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THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL INEQUALITY: FROM NATIONAL TO COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE

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In order to analyse the dynamics of global civil society (global politics, global capital, global culture, global inequalities), we need a methodological shift from the dominant national perspective to a cosmopolitan perspective. A cosmopolitan frame of reference calls into question one of the most powerful beliefs of our time concerning society and politics. This belief is the notion that 'modern society' and 'modern politics' are to be understood as nation state organised society and nation state organised politics; in other words, the concept of society is identified with the national imagination of society. When this belief is held by social actors, I call it 'national perspective'; when it is held by scientific observers, I call it 'methodological nationalism'. This distinction between the perspective of a social actor and that of the social scientist is important because there is *no* logical connection between the two, only a common origin.

The Principles of Methodological Nationalism

Methodological nationalism equates societies with nation-states societies and sees states and their governments as the cornerstones of social science analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations which organise themselves internally as nation-states and set external boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. It goes even further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states represents the most fundamental category of political organisation. Much social science assumes the coincidence of social boundaries with state boundaries, thus presupposing that social action occurs primarily within, and secondarily across, these divisions.

From a social science perspective, the cosmopolitan question is not primarily normative; that is to say, it is not what a 'cosmopolitan society', 'cosmopolitan democracy', 'cosmopolitan state' or regime ought to be. Rather it is whether there is a clear sociological alternative to the national mystification of societies and political order. Is there an *actually existing* cosmopolitanism, a reality of (re)attachment, multiple belongings or belonging from a distance? In fact, to belong or not to belong: that *is* the cosmopolitan question (Favell 1999; Beck 2002). Is global civil society part of this reality?

A sharp distinction should be made between *methodological* nationalism and *normative* nationalism. The former is linked to the perspective of the social sciences observer whereas the latter refers to the perspective of political actors. Normative nationalism holds that every nation has the right to determine itself within the frame of its cultural distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a given and simultaneously defines the conflicts and institutions of society and politics in these terms. These basic tenets have become the main grid through which social scientists see the world.

Indeed the social scientist's stance is rooted in the concept of the nation state, his or her sociological imagination dominated by a nation-state outlook on society, politics, law, justice and history. Social scientists are, to a large degree, prisoners of the nation-state.

These premises also structure empirical research; for example, statistical indicators are almost always exclusively national. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed nigh impossible, because many statistical categories and processes of investigation are based upon it.

Comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, a significant part of history, and jurisprudence are all essentially based on methodological nationalism. Indeed, most positions in the contemporary social and political science debate over globalisation can arguably be systematically interpreted as trans-disciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism. It is therefore very important for the future development of social science that methodological nationalism,

as well as the associated categories of perception and institutional discipline, be theoretically, empirically, and organisationally dissected and reassessed.

Methodological nationalism includes the following principles:

1 the *subordination* of society to the state; which implies
2 that there is no singular but only the *plural* of socie*ties*, in contrast to Niklas Luhmann's (2002) argument that there is only *one* society, that is 'world society';
3 a *territorial* notion of societies with state-constructed *boundaries*, that is, the territorial state as container of society;
4 the principle of reciprocal *determination* between state and society: the territorial nation-state is both creator and guarantor of individual citizenship rights, and citizens organise themselves to influence and legitimise state actions;
5 both states and societies are imagined and located within the *dichotomy-between the national and the international*, which up to now has been the foundation of the dominant ontology of politics and political theory;
6 the state as the guarantor of the social order provides the instruments and units for the collection of *statistics* about social and economic processes that empirical social science requires; indeed, the categories of the state census have come to be the main operational categories of empirical social science, and this is true even for most 'global' data, which are based on nation-state statistics and exclude transnational 'networks', 'flows', and 'scapes';
7 in membership and statistical representation methodological nationalism operates on the either-or principle, excluding the as-well-as principle: either 'us' or 'them', either 'in' or 'out'.

There is, however, a problem with the term 'methodological nationalism'. It can be thought of as a sort of prejudice, a 'belief', an 'attitude', and therefore something that can be eliminated from modern enlightened thought in the same way that we eliminate other attitudes such as racism, sexism, or religious bigotry. But the crucial point of methodological nationalism is that it is not a matter of values and prejudices, but rather of science and

scholarship and informed expert opinion. To be precise, methodological nationalism refers to a set of beliefs that are statements about empirical reality, statements that mainstream social scientists, using highly sophisticated empirical research methods, accept as true, as propositions supported by 'the facts'. Methodological nationalism is therefore very difficult to understand. We have to ask on what grounds we reflect upon and criticise methodological nationalism. And is there an alternative? Why should one accept it?

The Cosmopolitan Perspective

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be mistaken for the thesis about the end of the nation-state. Nor is it necessarily the case that in criticising methodological nationalism one is promoting the elimination of the nation. Nation-states (as all investigations have shown) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? The decisive point is that *national organisation as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as a premise for the social science observer*. In order to understand even the re-nationalisation or re-ethnification trend in the USA or in western or eastern Europe one needs a cosmopolitan perspective. How to move away from this underlying methodological bias in the social sciences is primarily an analytical and empirical problem, but it is also a normative and political issue. In this sense, social science can react to the challenge of a global civil society only if it manages to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialised fields of research so as to elaborate the foundations of a *cosmopolitan* social and political science.

This paradigmatic reconstruction and redefinition of social science from a national to a cosmopolitan perspective can be understood and explained as a 'positive problem shift' (Lakatos 1970) in the sense of a broadening of horizons for social science research:

When politics and society are de-bounded, the consequence is that the labels 'national' and 'international' can no longer be separated. Considering the fact that to an increasing extent governing takes place in de-bounded spaces, the

increasingly problematic distinction, but which is typical of the field- between 'domestic' and 'foreign' politics, as 'national governmental politics' and 'international relations' becomes definitely obsolete. Thus it is not only a matter of integrating national explanation factors in the analysis of international political processes, or of re-evaluating the international determinants of national political processes, as was pursued in numerous approaches over the past years. Rather, it is a matter of questioning the very separation between 'inside' and 'outside'. (Grande and Risse 2000)

To sum up, traditional conceptualisations of terms and construction of borders between 'national' and 'international', domestic and foreign politics, and society and state are less and less appropriate for tackling the challenges linked to the global age.

One implication is that the national and the cosmopolitan perspectives understand sovereignty differently. In the national perspective we find it easiest to think about globalisation as a simple alternative to or negation of the modern state or the system of modern states. This framing is often articulated as an opposition between *political realism* as a celebration of the necessity of state interests and a *political idealism* that celebrates the potentiality of some kind of universality, some global or human community. But the cosmopolitan perspective is not concerned with the fall (or rise) of the nation-state in the global age in the same way as the national perspective. The cosmopolitan perspective offers a way of analysing the whole global power game in which states are redefined as one class of actor among others. The either/or of realism and idealism does not make sense in a cosmopolitan perspective. In this either/or game, either the state exists, albeit only as an essential core, or it does not exist at all; either there is national sovereignty—that is, a zero-sum game between national and international competence—or there is no sovereignty at all. In the cosmopolitan perspective, 'realism' is a kind of political *non*-realism because it neglects the second great transformation of the whole global power game. A concept of cosmopolitan *Realpolitik* is necessary in order to understand the positive-sum game of pooled sovereignties. In an era of global crisis, national

> **A concept of cosmopolitan Realpolitik is necessary in order to understand the positive-sum game of pooled sovereignties**

problems can be solved only by transnational-national cooperation and state networks (Beck 2002).

The horizon opened up by the distinction between methodological nationalist and cosmopolitan perspectives reveals a new configuration of the world. Previously, the national cosmos could be clearly decomposed into 'inside' and 'outside'. The nation-state-governed order was established between the two. In the inner experiential space, the central themes of work, politics, law, social inequality, justice, and cultural identity were negotiated against the background of the nation, which was the guarantor of a collective unity of action. In the international realm, that is, in the outer experiential field, the corresponding concept of 'multiculturalism' developed. Multiculturalism, by delimiting and excluding the foreign, mirrored and crystallised the national self-image. Thus, the national/international distinction always represented more than a distinction; it actually functioned as a permanent self-fulfilling prophecy.

Against the background of cosmopolitan social science it becomes suddenly obvious that it is possible neither to clearly distinguish between the national and the international nor, in a similar way, to convincingly contrast homogeneous units. National spaces have become denationalised so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising, a new mapping of space and time, new coordinates for the social and the political which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated. (This is the research agenda of the 'Reflexive Modernization' Research Centre at Munich University; see Beck, Bonß, and Lau 2003.) What we are talking about is a paradigmatic shift as illustrated in Table 3.1.

The paradigmatic opposition between (inter)-nationalism and cosmopolitanism does not establish a logical or temporal exclusivity but an ambivalent transitional coexistence, a new concurrence of phenomena that are not concurrent.

Institutions and organisations focusing on a form of cosmopolitan social science research have a long history and have competed with the 'self-confirmation circle' of nation-state data and knowledge production. First of all, it is the scientific

Table 3.1: Paradigmatic change from a national perspective to a cosmopolitan social science		
	Political action	
	National perspective	Cosmopolitan perspective
Methodological nationalism	Nation-state-centred understanding of society and politics in both political practice and political science.	Globalisation seen from within the nation-state: under which conditions do actors change from a national to a cosmopolitan perspective? Actually existing cosmopolitanism.
Methodological cosmopolitanism	Opening up of the nation-state-centred society and politics, sociology and political science: new critical theory with a cosmopolitan intent; redefinition of basic notions and frames of references from a cosmopolitan perspective.	The cosmopolitan society and its enemies: what does a cosmopolitan society, state, and regime mean?

(Left row label spanning both data rows: **Political science**)

ethos that bases itself on the higher quality of nation-state data. In parallel, one witnesses, along with the feared 'cosmopolitan turn', the return of either metaphysics or the non-scientific, and often both of them, to the centre of academic social science. Furthermore, methodological nationalism acquires its superiority from the prevalent conviction of philosophy and political theory that Western values—democracy, the rule of law, social justice—are possible only in the shapes and contexts provided by the nation-state. This leads to the conclusion that the cosmopolitan opening betrays and endangers the democratic ethos.

In both these scenarios the major mistake is based on two oversights. On the one hand the interpretation of the classical researchers and their nation-state premises has been a-historicised and set as an absolute. Whoever lauds the classical researchers masks her or his mental sterility, and forces herself or himself to assume the existence of a copyist, a fact which has already been the case for some time. On the other hand one reproduces the mistake according to the old principle of 'es darf nicht sein, was nicht sein soll' ('it cannot be, what ought not to be') of sacrificing curiosity about reality to institutionalised convictions about values. Even the most demanding of data from the methodological point of view can be

blind and lead to us being surprised and overwhelmed by the return of the suppressed cosmopolitan reality.

Global civil society actors can be understood as the agents of a cosmopolitan perspective, even though the phenomenon of global civil society encompasses a diversity of cross-cutting beliefs, prejudices, and assumptions. To put it another way, global civil society could be represented as one element of actually existing cosmopolitanism. To grasp the meaning of global civil society, social science must be re-established as a transnational science of the reality of denationalisation, transnationalisation, and 're-ethnification' in a global age—and this on the levels of concepts, theories, and methodologies as well as organisationally. The fundamental concepts of 'modern society' must be re-examined. Household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history and politics must be released from the fetters of methodological nationalism and re-conceptualised and empirically established within the framework of a cosmopolitan social and political science which remains to be developed. This is quite a list of understatements. But nevertheless it has to be handled and managed if the social sciences are to avoid becoming a museum of antiquated ideas.

The Invisibility of Global Inequalities

In the second part of this chapter I would like to address a theme, as well as a research area, which has remained central but has until now received little attention from the cosmopolitan perspective. I focus on the sociology of social inequalities in order to both test and illustrate the relevance of a new critical theory and its empirical claims by using a concrete example. The World Bank's (2002) report on the financial situation of developing countries can be read like a an official written accusation from child rights organisation Terre des Hommes against the ignorance of wealthy countries. The falling prices of raw materials on the world market, the commercial protectionism and the economic slump in industrialised states, and the decline of worldwide tourism after 11 September 2001 have all dramatically increased the destitution of the world's poorest regions. The world has become a dangerously unequal place—and this is true even for the rich in Western metropolises. Through debt repayment alone, $US200 billion dollars is transferred annually from the South to the North. In parallel, private capital investment flows to the South have shrunk for the fifth successive year and have now stabilised at less than their 1997 value. While 1.2 billion people, almost a fifth of the world's population, must make do with less than a dollar a day, state development aid has decreased by 20 per cent since 1990 (World Bank 2002: 1, 11). How can one explain the contradiction between the growing poverty of ever-increasing sections of the population and the growing ignorance about this problem?

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In Germany, many members of the Bundestag belong to the generation which 30 years ago pledged a form of 'international solidarity', were active in Third-World initiatives, or fought against poverty during ecclesiastical action days, and stood for the needs of 'One World'. Now it appears that the policies of this generation have transformed Germany into one of the laggards of development politics. Can this be adequately explained by the impotence of politicians? Or is the fading out of global injustices structurally conditioned? Is there a principle that can account for the contradiction whereby global inequalities grow while from the sociological point of view they are legitimised? There is now a growing global justice movement, sometimes known as the anti-globalisation or anti-capitalist movement, that tries to draw attention to these inequalities. This movement, described in Chapter 4, is probably the most active component of global civil society at the moment. Yet its voices do not translate into concrete policies or generalised public concern. Why not?

There are at least two possible answers to the question of what legitimises social inequality: the merit system and the nation-state principle. The first has been carefully elaborated and criticised, since it derives from the self-understanding of the national perspective and is related to internal, intra-state inequalities. The second can be derived from the cosmopolitan perspective and is related to the 'legitimisation' of social inequalities. The bigger blind spots—and sources of error—of methodological nationalism linked to research on inequality can be revealed only by means of a systematic switch from the national to the cosmopolitan perspective. A new critical theory of social inequalities is needed which provides a scientific expression of the cosmopolitan perspective already held by parts of global civil society. Only on the basis of such a theory can the fundamental asymmetry of inequality, which is reinforced by a perception trapped in the national viewpoint as well as in the social and social science perspective, be unravelled. Such a theory would demonstrate that the 'legitimisation system' of the nation-state rests on the fact that attention is exclusively focused on the inside, thereby excluding global inequalities from the field of vision of the (relatively) privileged.

From a purely spatial point of view, it is possible to distinguish between *big* inequalities (which can further be divided into transnational, supranational, international, and global inequalities) and *small* inequalities. Small inequalities are those found within the nation-state. They appear big to the people or groups concerned and this for the most obvious reasons, but from a cosmopolitan perspective they are small. The merit system both explains and legitimises intra-state inequalities. The appropriate metaphor

Table 3.2: **Sociology of social inequalities: national and cosmopolitan perspectives**		
	Matrix of social positions	
	Large (global) inequalities	Small (nation-state level) inequalities
National perspective	Irrelevant, non-existent	Merit system
Cosmopolitan perspective	The nation-state principle excludes the excluded and makes global inequalities invisible	The nation-state principle can only explain inequalities within the nation-state.

(Legitimisation)

for this phenomenon is the exam: all enter as equals but come out unequals (with different positions in the hierarchy of needs). Under the merit system, incomes, for example, can be characterised as both unequal and legitimate. When we say that the nation-state principle 'legitimises' social inequalities, we mean that the lens through which the nation-state observes national inequalities blocks out global inequalities. Big inequalities are thus removed from the national perspective, and can therefore both grow and be 'legitimised' within a form of institutionalised irrelevance and non-reality. How is this possible? It is because the national perspective functions like a microscope. By focusing on small internal inequalities it leaves out the bigger, global ones. In other words, the preoccupation with small national inequalities legitimises big inequalities.

The 'law' of nation-state exclusion of global inequalities is obviously a case in point. The national particularism of the state does not necessarily exclude universal principles and perceptions. Nevertheless, it does appear that the nation-state perspective provides a 'liberation' from the misery of the world. It functions according to the model of *double exclusion*: it excludes the excluded. Global inequalities have grown: 'the average income in the richest 20 countries is now 37 times that in the poorest 20. This ratio has doubled in the past 40 years' (World Bank 2003: 7). It is surprising how the big inequalities which are suffered by humanity can be continuously legitimised through a silent complicity between the state authority and the state-obsessed social sciences by means of a form of organised non-perception.

Principles of the Construction of Non–reality

While the merit system provides a *positive* legitimisation of small inequalities, the nation-state principle produces a *negative* 'legitimisation' of big inequalities. 'Positive' legit-imisation means that the merit system validates a reflexive and reciprocal legitimisation, that is, social inequalities can in principle be tolerated by the underprivileged. In contrast, the legitimisation of the nation-state principle is 'negative' because it is characterised by *non*-reflexivity and *non*-reciprocity, meaning that it cannot be tolerated by the underprivileged and the excluded. The nation-state principle is based on non-reflection, not on reflection, as in the case of the merit system. Thus, negative legitimisation through institutionalised silence or blindness precludes acceptance by those whose acceptance is most needed, that is, the poor, the humiliated, and the excluded. The nation-state evidently does *not* legitimise global inequalities. Rather, the *non*-legitimised global inequalities are hidden from view and thereby stabilised. Historically, this means that the European nation-state represents the institutionalised forgetting of colonialism and imperialism, both of which fostered its development.

In elaborating this 'legitimisation through silence', I should like to identify four principles of nation-state irrelevance and non-reality construction.

1. *The fragmentation of the world into nation-states removes accountability for global inequalities.* As long as there is no global jurisdiction or monitoring institution to survey global inequalities, these will

remain disaggregated into a motley pattern of nation-state inequalities. Because there are approximately 200 states, there are approximately 200 different frames of relevance and observation for small social inequalities. But the sum of these recorded inner, single-state inequalities does not correspond to the larger global inequalities, because the logic of the national perspective is not the same as that of the cosmopolitan perspective. In particular, national self-ascription and the endogenous causal suppositions linked to it contradict the cosmopolitan viewpoint, which stresses the fact that transnational interdependences, power relations, and causalities also contribute to the explanation of 'intra-nation-state' inequalities.

In the South Commission (1990: 2) report it is argued that: 'if humanity were a single nation state, the current North-South split would transform it into a politically explosive, semi-feudal unit, the stability of which is threatened by internal conflicts.' This is both right and wrong: it does not recognise that the nation-state world order structurally ignores and therefore 'legitimises' global inequalities.

The nation-state principle explains why the connection between globalisation and poverty has been so seldom researched. As long as the national perspective reigns in both political action and in social science analysis, poverty and wealth will continue to be localised in the national context as a matter of course. Even the mere possibility that the problematic consequences of globalisation materialise in various historical contexts—in the shape of growing inequalities, eroding incomes, the over-exploitation of natural resources, and the undermining of democracy—remains *analytically* excluded. Thus, as far as social science inequality research is concerned, the principle of nation-state fragmentation is linked to a major source of error: the danger of a *misguided 'nation-state-oriented' conclusion*. Global or transnational interdependences, processes, power relations, causalities easily fade away or are misinterpreted within the closed circle of a national perspective. The crucial point is that this big mistake can be neither unravelled nor avoided using a national perspective; only a cosmopolitan outlook can provide a way out of the deadlock.

> **Big inequalities are removed from the national perspective, and can therefore both grow and be 'legitimised' within a form of institutionalised irrelevance**

2. *The perception of social inequalities presupposes equality norms.* Within the nation-state perspective, the stability with which major inequalities can be excluded rests on the validity of national equality norms, whether they be culturally, ethnically, legally, or politically defined. The objectivity of global social inequalities is politically irrelevant as long as these inequalities remain in the shadow of institutionalised equality norms. Within the national paradigm, at least in Westernised welfare states, equality norms rest on the formal equality of the citizen: income differences between men and women, places of residence, and so on, do not justify a differentiated citizen status. All individuals within a nation have the same rights and duties. In this context, a differentiated citizenship status is therefore unacceptable. This legally sanctioned citizen equality corresponds to the nation-state guiding principle of cultural homogeneity (same language, history, cultural traditions). The national principles of inclusion and exclusion thus determine and stabilise the boundaries of the perception of social inequalities. This leads to:

3. *The impossibility of comparing social inequalities between nation-states.* The national perspective and the 'functional capacity' of the nation-state to legitimise global inequalities rests on the fact that politically relevant comparisons can be completed only *intra*nationally and not *inter*nationally. Delegitimising comparisons again presuppose national equality norms. In that sense, income differences between, for example, Nigerians and Germans, South Americans and Finns, Russians and Chinese, Turks and Koreans—even where they have similar qualifications and functions—can be very important. But the delegitimising potential of these comparisons is felt only if they take place within a common framework of perception of institutionalised equality. This can be achieved through belonging to a particular nation or to a globally active corporation. To some extent, it also begins to be achieved through global civil society: international NGOs, for example, or Diaspora links.

This raises the interesting question of how far one can and will be able to legitimise the international wage differences within the European Union by means

of the principle of non-comparability. As European self-consciousness grows along with the institutionalisation of European self-observation, will inequalities which were previously ignored because they were international also be perceived as *intra*national inequalities, and will new equality norms have to be developed? To the extent that barriers enforcing the international non-comparability of inequalities dissolve (for whatever reason), the states of the European Union—even when facing so-called 'fixed' inequality relations—will probably experience considerable turbulence.

