53, sec. 2, p. 13.
96. *La France Musicale* 10 (March 10, 1850).
97. Law of March 11, 1857.
98. For mechanical reproduction, the publisher generally receives 50 percent and the intellectual creators 50 percent. This indicates, as we will see later on, that the balance of power between the various parties changed with the sudden emergence of mechanical means of reproduction.
99. See Dominique Jameux, *Musique en jeu* 16 (Nov. 1974): p. 55.
100. Stefan Zweig, *The World of Yesterday* (New York: Viking, 1943), p. 22.
101. See a research note by Y. Stourdézé (Paris: IRIS, 1976).

because—if we are still within earshot—the World, by repeating itself, is dissolving into Noise and Violence.

Five people in a circle. Are they singing? Is there an instrument accompanying them? Is Brueghel announcing this autonomous and tolerant world, at once turned in on itself and in unity?

For my own part, I would like to hear the Round Dance in the background of *Carnival's Quarrel with Lent* as the culmination, not the inauguration, of a struggle begun twenty-five centuries ago. I would like to hear it as the forerunner of postpenitence, postsilence, at the back exit of the church, not the rear-guard of the pagan Carnival, supplanted by capitalist Lent in the foreground.

Unless Brueghel, by making the field interpenetrate, rooting each within the other, wishes to signify that everything remains possible and to make audible, as though by a message coded in irony, the inevitable victory of the aleatory and the unfinished.

Afterword

The Politics of Silence and Sound

Susan McClary

The subject of Attali's book is noise, and his method is likewise noise. His unconcealed ideological premises, his penchant for sullyng the purity of pitch structures with references to violence, death, and (worst of all) money, and his radically different account of the history of Western music all jar cacophonously against the neat ordering of institutionalized music scholarship, especially as it is practiced in the United States. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that those trained in music will perceive the book's content also as noise—that is, as nonsense—and dismiss it out of hand.

Such dismissal would not surprise Attali, for among his observations he includes remarks on the rise of positivistic musicology and pseudoscientific music theory, both of which depend upon and reenforce the concept that music is autonomous, unrelated to the turbulence of the outside, social world. But it would be most unfortunate if the mechanisms that have already done so much to silence the human and social dimensions of our music (past and present, classical and popular) succeeded also in silencing the noise of this book. For if Attali can serve to jolt a few musicians awake or to encourage those attempting to forge new compositional or interpretive directions, then the hope he expresses for a new music—controlled neither by academic institutions nor by the entertainment/recording industry—may be at least partially realized.

Noise poses so many provocative questions that to try to respond adequately to it would require another book—or, indeed, new fields of study, new modes of creating, distributing, and listening to music. In this essay I shall address and amplify three issues raised by Attali: first, the means by which silence has been

imposed and is maintained by our theories and histories of music, by our performance practices and educational institutions; second, the concept that music articulates the ways in which societies channel violence and some ways in which this concept might be used in constructing a revised history of music; and third, the most recent of Attali's four stages of music (Composition) and signs of its emergence in the seven years that have passed since the original publication of *Noise*.

The idea that music can be regarded as silenced, even as its din surrounds us deafeningly at all times, seems a paradox, but it is central to Attali's argument. Unless one can accept this idea and its far-reaching implications, one cannot respond sympathetically to his narrative or prognosis. But the theories of music that have shaped our perceptions and consumption of music have been instrumental in conditioning us not to recognize silencing—not to realize that something vital may be missing from our experience.

From the time of the ancient Greeks, music theory has hovered indecisively between defining music as belonging with the sciences and mathematics or with the arts. Its use in communal rituals and its affective qualities would seem to place it among the products of human culture, yet the ability of mathematics to account for at least some of its raw materials (tones, intervals, etc.) has encouraged theorists repeatedly to ignore or even deny the social foundations of music. The tendency to deal with music by means of acoustics, mathematics, or mechanistic models preserves its mystery (accessible only to a trained priesthood), lends it higher prestige in a culture that values quantifiable knowledge over mere expression, and conceals the ideological basis of its conventions and repertoires. This tendency permits music to claim to be the result not of human endeavor but of rules existing independent of humankind. Depending on the conditions surrounding the production of such a theory, these rules may be ascribed to the physical-acoustical universe or may be cited as evidence for a metaphysical realm more real than the imperfect material, social world we inhabit.

Now it is quite clear to most listeners that music moves them, that they respond deeply to music in a variety of ways, even though in our society they are told that they cannot know anything about music without having absorbed the whole theoretical apparatus necessary for music specialization. But to learn this apparatus is to learn to renounce one's responses, to discover that the musical phenomenon is to be understood mechanistically, mathematically. Thus non-trained listeners are prevented from talking about social and expressive dimensions of music (for they lack the vocabulary to refer to its parts) and so are trained musicians (for they have been taught, in learning the proper vocabulary, that music is strictly self-contained structure). Silence in the midst of sound.