Nevertheless, the role of the nation-state is not confined solely to a so-called legitimisation function within the system of global inequalities.

4. *The 'fading out phenomenon' legitimises inaction*, or rather it legitimises those actions which increase big inequalities because so-called 'external' effects, from the national perspective, are precipitated into a form of pre-determined non-reality or political irrelevance. The exclusiveness with which social inequalities are thematised as inner inequalities thus facilitates a global redistribution politics whereby risks are externalised, that is, they are imposed upon weaker developing or emerging countries, while profits are maximised within the rich countries of the 'West'.

While western politicians were busy extolling the fact that we had reached a decade of unexpected peace and wealth, a growing number of countries were becoming engulfed in debts, unemployment, and the decline of health and social services as well as urgently needed infrastructures. What has proved profitable for Western corporations in terms of the strict enforcement of deregulation, privatisation, and flexibilisation in developing countries often turns out to be a disaster for ordinary people in these countries. To take just one example: the World Bank, in its role as implementation agent for the G-7 states, supported contracts with private energy suppliers both in Indonesia and in other countries. 'These contracts obliged the public sector to buy great quantities of electricity at very high prices' (Stiglitz 2002: 71). The international corporations pocketed the profits while the risks were imposed on the 'anyway already' poor states.

The U.S. Department of Finance and the World Bank became renowned for precisely this type of private commercial activity. That is already bad enough. But when the corrupt governments of these emerging economies were overthrown (cf. e.g. Suharto (Indonesia) in 1998 ...), the U.S. administration put pressure on the new governments to honour the contracts, instead of releasing them from their obligation to pay or at least re-negotiating conditions. Indeed, there is a long list of unfair contracts, the honouring of which western governments achieved by exerting pressure through oppression. (Stiglitz 2002: 71)

> **As long as the national perspective reigns both in political action and in social science analysis, poverty and wealth will continue to be localised in the national, not the global context**

To sum up these principles: the nation-state world order fragments global inequalities, national equality norms exclude global inequalities, and intranational comparability of inequalities ensures international non-comparability. The predetermined irrelevance of big inequalities enables powerful and wealthy nation-states to burden poor states with risks that flow from their policies. Additionally, these policies are confirmed and strengthened by the methodological nationalism of the social sciences in rich countries. Inequality research based on this perspective greatly reinforces national myopia; it also depicts both itself and its object of research within the framework of a nation-state science which endlessly gives birth to itself. What is normally seen as problematic from a scientific point of view, that is, research which reinforces the researchers' own premises, is extolled here as a methodological principle. At best, this form of national autism is extended into an international comparative autism. But this comparative methodological nationalism remains bound by methodological nationalism. The nation-state is a state of mind. Walls hindering perception are erected and fostered, and are justified and cemented by the knowledge generated by a social science that bases itself on methodological nationalism. However, this social and social-science creation, that is, the non-reality of growing global inequalities, is proving increasingly problematic.

Cosmopolitan Realities Intrude

Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness of the mistakes and contradictions of the national perspective, for several reasons.

First of all, boundaries have become permeable, and interdependences which transcend all borders are growing exponentially. Take for example the obvious contradictions in which restrictive immigration policies are trapped. On the one hand, the rich Northern countries are currently plagued by a spectacular demographic regression, with ageing populations that threaten to overwhelm pension and health systems and reinforce political conservatism. On the other hand, these very countries are busy building ramparts to ward off both the feared and the real immigration flows from the poorer South. In parallel, military, economic, and political interdependences are growing worldwide, leading to new flows of migrants and refugees. Every measure in this field is damned: it leads to side effects that can be anticipated and often proves utterly counterproductive. Thus, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the political desire to control migration flows, especially in the US but also in European countries, has been strengthened and sharpened. But it is precisely this repressive impulse that undermines the necessary readiness to authorise more immigration, which could counter falling demographic curves and rejuvenate the population.

> The repressive impulse undermines the necessary readiness to authorise more immigration, which would rejuvenate the population

A second reason has to do with the processes of inner globalisation of nation-state experiential spaces. Several developments play a role in this evolution. Human rights are increasingly detached from citizenship status and are no longer bound by national contexts. Examples of this trend include international education curricula, the growing number of bi-national marriages and families, as well as increasing transnational work and private life connections. The national perspective is also imperilled by the growing mobility of communication, information, cash flows, risks, products, and services. Even indigenous groups that have remained immobile are being transnationalised within their experiential capacities through mass communication, publicity, and so on (Held 1999: 374). Moreover, supranational institutions such as the World Bank, UNESCO, or various NGOs systematically provide data which publicise big inequalities worldwide, thus questioning the mechanisms of the national non-reality-making process.

Third, new methods and patterns of differentiating between inclusion and exclusion have gained considerable significance. Increasingly, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion no longer follow the classification of inequality into strata which end at the national border: a feature typical of the nation-state. New central patterns of inclusion and exclusion are being developed along the lines of, for instance, (1) supranational trade agreements (European Union, NAFTA, and so on), (2) Diaspora cultures which follow ascriptive characteristics: for example, 'Black Atlantic' (Gilroy 1993), or (3) the conditions of everyday life in global cities (Sassen 2001; 2002; Castells 1997; Albrow 1996; Eade 1996; 2000).

Garret Hardin, in 'Living on a Lifeboat' (1977), provided an early and famous defence of the national perspective and a critique of the cosmopolitan outlook. He compared nation-states with diversely equipped lifeboats in which the survivors of a shipwreck find refuge. Hardin argued that every one of these boats is free to offer a seat to the many survivors who are struggling against the wild sea. But this possibility cannot be transformed into a duty since the taking on of castaways disregards the very security regulations of the lifeboat, thus endangering all the passengers on board.

This 'lifeboat ethics' ('the-boat-is-full') argument, which is still very effective today, is especially inappropriate because the nation-state lifeboats suggested by the national perspective have become fewer and fewer. This is no longer a moral issue but an empirical argument. The real current post- and transnational inequality situations, forms, and causalities are being misinterpreted. It is uncovering the misdiagnosis of the national perspective, not a moral critique of it, which constitutes the essence of the cosmopolitan outlook and substantiates its superiority.

Fourth, the distinction between big and small inequalities—or, put differently, between the cosmopolitan and national perspectives—has itself become questionable. We are increasingly confronted

with an *internationalisation of national models of inequality*. Competition within and between national spaces increases along with the permeability of national boundaries. Correspondingly, it entails a distribution of globalisation winners and losers according to production sectors that are either shielded from the market or exposed to it. Last but not least, the nebulous concept of 'globalisation' is often used in the *struggle between national and transnational elites*, who fight over positions and resources *within* national power spaces.

Finally, the view-obstructing walls are also disintegrating in relation to the international situation. At least since the terrorist attacks it has become more difficult to exclude the excluded: the increasing poverty of the world population is also perceived as a problem inherent in the wealthy Western countries, but its practical consequences remain to be defined. On the one hand, the danger of terrorism, which defies national borders, undermines the nation-state vision boundaries behind which global inequalities continue to grow menacingly. On the other hand, the emergence of global movements opposed to war and linked to the global justice movement introduces a cosmopolitan perspective on inequality.

There is no doubt that these developments overstrain nation states. They have not developed the capacity to intervene to redress large inequalities. Indeed, they do not even possess the capacity to survey or monitor large inequalities, let alone do anything about them. This is the explanation of the central paradox of a new cosmopolitan orientation. To the extent that the boundaries between big and small inequalities become more permeable and no longer correspond to national borders, the mental wall—that is, the institutionalised non-perception of big inequalities—does not lose its significance; on the contrary, it is further buttressed. Why? Because it is only thus that the growing asymmetry between demands for intervention addressed to states and the actual capacity of these states to intervene can be bridged.

Conversely it can be inferred that, if the nation state 'legitimises' global inequalities according to the Brechtian principle that 'we don't see those who are in the dark', this legitimisation breaks down with the 'cosmopolitisation' of the state. The cosmopolitan

The silence of social science concepts on the subject of global inequality is a scandal

state which (however selectively) integrates cultural Others lets loose—even in the most optimal case of stable inequalities—an avalanche of legitimisation problems as a side effect. Why? For the simple reason that it abolishes the boundaries of the non-comparability of social inequalities. In other words, cosmopolitisation actually increases the seductive potential of re-ethnification and re-nationalisation of both society and politics. Precisely because boundaries are no longer fixed, the mental wall which hinders perception is cemented anew.

Can one or must one say now whether the nation-state principle is a trap? Whatever the answer, it is clear that the non-reflective unity between both the state's and the social sciences' capacities to make global inequalities invisible affects political and scientific actors in contrasting ways. Whether or not the national perspective can be attributed to 'functional perform-ance' of the nation-state, it perverts the social sciences. These are grad-ually trapped into an increasingly obvious contradiction with their scientific reality mission and ethics. Indeed, they base themselves (often imperceptibly and unintentionally) on the generation of non-reality within reality. The silence of social science concepts on the subject of global inequalities is a scandal.

A New Critical Theory

In this new era, a new critical theory with a cosmopolitan intent has a crucial task. It must breach the fixed walls of category systems and research routines of the methodological nationalism used by the social sciences in order to, for example, bring big equalities back into the field of vision. The established *intra*national maps of social inequalities are elegant, depicted in detail, and thought to be generally sufficient to manage politically the more privileged part of the world population. But the dragons of the large, unknown, completely inad-equately researched worlds of global inequalities are no longer just simple decorative motifs adorning the borders. The nation-state belief, the national nar-ratives, which dominate both public commentaries and academic research certainly cannot be overlooked or ignored. At least since the 11 September terrorist attacks it has become clear to many people that the view through the wall that separates small

inequalities from bigger ones goes straight down the barrel of a gun.

The new critical theory is also a self-critical theory. Its main claim is that, first of all, the cosmopolitan viewpoint, linked to various realities, detects the *chasms* that threaten the beginning of the twenty-first century. Critical theory investigates the *contradictions, dilemmas, and the unseen and unwanted (un-intentional) side effects* of a modernity which is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan and draws its critical definition power from the tension between political self-description and the observation that social sciences make of it. The main thesis is then that *the cosmopolitan perspective opens up negotiation spaces and strategies which the national viewpoint precludes.* The cosmopolitan contradicts the argument, often accepted by national political actors and social scientists, that there are no alternatives.

In the debate on globalisation the main point does not revolve around the meaning of the nation-state and how its sovereignty has been subordinated. Rather, the new cosmopolitan perspective of the global power field pushes new actors and actor networks, the power potentials, strategies, and organisation forms of de-bounded politics, or in other words global civil society, into the field of vision. This is why the cosmopolitan critique of nation-state-centred and nation-state-buttressed politics and political science is empirically and politically crucial.

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
Neoliberal Hegemony

A Global Critique

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Introduction

Reconsidering neoliberal hegemony

Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhöffer

> It's true that many people do not know where certain ideas come from, but the important thing is that they agree with them.
>
> *Michael Joyce, Bradley Foundation* (http://exile.ru/118/finktanks.php)

Current world politics are marked by a manifest paradox: The triumphal procession of global neoliberalism seems to have come to an end in the new millennium. Utopian neoliberalism's pain-free, non-cyclical 'new economy' has long been transformed into real existing 'slow growth' Enron-style crony capitalism. Neoliberalism has been under constant attacks from the left (new social movements, communitarian social democracy) and right (cultural nationalists), from activists and academics, unwilling to continuously affirm prevailing neoliberal consent. At the same time, the post-9/11 *Realpolitik* of US security measures and anti-terror unilateralism are widely regarded to contradict the 'new constitutionalism' of the disciplinary neoliberal global order (Gill 1993: 11). But in spite of these challenges, a wide variety of neoliberal policies and projects, at both the national, regional and global levels, remain on the political agenda. Examples of the former include Agenda 2010 – a program designed to reform the 'sclerotic' German welfare state, courtesy of the country's Social Democratic and Green Party leadership. At the regional level, negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) continue, as the primary thrust in the effort to institutionalize a free trade regime stretching from Alaska to Argentina. Europe's increasingly neoliberal Union does count 25 members since the first wave of accession of mainly Eastern European countries of the former socialist camp. Efforts continue to bring a wide range of services within the WTO framework and attest to the ongoing persistence of core aspects of neoliberal hegemony at the global level. Margaret Thatcher's TINA (There Is No Alternative) thus has not lost much influence in economic and social policy making even in countries openly rebelling against Neoliberalism such as Brazil.

Most of the contributions to this book argue that a range of stabilizing factors attest to the profound transformation of the social agenda that these various projects represent. Our central argument is that neoliberal hegemony must be understood not as a fait accompli, but rather as an ongoing process of struggle and compromise through which the meaning of neoliberalism is both re-examined

and reaffirmed. In particular, the various analyses gathered here suggest that we need to take seriously the social practices and discourses of neoliberalism, and the way in which these have become deeply entrenched in *civil society*, if we are to understand the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony. We contend that various social and political struggles which might be read as *contestations* of neoliberalism so far should rather be seen as part of its *evolution*. Accordingly, these challenges have contributed to the simultaneous reproduction and transformation of neoliberal hegemony, rather than to its imminent demise. In short, it is our belief that the death of neoliberalism has been greatly exaggerated.

To better understand why neoliberal projects and practices do not vanish in spite of the growing challenges they face, we need to revise our understanding of two concepts central to this debate: neoliberalism and hegemony.

- With regard to *neoliberalism*, we understand neoliberal philosophy itself as a 'plural' set of ideas rather than as a singular 'pensée unique' (Ignacio Ramonet). Much like social liberalism and 'Keynesianism' (Hall 1989), we argue that neoliberalism cannot be understood as a *singular* set of ideas and policy prescriptions, emanating from one source (Kjær and Pedersen 2001). Neoliberalism is frequently equated with market radicalism and anti-statism, but a number of core principles developed by *self-conscious* neoliberals not only express their belief in the superiority of market-driven competition as the best mechanism of economic allocation, or in the privileging of property rights (above, say, democratic rights) as a foundational condition of liberty. Social minimum standards, for instance, are held to be compatible with neoliberalism if welfare schemes are designed in ways 'not inimical to initiative and the functioning of the market' (Statement of Aims, Mont Pèlerin Society 1947, reprinted in Hartwell 1995: 41–2). More fundamentally, the architects of post World War-II neoliberalism distanced themselves from the laissez-faire liberalism of their intellectual ancestors by maintaining that some degree of governmental oversight was a sine qua non of contemporary capitalism. Thus, the challenge for them was not to eliminate the state, but rather to reduce its scope and redefine its role *vis-à-vis* the market (see Plehwe and Walpen in this volume).
- Efforts to offer a comprehensive definition of neoliberalism are frustrated by the plurality of views that exists within this philosophical and political camp. Based on a range of common principles that form no more than a smallest common denominator, a diverse group of academics and intellectuals have succeeded in establishing and developing a family of neoliberalisms, including the Austrian and Chicago Schools, Ordoliberalismus as well as Libertarianism, some of which have been accommodated in quite diverse political systems and by now inform the positions of both advocates and critics of neoliberalism to a greater or lesser extent (Walpen 2000). In addition, influential contemporary paradigms that claim to be critical of neoliberalism (e.g. communitarianism) display a certain amount of overlap and compatibility with neoliberal philosophies.

- With regard to *hegemony*, we need to deconstruct a global (in the sense of universal) and overly harmonious understanding thereof, in favour of an approach that seeks to identify what we call hegemonic constellations. According to Antonio Gramsci (1975), hegemony cannot be exercised exclusively by force and repression, even though these aspects of power have to be at the disposal of the ruling classes in case of need. Hegemony requires the active consent and participation of the ruled and thus finds expression in coalitions and compromises designed to integrate diverse social forces into (asymmetrical) historical power blocs. Instead of a global, homogeneous neoliberal hegemony, we thus need to think of potentially quite distinct *neoliberal hegemonic constellations*, which may be constructed at national, transnational, world-regional and global levels. Neoliberal historical power blocs inevitably feature distinct characteristics and constituencies, although intensified 'globalization' insures some important overlap. Over time, new historical power blocs may be formed through political struggle and these can alter the orientation and content of earlier hegemonic paradigms, but this process of change will be circumscribed by the achievements and institutional legacies of the previous social forces who were successful in establishing patterns of order and disorder that circumscribe tensions and social conflict leading to new dynamics. We thus propose to study the rise, maintenance and transformation of neoliberal hegemony by way of distinguishing different neoliberal hegemonic constellations in comparative perspective with the aim of identifying both commonalities and differences across space and time.

The contributions in this book aim to shed light on a wide range of actors, networks, organizations, social forces, discourses and processes which are crucial to understand neoliberal political practices in various countries and supranational polities, in institutions, organizations and associations, and in policy arenas and discourse fields. We maintain in particular that larger political and economic structures, institutions and interests need to be better connected to social relations in the realm of knowledge, discourse, ideas and interpretation (Guzzini 2000; see Germain 2000 on 'globalization'). Peter Haas's (1992) concept of 'epistemic communities' informs our analysis of the ideational aspects of neoliberal hegemony, although the scope of our project demands the more inclusive (i.e. beyond agenda setting capacities) notion of a *comprehensive* 'transnational discourse community' (see Bislev *et al.* 2002 introducing 'transnational *issue area* discourse communities' involved both in agenda setting and implementation strategies).

We believe that far too little attention has been paid to the *political* dimensions of discourse communities imagining, nurturing, promoting and sustaining Neoliberalism – both in mainstream and heterodox contributions (see literature review below for detail). While neo-Gramscian scholars in particular have skilfully examined the capacity of and intellectual effort in elite forums such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the Trilateral Commission or the World Economic Forum to forge 'compromises' and 'consensus' expressive of 'historical blocs' of

social forces, little attention has been paid so far to the relatively independent role of 'traditional' intellectuals (i.e. 'universalistic' rather than organically tied to social classes) in attacking and transforming an existing consensus, to the issue of intellectual politics that cannot be reduced to the role of 'organic intellectuals' closely allied with dominant forces in the social relations of production. While neo-Gramscian scholars are thoroughly critical of simplistic ideas of structural determination, students of hegemony frequently pay little attention to intellectuals as agents of change, more often than not limit themselves to ideology critique of individual intellectuals, rarely examine in closer detail competing organized intellectual forces of the centre and right, tend to emphasize the role of intellectuals as technocratic 'legislators' and 'legitimators', and frequently associate neoliberal ideas and knowledge politics closely with the work of 'organic' intellectuals of the business class (compare Cafruny and Ryner 2003 and Bieler 2000 for example).[1] Organized efforts of neoliberal intellectuals who successfully challenged the prevailing social liberal consensus and subsequently developed and promoted a hegemonic intellectual agenda, therefore, are still not well understood.

Thus to further promote the neo-Gramscian research project, we aim to narrow this gap by way of indeed taking serious one of the crucial insights of Antonio Gramsci: 'the relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society' (Gramsci 1971: 12). Under contemporary conditions of globalizing social relations of capitalist production engendering certain forms of state internationalization and concomitant transnational processes of civil society formation (see Gill's 1993 argument and a corresponding outline of a research agenda), it is our contention that this 'mediation' process 'by the whole fabric of society' differs dramatically from the way it worked before the Second World War. These transformations require a careful effort to both further explore the historical work of Gramsci with regard to the status of the transnational sphere in the analysis of capitalism[2] and to address contemporary hegemonic constellations with an *approach* similar to Gramsci's efforts to further develop a critical theory and social practice, an unorthodox approach driven as much by historical experience as by a commitment to independent thinking (see Morton 2001a responding to challenges posed, among others, by Germain and Kenny 1998). Specific forms of translating rather than simply applying Gramsci's approach to the study of hegemony are required to confront the historically unprecedented rise of think tanks and other civil society organizations involved in contemporary struggles for hegemony within and across borders since this new layer of 'hegemony apparatuses' complementing and competing with traditional knowledge organizations constitute one of the key aspects of a transformed 'global knowledge power structure' (Strange 1988). The conscious build up of vast infrastructures in support of both national and transnational neoliberal knowledge politics in particular must be explored as a crucial aspect of contemporary mediation processes affecting the role of intellectuals (see Fischer 1996 on a similar argument of *political* technocracy in the US).

Consequently, one of our primary goals is to offer a more detailed comparative assessment of the different roles of intellectuals in the creation and dissemination of neoliberal ideas and practices, while also underscoring – and here we share the disagreement of neo-Gramscian scholarship with idealistic approaches that want to single out ideas as causes – the way in which these intellectual social forces are themselves socially structured, thence partake in the social relations of production and connect to other collective actors, networks, channels of communication and organizations that occupy crucial positions in various important political arenas of society beyond the narrow sphere of the state.[3] While originally there was a distance of neoliberal intellectuals in many places around the world to the power centres in the social relations of production that should not be underestimated, the transformations occurring with the crisis of Fordism led to a far-reaching realignment and helped to forge closer links, indeed transformed many 'traditional' neoliberal intellectuals into 'organic' intellectuals of the new ruling classes.[4] However, even under conditions of neoliberal hegemony, a relative independence from business forces is carefully guarded by highly self-conscious intellectual leaders such as Edwin Feulner of the Heritage Foundation (Feulner 2000). While a lot of common ground can be detected between the family of neoliberalisms and business elites, neoliberal and organic intellectuals cannot be simply identified because each side maintains a selective approach to the other based on partly diverting agendas and interests. A societal approach (Strange 1996) to contemporary problems of neoliberal hegemony in effect emphasizes the need to improve understanding of the diverse whole of the political, economic, social and cultural spheres which together account for an 'ensemble of social relations' (Marx) marked by complexity and many aspects of conflict, co- and cross-determination.

By drawing a distinction between neoliberalism and hegemonic constellations we thus stress the need to analyse the world of ideas beyond traditional intellectual history, especially their modes of production and distribution, in order to better understand the materiality of ideas, i.e. their social aspect.[5] The analysis of the interrelation of conceptual and social aspects within today's capitalism is important to better understand neoliberal hegemonic constellations.[6] A critical assessment of the contemporary state of neoliberal hegemony must account for flexible combinations of both ideational and material elements across time and space within a common neoliberal matrix taking precedence over preceding frames of social liberalism. We argue that neoliberal discourse communities are crucial with regard to establishing the contemporary pluralism that exists today within neoliberal confines. They were indeed extraordinarily influential and instrumental in the original effort to forge neoliberal power blocs that eventually replaced or helped to reorient previous social liberal coalitions and alliances, but the structural power position of neoliberal discourse communities was strengthened subsequently when many of the erstwhile right-wing outsider positions entered a widely accepted mainstream. Such mainstreaming eventually helped to obscure the very influence of former heretics. At the same time a neoliberal hegemonic constellation can persist even if a particular group of originally key

neoliberal actors or a particular neoliberal school of thought is pushed to a marginal position of the public discourse at a later point in time, depending on what type of policies are actually pursued.

Furthermore, even if *elements* of neoliberal hegemonic constellations and historical power blocs weaken due to the electoral defeat of a neoliberal government or due to an economic (or financial) crisis, we argue that a range of internal and external stabilizing factors beyond political and economic power complexes can serve to defend, to maintain and to adapt neoliberal hegemony to new circumstances. Challenges to a neoliberal hegemonic constellation can and almost certainly will be reinterpreted by neoliberal forces who aim to deflect opposition and do indeed not fully trust in government or business to accomplish the task. Insofar as these efforts are by and large successful, a major realignment of social forces is considered unlikely. Most of the contributions to this book argue that this is the case, at least at present. Our purpose is not, however, to assert the immutability of the current world order. Rather we argue that social forces attempting to challenge neoliberal hegemonic constellations still need to develop a better grasp of the core features of these constellations, and in particular the way in which they adapt and respond to changing circumstances and criticism.

We will proceed considering three bodies of literature that offer different perspectives on the problem of global hegemony – namely, the state power, transnational class, and more recent 'private authority' approaches. We will stress the relevance and contribution of these approaches to our project, while also underscoring their limitations. In the penultimate section of this introduction, we outline our (the editors', not necessarily the contributors') neo-Gramscian perspective (Morton 2001b) to the study of emerging transnational civil society as an arena critical to the formation and articulation of hegemonic constellations. We conclude with a brief overview of the chapters and summary of the key findings that emerge from these contributions.

Three approaches to studying (neoliberal) hegemonic constellations

State power relations, transnational capitalist class and 'private authorities'

State power relations

Neo-realists posit the determining role of state power relations in world politics (Gilpin 1987: 25–6), and thus express concern about the re-emergence of imperialism and conflict due to the decline of US hegemony. Their efforts to explain both the maintenance and shortcomings of hegemony in the current world order focus on the role of the United States as the sole superpower. While the US enjoys an unprecedented military superiority *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world (see Easterbrook 2003), the risks of military overstretch (Kennedy 1987) threaten a future deterioration of America's global dominance. To put it simply, the US may be able to wage wars, but can it pay for them? New imperialism pundits also

maintain that the transatlantic partnership between the US and Europe has been transformed into a new rivalry, with Europe vying for the hegemonic power position that the US can no longer maintain (Kupchan 2002; Kagan 2003). European emphasis on multilateral negotiation and problem solving, combined with a somewhat greater willingness to commit resources to environmental and social problems, are either interpreted as evidence of the coming battle for global supremacy, or as part of the effort of constructing a European identity in the wake of the United States' decline (Habermas and Derrida 2003; cf. the critique voiced by Dahrendorf and Ash 2003).

However, despite the fact that disagreements over the Iraq question before and during the US-led war in spring 2003 arguably constituted the most serious rift in the transatlantic alliance since the Second World War, all the parties involved sought to defuse tensions shortly after the war began, appearing rather keen to rebuild a transatlantic consensus. At any rate, reading the debate over Iraq as a transatlantic battle is inaccurate, since the US's closest allies in North America – Canada and Mexico – supported the French-led effort against the war, whereas the UK, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the Eastern part of 'new' Europe backed the US position.

While in times of crisis, the increased use of state force (both in the form of war and domestic repression) enables the dominant countries and classes to secure their position, this iron law of power does not suffice to explain hegemony. Hegemony, as proposed by Gramsci, relies to a large degree on the consent of the ruled rather than on sheer force. In his famous and concise definition of civil society, Gramsci writes: 'the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil Society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)' (Gramsci 1971: 263).[7] If consent is waning and force needs to be used, hegemony must be endangered. At the same time, the ability to successfully use coercion may enable the dominant power to support rebuilding a consensus.

In any case it turns out that the central explanatory variable of state power relation theories do not tell us much about what Joseph Nye (2002) calls 'soft power'. Worse still, neo-realists try to explain variations in global orders and the existence or absence of hegemonic stability across history with the same indicators of economic and ultimately military strength, without regard to the changing social and material content of such orders. Ruggie (1983) argued instead that international consensus regarding the content of international regimes allows for the construction of relatively stable institutions, even in a multi-polar world such as the one that has emerged in the wake of the relative decline of US hegemony following the crisis of Fordism (see Murphy 1994 on the historical transformation of international regimes). In fact, neoliberal hegemony was on the ascendance right at the time when many indicators pointed to the relative decline of the US hegemonic position, and 'Thatcherism' preceded 'Reaganism'. The US decline in fact coincided with the expansion and strengthening of the GATT turned WTO regime, and international cooperation on many issue areas has reached unprecedented levels due to the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g. in the field of

nuclear safety). While the reluctance of the US to embrace the Kyoto protocol and the International Criminal Court indicates hegemonic struggles typical of a multi-polar order, the US has recently rejoined several United Nations programs, following the neoliberal turn of a United Nations which is now featuring corporate partnership programs in virtually every issue area (see Paul 2001 on the UN 'global compact'). In short, neo-realist hegemonic stability theory has a lot to say about the rise and decline of a superpower. It has little to say about the rise and decline of neoliberal hegemony. The rise of neoliberalism, and its subsequent reproduction, cannot be explained by the role of the United States in the world-system.

Still, even if neo-realist theories cannot fully explain hegemonic (in)stability and are not interested in neoliberal content, their emphasis on state power, and particularly the importance of military force, nevertheless highlights factors which clearly remain important in the international political economy, as recent developments around the war on terrorism have made apparent. Even if force is not enough to secure hegemony, Gramsci certainly understood that consent alone (without the military threat securing compliance) only suffices in a global *regulated society* (as he called communism). As for now, state and military power relations clearly are an important factor in world order, but they cannot be singled out as the only or even primary explanatory variable in the study of neoliberal hegemony (compare the alternative account for American imperialism and Eurocapitalism by Panitch and Gindin 2003).

Transnational capitalist class analysis

Transnational capitalist class approaches have recently attracted attention from authors looking to challenge the dominance of the neo-realist paradigm in the field of international political economy. Different versions of transnational capitalism and class analysis, such as those represented by members of the Amsterdam School (e.g Kees van der Pijl, Otto Holman and Henk Overbeek), and Leslie Sklair's more sociological effort to investigate the contemporary formation of a transnational capitalist class, predominantly stress the structural power of transnational capital, with an eye to allies in politics, the professions and the media-culture complexes. While Overbeek (1993) and van der Pijl (1998) as well as a series of recent neo-Gramscian contributions on European Integration and Enlargement (Bieler 2000; Bieler and Morton 2001; Cafruny and Ryner 2003) emphasize the regrouping of dominant transnational capital factions in their analyses of neoliberal hegemony, Leslie Sklair (2001) focuses on the formation of a historically unprecedented transnational capitalist class centring around transnational corporations, which according to him only now are increasingly detached from their countries of origin (see Robinson 2004 for a comprehensive theoretical statement on global capitalism and the chapter by Carroll and Carson in this volume for a further discussion of the transnational capitalist class debate).

Van der Pijl understands neoliberal hegemony as a comprehensive concept of control, which has successively replaced the preceding paradigm of corporate

liberal control (1998: 4). In his reading, during the Fordist era, transnational industrial capital constituted the most powerful transnational bloc supporting the US-led global system, which Ruggie has described as 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1983). The crisis of Fordism led to the rise of financial and speculative business interests in the 1970s – politically enabled by measures to liberalize financial markets (Helleiner 1994) – that in turn resulted in a realignment of the dominant capitalist class faction. Compared with the corporate liberal comprehensive concept of control, neoliberalism is characterized by an open hostility to trade unions, corporatist style decision-making, state interventionism, progressive taxation and other efforts to redistribute income in favour of the working classes. However, class and power relations in the different industrialized countries require and result in specific compromises (Overbeek 1993).

While van der Pijl's research provides rich historical detail of the alliances between business factions and political forces that cooperate closely in corporate planning groups (such as the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission), factors other than dominant business interests are not given much independent weight. The definition of the control concept eventually reveals a fair amount of functionalism.[8] The insistence on comprehensiveness leaves little room for variations likely to result from specific power relations in (and between) countries, and for ambiguous, even contradictory aspects of control and participation characteristic of rather stable hegemonic constellations (e.g. many elements of continuity during the social liberal and neoliberal age of capitalism).

Leslie Sklair (2001) instead constructs his argument around what he regards as historically new structural features of transnational operating capital, and specifically changes in foreign direct investment practices. In so doing, he combines a structural analysis with attention to the dynamics of identity formation among members of the emerging transnational capitalist class. He distinguishes four class fractions, namely corporate, state, technical and consumerist parts. Although analytically separate, the different constituting groups are understood to closely cooperate on the basis of institutionalized relations. Although Sklair does not operate with a narrow understanding of class formation, the corporate fraction (heads of transnational corporations and their subsidiaries) receives much greater attention than the globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, professionals (e.g. lawyers and accountants) and merchant and media leaders making up the other three fractions. His analysis of the formation of a 'class for itself' is based on the development of global corporate concepts such as best practice, benchmarking, and corporate citizenship. The proposal of neoliberal solutions to global problems such as global warming, for instance, is predominantly tied to corporate planning groups acknowledging the 'sustainability' discourse that has emerged as one response to the environmental pressures of global capitalism. The business nexus of the culture-ideology of consumerism, finally, may be considered the most important pillar of transnational class power. According to Sklair it provides the single dominant lifestyle concept characterizing the contemporary world-system, with the only possible challenge coming from some versions of religious fundamentalism (see Jameson 1998: 64).

While Sklair thus presents a straightforward and systematic analysis, some manifest contradictions of a *single* transnational class concept are easily detectable. For instance, Sklair emphasizes that the Business Council for Sustainable Development has successfully replaced obstructionist business strategies in the ecological battlefield. Thus, the business forces behind the US efforts to block the Kyoto protocol (the Global Climate Coalition, for example) would have to be identified as members of a national capitalist class faction in Sklair's framework, regardless of the size and investment patterns of such companies and regardless of their countries of origin. But many a big business leader representing giant capital interests which clearly fall in Sklair's category of transnational enterprises both outside and inside the US supports the US position rather than the arguably more enlightened position of the Business Council. A concept of transnational (capitalist) class *formation*, which allows for a less universalizing perspective and is more aware of the tensions between competing factions, might also better illuminate the link between political and economic power, as suggested by the relationship between various capitalist factions and regionalization projects such as the European Union and NAFTA (Gamble and Payne 1996). Such a *relational* class formation perspective with an eye on competing forces would also help to make better sense of contradictions within Europe that led Cafruny (2003) to suggest that 'Neoliberalism does not provide an adequate economic or ethico-political basis for the further development of the monetary union or of a transnational European capitalist class'. 'Neoliberalism' may indeed not provide for a basis of further development of a class, but it is unlikely to not influence further class formation processes more likely than not to contribute to patterns of (dis)-order. Finally, a more nuanced understanding of parallel and possibly *competing* transnational class formation processes and projects might help to avoid what appears as a form of economic determinism in Sklair's argument, despite the strong emphasis he places on cultural and ideological aspects of class formation in his theoretical framework.

Still, transnational capitalist class approaches must be considered indispensable to the study of global neoliberal hegemony. Unlike state power relations theories, these insist on historically specific explanations, and they provide a way to make sense of the link between structural economic power and the neoliberal content of present hegemonic constellations. As much as state power approaches remind students of the importance of military power, transnational capitalist class approaches remind us of the importance of economic power structures (of industry and finance, in particular) and resources that must figure prominently in the study of hegemonic struggles.

'Private authorities'

A third and fast growing literature addresses questions related to what can be considered 'privately' exercised authority in the international political economy, involving a wide variety of actor groups, and rapidly rising channels of transnational influence. There is an overlap with transnational capitalist class approa-

ches since arguably the most significant group discussed with regard to international 'private authority' is constituted by multinational companies and organized business interests (Cutler *et al.* 1999; Greenwood and Jacek 2000). Private authority approaches and transnational capitalist class approaches share an interest in understanding the sources and structures of power in international politics beyond the state, but the former has given greater attention to a wider range of private actors beyond corporations, including social movements, trade unions, churches, NGOs and think tanks. Many of the actors discussed in the private authority literature are at least relatively independent from private business (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Higgott *et al.* 2000; Brühl *et al.* 2001; Josselin and Wallace 2001). In spite of the structural power of capital, business forces are also frequently found to *react* to challenges arising in the wide labyrinths of civil society (see for example Paul 2001 on battles in and around the UN system).

One of the most stimulating contributions to this literature documents the rise of 'transnational advocacy networks'. According to Keck and Sikkink, these networks in various issue areas (e.g. human rights, environment, feminist, development, peace, etc.) build 'new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations' and thereby 'multiply channels of access to the international system' (1998: 1). Keck and Sikkink argue that non-governmental organizations have succeeded in gaining influence due to their ability to gather and report reliable information (*information politics*), to dramatize facts (*symbolic politics*), to effectively exert material pressure by linking the issues to money, trade or prestige (*leverage politics*), and to exert moral pressure by publicly scrutinizing the extent to which institutions and organizations meet principles they have endorsed (*accountability politics*). Successes and failures of transnational advocacy networks are duly compared and (mainly) explained with reference to the particular characteristics of networks and issues, as well as leverage opportunities and 'target vulnerabilities' (e.g. Mexico being sensitive to human rights accusations due to NAFTA negotiations, the Nestlé corporation being sensitive to a consumer boycott due to the fact that many of the Nestlé products bear the company name). Due to the undeniable direct or intermediate influence of civic organizations, the authors suggest, 'that scholars of international relations should pay more attention to [transnational] network forms of organization – characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal exchanges of information and services' (200).

While their empirical findings lead them to reject the notion of an emerging global civil society (compare Anheimer and Themudo 2002), Keck and Sikkink opt for an understanding of civil society 'as an arena of struggle, a fragmented and contested area' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 33). In elaborating their concept of civil society, they cite Hurrell and Woods, who argue, 'the politics of transnational civil society is centrally about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized (by governments, institutions, and other groups)' (1995: 468).

Although Keck and Sikkink appear to recognize that there are top-down and side influences on (transnational) civil society actors, their own research emphasis on bottom-up organized networks fails to adequately consider the weight of other

transnational actors and the extent to which transnational advocacy networks are indeed shaped by institutionalized political and economic power relations. By drawing too sharp a line between business and business-related actor groups and civil society actors (which are effectively identified with non-profit or third sector groups), Keck and Sikkink fail to recognize the extent to which a broader range of 'private' actors and neoliberal forces in particular have contributed to the transformation of transnational civil society.

Dezalay and Garth (2002), for example, have described in great detail how the internationalization of organizations promoting human right and public interest law lags behind the internationalization of organizations promoting professional economics and corporate law in Latin America. This uneven development suggests not only the still relatively marginal position of global social movements at present (Rucht 2003), but also indicates structural imbalances accounting for differences in the internationalization process across issue areas. Furthermore, the extent to which the transplantation of norms and practices in the field of human rights has to be considered an element of what Dezalay and Garth call 'top-down participatory development', designed to secure legitimacy for neoliberal capitalism, suggests that a more critical reflection on transnational advocacy networks in particular, and global social movements in general, is in order.[9]

Due to their emphasis on the transnational network form of organization, Keck and Sikkink only marginally consider important transnational private actors such as foundations, think tanks and research organizations, media, trade unions and churches as possible participants in issue networks. An arguably even more important blind spot in a (transnational) civil society concept that reserves this terrain to non- or even anti-business forces is the lack of attention paid to authority exercised by private firms and corporate-related or corporate-sponsored organizations outside the sphere of business proper. This, however, is easily balanced by a great number of recent volumes, which are almost exclusively devoted to the issue of private business authority (see Cutler *et al.* 1999 for a typology of various forms of business authority) and their contribution to the (in)stability of the global international economy (see Sinclair 1999 on rating agencies and the financial crisis in South East Asia).

For example, the pivotal role of business associations in the shaping of economic as well as political dimensions of free trade agreements and regional integration projects such as NAFTA (Jacek 2000) and the EU (Apeldoorn 2000; Greenwood 2000) is well documented. Matthews and Pickering (2000) have provided a detailed comparison of the relation between sectoral business strategies and evolving rules in the European single market. The proliferation of regional integration projects (Gamble and Payne 1996) in turn can be considered the institutional pull factor with regard to the proliferation of business (and other) interest groups (Plehwe and Vescovi 2003).

Globalization processes in general and regionalization processes in particular have contributed to a far-reaching restructuring of firms, which in turn has helped to supplement, if not undermine, traditional, nation-state centred business associations and 'private interest governments' (Streeck and Schmitter 1985).

More recently formed *transnational* alliances of firms and associations tend to sideline traditional (national and multi-national) associations and account for some of the strongest forces with regard to the pressure to continue neoliberal projects at global and world regional levels (see Sell 1999 and 2000 on the field of intellectual property rights and Plehwe and Vescovi 2003 on transport and postal services). Transnational business alliances and associations thus play a pivotal role in the 'new regionalism' (Spindler 2002), which is crucial to understand the transnational transformation of economic, political, and civic dimensions of neoliberal capitalism. New regionalism is characterized by a systematic pattern of intensified interaction between private (predominantly transnational business) and public authority predominantly designed to strengthen microeconomic competitiveness.

The 'private authority' literature can thus be divided into a not for profit/third sector and a private business research interest with certain amounts of overlap. Grouped around the highly significant issue of knowledge, which is frequently emphasized as a crucial surplus value generated by diverse private groups and thus constituting a core factor enabling (or restraining) the exercise of some sort of private authority, a third research interest centres around actor groups, networks and organizations that are more explicitly involved in the task of knowledge production. Both with regard to Eastern Europe's transformation processes (Bockman and Eyal 2002) and the transition of import substitution development towards export orientation (Babb 2001) scholars have examined the background of professional economists and their roles with regard to the discursive and ideological dimensions of neoliberal hegemony, its transformation, and reproduction. Diane Stone (2000b) provided us with a detailed empirical overview of the proliferation of think tanks around the globe (see also McGann and Weaver 2000). These organizations occupy a crucial position in the information and knowledge processing business. Think tanks frequently are private, not for profit organizations and can be considered among the most interesting organizations to understand the interconnections between the corporate and 'third' sector. Stone however fails to examine critical links between think tanks and other social, economic, political, and intellectual networks, as well as *between* these think tanks. The resulting impression of a pluralistic landscape of all sorts of think tanks does not help us to see in which ways neoliberal partisan think tanks in particular play an increasingly important role in the ideological class struggle, which is being waged in national and transnational civil society. An impression of think tank pluralism also fails to account for the enormous financial and more general power gaps among think tanks, for instance between neoliberal and progressive organizations. Looking at the extent to which many think tank and other civil society projects are financed and guided by US philanthropic foundations of corporations in particular, Roelofs (2003) quite convincingly speaks about a 'Mask of Pluralism'. Due to her predominant focus on US foundations, however, Roelofs tends to overrate this aspect of 'Americanization'.