A few examples. Jean Philippe Rameau is recognized as the founder of tonal harmonic theory—the theory developed first to account for music of the eight-

teenth century, later extended to nineteenth-century repertoires. Musicians have been trained for the last two hundred years to perceive music in Rameau's terms—as sequences of chords—and thus his formulations seem to us self-evident. Before Rameau's *Traité de l'harmonie* [*Treatise on Harmony*] (1722), theories and pedagogical methods dealt principally with two aspects of music: coherence over time (mode) and the channeling of noise in the coordination of polyphonic voices (counterpoint). In this tradition, the integrity of a composition's sense of motion and formal unfolding was preserved, and simultaneities were treated contextually—as formations that emerged from communal activity and that continued on in accordance with rules for dissonance control, with the verbal text, and with the modal structure. Rameau, in a striking reworking of Descartes' *Cogito* manifesto, declared this earlier tradition moribund and, in seeking to build a musical system from reason and science, hailed the triad as the basis of music.

Now to be sure, the major triad can be generated from very simple mathematical principles, and its pitches occur in the overtone series. It appears thus to be inscribed in nature (not invented arbitrarily by culture), and its music seems to be therefore the music dictated by the very laws of physics. Yet the triad is inert. Breaking a piece of music down into a series of its smallest atomic units destroys whatever illusion of motion it might have had. It yields a chain of freeze-frame stills, all of which turn out to be instances of triads. Mathematical certainty and the acoustical seal of approval are bought at the price of silence and death, for text, continuity, color, inflection, expression, and social function are no longer relevant issues. The piece is paralyzed, laid out like a cadaver, dismembered, and cast aside.

Heinrich Schenker's neo-Hegelian theoretical program early in this century attempted to restore to music theory the accounting for motion, the illusion of organically unfolding life he detected in German music from Bach to Brahms. His principal treatise, *Der freie Satz* [*Free Composition*] (1935), is expressly metaphysical in intent—the work of an Austrian Jew between the world wars who sought evidence of transcendental certainty and meaning in this music. The book is intensely, almost desperately, rigorous as he demonstrates the underlying process that characterizes all "great" (that is, eighteenth and nineteenth-century German) music. Details of expression, rhetoric—even vocal texts—are dismissed as surface irrelevances in his search for higher truth. Ironically, while his treatise provides the key to much of the implicit ideology of the standard German repertory, Schenker conceals his observations in formalisms. As a further irony, Schenker's work has been accepted as one of the principal modes of academic analysis in the United States, but only after it was stripped of its ideological trappings: in the recent translation (trans. Ernst Oster [New York:Longman, 1979]) the sections involved with mysticism and German supremacy have been moved to an appendix. The book now reads like a cut-and-dried method and is

meant to be used as one. If Schenker silenced the cries of uncertainty and anguish apparent in the discontinuities of so much nineteenth-century music by showing that it all is—in the final analysis—normative and consistent with the laws of God, American Schenkerians have in turn silenced his metaphysical quest.

What does it matter in the real world of production and listening what music theorists say to one another? Inasmuch as musicians who are trained in conservatories or universities are required to have had at least two (often three or four) years of such theoretical study, it can matter quite a bit: our performers, historians, and composers by and large are taught that music has no meaning other than its harmonic and formal structure.

The performers on whom we rely to flesh out notated scores into sound are trained *not* to interpret (understood as the imposition of the unwanted self on what is fantasized to be a direct transmission of the composer's subjective intentions to the listener), but rather to strive for a perfect, standard sound, for an unbroken, polished surface. Such performers became ideal in the nineteenth century as grist for the symphony orchestra in which the conductor usurped complete control over interpretation and needed only the assurance of dependable sound production from the laboring musician. In our century of Repetition, they have remained ideal for purposes of the recording industry, which demands perfection and the kind of consistency that facilitates splicing. And our mode of consuming music as background decor (Beethoven's *C#* Minor Quartet played as Muzak at academic cocktail parties) favors performances that call no attention to themselves.

Because Attali's book locates musical social significance in its channeling of noise and violence—qualities almost entirely lacking in our musical experiences—his point is likely to be met with incomprehension. But he is absolutely right. If the noise of classical music (portrayals of the irrational in Bach, the Promethean struggles of Beethoven, the bitter irony and agonizing doubt of Mahler) is no longer audible, it is because it has been contained by a higher act of violence. To refuse to enact the ruptures of a discontinuous musical surface is to silence forcibly, to stifle the human voice, to render docile by means of lobotomy. It is this mode of performance that characterizes our concert halls and recordings today. It leads us to believe that there never was meaning, that music always has been nothing but pretty, orderly sound.