'Private authority' research nevertheless has come a long way in establishing a wide range of cooperating and competing 'private actors' in civil society as

subjects to be more fully considered in the contemporary transformation of the international political economy, and the creation and transformation of neo-liberal hegemonic constellations. Private groups are shown to contribute to (global, regional, sectoral, etc.) order in their own right and, more frequently than not, in close interaction and even institutionalized interrelation with public authority. The literature has shed light on the many conflicts and struggles that accompany such processes of the transformation of governance patterns. Crucial aspects of hegemonic struggles with regard to 'global governance' can be clarified by way of distinguishing ideal types of 'old' and 'new' multilateralism. 'Old multilateralism' is characterized by efforts to reinforce the prevailing state and economic system dominance in international relations by way of extending the influence of inter-governmental organizations which seek to co-opt oppositional forces 'thus securing their socialisation into the dominant market liberal ideological mode' (Higgott *et al.* 2000: 4). 'New multilateralism' in contrast is considered a contending philosophy, which 'attempts to "reconstitute civil societies and political authorities on a global scale, building a system of global governance from the bottom up"' (4, citing Cox 1997). Civil society in the latter framework again carries a strongly normative, positive, participatory and positively pluralist connotation. A critical political analysis of the reality of transnational civil society, however, has to carefully navigate between the effort to understand what (transnational) civil society (in formation) truly is, as well as what kind of private and public authority it helps generating, and the desire to contribute to a new understanding of what civil society ought to be. The binary opposition of 'top down' and 'bottom up' may turn out to be less convincing a guide for progressive politics once due consideration is given to other than progressive organization efforts in the realm of civil society. In particular, a more complete understanding of the formation of transnational civil society urgently requires a recognition that bottom up organizing activities are not the exclusive prerogative of progressive and anti-business forces and advocacy networks.

Towards a more comprehensive understanding of transnational civil society

Neo-Gramscian approaches to International Political Economy and the 'private authority' research community that emphasizes corporate actors and business related forces as key constituencies of civil society (Cutler *et al.* 1999; Higgott *et al.* 2000) take issue with a substantial distinction between public and private authority since 'the state' (the traditional notion of authority) cannot be confined to the public sphere. The theoretical perspective of an *expanded state* (Gramsci) regards politics as the combination of political (the state in the narrow sense) *and* civil society with the latter sphere being considered critical for the exercise of hegemony rather than merely rule, for the organization of consent rather than simple control. Both political and civil society is thus understood as a 'complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures' which reflects 'the ensemble of the social relations of production' (Gramsci 1971: 366). Hegemony

can only be achieved if a relatively stable historical bloc is formed which constitutes the underlying source of power (though not merely in the economic or material sense) for the specific ensemble of superstructures. A sharp dichotomy between public and private, or a sharp distinction between state, market, and civil society, consequently misses the point, and a narrow and predominantly normative approach to civil society actors (i.e. NGOs) must be considered inadequate.

> In order to assess the internal relationship between the two, states and markets have to be understood as two different expressions of the same configuration of social forces. States and markets are integrated ensembles of governance involving firms, the NGOs of 'civil society', and traditional INGOs [international non-governmental organizations]. A neo-Gramscian concept of an 'historic bloc' throws light on this communality. Various social forces may attempt to form an historic bloc in order to establish an order preferable to them.
>
> (Higgott *et al.* 2000: 6)[10]

Instead of continuing the debate of public *versus* private *authority*, research directed at the issue of neoliberal *hegemony* has to focus on diverse, albeit inter-related social forces which constitute historical blocs. Because we are interested in exploring neoliberal hegemonic constellations instead of offering a definition of *a* universal neoliberal hegemony, we want to examine the way in which those constellations are formed through various combinations of public and private, with state, business and other civil society forces as key actors. Higgott *et al.* have gone further than others in clarifying the reformist character of the observed transformation of state authority:

> The fact that state authority is passed on to firms, INGOs and NGOs does not mean that states lose and non-state actors gain authority. Rather, it signifies a new way of sustaining capitalist accumulation in an era of global structural change. What appears at first sight as a competition for authority turns out to be a strategy for the continuation of the same system of economic production, only under new conditions.
>
> (Higgott *et al.* 2000: 6)

What is missing in this literature so far is a clear focus on the neoliberal content of shifting forms of governance and a more comprehensive focus on actor groups and organizations, which may be considered producers, visionaries and guardians of such neoliberal content. While many contributions to the 'private authority' literature emphasize aspects of the importance of 'knowledge' to the social construction of reality, the changing composition and configuration of transnational discourse communities, and the rise of neoliberal discourse communities in particular, has not been subject to systematic scrutiny. Neoliberal forces are starkly misrepresented and underestimated if they are equated with

'systemic forces' of the ruling elites or classes, or if the bottom up reproduction of neoliberalism on the terrain of civil society escapes attention. It is this gap in the literature that the present volume seeks to help fill.

A wide range of neoliberal associations, organizations, networks, social and cultural forces and even movements as well as their corresponding transnational civil society forces *currently* 'in defense of global capitalism' (Norberg 2001) has not received the attention they warrant in studies of neoliberal hegemony. Our efforts to do so are inspired by Susan Strange's (1988) work, which identified the global knowledge system as the fourth and final *primary* power structure determining the International Political Economy. We regard her outline of the global power structure of knowledge as complementary to and congenial with neo-Gramscian conceptualizations of knowledge and power. Whereas Robert Cox (1996) argues against postmodern relativism to explore conditions for specific ways of post-hegemonic knowledge and communication (based on a knowledge ontology of a workable set of hypotheses rather than absolute truth), Susan Strange emphasizes organizational structures and processes crucial not only with regard to what is and can be known, but also to what will be obscured in more or less systematic ways (applied postmodernism one might say and think of the extremely skilled art in deflecting what cannot be denied by a contemporary superpower administration). While both state power relations and transnational capitalist class approaches are indispensable to account for the uneven distribution of power and wealth within the contemporary world system, the hierarchy of knowledge and ideology characterizing neoliberal hegemonic constellations, as well as the ongoing ideological class struggles and the transformation of common sense belief systems which are predominantly formed in civil society spheres, need to be subject to comparative research in an effort to better understand both the reach and the limits of neoliberal hegemony.

The private authority literature has helped to establish a transnational civil society dimension and perspective in the field of international political economy and comparative capitalism. It already provides us with crucial insights into the contribution of a wide range of civil society forces in the transformation of order and hegemonic constellations, and can therefore be deepened by way of focusing on a range of hitherto neglected organized actors and processes, namely the straightforward and self-conscious production of neoliberal knowledge and ideology which we consider crucial to understand a wide range of discourses prevalent in society. We seek to establish firstly to what extent the class of self-conscious neoliberal intellectuals, knowledge entrepreneurs, and partisan organizations such as think tanks that have developed into sophisticated hegemony apparatuses serve at the core of prevailing historical blocs, and how they express themselves in different socio-geographic spaces, policy and discourse fields.[11] Since hegemony in a neo-Gramscian understanding inevitably incorporates compromises which will be reflected in the prevailing order of ideas,[12] second, we seek to establish the relations between self-conscious neoliberal and other interpretations, be they neoliberal if not self-conscious, quite distinct from neoliberalism but compatible, or more fundamentally diverse.

Our working hypothesis can be described as follows: with reference to the global power system of knowledge, the ensemble of neoliberal (or *right wing* liberal if you wish, see Bobbio 1994 and Anderson 1996) orientations has strongly influenced the mainstream, and thus by and large replaced preceding social-liberal orientations characteristic of the Fordist era. While we readily observe certain centrifugal processes with regard to the overall consensus of the ruling classes and historical power blocs in recent times, and a resurgent ideological class struggle in which new global social movements in particular challenge neoliberal paradigms, contemporary good and global governance debates, the revitalization of communitarianism, traditional social liberal and other belief systems are held to contribute to the reform of contemporary neoliberal hegemonic constellations rather than to their demise. Furthermore, the radical, self-conscious neoliberal forces and networks should not be prematurely dismissed, since they are better positioned than ever before in their history to engage in these debates.[13] That this is the case should not be surprising, as a wide range of economic, political and cultural transformations characterizing the neoliberal era are well embedded in contemporary social configurations. Even if radical neoliberal voices appear to be more marginal now compared to say the 1980s and early 1990s, it is thus crucial to shed more light on neoliberal actors, networks and discourses in order to better understand the next stage of neoliberal hegemonic struggles around the globe.

The outline of the book

The present volume aims to contribute to a deepened understanding and sharpened critique of neoliberalism, first by way of improving knowledge about neoliberal discourse, corporate planning, and neoliberal policymakers, academics and writers, and second, through comparisons of 'real existing neoliberalism' in different socio-geographic spaces, policy debates, and discourse arenas. While authors were free with regard to their individual contributions, we asked each participant to consider the role of what we consider a core agency of *self-conscious* neoliberalism, namely neoliberal intellectuals (organized since 1947 in the Mont Pèlerin Society) and think tanks closely associated with members of said global network of intellectuals. All of the authors have made an effort to weave this common thread, but the thickness is different in each chapter depending on available sources and empirical relevance. In some chapters the discussion of this neoliberal actor group is thence more marginal compared to other (neoliberal) forces than in others. However, with this source of neoliberal power hitherto almost systematically neglected, the book sheds considerable light on neoliberal laboratories, which are in turn indispensable for understanding neoliberal hegemonic constellations.

Global neoliberal projects

Two contributions to the first part of the book introduce and analyse hitherto much neglected neoliberal networks of intellectuals and think tank organizations (Plehwe and Walpen), and shed new light on some of the arguably most influential

corporate planning groups (Carroll and Carson). Both contributions emphasize that neoliberal doctrines cannot be reduced to a single idea, but have to be regarded as different members (some more radical, others more pragmatic) of neoliberalism's discursive family. Central to the understanding of neoliberal hegemonic constellations is the shift of the dominant debates from social liberalism and socialism versus (neo)liberalism to a pluralistic mainstream within neoliberal confines, which is strongly influenced by transnational neoliberal discourse communities.

Plehwe and Walpen provide a systematic overview over the origins and the development of organized neoliberals from the humble beginnings in the Colloque Walter Lippmann organized in Paris in 1938 (where the term 'neoliberalism' was adopted) to the more successful launch of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947 to the present day. Close attention is paid to the global composition of the Mont Pèlerin Society and its close links to more than 100 partisan think tanks and foundations supplementing the primarily academic forum with a more direct opportunity to intervene in public policy and general debates.

Carroll and Carson engage in the transnational class debate with their corporate network analysis of five corporate planning groups, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Bilderberg Conferences, the Trilateral Commission, the World Economic Forum and the Business Council on Sustainable Development. While the different transnational policy planning groups can be sorted into three varieties of neoliberal orientations – free market conservative, neoliberal structuralist and neoliberal regulationist – the analysis of corporate-policy group interlocks reveals that a few dozen 'cosmopolitan' leaders primarily from Europe and North America knit the network together: Neoliberal pluralism practiced in the academic networks must be regarded as an important feature of the corporate family as well.

The chapter by Weller and Singleton complements the focus on global neoliberal projects with an analysis of the nexus between the US administration and neoliberal civil society with regard to reform proposals for the international financial institutions, the IMF and World Bank. While radical neoliberal reform proposals originating from within the networks of organized neoliberals have not been implemented by the Clinton administration, the widespread mobilization of neoliberal discourse communities successfully influenced the terms of the debate, and much of the advice of the Meltzer Commission has been heeded in the formulation of President Bush's 'millennium challenge account', which is deliberately designed to sideline the global financial institutions. While organized neoliberal agents certainly attempt to gain maximum influence, the contemporary power of neoliberal discourse communities may be better grasped by understanding their role in influencing the terms of the debate and as guardians of what has been termed 'new constitutionalism' and 'disciplinary neoliberalism' (Gill 1998).

Neoliberal hegemonic constellations in the (semi)periphery: transnational and domestic roots

While the domestic roots of neoliberalism in capitalist core countries have been the subject of previous comparative research (see Overbeek 1993), international

financial institutions and other external forces are usually credited with the rise of neoliberal hegemonic constellations in the developing world. Adopting neoliberal agendas of export orientation reversed a century-old pattern of developing country strategies and developmental (to a certain extent protectionist) ideologies *vis-à-vis* leading industrial producers. Did developing countries indeed succumb to purely external powers and ideologies? In chapters on Poland (Bohle and Neunhöffer), South Korea (Berger) and Mexico (Dussel Peters), the authors explore the domestic and transnational roots of neoliberal hegemonic constellations in countries close to the capitalist core. Their analyses suggest that these are deserving of greater attention than they have received, even if external institutions and constraints can hardly be overestimated (see Hay 2000 for a useful distinction between internally generated and externally institutionalized (monetary) constraints).

The former socialist bloc is clearly a crucial example of a seemingly paradoxical situation: the establishment and persistence of neoliberal hegemony despite numerous critiques and questionable results. Still, there is little analysis of an important feature of this 'success' – namely, transnational networks as crucial agents. Bohle and Neunhöffer forcefully argue the importance of East/West relations for the development of neoliberalism on both sides of the iron curtain in the course of the crisis and breakdown of state socialism in their study of Poland. There exists a specific Polish twist on the question, why neoliberal hegemony? Why and how could the neoliberal transformation succeed despite Poland's long market-socialist tradition and a strong, rather socialist-democratic movement, namely Solidarity? Bohle and Neunhöffer carefully trace the parallel development of Solidarity and initially informal neoliberal networks and show that the two were only partially aligned against a common enemy, namely the Polish Communist Party. Brought to ministerial power on the back of Solidarity's mass movement, neoliberal economists successfully utilized the historical opportunity to administer shock therapy, which not only locked the country into a neoliberal reform trajectory, but also tore the erstwhile alliance between the trade union movement and neoliberal intellectuals apart. The influence of organized neoliberals did not wane under conditions of frequent government crisis, however, since neoliberal think tanks in Poland provided neoliberals a sheltered space and continuous public access.

While South Korea was celebrated throughout the 1980s and early 1990s for its stellar economic performance and sound development strategy, this country also seemed to be a likely stronghold against a more complete implementation of neoliberal economic policy doctrines. Mark Berger explains that this situation changed when, in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis, South Korea lost the preferential status that allowed it to combine an export orientation with a considerable degree of state intervention in its domestic economy. Although Berger shows the nexus of external and internal neoliberal forces, his analysis underscores the external influence of neoliberal development experts such as MPS member Peter Bauer, and structural aspects extending neoliberal hegemony to a newly-industrialized country that had been hailed as one of the four 'Asian tigers' just a decade earlier.

Enrique Dussel Peters traces the story of transnational networks of economists promoting export orientation in explaining Mexico's decision to embrace a far-reaching program of economic reform and restructuring. His chapter provides a detailed analysis of Mexico's liberalization strategy and the implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in particular. The major finding is a sharp polarization in the Mexican economy and rising inequality. While he insists on a narrow concept of neoliberalism in the Latin American context – defining the term as the odd mix of authoritarianism and radical free market economics prevalent in Chile under General Pinochet – his findings nevertheless resonate with the Polish and South Korean stories that round out this part of the book. Continentalism and the legal framework of NAFTA must be regarded as crucial aspects of North American hegemonic constellations, developed and shaped to a certain extent by (transnational) intellectual agency. Peter Bauer again deserves mentioning here since his principled neoliberal opposition against development aid finds literal expression in the preamble of the NAFTA treaty stressing 'trade, not aid', as the means to development.

Neoliberal discourse relations: dissemination, diffusion, and adaptation

Neoliberal intellectuals fought their battle for hegemony not only by spreading their world views geographically, but also by disseminating them across various discursive fields. To analyse the influence of neoliberal ideas and the impact of neoliberal intellectual networks is the aim of the third part of the book. It opens with a chapter by Richard Hull tracing the emergence of the notion of 'knowledge as a unit of analysis' in the economic discipline, which emerged in the intellectual battles of Marxist and (future) neoliberal intellectuals in the 1920s through the 1950s in Budapest, Vienna, London and Manchester. Apart from Karl Mannheim's development of a sociology of knowledge and his notion of the true intellectual as a free floating individual in response to Georg Lukács turn towards scientific socialism, key members of the Mont Pèlerin Society such as Friedrich August von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Michael Polanyi and Karl Popper laboured untiringly to attack academic efforts to ground socialist calculation and economic planning on scientific grounds. Concepts such as 'tacit knowledge' and a general scepticism towards positivism not only succeeded in establishing a general neoliberal theory of knowledge, but helped pave the way for other versions of post-positivism as well.

While Hull's chapter shows how the intellectual debates between Marxist and neoliberal thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century influence the philosophical, economic and political debates of our time, the next chapter traces the rarely considered ways in which neoliberal ideas are diffused to broader publics. Peter Mühlbauer's pioneering chapter focuses on popular science fiction literature which has been strongly inspired by libertarian and 'objectivist' thought (in particular the work of Ayn Rand). Major features akin to core elements of neoliberal doctrines include 'frontier thinking', narratives of adventure capitalists

and merchant heroes, anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist tales, which are shown in turn to inspire many neoliberal thinkers such as Milton Friedman. Mühlbauer's chapter helps to better understand otherwise 'invisible' dimensions of popularization and dissemination of neoliberal ideology to mass audiences.

Turning to more recent developments, Oliver Schöller and Olaf Groh-Samberg's chapter bridges the worlds of intellectuals and corporations with their study of how corporate think tanks facilitate neoliberal problem solving in a single policy field. The role of the Bertelsmann Foundation, one of the most important think tanks in Germany, in forging a neoliberal alliance to reform higher education in Germany provides an excellent example of the manufacturing of neoliberal consent. The Bertelsmann Foundation managed to stimulate a new higher education agenda by way of forging alliances that include radical neoliberal networks of intellectuals and think tanks as well as traditional constituencies of social liberalism. As a result, the recent debate about how to reform the German system of higher education has been dominated by a set of ideas which can be considered pragmatically neoliberal, a compromise between radical neoliberal and traditional social liberal concepts on neoliberal terms, that was originally developed by a private corporate think tank connected to one of the world's largest media conglomerates.

Susanne Schunter-Kleemann and Dieter Plehwe's chapter is another case study on the reconfiguration of debates and policy approaches in a particular issue area. The emergence and application of the new concept of 'gender mainstreaming' is scrutinized to ask if gender mainstreaming provides an effective policy tool to overcome gender-based inequality. Locating the origins of the concept in the human resource literature on 'managing diversity', the authors argue that 'gender mainstreaming' was pushed by European elites in an attempt to shore up women's support for the European Integration project, which many women were viewing with increasing scepticism due to its neoliberal policy orientation. The analysis documents that gender mainstreaming is a highly ambiguous concept. While gender mainstreaming is at odds with more radical neoliberal concepts such as 'individualist feminism' which are more outrightly hostile to any sort of state intervention to improve the position of women *vis-à-vis* men, policies developed under the umbrella of gender mainstreaming have not yielded the promised impact and may in fact undermine institutional positions won by more autonomous feminist movements of the past.

Major hegemonic battle lines

In the concluding part we focus on contemporary ideologies that claim to challenge neoliberalism and present themselves as alternatives. First, Hans-Jürgen Bieling explores the relationship between neoliberal and communitarian forces and discourses. While communitarians clearly diverge from neoliberalism in perceiving unfettered market relations as one cause of the weakening and dissolution of social community structures, they share with neoliberals the rejection of a centralized and bureaucratic state, which is regarded as an impediment to

both free markets and self-organized community structures. If the discourses converge on the issue of anti-statism, third way concepts inspired by communitarianism attempt to synthesize neoliberal and communitarian thought. In conclusion Bieling stresses the power of neoliberalism to absorb and neutralize potentially counter-hegemonic forces and ideas, like some strands of communitarianism.

Cultural nationalism is often presented (and presents itself) as a countervailing force to neoliberalism. Cultural nationalist forces on the one hand draw support from this apparent opposition, and proponents of neoliberalism gather support from people who are suspicious of the fundamentalist tendencies of various cultural nationalisms. Opposed to this view, Radhika Desai argues in her chapter that there are important and systematic ideological, socio-economic and political linkages between neoliberalism and cultural nationalism. She identifies the characteristics of the New Right, which make it distinct from previous political formations on the right, and, in that context, explores the relationship between cultural nationalism and neoliberalism to tease out connections between them that have hitherto been neglected in the study of the right.

Finally, Ulrich Brand focuses on the movement that arguably most forcefully challenged neoliberalism in the last decade – the so-called anti-globalization movement. His chapter starts by reviewing some controversial interpretations in the movement itself about its forms and contents. He then examines why the heterogeneous movement constituted itself and under which conditions it acts, using the insights of regulation and Gramscian hegemony theory to highlight some key ambivalences of the movement(s). Pointing to the inherent dangers of a movement that is threatened to share the fate of global NGOs that were integrated into, and swallowed up by, neoliberal discourse and policy procedures, the chapter aims to support a more principled stance against both neoliberal thinking and policy formulation.

At the end, Brand stresses not only the need for critical self-reflection of social movement intellectuals, but the importance of critical intellectuals reflecting on and being part of social movements as well. Our goal for this book, and for the conference from which it emerged, was to gather critical intellectuals to contribute to a better understanding of the rise of neoliberalism in various hegemonic constellations, as well as its contestation, transformation, and, we argue, largely successful adaptation and stabilization which requires a heightened awareness of the continuing need for principled opposition in what amounts to an ongoing war of position in a neoliberal and transnational civil society. We understand this analysis as a contribution to the larger goal of clarifying perspectives with regard to neoliberal hegemonic constellations and, on this basis, of searching for ways to more comprehensively challenge neoliberal hegemony in the medium and long run.

Notes

1   See Scott-Smith (2002) for an excellent introduction to Gramscian perspectives on intellectuals and hegemony. While Scott-Smith underlines the importance of the

'perception of the technocrat-intellectual as part of a vanguard, having the potential to play a vital role in the transformation of society' (26) his emphasis on the 'consensus' building effort fails to more fully account for the tension between social liberal and neoliberal activists in the Congress for Cultural Freedom. While the success of the Congress during the post-war era expressed the hegemony of social liberalism, it included right-wing neoliberal activists such as MPS members Hayek, Michael Polanyi and Raymond Aron among others, who did not subscribe to the 'end of ideology consensus'. The neoliberals in fact re-conceptualized technocracy as a problem to henceforward politicize technocracy. Their work in the important intellectual-cultural arenas of social liberalism in fact is most interesting with regard to their subsequently rising fortunes as key intellectuals of neoliberal hegemonic constellations.

2   While Gramsci certainly emphasized and focused on the relation of '*national*' political and civil society, already an eclectic reading of the *Prison Notebooks* reveals the extent to which Gramsci was aware of the importance of transnational aspects of the analysis of capitalism in general and of transnational aspects of civil society in particular. He took note of the need to examine transnational links in a prospective examination of conservative catholic forces (azzione catholica) in the first notebook and certainly inspired van der Pijl's (1998) detailed historical analysis of early transnational class formation processes centring on the freemasons with his notes on the role of organizations such as the Freemasons, the Rotary Club, or the YMCA. He emphasizes their educational activities designed to establish and promote new cultural norms and moral values as well as economic practices within specific countries as well as across borders. Gramsci also provides a historic account of freemasonry to show how it became one of the most effective forces *of the state in civil society* (Gramsci 1975: NB 19, º 53). At the same time we agree with Bieler and Morton (2001: 12) on the need to clarify 'shortcomings involved in the task of theoretically and practically translating Gramsci's work as a framework for contemporary analysis'.

3   See Campbell's (2001, 2004: Ch. 4) useful distinction between cognitive and normative, foreground and background levels of the knowledge/idea complex and his correlation of the different levels with specific actors.

4   Gramsci already at this time took notice of conscious efforts of intellectuals to separate from the ruling class 'in order to more intimately unite, to become a true superstructure rather than an unorganic and non-differentiated element of the structure-corporation' (Gramsci 1975: NB 5, º 105, 659; our translation).

5   To avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to explain the differences between the English and the German concerning the term 'material'. The English 'material' designates the German 'materiell' as well as 'stofflich'. The latter captures the physical aspect of an 'object'. Since the *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845/46) Marx distinguished between 'materiell', which designates the 'social' part or the 'form', and 'stofflich' (physical). His concept of capital in *Capital* represents a social relation and therefore cannot be reduced to 'stofflich' even if capital is invested in production centres. In Marx's approach capital is always 'materiell' however, and he thus would be at odds with today's talking of 'immaterial capital'. Financial capital or capital in the service sectors likewise are social relations and therefore 'materiell'. Capital is not a 'thing' which one perceives with the senses. A materialistic analysis of the 'role of ideas' is beyond the western dualisms of consciousness versus being/existence (Sein vs. Bewusstsein), idea versus materiality, etc. (see Walpen 2004: 354, note 55). In this perspective ideas matter because they are an inseparable part of the social.

6   The frequently close association of ideational or 'material' aspects with the whole story has been the cause of many debates and misunderstandings of neoliberalism. If scholars primarily look at neoliberal rhetoric, they tend to emphasize the departure from previous social liberalism, and speak about neoliberalism in revolutionary terms. When students of neoliberalism mainly look at institutional change and larger patterns of societal transformation, the emphasis tends to highlight continuities

with regard to the preceding social liberal era and incremental change at best (see Hay 2001).

7 See especially in this context the state theories developed by Nicos Poulantzas 1978 and 2001; Leo Panitch 1998; Joachim Hirsch 2001; Bob Jessop 2001a and 2001b; and Mario Candeias 2004: 42–55.

8 Concepts of control, then, are the projects of rival political alliances which on account of their appropriateness to deal with current contradictions in the labour, intersectoral/competition, and profit distribution processes, as well as with broader social and political issues, at some point become *comprehensive*, crowding out the others by their greater adequacy to a historically specific situation – until they themselves unravel in the course of further development and struggle (van der Pijl 1998: 4).

9 Despite the great achievements of human rights organizations in the north and the south in mobilizing new legal rights and institutions against the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, the organizations – in contrast to many of those who had been active in them – did not succeed in becoming important actors once the state was transformed. Business law firms, in contrast, have taken root and have started to thrive in the new economic and political environments (Dezalay and Garth 2002: 248).

10 C. Wright Mills (1956: 288f.) certainly contributed a lot to such an understanding with his introduction of the categories of 'in-betweens' and 'go-betweens' designed to capture individuals who belong to and express different parts of (military, political and economic) power elites simultaneously and consecutively, respectively.

11 In his analysis of the role of intellectuals in the emerging Fordist constellation, Gramsci underlined that a new type of intellectual was separating from the ruling class in the United States (unlike in Europe) in order to better unite with it, namely to be able to provide the necessary analysis and develop appropriate strategies (see Note 4). We observe a similar, albeit better-organized, separation and eventual re-unification of neoliberal intellectuals in the post-war period, this time not confined to the United States (see Plehwe and Walpen in this volume).

12 'The philosophy of an epoch cannot be any systematic tendency or individual system. It is the ensemble of all individual philosophies and philosophical tendencies, plus scientific opinions, religion and common sense' (Gramsci 1971: 455). The unifying moment is the distinctiveness of such an articulation of varieties of belief systems compared to previous or subsequent epochs (Jacobitz 1991: 18).

13 It is indeed characteristic of the common-sense utopianism and zeal of self-conscious neoliberals that they think along lines analogous to Trotsky's permanent revolution: 'Our fight will never end' (Martino 2001: 84).

Nancy Fraser
Social Justice in the Knowledge Society:
Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation

In choosing the phrase "knowledge society" to name this conference, the organizers suggest that we stand today at the brink of a major social transition. I agree with this suggestion. Even if we cannot yet be sure how best to characterize the overall change, it is clear that several epochal shifts are underway. One important shift is from a fordist phase of capitalism, centered on mass production, strong labor unions, and the normativity of the family wage, to a postfordist phase, premised on niche production, declining unionization, and increased female labor-force participation. Another, related shift is from an industrial society, premised on the manufacturing technologies of the second industrial revolution, to what the organizers call a knowledge society, premised on the information technologies of the third. Still another shift is from an international order of sovereign nation-states to a globalizing order in which huge transnational flows of capital undercut national state steering capacities.

I take all these processes to be part of the idea of a shift to a knowledge society. And I believe all of them are connected to yet another key feature of the present constellation: the increased salience of culture in the emerging order. This new salience of culture can be seen in a number of ways: in the enhanced visibility of "symbolic workers" (in contrast to factory workers) in the global information economy; in the declining centrality of labor vis-à-vis religion and ethnicity in the constitution of many people's social identities; in heightened awareness of cultural pluralism in the wake of increased immigration; in intensified cultural hybridization, promoted not only by face-to-face transcultural contacts but also by electronically mediated communication; in the proliferation and rapid diffusion of images by visually-oriented global mass entertainment and advertising; and finally, as a consequence of all these shifts, in a new reflexive awareness of "others," hence in a new stress on identity and difference.

What most interests me, however, is the effect of culture's new salience on politics-and thus on the prospects for social justice. Thus, I want to sug-

gest that a further defining feature of the knowledge society is the widespread politicization of culture, especially in struggles over identity and difference-or, as I shall call them, struggles for recognition. Such struggles have exploded in recent years. Today, in fact, claims for recognition drive many of the world's most intense social conflicts—from battles around multiculturalism to struggles over gender and sexuality, from campaigns for national sovereignty and subnational autonomy to newly energized movements for international human rights. These struggles are heterogeneous, to be sure; they run the gamut from the patently emancipatory to the downright reprehensible. Nevertheless, such widespread recourse to a common grammar is striking, suggesting an epochal shift in the political winds: a massive resurgence of the politics of status.

The flip side of this resurgence is a corresponding decline in the politics of class. Once the hegemonic grammar of political contestation, claims for economic equality are less salient today in the knowledge society than in the fordist heyday of the Keynesian welfare state. Political parties once identified with projects of egalitarian redistribution now embrace an elusive "third way"; when the latter has genuine emancipatory substance, it has more to do with recognition than redistribution. Meanwhile, social movements that not long ago boldly demanded an equitable share of resources and wealth no longer typify the spirit of the times. They have not wholly disappeared, to be sure; but their impact has been greatly reduced. Even in the best cases, moreover, when struggles for redistribution are not cast as antithetical to struggles for recognition, they tend to be dissociated from the latter.

In general, then, the knowledge society is generating a new grammar of political claims-making. In this constellation, the center of gravity has shifted from redistribution to recognition. How should we evaluate this shift? What are its implications for social justice?

In my view, the prospects are double-edged. On the one hand, the turn to recognition represents a broadening of political contestation and a new understanding of social justice. No longer restricted to the axis of class, contestation now encompasses other axes of subordination, including gender, "race," ethnicity, sexuality, religion, and nationality. This represents clear progress over restrictive fordist paradigms that marginalized claims not centrally related to labor and its compensation. Consequently, social justice is no longer restricted to questions of distribution, but now encompasses issues of representation, identity, and difference. The result is a major advance over reductive economistic paradigms that had difficulty

conceptualizing harms rooted, not in political economy, but in institutionalized value hierarchies.

On the other hand, it is by no means clear that struggles for recognition are serving to supplement, complicate, and enrich struggles for egalitarian redistribution. Rather, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, they may be serving to displace the latter. In that case, the recent gains in political culture would be entwined with a tragic loss. Instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, we would have traded one truncated paradigm for another–a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. The result would be a classic case of combined and uneven development: the remarkable recent gains on the axis of recognition would coincide with stalled progress if not outright losses on the axis of distribution.

That, in any case, is my reading of current trends. In what follows, I shall outline an approach to the knowledge society that responds to this diagnosis and aims to forestall its full realization. What I have to say divides into three parts, each of which corresponds to a more specific worry about the current trajectory of the knowledge society. First, I shall consider the worry that recognition struggles are displacing redistribution struggles, instead of enriching and complicating the latter. In response to this worry, I shall propose an analysis of social justice that is broad enough to house the full range of concerns in the knowledge society, including class inequalities as well as status hierarchies. Second, I shall consider the worry that the current focus on cultural politics is reifying social identities and promoting repressive communitarianism. In response to this worry, I shall propose a non-identitarian conception of recognition that is appropriate to the knowledge society, one that promotes interaction across differences and synergizes with redistribution. Third and finally, I shall examine the worry that globalization is undermining state capacities to redress injustices of both types. In response to this worry, I shall propose a multi-tiered conception of sovereignty that decenters the national frame. In every case, the conceptions I propose will be rooted in emancipatory potentials now unfolding with the emergence of the knowledge society. And the combined result will be the outlines of a political project aimed at promoting social justice in this society.

1. Countering Displacement:
A Two-Dimensional Conception of Social Justice

One threat to social justice in the knowledge society is the result of an historical irony: the shift from redistribution to recognition is occurring despite (or because of) an acceleration of economic globalization. Thus, identity conflicts have achieved paradigmatic status at precisely the moment when an aggressively globalizing U.S.-led capitalism is radically exacerbating economic inequality. As a result, the turn to recognition has dovetailed all too neatly with a hegemonic neoliberalism that wants nothing more than to repress the memory of socialist egalitarianism. In this context, struggles for recognition are serving less to supplement, complicate, and enrich redistribution struggles than to marginalize, eclipse, and displace them. I have called this *the problem of displacement.*

Displacement threatens our ability to envision social justice in the knowledge society. To avoid truncating our vision of emancipation, and unwittingly colluding with neoliberalism, we need to revisit the concept of justice. What is needed is a broad and capacious conception, which can accommodate at least two sets of concerns. On the one hand, such a conception must encompass the traditional concerns of theories of distributive justice, especially poverty, exploitation, inequality, and class differentials. At the same time, it must also encompass concerns recently highlighted in philosophies of recognition, especially disrespect, cultural imperialism, and status hierarchy. Rejecting sectarian formulations that cast distribution and recognition as mutually incompatible understandings of justice, such a conception must accommodate both. As we shall see, this requires theorizing maldistribution and misrecognition by reference to a common normative standard, without reducing either one to the other. The result will be a *two-dimensional conception of justice*. Only such a conception can comprehend the full magnitude of injustice in the knowledge society.

Let me explain. The approach I propose requires viewing social bifocally, simultaneously through two different lenses. Viewed through one lens, justice is a matter of fair distribution; viewed through the other, it is a matter of reciprocal recognition. Each lens brings into focus an important aspect of social justice, but neither alone is sufficient. A full understanding becomes available only when the two lenses are superimposed. At that point, justice appears as a concept that spans two dimensions of social ordering, the dimension of *distribution* and the dimension of *recognition.*

From the distributive perspective, injustice appears in the guise of class-like inequalities, rooted in the economic structure of society. Here, the quintessential injustice is maldistribution, understood broadly, to encompass not only income inequality but also exploitation, deprivation, and marginalization or exclusion from labor markets. The remedy, accordingly, is redistribution, also understood broadly, to encompass not only income transfers, but also reorganizing the division of labor, transforming the structure of property ownership, and democratizing the procedures by which investment decisions are made.

From the recognition perspective, in contrast, injustice appears in the guise of status subordination, rooted in institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value. The paradigm injustice here is misrecognition, which must also be broadly understood to encompass cultural domination, nonrecognition, and disrespect. The remedy, accordingly, is recognition, understood broadly as well, so as to encompass not only reforms aimed at upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups but also efforts to recognize, and valorize, diversity, on the one hand, and efforts to transform the symbolic order, deconstruct the terms that underlie existing status differentiations, and thus change everyone's social identity, on the other.

From the distributive perspective, then, justice requires a politics of redistribution. From the recognition, perspective, in contrast, justice requires a politics of recognition. The threat of displacement arises when the two perspectives on justice are viewed as mutually incompatible. Then, recognition claims become decoupled from redistribution claims, eventually eclipsing the latter.

When the two justice perspectives are superimposed, however, the risk of displacement can be defused. Then, justice emerges as a two-dimensional category, which encompasses claims of both types. From this bifocal perspective, it is no longer necessary to chose between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. What is required, on the contrary, is a politics that encompasses both.

The emergence of the knowledge society makes such a politics possible in principle—and necessary. In this society, as we saw, identity is no longer tied so exclusively to labor, and issues of culture are intensely politicized. Yet economic equality remains rampant, as a new global information economy is fueling major processes of class recomposition. Moreover, today's diversified population of symbolic workers, service workers, manufacturing workers, and those suffering from social exclusion is highly con-

scious of multiple status hierarchies, including those of gender, "race," ethnicity, sexuality, and religion. In this context, neither reductive economism nor vulgar culturalism is viable. On the contrary, the only adequate perspective is a bifocal perspective encompassing both recognition and distribution.

Combining redistribution and recognition is no easy matter, however, as it requires bringing the two dimensions of justice under a common normative measure. What is needed is a single normative principle that can encompass both justified claims for redistribution and justified clams for recognition, without reducing either one to the other. For this purpose, I propose the principle of *parity of participation*. According to this principle, justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another *as peers*. For participatory parity to be possible, at least two conditions must be satisfied. First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and "voice." This I call the "objective" condition of participatory parity. It precludes forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality that impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers. In contrast, the second condition for participatory parity is "intersubjective." It requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. This condition precludes institutionalized value patterns that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are institutionalized value patterns that deny some people the status of full partners in interaction—whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed "difference" or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.

Both conditions are necessary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient. The first brings into focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of distributive justice, especially concerns pertaining to the economic structure of society and to economically defined class differentials. The second brings into focus concerns recently highlighted in the philosophy of recognition, especially concerns pertaining to the status order of society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Yet neither condition is merely an epiphenomenal effect of the other. Rather, each has some relative independence. Thus, neither can be achieved wholly indirectly, via reforms addressed exclusively to the other. The result is a

two-dimensional conception of justice that encompasses *both* redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the other.

This approach serves to counter the risk of displacement. By construing redistribution and recognition as two mutually irreducible dimensions of justice, it broadens the usual understanding to encompass injustices of both status and class. By submitting both dimensions to the overarching norm of participatory parity, moreover, it supplies a single normative standard for assessing both the economic structure and the status order. Thus, it constitutes the broad understanding of justice that is needed in the knowledge society.

2. Countering Reification: A Non-Identitarian Conception of Recognition

A second threat to social justice in the knowledge society arises as a result of another historical irony: struggles for recognition are proliferating today despite (or because of) increased transcultural interaction and communication. They occur, that is, just as accelerated migration and global media flows are fracturing and hybridizing all cultural forms, including those experienced as previously "intact." Appropriately, some recognition struggles seek to adapt institutions to this condition of increased complexity. Yet many others take the form of a communitarianism that drastically simplifies and reifies group identities. In such forms, struggles for recognition do not promote respectful interaction across differences in increasingly multicultural contexts. They tend, rather, to encourage separatism and group enclaves, chauvinism and intolerance, patriarchalism and authoritarianism. I have called this *the problem of reification*.

Like displacement, reification threatens our ability to envision social justice in the knowledge society. To defuse this threat, we need to revisit the concept of recognition. What is needed is a non-identitarian conception, which discourages reification and promotes interaction across differences. This means rejecting standard interpretations of recognition.

Usually, recognition is viewed through the lens of identity. From this perspective, what requires recognition is group-specific cultural identity. Misrecognition consists in the depreciation of such identity by the dominant culture and the consequent damage to group members' sense of self. Redressing this harm requires engaging in a politics of recognition. Such a politics aims to repair internal self-dislocation by contesting the dominant culture's demeaning picture of one's group. Members of misrecognized groups must reject such pictures in favor of new self-representations of

their own making. Having refashioned their collective identity, moreover, they must display it publicly in order to gain the respect and esteem of the society-at-large. The result, when successful, is "recognition," an undistorted relation to oneself. On the identity model, then, the politics of recognition means identity politics.

Without doubt, this identity model contains some genuine insights concerning the psychological effects of racism, sexism, colonization, and cultural imperialism. Yet it is deficient on at least two major counts. First, it tends to reify group identities and to obscure cross-cutting axes of subordination. As a result, it often recycles stereotypes about groups, while promoting separatism and repressive communitarianism. Second, the identity model treats misrecognition as a free-standing cultural harm. As a result, it obscures the latter's links to maldistribution, thereby impeding efforts to combat both aspects of injustice simultaneously.

For these reasons, I have proposed an alternative conception of recognition. On my account--call it "the status model"--recognition is a question of *social status*. What requires recognition in the knowledge society is not group-specific identity but the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction. Misrecognition, accordingly, does not mean the depreciation and deformation of group identity. Rather, it means social subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating *as a peer* in social life. To redress the injustice requires a politics of recognition, but this does not mean identity politics. On the status model, rather, it means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members.

Let me explain. To apply the status model requires examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative *standing* of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as *peers*, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then we can speak of *reciprocal recognition* and *status equality*. When, in contrast, institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction, then we must speak of *misrecognition* and *status subordination*. On the status model, therefore, misrecognition is a social relation of subordination relayed through *institutionalized patterns of cultural value*. It occurs when social institutions regulate interaction according to cultural norms that impede parity of participation. Examples include marriage laws that exclude same-sex partnerships as illegi-

timate and perverse, social-welfare policies that stigmatize single mothers as sexually irresponsible scroungers, and policing practices such as "racial profiling" that associate racialized persons with criminality. In each of these cases, interaction is regulated by an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that constitutes some categories of social actors as normative and others as deficient or inferior. In each case, the result is to deny some members of society the status of full partners in interaction, capable of participating on a par with the rest.

On the status model, finally, misrecognition constitutes a serious violation of justice. Wherever and however it occurs, a claim for recognition is in order. But note precisely what this means: aimed not at valorizing group identity, but rather at overcoming subordination, claims for recognition seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact with others as a peer. They aim, that is, *to deinstitutionalize patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it*.

The status model of recognition constitutes a resource against reification in the knowledge society. Focused not on group identity, but on the effects of institutionalized norms on capacities for interaction, it avoids hypostatizing culture and substituting identity-engineering for social change. Likewise, by refusing to privilege remedies for misrecognition that valorize existing group identities, it avoids essentializing current configurations and foreclosing historical change. Finally, by establishing participatory parity as a normative standard, the status model submits claims for recognition to democratic processes of public justification. Thus, it avoids the authoritarian monologism of the politics of authenticity; and it valorizes transcultural interaction, as opposed to separatism and group enclaving. Far from encouraging repressive communitarianism, then, the status model militates against it.

In general, then, this approach fosters the sort of politics of recognition that is needed in the knowledge society.

3. Countering Misframing: A Multi-Tiered Conception of Sovereignty

There is also a third threat to social justice in the knowledge society. Like displacement and reification, this one, too, is the result of an historical irony: the knowledge society is emerging despite (or because of) the decentering of the national frame. It is occurring, that is, just as it is becoming increasingly implausible to posit the national state as the so-

le container, arena, and regulator of social justice. Under these conditions, it is imperative to pose questions at the right level: one must determine which matters are genuinely national, which local, which regional, and which global. Yet current conflicts often assume an inappropriate frame. For example, numerous movements are seeking to secure ethnic enclaves at precisely the moment when increased mixing of populations is rendering such projects utopian. And some defenders of redistribution are turning protectionist at precisely the moment when economic globalization is making Keynesianism in one country an impossibility. In such cases, the effect is not to promote parity of participation. It is rather to exacerbate disparities by forcibly imposing a national frame on processes that are inherently transnational. I shall call this *the problem of misframing*.