Likewise historians of music, given their commitment to positivistic research and formal descriptions of music, limit their programs to questions that can be answered factually. Problems of the sort Attali raises are not simply solved differently in musicology—they are not even posed, for to attempt solving them would lead necessarily into forbidden speculation. If the piece of music is but a series of chords on a notated grid, then there exists no way of linking it to the

outside world. Research involves the conditions surrounding the material production of the work and the preparation of increasingly rigorous scholarly editions. Musicology remains innocent of its own ideology, of the tenets with which it marks the boundaries between its value-free laboratory and the chaotic social world. Reduced to an artifact to be dated and normatively described, the piece of music is sealed and stockpiled, prevented from speaking its narrative of violence and order.

Composers raised within the academic context have been silenced in a way perhaps more detrimental than other members of the musical caste. For the music of the concert repertory (the mainstay of performers, musicologists, and theorists) did at least get to present some semblance of live drama at some time in history. But the university that has provided a shelter for alienated artists for the last forty years has also encouraged them to pursue increasingly abstract, mathematically based, deliberately inaccessible modes of composition. A curious reversal has occurred: the relentless serial noise of Schoenberg's protest against the complacent bourgeoisie has become the seat of institutionalized order, while attempts by younger composers to communicate, to become expressive, are dismissed as noise—the noise of human emotion and social response. The battle between the New York Uptown and Downtown schools of composition (which will be dealt with again later in this essay) is being waged over what counts as noise, what counts as order, and who gets to marginalize whom. Attali's *Noise*, as it traces the contours of the invisible, inaudible network controlling our musical world, helps immeasurably in clarifying the issues underlying today's upheavals.

Attali's model for the ideological criticism of music (based on the idea that the relationship between noise and order in a piece or repertory indicates much about how the society that produced this music channels violence) owes a great deal to Theodor Adorno. Attali's model differs, however, in that Attali is not bound up with Adorno's love/hate relationship with German culture, which caused him on the one hand to despise all else as trivial or primitive, but on the other to call attention to signs of totalitarianism, self-willed silence, and finally death in the German musical tradition. Adorno's program is first that of a Cassandra and then that of a coroner performing an autopsy. Attali may likewise resemble Cassandra (and the future may prove him a coroner as well), but his model permits him to consider a much wider spectrum of music, to recognize the German tradition as an extremely important moment in the continuum of Western music, but to be able in addition to recognize popular genres and ethnic, early, and new musics. The insights of both Adorno and Attali, however, are results of a refusal to read the history of music as a flat, autonomous chronological record, an insistence on understanding musical culture of the past as a way of grasping social practices of the present and future. Both take the music we

retreat to for escapist fantasies or entertainment and convert it into discomfiting reminders of that from which we sought to hide—political control and money.

If American musicology is concerned with polishing the surfaces of compositions for affirmative appreciation—indeed with polishing the entire history of style into a chain of bright, attractively packaged commodities—what sort of historical narrative would Attali's model produce? He has provided an outline, filled in occasionally with evocative examples that whet (but do not fully satisfy) the appetite. Such spottiness is characteristic of the early stages of most paradigm shifts. But his model does offer the key to a revitalized version of the history of Western (and even, by extension, non-Western) music, and it is possible to apply it productively to repertoires he does not discuss at length.

For instance, several elements of seventeenth-century music can be richly illuminated both by Attali's succession of stages (Sacrifice, Representation, etc.) and by his concept of examining the opposition of socially legitimated order and noise in explaining style change. Polemic discussions concerning style—rival taxonomies, competitive claims to authorized lines of descent, and ideologically polarized sets of tastes—were rampant in the seventeenth century, indicating that it might be a period of particular interest to an enterprise connecting music and social/economic factors. But the seventeenth century is not usually treated very seriously in musicology, for its music is (in terms of our standard tonal expectations) noise. If we take Attali at his most daring and permit ourselves to assume that music truly heralds changes that are only later apparent in other aspects of culture, we may find explanations for several problems in seventeenth-century music scholarship: for the upheaval in style around 1600, for the peculiar contradictory story concerning the invention of opera advanced by its first practitioners, for the staunch resistance in France to Italian style, and for modern musicology's tendency to write the century off as primitive.