Like displacement and reification, misframing threatens our ability to envision social justice in the knowledge society. To defuse this threat, we need to revisit the problem of the frame. What is needed is a multi-tiered conception that decenters the national frame. Only such a conception can accommodate the full range of social processes that create disparities of participation in the knowledge society.

The need for a multi-tiered conception arises because of mismatches of scale. For example, many of the economic processes governing distribution are clearly transnational. Yet the redistributive mechanisms we inherit from the fordist period are national in scale. Thus, there is a clear mismatch at present between them. Granted transnational institutions such as the European Union promise to help close the gap. But they too suffer from severe justice deficits, both internal (in their neoliberal proclivities) and external (in their tendency to erect Fortress Europe). Apart from scattered campaigns for a Tobin Tax and an unconditional Universal Basic Income, there is little on the horizon at present that promises to overcome this mismatch of scale.

Likewise, many of the cultural processes that generate distinctions of status are not confinable within a national frame, as they include global flows of signs and images, on the one hand, and local practices of hybridization and appropriation, on the other. Yet here, too, the mechanisms for redressing status subordination are largely housed within countries or, as we used to call them, nation-states. Thus, here too, we encounter a mismatch. Granted, emerging new transnational mechanisms for institutionalizing human rights, such as the World Criminal Court, hold out some promise for closing this gap. But they remain rudimentary and subject to pressure from powerful states. In any case, such organizations are probably too glo-

bal, and too oriented to universals, to deal with the many cases of status subordination that arise from cultural flows that are more "glocal" in scale.

In addition, there is no one frame that fits all issues of justice in the knowledge society. As we saw, justice here means removal of impediments to parity of participation. Yet, as we also saw, there are at least two different types of impediment, maldistribution and misrecognition, which do not map neatly onto one another. Thus, there is no guarantee that a frame appropriate to one dimension of justice will also befit the other. On the contrary, there are many cases in which reforms framed from one perspective end up exacerbating injustice in the other.

Finally, the need for multiple frames is effectively built into the idea of participatory parity. That principle cannot be applied, after all, unless we specify the arena of social participation at issue and the set of participants rightfully entitled to parity within it. But the norm of participatory parity is meant to apply throughout the whole of social life. Thus, justice requires parity of participation in a multiplicity of interaction arenas, including labor markets, sexual relations, family life, public spheres, and voluntary associations in civil society. In each arena, however, participation means something different. For example, participation in the labor market means something qualitatively different from participation in sexual relations or in civil society. Thus, the meaning of parity must be tailored to the kind of participation at issue. In each arena, too, the set of participants rightfully entitled to parity is differently delimited. For example, the set of those entitled to parity in labor markets may well be larger than the set entitled to parity with a given voluntary association in civil society. Thus, the scope of the principle's application must be tailored to the arena in question, It follows that no single formula, quantitative or otherwise, can suffice for every case. Multiple frames are therefore required.

In general, then, no single frame or level of sovereignty can suffice to handle all questions of justice in the knowledge society. What is required, rather, is a set of multiple frames and a multi-tiered conception of sovereignty. As a result, the question of when and where to apply which frame becomes unavoidable. Henceforth, every discussion about justice must incorporate an explicit reflection on the problem of the frame. For every issue, we must ask: who precisely are the relevant subjects of justice? Who are the social actors among whom parity of participation is required?

Earlier, before the current acceleration of globalization, the answers to such questions were largely taken for granted. It was assumed, usually without explicit discussion, that spheres of justice were coextensive with states, hence that those entitled to consideration were fellow citizens. Today, however, that answer can no longer go without saying. Given the increased salience of both transnational and subnational processes, the country can no longer serve as the sole unit or container of justice. Rather, notwithstanding its continuing importance, the country is one frame among others in an emerging new multi-leveled structure. In this situation, deliberations about institutionalizing justice must take care to pose questions at the right level, determining which matters are genuinely national, which local, which regional, and which global. They must delimit various arenas of participation so as to mark out the set of participants rightfully entitled to parity within each.

In general, explicit discussion of the frame should play a central role in deliberations about justice. Only such explicit discussion can defuse the risk of misframing in the knowledge society.

4. Conclusion

All three problems—reification, displacement, and misframing—are extremely serious. All threaten social justice in the knowledge society. Insofar as the stress on recognition is displacing redistribution, it may actually promote economic inequality. Insofar as the cultural turn is reifying collective identities, it risks sanctioning violations of human rights and freezing the very antagonisms it purports to mediate. Insofar, finally, as struggles of any type are misframing transnational processes, they risk truncating the scope of justice and excluding relevant social actors.

In this lecture, I have proposed three conceptual strategies for defusing these risks. First, to counter the threat of displacement, I proposed a two-dimensional conception of justice, which encompasses not only recognition but also distribution. Second, to counter the threat of reification, I proposed an account of the politics of recognition that does not lead to identity politics. Third, to countert the threat of misframing, I proposed a multi-tiered conception of sovereignty that decenters the national frame. All three proposed conceptions were rooted in emerging features of the knowledge society.

Taken together, these three conceptions constitute at least a portion of the conceptual resources we need in order to begin answering what I take to

be the key political question of our day: How can we devise a coherent strategy for redressing injustices of both status and class in the knowledge society? How can we integrate the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition so as to challenge injustice on both fronts? If we fail to ask this question, if we cling instead to false antitheses and misleading either/or dichotomies, we will miss the chance to envision social arrangements that can redress maldistribution and misrecognition simultaneously. Only by uniting both objectives in a single effort can we meet the requirements of justice for all in the knowledge society.

Nancy Fraser: Social Justice in the Knowledge Society: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation
Beitrag zum Kongress "Gut zu Wissen", Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 5/2001

Future Matters

Action, Knowledge, Ethics

By

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BRILL

CHAPTER NINE

FUTURES TRANSCENDED

Introduction

With this book we have sought to lay foundations for approaches to the future that are appropriate to their contemporary context of future making. While we fully appreciate that there is much work still to be done, we are also aware that this exploration has enabled us to make the future tangible, render the invisible visible. This in turn affected the way we understand our role and our implication in potential effects. How we see our actions, knowledge and responsibility has irreversibly changed. Moreover, there is no going back. Just as we cannot re-enter the pre-linguistic world of the infant after we have acquired speech, so we cannot return to a two-dimensional futures world of space and matter after we have begun to integrate temporality and futurity into our knowledge practices*. As readers you have joined us in this endeavour, which means that you too have passed a point of no return. Your world too has irrevocably changed and these changes reach deep. Thus, for example, once temporality and futurity are explicitly encompassed in our knowledge practices, their negation becomes a consciously willed act. Similarly, any denial of implication in potential outcomes and the exclusion of latency periods* from horizons of concern will require active effort. The designation of either as unreal will be based on choice rather than ignorance. What used to be implicit and taken-for-granted has become illuminated, explicated and transformed into subjects of reflection. And with this shift in standpoint and perspective the foundations are laid for new knowledge practices: each one of us is charged to help create on these foundations structures that are appropriate to both their base and their contemporary context.

Since the laying of these foundations has been a joint effort involving authors and readers, the resulting structures will differ greatly, as each must suit not only its unique context but also its inhabitants, who have their own diverse biographies and needs. Every participant in the exploration will have drawn different inferences from the processes we investigated and the stories we told, will have identified different

priorities and mapped out different solutions. As authors we set out to find, mark and map access points for change. Making changes, however, requires context-specific practices that will inescapably differ not only with the level at which action is conducted, the competence and the skills applied but also with the associated sphere of influence. Nonetheless, despite our awareness as authors that every reader will need to appropriate the insights gained for *their* own purposes, construct the new buildings according to *their* requirements and make changes appropriate to *their* context, there is still one knowledge domain that requires our further attention. There is a need to re-visit the conceptual tools we have touched upon throughout this text and focus once more on the relationships between them. The tools in question are the concepts and frameworks of meaning that constitute the scaffolds for this undertaking. Not quite enough has been said about the relations between the components to consider this part of the exploration adequately covered. Some of the conceptual issues already addressed we would like to develop further, others we would like to weave together to give them additional strength and solidity. Appropriate conceptual tools, we want to argue, are essential for re-building approaches to the future. The further development of such tools is therefore the endeavour with which we want to bring this book to a close. 'Tools' sounds frightfully utilitarian and technical, yet the objective is not technical upskilling. Rather, the purpose is one of relating and integrating, of binding into a coherent whole the fragmented domains of action and being-becoming that have been sketched in previous chapters.

Taken-for granted assumptions are invisible. They belong to the world of know-how rather than explicit knowledge. If, as 'common sense', they act invisibly as barriers to desired change then we first need to render them visible. Once habits of mind* are brought to the forefront of consciousness and we learn to 'see' them, we can begin the difficult task of changing those deeply sedimented ways of knowing. As with all the other issues we discussed in this book there are two key insights. The first is that *things could and can be different*. The second is that *our extensive thought traditions are not lost but enfolded in who we are and what we know*. It is up to us therefore to recover these traditions and consider their (in)appropriateness for contemporary *future matters*. We should ask whether and in what way they might be usefully adapted for our contemporary context, and what difference it might make if parts of this enfolded ancient knowledge were unfolded, recovered and adapted for responsible future making. Again, this is not about going

back. Rather, it is about moving forward with an expanded consciousness, emboldened by the knowledge that the industrial way of life is not destiny: there have been and still are other ways of living our lives.

In the first section of this final chapter we reconnect what has come adrift during the industrial way of life: the production of futures, knowledge of futures and our responsibility for potential outcomes. This means relating action, knowledge and ethics. Since everyone has different competencies in these domains of the future, we explore a number of access points where improvements could be achieved and consider what these might entail. Next we revisit key assumptions that tend to predispose current knowledge practices towards a lack of concern for long-term effects of contemporary future making. We focus on deeply sedimented habits of mind and, in some cases, trace their cultural roots. Our aim is to identify openings for change, ones which may produce approaches to the future that are adequate to our contemporary timeprint*. What we want to transcend, therefore, are not futures but contemporary perspectives and approaches to futures and futurity.

Action, Knowledge, Ethics

In the course of this investigation one thing has becomes obvious: making futures is easy. Everyone does it all the time and with great facility. Knowing these futures with all their impacts and ramifications as they stretch across time and space, in contrast, is impossible for all but the most repetitive of actions and events. This disjunction between action and knowledge has implications for the way responsibility for future effects is approached. As long as responsibility is tied exclusively to known outcomes of policies, actions and inactions and excludes impacts that are shrouded in uncertainty, futures will continue to be produced with impunity. See Figure 2.

The three interconnected elements of action, knowledge and responsibility do not play equal roles in our contemporary relations to the future. Often they are treated quite separately, having come adrift in our world of compartmentalised knowledge. If we can agree that those three spheres belong together and that future making ought to be done knowledgeably *and* with responsibility then we need to understand the reasons for the disconnections as these may help us to find ways of reconnecting what has become separated with the industrial way of life and re-align the three elements in accordance with specific contexts.

Figure 2: Ethics Based on Knowledge

In the first two chapters of this book we suggested that it makes a difference to our action potential whether the future is conceived as pre-given and actual, as empty* possibility, or as process* realm of latent futures in the making*. Who owns the future, we argued further, has knock-on effects for the way it is perceived, the nature of the knowing and the anchoring of responsibility. Thus, efforts to *know* the future are more likely to involve discovery, disclosure and interpretation of destiny, fate and fortune if the future belongs to god(s). If it is tied to the cosmos, in contrast, then calculation, prediction and extrapolation of planetary movements and auspicious moments for change may be involved. But, if the future is seen as ours for the making and taking, then imagination may be employed for conjecture, creation, colonization and control. With respect to the interdependence of action, knowledge and ethics we argued that once people's approach to the future shifts from seeing themselves as recipients to understanding themselves as pro- tagonists and agents of change, the locus of responsibility changes too. The onus is then on the new future makers to know their productions together with their potential ramifications. This, however, is far easier to demand than it is to achieve since the changing locus of control is accompanied by massively increased uncertainty. That is to say, when the future is no longer thought to pre-exist but is approached instead as a realm to be shaped by human will, then potential outcomes are continuously shifting and changing.

Thus, the modern drive towards innovation and progress* has produced fundamentally different constellations of action, knowledge and respon- sibility from those arising from traditional responses to the challenges

of the future. Contextuality and embeddedness have been displaced by decontextualised, disembedded* relations in order to produce a world of pure potential where anything is possible, thus subject to our design. Having divested the future of content and rooted human freedom in nothingness we find that knowing futures of our making and taking responsibility for them take place under altered conditions: freedom and the committed pursuit of progress are accompanied by an inevitable rise in uncertainty and loss of control. It is here that we encounter the major paradox of the pursuit of progress and the assumption that freedom issues from an open future: *as owners of the future we also carry the sole responsibility for the outcomes of our future-creating actions. This makes us inescapably responsible for that which we cannot know.*

One way to deal with the openness and uncertainty of the future has been to create social rules and regulations that bound and delimit the production of what is unbounded and interactively open. This entailed creating laws and regulations on the one hand and institutions that enforce social rules on the other. In addition, knowledge systems emerged that predicted the uncertain future with new and innovative methods, shifting focus from individual and unique outcomes to aggregate phenomena. The distinction between *facta* and *futura** was established in the knowledge spheres of science and economics where pronouncements were consequently based not on future 'fact' but probability*.

A second way of dealing with the uncertainty of the open future was to treat the temporal realm as if it was spatial and material. This meant approaching it technologically with the tools of material fabrication. As we showed in Futures Traversed, this involved bracketing the open, interactive and transactional aspects of the processes involved. When processes and futurity were thus placed outside the frame of reference and concern, highly paradoxical situations ensued: much of what was externalised emerged from the shadows and dramatically increased the unintended effects of carefully planned strategies and actions. In this modern future-making context it was no longer possible to retain the triple constellation of action, knowledge and ethics in its unity. The interdependencies were severed in line with a growing differentiation of knowledge spheres and academic disciplines whose objects were studied in abstraction from their contexts: the three key elements of the social relation to the future drifted apart. See Figure 3.

The result is a contemporary situation where actions extend over ever longer time spans into the future whilst the sphere of knowledge is reduced to the past and extended present. Since ethics is tied to

Figure 3: Broken Interdependencies

knowledge of outcomes, responsibility too is restricted to the extended present. On the basis of the taken-for-granted understanding of this relation, environmental economist Michael Jacobs argues that, given we cannot know the future, we should encompass a perspective and duty of care that extends to one generation hence.

> As long as each generation looks after the next (say over a period of 50 years) each succeeding generation will be taken care of. Of course, if an effect in the further future can be foreseen, then it too can be taken into account. (Jacobs 1991: 73)

We can see here a number of broken interdependencies that are of interest to this discussion. First, there is no sense that action, knowledge and ethics form an inseparable unity. Secondly, irrespective of how long into the future the effects of our actions may last, Jacobs implies that we cannot be expected to take them into account if we cannot know about them. Thirdly, when responsibility is tied to knowledge in contexts where the future is seen as open potential, and thus as unknowable, such purely arbitrary cut-off points are encouraged for the suggested horizon of socio-political concern. And since, fourthly, these proposed periods *are* arbitrary and disconnected from their timeprint, that is, their future-making actions and associated consequences, they can be debated *ad infinitum* without ever coming to an agreement. It means, finally, that we are at liberty to continue producing futures without social and

ethical bounding, with no one to hold us to account for the long-term consequences of our decisions, actions and inactions.

In the light of such situations, Jay Griffiths (1999: 227) notes critically that the contemporary future of industrial societies "is a blank absence of elsewhere: there is a Teflon coating between today and tomorrow. It is an attitude so implicit it is all but invisible and one merely masked by forecasts, plans and futurism". As no-man's-land, we argued in Futures Traversed, the future is approached as a realm where poisons can be deposited for thousands of years, where resources evolved over millennia can be used up or depleted in a single life time, and where our atmosphere and stratosphere can be altered. Those affected by our future making and future taking have no means of redress. Without voice or vote they are simply at the receiving end of our ignorance. This surely cannot and must not continue. Finding ways to reconnect action, knowledge and ethics is a pre-condition to being able to accompany our actions to their time-space distantiated* effects and to take responsibility in ways that are appropriate to our socio-environmental timeprint.

Hannah Arendt's work is once more of relevance to the issues we are addressing here. Human affairs, Arendt (1998/1958: 183–4) insists, exist in ongoing webs of mutually affecting relationships. As such they are unbounded in space and time which makes their effects unpredictable in principle. As we showed in previous chapters, the bounding of action has been achieved culturally through the creation of social rules and laws, rituals and institutions. Unpredictability, in contrast had been reigned in and stabilised through the production of artefacts. However, the perspective of fabrication has turned out to be no panacea for the unpredictability of social action and socio-technical practices since action ineluctably expands into its networked consequences, and thus cannot be abstracted from its context or reduced to a single deed. When this is attempted, problems occur, as we showed in Futures Transformed and Futures Traversed. Arendt identifies *promise* and *forgiveness* as social responses to, respectively, the unboundedness and uncertainty of actions and their irreversible and unknowable impacts.

In Futures Tamed we showed that the *power of promise* works on the basis of bringing the future into the present. This entails, as Arendt (1998/1958: 245) explains, disposing "of the future as though it were the present, that is, the enormous and truly miraculous enlargement of the very dimension in which power can be effective". The creation of an extended present based on promise, as we have shown, is of course very different from the one that arises with the economic trading* of

futures. While promise works in contexts where it can be relied upon, the economic treatment of the future, in conjunction with the valorisation of speed,* negates the very processes that were set up on the basis of covenant. Moreover, we identified discord between private and public modes of being. Our private lives, we suggested, are embedded in unbroken chains of obligation and care that allow us to identify with future generations in a way that is more difficult to achieve in the public domain of instrumental (largely economic) relations where those chains are broken and the frontier spirit* dominates.

Forgiveness, Arendt's strategy to counterbalance the irreversible consequences of actions, works in a very different way and on the basis of unrelated principles. While promise brings the future into an expanded present, recognition of our dependence on forgiveness has the potential to place us in the *future present** of others. It allows us to connect open-ended outcomes of deeds to their eventual impacts on the lives of unknown successors. For Arendt it links us to the planned futures of predecessors through their impacts on our lives today.

> Forgiving serves to undo the deeds of the past […] Without being forgiven, released from the consequences for what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover. (Arendt 1998/1958: 237)

Arendt thus identifies the future-binding covenant and the importance of forgiveness for deeds of predecessors as two social tools to tame the unboundedness, irreversibility and unpredictability that arise with the freedom of social action. In the contemporary industrial way of life, however, neither is still adhered to in the sense that Arendt elaborated for classical antiquity. Yet, both strategies can provide us with pertinent food for thought.

When we apply Arendt's insights to the issues addressed in this book, the need for contexts of social stability where promises can be relied upon is self-evident, if not easily achieved, when progress, speed and economic profit are pursued with such vehemence. The need for forgiveness, Arendt's second means of redemption, is less obvious. Arendt's focus on forgiveness is past-oriented. We forgive predecessors for their deeds and legacies: the cancer-producing radiation, hormone disrupting chemicals, climate-changing fossil fuels. From our futures perspective, however, there is no barrier to extending the temporal orientation of forgiveness to the future. That is to say, we can equally know ourselves to be acting in a context where we not only forgive predecessors but

require forgiveness from successors for our future making. This turn to the future inescapably embeds us in relations of indebtedness with not-yet existent others, which in turn tempers the frontier spirit and the improvidence with which their presents and futures are spoilt by us and or eliminated altogether. Knowing ourselves to be acting within unbroken webs of obligation, and appreciating that our deeds will require forgiveness, places us almost by default in positions of increased care and concern.

As we identified in our discussion on non-reciprocal* care in the previous chapter, this is the position of, for example, parents or guardians who act in what they think is in the best interest of their children and charges when they choose a particular godparent or a special school. Parents and guardians know that should these turn out to have been bad decisions, they will require their charges' forgiveness for those decisions and the unforeseen problems that arose with them. It would not occur to parents or guardians to insist that they cannot take responsibility for their actions because they could not be sure of the outcomes. Equally, they would not turn solely to past-based scientific knowledge for help to either reduce the uncertainty of the situation or make better decisions. What we have here is an occurrence where *action is directly linked to responsibility in contexts of uncertainty.* It works. We know how to do it at the everyday level, where we are extremely accomplished at linking those two domains of future making. In our daily lives non-knowledge neither incapacitates us nor does it lead to irresponsible action. In contexts of obligation and care, action and responsibility are routinely coupled without giving much thought to the matter. Clearly, what is possible in the private domain ought to be possible also in public life. Important here is first the recognition that responsibility in contexts of uncertainty is possible and second an appreciation of the conditions in which such responsible action can flourish: that is, non-reciprocal, non-instrumental relations of care which are embedded in chains of obligation. Of further relevance is an understanding of the barriers to social relations of care that exist in public life together with strategies designed to break down those obstacles and facilitate the restoration of temporally extended relations of care to the public realm. Much of this has been addressed in the preceding chapters.

The creation of social contexts where promises can be relied upon requires social will. Redemption through forgiveness in contrast is a question of attitudes and values that connect our actions with their effects on future generations. When we approach future making with

an attitude that recognises our inevitable indebtedness, it is likely that socio-technical hubris will be tempered. For either of these responses the action-knowledge-ethics relation is held together as a coherent unit but its domains are constituted differently. Where the future can be relied upon due to socially constituted promise, knowledge of outcome is available. In such contexts we can be held to account for our actions. In contexts of non-knowledge, in contrast, this is no longer the case. Here, *knowing ourselves to be dependent on forgiveness from successors for the unintended consequences of our actions becomes important as it induces an approach to the future that is tempered by responsibility to others as yet unborn.* Acting in the knowledge that we require forgiveness is an important step towards relating what has come adrift, acknowledging interdependence and our implication in time-space distantiated effects, and widening our horizons of concern, obligation and responsibility.

A further step has to be achieved through conceptual renovation. This entails not simply the recovery of enfolded wisdom but requires in the first instance that we make visible historically sedimented habits of mind. Some of these ways of knowing have become inappropriate and are thus in urgent need of change. Others, which had been displaced, have become relevant once more. Thus, their recovery and subsequent adaptation to the contemporary context become pertinent. At this point, therefore, we want to reconsider some unquestioned assumptions that have been naturalised as 'truths', bring some of their key features to the fore and explore openings for change. This process is important, we argue, since a new way of understanding future making and the relation between action, knowledge and ethics is a precondition for change at the level of both individual action and public policy.

Throughout this book we have worked with the assumption that knowing is intimately connected to doing, theory to practice, that understanding which is *in*appropriate to the contemporary condition is therefore tied to equally *in*appropriate action. To stress the performative nature of knowledge Marx worked with the concept of *praxis.* We have mostly used the term *knowledge practice* to express this active and constitutive side of knowledge and to convey our conviction that transformed understanding and new knowledge affect our action potential, enhance our capacity for change. The point of troubling taken-for-granted assumptions therefore is to open up spaces for doing things differently. We can here only select a few of the most pertinent assumptions we encountered in our exploration. Where we have dealt with problematic presuppositions in depth in the text already—the 'empty' future,

the future as 'spatial territory' and the future as a 'free resource', for example—these will not be revisited here. Instead, we will address the reality status of the future and its moral standing. Pinpointing some of the key inadequacies allows us to open up spaces that enable us once more to consider alternatives appropriate to our context and sphere of influence. Some of the summaries that follow are more black and white than we would wish but sometimes such simplification and contrast are necessary to achieve a measure of (artificial) clarity before complexity is reinstated to its rightful place.

Troubling Facts

In this section we explore the reality status of the future. This takes us into the realm of presuppositions that are deeply embedded in western cultural history and associated with the rise of science to dominant knowledge system. Today, mechanistic science's way of understanding the world has become the unquestioned western norm for evidence-based practice. It is used, defended and legitimated by the governments of industrialised nations. It is deferred to in the media and in courts of national and international law. Its assumptions have become deeply embedded habits of mind that are difficult to unsettle and even harder to displace.[1] The difficulty, however, should not deter us from trying.

When pared down to the bare bones of its temporal logic, mechanistic science deals with facts and its operational domain is the present. These facts refer to past events: done, achieved, completed and thus amenable to empirical investigation. Facts can be established as evidence. The future, in contrast, is that which has not yet come about, something non-factual which *will* become fact only after it has occurred. While the one has already taken (unalterable) form, the other is still open to influence. Moreover, as we showed in Futures Traversed, facts belong to the realms of space and matter. The non-factual future in contrast is associated with mind and the realm of ideas. It is desired, anticipated, expected, planned and projected.

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[1] As noted in the Prologue, we are here not discussing the activities and assumptions of contemporary scientists but rather the reductive use of science in everyday public life with its associated taken-for-granted expectations about what science is and can do. Our critique therefore is not of modern science but rather of the unquestioned public use and abuse of mechanistic science for purposes of legitimation. On the role of science in legitimating practice, see for example Haack (2005).

This understanding, which has become an unquestioned 'fact' within the western tradition of thought, was cogently expressed by St Augustine in the fourth century AD.[2] To live life as a human, St Augustine thought, involves the interaction and integration of past memory, present perception and future anticipation. He concluded that only the present exists while past and future are aspects of the mind only. St Augustine's understanding of the past, we need to appreciate, has been partially abandoned and replaced. Thus, today we no longer think of the past as an exclusive domain of memory. Instead, we acknowledge that the past has also left records and traces. It is on this basis that we can know the invisible past as fact. Moreover, our methods of accessing those hidden traces are still developing, so that today, with carbon dating, for example, we can know a 'factual past' that extends over millennia. St Augustine's view on the future, in contrast, has survived unscathed in its original form. Here, there has been no equivalent development for gaining access to 'factual processes in the making', to futurity that extends into the long-term future, which has not yet congealed into phenomena. Today, as we have shown, past, present and future interleave and futures are not merely planned or imagined but set on their way. The assumption and associated distinctions therefore no longer hold. The ancient perspective on the future loses its grip. *After 1600 years of adhering to the non-factual understanding of the future it is time for a change.* Contemporary contexts where past and present futures* are already in progress require that we grasp *as real* latent processes that set future presents in motion.

The important point for this discussion on habits of mind is that currently only outcomes of processes are accorded reality status. Where processes take a long time to congeal and effects cannot be linked causally to an origin, the invisible process domain tends to be negated, placed outside the scientific frame of reference. The mechanistic scientific perspective tends to lack conceptual tools, an appropriate methodology and adequate explanations to grasp time-space distantiated processes in progress. This is a problem since today a great number of the products of science, such as chemical, nuclear, genetic and nano-technologies, for example, are characterised by processes of extensive time-space distantiation, that is, the stretching of effects across time and space where the latency period is vast and effects cannot be linked unambiguously to

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[2] See Bourke (1983); for a brief summary see Adam (2004: 52–4).

their causes. We can therefore say that *the relevance of factual under-standing that accords reality status only to processes that have congealed into matter is decreasing proportionally to the increase in technologies marked by long periods of latency.* This situation too is clearly in urgent need of change.

How, then, is this deeply ingrained set of assumptions to be troubled and opened up for change? We can, as we have done in this book, amass examples from the breadth of social action that show its inappropriate-ness for the contemporary condition. It is, however, still a big step from recognizing the inadequacy of trusted sets of assumptions to changing them. The alternative to the *status quo* not only has to be able to do what could be done before but also has to do more and do it better. In other words, it has to be an all-round improvement. Moreover, the concepts chosen as replacements have to resonate with experience at the everyday level and do the job that is required of them.

Let us begin by considering the concept of *process* in the English language. The difficulty can be appreciated when the English notion is compared respectively to a Latin and German pair of concepts that encompass the process world. In Latin we have the distinction between *natura naturata**, the world of factual outcomes and *natura naturans**, the active process world of nature in the making.[3] The former is factual, finished and finite. The latter is temporal, transient and transformative. *Natura naturans* thus refers to the activity and creativity of naturing, to nature in the process of its production. In Germany, Jakob von Uexküll and Georg Kriszat (1983/1934) have worked with the related distinc-tion of *Merkwelt**, which is the factual world amenable to perception, and *Wirkwelt**, which is the active, creative and productive world of processes. The *Wirkwelt* is largely invisible. It is marked by projective interiority and depth. It is oriented, yet without simple or fixed location. Its formative activity is below the surface, inaccessible to the senses and thus beyond the grasp of empirical science. This means that its activi-ties and processes need to be intuited and unfolded. Inaccessibility to factual investigation, however, does not diminish the importance of the *Wirkwelt*, its productivity or its reality status. Rather, all the power of activity and production of impacts belongs to the *Wirkwelt* rather than the visible world of outcomes. The *Wirkwelt* is the domain of lived*

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[3] Baruch Spinoza, in his *Ethics* (1992/1677) is generally credited with having drawn attention to this important distinction.

and living* futures, discussed in the previous two chapters, while the *Merkwelt* signifies the finished product, the process-world congealed into material form, surface phenomena occupying space and amenable to quantification.

Throughout the previous chapters we have argued that past and present facts are the bounded products and congealed form of processes, nature in its phenomenal form, snapshots of the ephemeral world of change. This means we have worked with the distinction between *products* or outcomes of processes (past and present) and *processes* that produce outcomes (futures). The difficulty is that in the English language the concept of process lacks some of the power of both the Latin and the German characterisations respectively, which stress the active, creative and transformative character of the process domain, thus emphasise its futurity. This deficit in the English concept of process makes it that much harder to grasp the reality of futurity with reference to invisible and latent processes which may not materialise as symptoms for a very long time.[4] To our knowledge there is no ready-made equivalent pairing in the English language. In order to achieve the distinction between accessible, temporally bounded outcome and inaccessible, temporally unbounded, transformative futurity we therefore would like to propose *phenomenal reality** for *Merkwelt* and *effecting reality* for *Wirkwelt*.[5]

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's (e.g. Deleuze 1994/1968) theorization of the *virtual* and its 'halo' of potential, discussed in Futures Thought, does much of the work we feel is necessary to accord reality status to the realm beyond empirical grasp. Their use of 'the virtual' as the key concept for this re-conceptualisation, however, is unfortunate as the term itself has many inappropriate terminological associations. Through its everyday usage—for example, as 'virtual reality' in the world of computers—it is infused with *un*reality and even the best theoretical argument will not overcome this problem of association. The second, more profound difficulty with the concept of the virtual is its a-temporality

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[4] For an extended discussion on these matters see Adam (1998) where the distinctions are first discussed on pages 33–35 and then applied to socio-environmental phenomena throughout the book.

[5] In our search for appropriate English terms we consulted colleagues and would like to express our thanks to them here: Dr Rachel Hurdley for the helpful excursions into Latin grammar to better illuminate the distinctions between *natura naturata* and *natura naturans* as well as *facta* and *futura*; Dr Jan Adam for our in-depth discussions of the German terms *Merkwelt* and *Wirkwelt* that led us to the English distinction between 'phenomenal reality' and 'effecting reality'.

in everyday usage, which provides us not even with a hint of process, let alone futurity or creative, effecting power. It is static and decontextualised, its location everywhere and nowhere. In conjunction with the simulation of animation heroes fighting it out in the world of computer games, the virtual becomes unusable as an alternative to the assumption of a factual present and a mind-based, thus fictional, future. Finally, in everyday usage the opposite of virtual is real. Since every concept is co-defined by its other, the everyday opposition between the real and virtual makes the virtual unreal by default. On these three counts, therefore, we find the concept of the virtual unhelpful for the task of grasping as real the effecting, processual future in progress. This means we need to take on board Deleuze and Guattari's important theory of futurity (expanded by our conceptualisation of lived and living futures), retain its reality status but abandon the terminology of virtuality for its problematic everyday imagery and inappropriate associations.

In this book we have developed the idea that the future is both *lived* and *living*. It is lived, we argued, at every level of reality. As futurity it is lived by humans as social beings, always ahead of themselves, extending to what they and others will be and become, to the horizon of individual and collective death as well as the legacies they leave behind, which will grant them immortality. As futurity the future is lived also at the level of organised organic and inorganic matter, albeit in degrees of receding consciousness. Even matter such as sand and stones are ahead of themselves, extending temporally and interactively to future states: in conjunction with water and wind, for example, the stone will turn to sand and, depending on context, the sand may turn to sediment at the bottom of the ocean or form dunes and grow plants where its nutrients live on in chains of other life forms. Context dependence makes this future like all others both predictable *and* unknowable. Futurity is 'Being ahead of itself', to use Heideggerian language, and potential for novelty. It encapsulates the inescapable reaching out from an ever-changing present.

The idea of the living future, in contrast, has a different location within the time-space-matter continuum. It is to be found in the interactions, the patterns, processes and rhythms of change and evolution beyond individual perception. It is rooted in the wider ecological give-and-take that extends from the beginning to the end of time within which our interactions and socio-technical products are embedded and where we partake as participants and contributors across the levels of being. It designates a continuum of variable pasts and futures, extending in unbroken chains

of interactions to origin and destiny. It is the basis on which we can know ourselves as star matter. The idea of the living future, therefore, can offer the crucial active and creative ingredients to the effecting world of futures in the making which is entailed in the German *Wirkwelt* but lacking in the a-temporal English concept of process.

Finally, we have distinguished *present futures* from *future presents**. The present future refers to the standpoint of the present. As such it encapsulates both the factual approaches of science and economics and process-based perspectives on futurity and the lived future. The concept of future presents, in contrast, encompasses the future as both an effecting process and/or as living. Moreover, the *standpoint of the future present positions us with reference to potential impacts of present actions on future generations who have to cope with the consequences of our inventions and interventions.* That is, it relates us to deeds and processes already on the way.[6] Through their different positioning, present futures and future presents offer greatly divergent options not only for knowledge but also for action and ethics. Only the standpoint of the future present, we need to appreciate, enables us to accompany our actions to their potential destinies and know ourselves as responsible for their time-space distantiated impacts. To encompass future presents and to take that standpoint, however, requires that we first understand as real and living these invisible, effecting process futures in progress. This prior move is essential if we seek an approach to the future that brings into a coherent unity action, knowledge and ethics. While we have moved quite a way in that direction already, there are, however, still a number of hurdles to overcome. Prominent amongst these is the widespread practice of reductionism.

Complexity with Futurity

Looking across the thought traditions of western cultures, we can recognise that reductionism in its various guises has facilitated socio-technological development and control. In fact it has been central to the successes of the industrial way of life as well as its excesses. Admittedly, in this book

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[6] As we have explained previously and show in the Glossary, Niklas Luhmann (1982) based the distinction on the difference between mentally represented utopias, which open up present futures, and the technology-based reality of future presents, which close down options for both present and successor generations.

we have concentrated on showing interdependences primarily with regard to the excesses rather than the successes of this way of life. Thus, in a number of previous chapters we have shown how reductionist approaches to reality have been implicated in the fragmentation of social existence and knowledge on the one hand and pose significant barriers to a futures perspective that seeks to re-unite action, knowledge and ethics on the other. The shift from multiplicity and interactive complexity to abstracted simplicity, from the interplay of exteriority and interiority to surface phenomena, from the complex interpenetration and mutual implication of time, space and matter to matter in space are just some of the reductions we encountered in this exploration.

In today's world of rising complexity and interdependence this kind of reductionism is being questioned. Across the knowledge spheres from physics to philosophy emerge discussions about the need to embrace complexity, multiplicity, context and the temporal world of process and change.[7] These efforts are at advanced stages of development and writings on the subject have begun to proliferate from the last part of the twentieth century onwards. The detailed debates and distinctions are not at issue here. What is of importance, instead, is the potential of this sweep of conceptual changes for transcending contemporary relations to the future. Since the complexity perspective across disciplines is hailed as the solution to reductionism, we need to establish whether or not it helps us to reinstate the active, creative and effecting process domain of futurity. Does it enable us to accord reality status to futures in the making, we need to ask, no matter how vast their time-space distantiation?

Fritjof Capra (2003), in a key text on complexity theory across the knowledge domains, proposes that the social dimensions of matter, space, time and meaning need to be brought into a coherent relation. Material structure, spatial patterns of networked relations, temporal processes of becoming and the cultural meanings these hold, he argues, need to be given equal weight in our analyses. The spheres of matter, space, time and knowledge have to be seen as mutually implicating rather than mutually exclusive. Moreover, when they are integrated in one analytical framework, context becomes an important consideration. As such, the

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[7] See for example Beinhocker (2006), Bohm (1983), Briggs and Peat (1989), Byrne (1998), Capra (1996), Gribbin (2005), Hayles (1990), Law and Mol (2002), Luhmann (1982), Nowotny (2001), Prigogine & Stengers (1984), Thrift (1999), Urry (2003), Weick and Sutcliffe (2001), Wynne (2005).

complexity perspective unsettles tried and trusted schemas for coping with the unknown. It questions the perspective that has habituated us to expect certainty, depend on simplicity and trust past-based evidence. Importantly for our discussion here, it allows for changes to the way the future has been handled for the past three hundred years, that is, to the historically tempered deep structure of cultural engagement with the not yet and the unknown.[8]

In Capra's fourfold constellation of complexity theory each aspect implicates all the others. When, in addition, we infuse Capra's perspective with futurity, as developed in this text, then new possibilities for understanding open up and the frozen world of facts springs into life. A brief summary of Capra's complexity constellation, which we have extended to encompass temporality, shows the potential of complexity theory for knowledge practices that seek to embrace futurity.

Matter, Capra's first domain, is our physical world—the earth we live on, the soil that feeds us, the air we breathe, the water we depend on, the body we inhabit, the landscapes and cityscapes we dwell in, the other beings we co-evolved and co-exist with and the socio-cultural world of artefacts (buildings, books, tools, machines, vehicles, computers, power stations, and laboratory products). From a futures perspective, however, this matter is to be understood not just spatially as frozen in time but also temporally as extended and enduring, interacting and regenerating, decaying and leaving a record, projecting and entailing *for*-ness, that is, futurity.

Form, Capra's second part of his fourfold constellation, encompasses patterned and networked relations of family and friends, work and play, with domesticated and non-domesticated other species. It covers all infra-structural aspects of social life, such as institutions and communication systems as well as political, economic, religious and knowledge-based associations. From a futures perspective this form is to be expanded. It is to be grasped not only synchronically as structured pattern but also diachronically: form as forming and historically formed, network as networking, pattern as patterning.

Process, Capra's time dimension of complexity, focuses on the temporal aspects of the world of space, matter and networks. It relates to the way this world is produced and to emergent properties arising from

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[8] For a working paper that elaborates on the temporal perspective on complexity, see Adam (2005).

interactions. From a futures perspective this world to has to be extended to further encompasses 'for-ness', extension into the future, futurity. It needs to include understanding of the dynamics of change and creativity, stability and novelty, continuity and discontinuity, evolution and history, a dynamic that produces not just emergent presents but entire *futurescapes* of past futures and future pasts, present futures and future presents, processes and their products as well as lived and living futures. It has to acknowledge a world where much of the on-goings and their effects are stretched across time and space, therefore often latent and invisible until they materialise as symptom—sometime, somewhere.

Meaning, the fourth feature of Capra's complexity perspective, involves the processes and products of reflective consciousness as well as socially constituted knowledge such as language, values and beliefs, which tend to be tied to the present or the a-temporal realm of ideas. From a futures perspective, however, meaning is projective and action-oriented. Knowledge is performative and transformative, hence we prefer to use the concept of *knowledge practices* to that of meaning. In their temporalised form, knowledge practices resonate with process and becoming, with form as historical and projective forming. This understanding in turn needs to acknowledge the contextuality of meaning and recognise knowledge practices as embedded and interdependent with the entirety of our world thus not abstractable from their networked relations. It places each one of us in the position of responsible social agent and future maker and thereby leaves behind the 'view from nowhere' that allowed us to act with impunity. Heidegger's *Dasein**, as discussed in Futures Thought and Futures Tended, is to be conceived no longer as merely individual but also social and collective.

From the above we can see that the complexity perspective requires non-linear thinking, that is, understanding of networked interdependencies and processes in a reflexive, autopoietic, non-sequential, non-linear way. In its non-temporalised form, however, there remain some major obstacles to utilising the potential of complexity theory for a futures perspective. Central amongst these is the way linear causality has been retained without the necessary adaptation to the requirements of the complexity viewpoint. This is particularly troublesome from a futures standpoint. As we have indicated in earlier chapters, our understanding of causality is linear, sequential, reductive and past-based, which has significant consequences for our concern with futurity, future presents and the process world of living futures.

In Futures Thought, we noted that Aristotle conceptualised *aition*, which is generally translated as causality, with reference to four inter-dependent elements. From our futures perspective these four elements appear to perfectly parallel the quadruple complexity proposed above, as long as meaning is temporalised and thus conceived as transformative knowledge practice:

Aristotle's causes	*Complexity dimensions*
Material cause	Matter
Formal cause	Form
Effective cause	Process (past-based)
Final cause	Meaning (projective knowledge practices), futurity

In the course of their historical development the natural sciences have reduced Aristotle's first three causes to one general physical cause where action produces subsequent effects in a linear fashion from past to present and future. The idea of a 'final cause' as both for-ness and the goal or end towards which organisms develop has been eliminated altogether. With this simplifying move the temporal has been reigned in and futurity effectively shielded out from scientific causality. In its place, the past and the a-temporal present have been installed as exclusive sources of the scientific meaning of causality.