Attali locates the stage of Representation (music for the bourgeois audience) in the nineteenth century. I wish to propose that it appeared much earlier, that it was ushered in with great fanfare with the invention of opera, monody, and sonata in the first decade of the seventeenth century.

Indeed, opera was first called *stile rappresentativo*, and its express purpose was to make spectators believe in—to experience directly—the dramatic struggles enacted in its performances. In place of the equal-voiced polyphony of the previous style (now dubbed by the rebels as the *prima prattica* ["first practice," as opposed to the new, modern "second practice"], it made use of flamboyant, virtuosic individuals. Its technical means involved a particular transformation of earlier syntactical procedures that resulted in constant surface control and long-term goal orientation (the essential ingredients of tonality and, not coincidentally, of capitalism).

It is significant that opera (and parallel solo genres) developed not in the context of the hereditary feudal aristocracy (which is often assumed by historians

and social critics of opera), but in the courts of northern Italy that were sustained by commerce and later, after 1637, in public opera houses. Despite the humanistic red herrings proffered by Peri, Caccini, and others to the effect that they were reviving Greek performance practices, these gentlemen knew very well that they were basing their new reciting style on the improvisatory practices of contemporary popular music. Thus the eagerness with which the humanist myth was constructed and elaborated sought both to conceal the vulgar origins of its techniques and to flatter the erudition of its cultivated patrons.

Moreover, the plots themselves repeatedly involve the subversion of the inherited social hierarchy. Orfeo as a demigod (between the gods and the plebian shepherds) willfully breaks through traditional barriers, first in his seduction of the deified nobility through his great individual virtuosity that wins him admission into the forbidden Inferno, and second in his apotheosis. Monteverdi's *Poppea*, Alidoro in Cesti's *Orontea*, and Scarlatti's *Griselda* succeed in penetrating the aristocracy by force of their erotic charms, talent, or virtue (all of which qualify as noise in a static, ordered social structure). What is represented, what one is made to believe in this music is the rightful emergence of the vital, superior middle-class individual in defiance of the established, hereditary class system.

That there should have been attempts at dismissing the new style as noise is to be expected, and the spokesmen for traditional authority rushed in with lists of errors committed by the new composers in voice-leading and dissonance control (quite literally complaints concerning the mischanneling of violence). The almost raw erotic energy of the new style swept over Europe, nonetheless, meeting real opposition in only one place: the France of Louis XIV. This too is to be expected, for the individual-centered explosivity of the Italian compositional procedures (with their compelling momentum, enjambments, and climaxes), performance practices (with improvised effusions added on the spot by the individual singer), and subversive plots could only have revealed the oppressiveness of Louis' absolutist regime of enforced Platonic harmony. Italian music was, in fact, banned in France, clearly for ideological reasons; but the documents comparing Italian and French styles refer not to politics directly, but to matters of orderliness, harmoniousness, and tastefulness (French *bon goût* or good taste versus Italian noise). If the violence of Italian music is right on the surface, luring us along and detonating periodically to release its pent-up tension, violence is equally present in French music—but it is inaudible. It is that which has silenced the noise, systematically siphoned off the tension, leaving only pretty blandness. The most worrisome aspects of music to a regimented society—the areas in which noise is most likely to creep in, such as physical motion and ornamentation—are the most carefully policed in French performance. Exact formulas for the bowing of stringed instruments and for the precise execution of ornaments were codified and enforced: the performer was most regulated

exactly where he would ordinarily be permitted to exercise greatest individual spontaneity.

Why does musicology avoid taking the seventeenth century seriously? Precisely because the ideological struggles that put tonality, opera, and solo instrumental music (and their economic, philosophical, and political counterparts) in place by the eighteenth century are distressing to witness—especially if one wants to hang onto the belief that tonality (and capitalism, parliamentary democracy, Enlightenment rationalism) are inevitable and universal. Only when the dust of the seventeenth century settles and the new ideological structures are sufficiently stabilized to seem eternal can we begin to perform acts of canonization and the kind of analysis that seeks to confirm that ours is truly the only world that works. The seventeenth century reveals the social nature and thus the relative status of tonal music's "value-free" foundation.

This interpretation of the seventeenth century goes counter to Attali's only in that he places the transition to Representation considerably later. It validates, however, the concepts central to his position: that music announces changes that only later are manifested in the rest of culture and that it is in terms of the noise/order polarity that styles define themselves ideologically against predecessors or contemporaneous rival practices. A history of Western music rewritten on the basis of these principles would be extraordinarily valuable, for musicians still stuck with sterile chronologies, but especially for nonmusicians who (as Attali demonstrates so well) must have access to the kinds of insights music offers.

Attali's term for the hope of the future, *Composition*, seems strange at first glance, for this is the word used in Western culture for centuries to designate the creation of music in general. But the word has been mystified since the nineteenth century, such that it summons up the figure of a semidivine being, struck by holy inspiration, and delivering forth ineffable delphic utterances. Attali's usage returns us to the literal components of the word, which quite simply means "to put together." It is this demystified yet humanly dignified activity that Attali wishes to remove from the rigid institutions of specialized musical training in order to return it to all members of society. For in Attali's eyes, it is only if the individuals in society choose to reappropriate the means of producing art themselves that the infinite regress of Repetition (whether in the sense of externally generated serial writing or of mass reproduction) can be escaped.

In the scant seven years since *Noise* was published, extraordinary evidence of such tendencies in music has emerged. It was in the mid-1970s that New Wave burst on the scene in England, with precisely the motivation suggested by Attali at his most optimistic and with the mixed results he also realistically anticipated. Many of the original groups began as garage bands formed by people *not* educated as musicians who intended to defy noisily the slickly marketed "nonsense" of commercial rock. The music is often aggressively simple syntac-

tically, but at its best it conveys most effectively the raw energy of its social and musical protest. It bristles with genuine sonic noise (most of it maintains a decibel level physically painful to the uninitiated), and its style incorporates other features that qualify as cultural noise: the bizarre visual appearance of many of its proponents, texts with express political content, and deliberate inclusion of blacks and of women (not as the traditional "dumb chicks" singing to attract the libidinous attention of the audience, but—taboo of taboos—as competent musicians *playing instruments*, even drums).

The grass-roots ideology of the New Wave movement has been hard to sustain, as the market has continually sought to acquire its products for mass reproduction. Even among the disenfranchised, the values of capitalism are strong, and many groups have become absorbed by the recording industry. The realization that much of their most ardent protest was being consumed as "style" caused a few groups, such as the Sex Pistols, to disband shortly after they achieved fame. But while there exists a powerful tendency for industry to contain the noise of these groups by packaging it, converting it into style-commodity, the strength of the movements is manifested by the seeming spontaneous generation of ever more local groups. The burgeoning of Composition, still somewhat theoretical in Attali's statement of 1977, has been actualized and is proving quite resilient.

The same seven-year period has witnessed a major shift in "serious" music, away from serialism and private-language music toward music that strives once again to communicate. Whether performance art, minimalism, or neo-tonality, the new styles challenge the ideology of the rigorous, autonomous, elitist music produced in universities for seminars. They call into question the institutions of academic training and taxonomies, of orchestras and opera houses, of recording and funding networks.

Many of the principal figures in these new styles come from groups traditionally marginalized, who are defined by the mainstream as noise anyway, and who thus have been in particularly good positions to observe the oppressive nature of the reigning order. Women, for instance, are not only strongly represented in these new modes of Composition—they are frequently leaders, which has never before been the case in Western "art" music. Instead of submitting their voices to institutionalized definitions of permissible order, composers such as Laurie Anderson and Joan La Barbara celebrate their status as outsiders by highlighting what counts in many official circles as noise. Some individuals composing new kinds of music were originally associated with other media (David Hykes with film, for instance) or have found their most responsive audiences among dancers and visual artists (Philip Glass). All are people who managed not to be silenced by the institutional framework, who are dedicated to injecting back into music the noise of the body, of the visual, of emotions, and of gender.

For the most part, this music is far more vital than the music of Repetition, which has deliberately and systematically drained itself of energy. Many practitioners of Composition fight the tendency toward objectification by making live, multimedia performance a necessary component of the work. Others (such as Pauline Oliveros) explore the possibility of breaking down the barrier between producer and consumer by designing instructions for participatory events. Collaborative efforts (combining music, drama, dance, video) are prominent in these movements. The traditional taxonomic distinction between high and popular culture becomes irrelevant in the eclectic blends characteristic of this new music, and indeed many of these new composers are as often as not classified as New Wave and perform in dance clubs. A new breed of music critic (such as John Rockwell and Gregory Sandow) has begun to articulate the way the world looks (and sounds) without the distortion of that distinction.

Composition, as Attali defines it, is coming increasingly to the fore, displacing the musical procedures and the networks of Repetition. That these new movements signal not simply a change in musical taste but also of social climate seems extremely plausible, though how exactly the change will be manifested in other areas of culture remains to be seen. At the very least the new movements seem to herald a society in which individuals and small groups dare to reclaim the right to develop their own procedures, their own networks. *Noise*, by accounting theoretically for these new ways of articulating possible worlds through sound and by demonstrating the crucial role music plays in the transformation of societies, encourages and legitimates these efforts.