From the above we can see that the complexity perspective provides us with the potential to transcend that reductionist, linear, a-temporal understanding and take account instead of the complex, interdependent, temporally extended social realm of matter, relations, processes and knowledge practices that produce time-space distantiated material effects. It is because our knowledge practices have impacts, which extend materially, spatially and temporally, that we need to explore ways that allow us to accompany the consequences to their eventual, potential destinies: tomorrow, in one hundred, even one thousand years' time. For this we need a causal understanding that transcends a mechanistic science perspective. The new complexity conceptualisation of causality needs to achieve the following: first, it has to implicate each of the other dimensions in any one aspect explicated. Secondly, it has to extend not just from past to present and future but also from future to present and past. Thirdly, this future-to-present direction needs to be not merely an aspect of mind, that is, of our imagination, but also a materially constituted effecting reality. We need to know it as for-ness and as deeds under way, as lived and living futures, as futures in the making that

cast shadows from the present to the future and back again, not yet congealed into matter but material nevertheless. And this is precisely the point: future-oriented and future-creating knowledge practices produce living futures that reverberate through the entire system of physical, biological and cultural relations and processes. Aristotle's four causes, therefore, provide us with a base from which to start our reconceptu-alisation of causality in a way that is consistent with the futurity and temporal complexity we seek to encompass in our understanding. Thus, we can say, when complexity is complemented by temporality and futu-rity then the active, creative and transformative domain of futurity is encompassed in the understanding and futures in the making become visible in their effecting materiality.

With the four-fold understanding of complexity and causality we can appreciate what was inaccessible before. Our knowing becomes reflexive. When we grasp that knowledge practices are neither isolated nor isolatable from their networked connections, that our deeds reverberate through the system, activating responses that stretch across time and space and are therefore not necessarily proportional to their initial 'cause', then we are also bound to recognise that we are implicated participants that cannot escape their responsibility. The complexity perspective deprives us of the comfortable position of external, uninvolved observer. It divests us of the 'view from nowhere' that allowed us to act with impunity. It therefore demands that we acknowledge ourselves as future makers and understand our responsibilities accordingly. Here too, however, we find that deeply engrained habits of mind stand in the way of taking that responsibility seriously and prevent us from relating action, knowledge and ethics in a meaningful and coherent way.

Beyond Certainty

When we shift emphasis from assumptions associated with knowledge of the future to assumptions about the responsibility part of the action-knowledge-ethics relation, as we have done in the previous chapter, the first thing to note is that both legally and morally we feel exonerated from responsibility when outcomes could not be foreseen at the time of action. With respect to the nuclear industry, for example, we find that the people who counselled governments on whether or not to establish a nuclear capability, and who happened not to include in their consid-erations associated problems of safety, were and still are not being held

legally responsible for either the resulting health hazards or the economic burden of the billions of dollars required for the decommissioning of power plants and the management of radio-active waste. In the nuclear case we find that installations are covered by limited liability only, which means that society is expected to foot any bill that might arise with accidents or leakages. This explicit recognition of the (non)knowledge-responsibility link is even enshrined in law. Thus, the Price-Anderson Act was introduced in the USA in 1957 specifically to limit the liability of nuclear power plant operators in the event of an accident.[9] It has been renewed several times since, and now limits the amount of liability for each site to $300 million. Thus, whether formally or informally, non-knowledge as well as unintended and unforeseen consequences all absolve us from personal and public responsibility.

Yet, for some socio-technological unforeseen effects the tide is turning. Thalidomide, asbestosis, smoking-related diseases and similar technologically produced hazards are cases in point where companies are being held responsible for the harm produced by their products. Thus far, however, such apportioning of responsibility for time-space distantiated effects applies predominantly to cases where causal chains can be established over the life times of individuals. It is not clear as yet, what happens to responsibility in situations where effects do not materialise as symptoms for hundreds and even thousand of years. The contemporary problem is that we link responsibility to knowledge in contexts where increasingly *non*-knowledge is becoming the dominant feature and thereby create ever-increasing spheres of *ir*responsibility. This is an unsustainable situation in desperate need of change. Since, however, the underpinning assumptions reach back in western cultural history to Greek antiquity, a change in these deeply embedded habits of mind is complex and involves not one but a number of suppositions and beliefs. In Futures Tended we have built on Hans Jonas' (1984/1976) work, locating these beliefs and their impacts in the wider cultural setting. Here we want to briefly highlight them, show their inappropriateness for the contemporary condition and identify some of the key features that would need to change for these moral presuppositions to become appropriate to contemporary future-making practices.

In models of morality with roots in Greek antiquity, responsibility is generally thought of as pertaining to relationships between living

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[9] See Shrader-Frechette (1993: ch. 2).

individuals. Actions involving non-human things such as artefacts and technological products, in contrast, were not considered of ethical significance. Moreover, virtuous moral action was to be achieved in the here-and-now world of politics. This meant that moral action and matters of ethics were defined by close proximity, thus limited in time and space. The long-term future, in contrast, was associated with fate, providence* and destiny. It was the realm of gods, and was not subject to human planning, debate and moral action. As such it was outside the sphere of human responsibility. This present-based morality was counterbalanced by an ethical orientation to eternity, regarding the good and the beautiful, truth and virtue, ideas and ideals. *Responsibility of individuals and political leaders was consequently defined by eternal values, which were to be enacted in the present by members of particular communities.*

In contrast to the Greek model, obligation towards a technologically produced, long-term future arises with the age of science. It emerges first with the capacity to create futures that outlast their originators, secondly with the human potential to threaten not just individual existences but the continuity of our species and life as we know it, and thirdly with the pursuit of progress which destabilizes eternal values and renders them historical. This context for responsibility is new. Today, the foundations for responsibility have shifted from an exclusively individual to a collective base, from predominantly local to global effects and from primarily present impacts to actions that may not materialise as symptoms for a very long time. The common-sense ethical assumptions, which we have inherited from the Greeks, therefore no longer hold for the contemporary condition. Let us explain by once more using nuclear technology as our example.

Beyond Immediacy: the effects of today's socio-technical, socio-economic and political processes are no longer spatially or temporally bounded, this is nowhere more pertinent than in the case of nuclear technology. Radiation, although most dangerous in the immediate vicinity of any leakage or accident, permeates outwards in space, spreads inwards in matter, organisms and bodies and extends temporally into the long-term future. Moral principles grounded in the immediacy of the here and now, therefore, need to be adjusted to the timeprint of potential outcomes. Such expansion of responsibility to the potential reach of actions places us in a different position with respect to what can and cannot be known, done and controlled. This means that responsibility can no longer be routed via knowledge. In contexts of extensive time-space distantiation (and the associated predominance of non-knowledge),

Action

Non-
Knowledge   Ethics

Figure 4: Uncertainty and Future Making

therefore, a direct link has to be established between action and ethics, ethics and action. See Figure 4.

Beyond Individual Responsibility: through the ages responsibility had been associated with individuals and their deeds. While this still holds good today, especially in the application of our laws, for example, technological activity in general and the policies associated with nuclear power in particular have the potential to affect the living conditions of *all* people now and in the future. This is not to suggest that the impact of decisions regarding radioactive waste management, for example, will be equal across time and space, but simply to point out that the time-space dispersal of effects is no longer encompassed by a moral code focused on the actions of individuals. The changed context means that the ethical project of modernity has to be expanded beyond individual responsibility to encompass collectives at the national and international level. Thus, for example, in recognition of the trans-boundary nature of radiation, nuclear policies have to become a cosmopolitan endeavour. Moreover, since liability for associated costs continues to be increasingly externalised to society at large, it is society who needs to come to decisions about the nuclear present and future. Not politicians whose mandate expires after their period of office, not scientists who build and maintain the installations, not insurance companies who cover limited liability but the general public who are liable will have to debate the pros and cons of that for which they are held responsible and for which they will require forgiveness from successors if their decisions lead to disasters sometime, somewhere.

Beyond Anthropocentrism: the transformative power of humans has always been extensive. In the industrial age, however, this capacity has reached undreamt of heights and fundamentally changed our relationship to nature. Today, nature is no longer the mere backdrop to human action but is subject to scientific intervention and invention. Flora and fauna, mountains and valleys, riverbeds and oceans, the biosphere and atmosphere—all are influenced by scientific practice and its technological applications. As such, nature in all its facets has become ethically significant, without, however, having its 'interests' represented in the socio-environmental polity of today. Instead, human interests grounded in the short-term politics of the here and now, arbitrated by science and justified on the basis of economic arguments are the primary determinants for decisions that impact on the long-term future of our environment and fellow beings. In the light of this mismatch between ethical assumptions and the reach of socio-technical effects we are charged to rethink our traditional anthropocentric responses and produce principles more appropriate to our ecological footprint and timeprint. This requires opening up ethical concern to encompass, as our responsibility, the sphere of impact, which extends beyond humanity to all of nature and the physical bases of our existence.

Beyond Certainty and Control: while the future has always been uncertain, humans were not called upon to take responsibility for what was considered the realm of gods or God. They were merely required to act responsibly in and towards the realm that did not belong to them. In a secular social world, which is understood to be (to a large extent at least) the outcome of human action, in contrast, the *unknown* and *unknowable* futures of our making become our responsibility. That is to say, uncertainty of potential outcomes cannot absolve producers of long-term, open-ended impacts from responsibility to those affected in remote futures and places. The difficulty confronting us, as we have shown, is that the *indeterminacy of unbounded effects makes reliance on scientific prediction and economic risk calculation inappropriate and presents us instead with questions about justice, rights and possible harm to future beings that have to be addressed*. Despite the extensive scale of potential effects and inevitable uncertainty we need to accept therefore that responsibility extends to the reach of our actions. This principle applies irrespective of whether or not the affected and afflicted are able to hold us to account. However, once we accept this general principle, as we have argued above, we need to find ways of connecting action to responsibility without routing it via knowledge. For a timescale of

Action

(Non)   Ethics
Knowledge

Figure 5: Reconnecting Interdependencies

action where outcomes can no longer be tied reliably to their sources and where knowledge becomes inescapably fuzzy, therefore, it is not past-based knowledge but *social* debate on what is right and just which will need to arbitrate between competing plans, decisions and interests. When we accept, in addition, that decisions may require forgiveness from successors, we act in a social context of indebtedness and this in turn helps to temper economic rationality and present-oriented self interest. It means that relations between action, knowledge and ethics need to be organised flexibly rather than uni-directionally. See Figure 5. How the interdependence is conceived and socially constituted, however, will depend on specific contexts of action and their attendant *timeprints*.

Reflections

In this book we have placed contemporary approaches to the future in a wider historical frame in order to give us a base from which to make comparisons, to identify differences and appreciate continuities. From this expanded perspective we could begin to understand what had been gained and what lost on the path to modernity. We could see some of the impacts associated with the major shift that has occurred in the ownership of the future, that is, people taking charge of the temporal domain that had previously been the preserve of gods. We could recognise a number of paradoxes that have accompanied the results of this transformation and appreciate some of the underpinning

interdependencies. In the course of reading the book possible openings for change became tangible and in the previous two chapters these were identifiable at the level of theory and ethics. In this chapter the potential for doing things differently became apparent at the level of implicit assumptions and naturalised habits of mind. Transcendence of contemporary approaches to the future becomes a real possibility once action, knowledge and ethics are reconnected and placed in relation to each other. Knowing that things could and can be different empowers us to infuse future making with concern and responsibility appropriate to our timeprint.

World Social Science Report

2010

2010

World Social Science Report

Knowledge Divides

Chapter 3
Unequal capacities

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Unequal capacities

Chapter presentation

Several papers in Chapter 2 referred to a decline in the quality of teaching and research in social sciences that has occurred in some countries in recent years; several also mentioned that there are large inequalities between countries and between institutions in the nature and quality of the social science research they carry out and the knowledge they produce. Knowledge production as measured by the number of publications in peer-reviewed journals is also very unevenly distributed across countries and regions (Chapter 4). Disparities in the volume, quality and visibility of social science research, and the continued supremacy of American–European social sciences, result in large part from disparities in research capacities. But how can capacities in social sciences be developed and improved? Governments, regional organizations and international agencies, UNESCO included, have been engaging with this issue for years. Strategies have been developed and attempts made to redress the divides, with varying degrees of success. Chapter 3 comes back to these issues, assesses some of these experiences, and addresses the challenges raised by the divide in social science research capacities.

Section 3.1 examines the social science research capacities at three levels – the individual, the organizational and the system levels – and argues that overcoming the limitations of research capacities calls for coordinated action at each of these levels. Section 3.2 examines the dramatic impact in some countries of consulting firms, private research institutes and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on research capacity in social sciences. Section 3.3 discusses the effects of brain flows on these capacities. The last section reviews the experiences of countries that have improved their research capacities, and examines promising practices such as networks in social sciences.

Drivers such as differing levels of capacity, the privatization of research, brain flows and national strategies for the improvement of research are not specific to social sciences, and they are not limited to the global South. One problem facing anyone working on these issues, as the following articles repeatedly show, is the scarcity of data needed for the comparison of research capacities and for the assessment of strategies in different parts of the world, especially in the social sciences. There is an urgent need for data-gathering to support these comparisons and analyses.

3.1 Dimensions of capacities in social sciences

Introduction

Understanding what research capacities in social sciences are, and what limits them, is crucial for the development of an appropriate strategy for their improvement. Governments often equate building research capacities with training. To improve research capacities in social sciences, they establish graduate and postgraduate courses in social sciences, send students abroad, and in some cases facilitate international exchanges, through twinning programmes with first-rank international universities. These efforts focus on reinforcing the methodological and theoretical skills of individual social scientists, and providing better access to international research. But training large numbers of social scientists does not in itself suffice to

improve research capacities at the national level. The production of knowledge supposes adequate institutional infrastructures, access to funding, and integration into scientific communities. This points to the existence of three levels of capacity: the individual level, the organization level and the overall system level. The degree of coordination between these three dimensions of research capacity determines the scope for capacity improvement of social science research systems.

Identifying and addressing knowledge deficits in social sciences research capacity is a priority for regional social science associations and councils, such as the Arab Council

for the Social Sciences (ACSS), the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC), and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Within each region there are broad disparities in countries' research capacities, according to their size, funding capacity, institutional infrastructure and access to national, regional and international research communities. Larger countries tend to have bigger research communities and generally better infrastructures (AASSREC). Yet shortcomings in social science training, lack of finance and infrastructure, and low access to information tend to reduce the ability of social sciences to inform society and policy in many countries. In some countries researchers are subject to political manipulation, leading to low-quality social science research (ACSS).

With some variations, all the social science associations and councils are developing strategies to combat disparities in research capacity. They emphasize the training of individual researchers, provide refresher training in different research methods, facilitate contacts and exchanges with peers within the region, convene biennial conferences (AASSREC), produce refereed journals (CODESRIA) or develop regional research databases (CLACSO)

Kenya is a good illustration of the effect of lack of capacities at the three levels. Kenya is home to one of the oldest universities in Africa and one of its biggest producers of social science publications. Yet the effect of individual training on the country's research capacity in social science remains partial, because limitations at the institutional and system levels are not addressed. Consequently social scientists in that country face serious difficulties in carrying out their work and in the end do not publish in international peer-reviewed journals (Mweru).☻

Assessing research capacity in social sciences: a template

What are the main components of research capacity? How can it be strengthened? What are the main challenges that will become priorities for action? This template was sent to ISSC partners as a background document for their own assessment of existing research capacity in their region.

International development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have long been concerned with the development of country capacities, without which sustainable development cannot take place. They analyse the problem at three levels: the individual, the organizational and the system level. This distinction applies as well to the issue of research capacities. When assessing national or regional capacities to conduct social science research, it may be useful to separate the three levels.

The individual level
Have enough researchers the necessary education and professional skills to conduct research, using quantitative or qualitative research methods? Do they have the ability to identify research themes that are relevant to society, and to

develop research questions? Increasingly also, researchers are requested to develop research proposals: do the researchers have the necessary skills to do this? Can they lead research teams, and can they communicate research results to improve public understanding, inform debate and advise policy?

An assessment of capacity development challenges at this level would look at the number of researchers, how they have been trained, their roles and the quality of the research they produce, the definition of which depends on the type of research promoted.

The organizational level
Well-trained researchers cannot do research unless there is demand for their skills, and unless they work in reasonably resourced organizations. Are there enough

research positions available to form a critical mass or a community of researchers in one or more institutions? How many and which institutions are sufficiently well funded to offer adequate infrastructure and an enriching research environment? The infrastructure necessary to do research in the social sciences is not as elaborate or as expensive as in the natural sciences but it includes computers, internet access, library and access to databases, journals and books. Is funding sufficient to allow fieldwork, recruitment of assistants, attendance at conferences and workshops, spending time abroad, and publishing?

The assessment of challenges at this level would look at issues like the type of research organizations (universities versus research centres and institutes), their status (are they centres of excellence, are they considered world-class or not?), their track record in terms of managing research programmes and publishing, their staff (are they stable, committed and available in sufficient numbers?), the quality of the infrastructure, the way they are financed, and last but not least, the opportunities they provide to publish and to collaborate and exchange information with other researchers at national, regional or international level.

Funding is a central issue, and needs to be considered from several angles. Do researchers bid for grants from national funding agencies? How dependent are they on funds from international agencies? How accessible are such funds? Is the level of financing sufficiently stable to allow research projects to be carried out over several years? What mechanisms of peer review and accountability are employed, and how does this impinge on capacity development?

The research system level and the overall national and regional contexts

Of concern here are the broader policy framework and socio-political context within which social science research operates. An assessment of capacity development problems and challenges at this level would need to consider four specific elements.

The first element concerns research policy. Is there a national policy that defines priority areas? Are there any indications of genuine interest in research on the part of the authorities or wider society?

The second element concerns the working conditions of researchers and their salary levels. The latter are generally linked to the salaries of the overall civil service, and cannot be modified by a single organization or even ministry. Do researchers have sufficient incentives to continue carrying out research rather than joining the private sector, or leaving their country? These include monetary incentives but not only. Are salaries sufficient for people to work full-time instead of looking for consultancies, moonlighting and working in other institutions, or leaving research to join the private sector or go abroad? Another series of questions relates to the incentives that may exist to encourage researchers to publish.

The third element concerns the country's overall level of stability and security.

The fourth element concerns the degree of academic freedom: freedom to teach, freedom to publish and freedom of the press. What tradition of academic freedom does the country have, if any?

Unsatisfactory conditions in any of these areas may reduce the scientific production, and may tempt academics to leave the country. When designing strategies to build capacity, certain negative conditions are easier to overcome than others. It is easier to train individuals than it is to retain them, and easier to create an institution than to create a community of researchers, or to maintain an enabling environment. But for success, all the elements have to be addressed.◡

Capacity development challenges in the Arab states

Seteney Shami and Moushira Elgeziri for the Arab Council for the Social Sciences (ACSS) www.arab-council.org

Current challenges in the Arab region require a concerted and wide mobilization of resources as well as the thoughtful identification of capacity-building modalities to respond to various needs. Major capacity-building targets ought to include the enabling of learning and the exchange of experiences within the region and the coordination of scientific and research policy across the region, as well as focused interventions for specific needs in different localities.

The *Arab Human Development Report* (UNDP, 2009) describes the Arab region as suffering from a 'knowledge deficit'. This is true but is also too broad a criticism, subsuming a number of complex deficiencies at the individual, institutional and systemic levels. The challenges are too big for small and fragmented regional research programmes to redress. They require a concerted and wide mobilization of resources as well as the thoughtful identification of capacity-building modalities to respond to various needs. Addressing the development of capacity regionwide means taking into account the huge disparities between the size and quality of the social science communities of the countries in the Arab region. It must also heed disparities in financial resources and allocations to social science education and research. Major capacity-building targets ought to include the enabling of learning and the exchange of experiences within the region and the coordination of scientific and research policy across the region, as well as focused interventions for specific needs in different localities.

Existing interventions have oscillated between capacity building for individual disadvantaged but promising researchers, and enhancing the capacities of highly specialized centres. This has been done by promoting new mechanisms for training and career opportunities, and by providing incentives for further education, field research and publication. A few endeavours have also targeted advanced graduate students to help them with dissertation writing and completion. On the other hand, little has been done in the past decade to either enhance existing institutions' capacity, or to create new ones specifically geared towards excellence in the social sciences or one of its branches. There are, however, an increasing number of networks that bring researchers together as individuals on a regional Arab level across the Mediterranean or in the

Euro–Arab space, and globally to address specific, usually developmental, issues.

Despite the diversity of the region, Arab countries generally share certain common features. These include:

- Poor quality of education, particularly in the social sciences. Governments have given priority over the years to educational quantity at the expense of quality.

- Limited attention to, and marginalization of, the social science disciplines, while giving priority to natural, professional, and business and management studies, which are identified with modernity and development. Private higher education institutions barely pay attention to the social sciences.

- As a result of these factors, social sciences have a diminishing role in response to societal problems and public interest, and only a modest role in informing policies and effecting social change.

These three features are a consistent challenge to the development of the social sciences, whether in countries with established educational traditions but modest resources or in wealthy countries with a limited history of higher education. It is along these main axes that the newly established Arab Council for the Social Sciences seeks to make itself visible and effective.

At the individual level, much needs to be done to redress the shortcomings in social sciences training. This means addressing 'pipeline' issues (ensuring the supply of talented students into the social sciences) and curriculum and pedagogy weaknesses at university departments, especially given the increasing difficulties in accessing graduate training outside the region. Second, there

is a need to bolster scholars' sense of themselves as a research community by promoting collaborative research and scholarly exchanges. This community encompasses researchers within the region, but extends too to scholars in the diaspora, who contribute invaluable expertise and resources and wish to reconnect to their homeland and re-engage with its problems.

Arab researchers undoubtedly recognize the main challenges facing Arab societies, but are hampered by serious deficiencies in methodological training and by isolation from international debates and knowledge production. This applies most notably to the younger generation, who have suffered most from the deterioration in education. To redress these problems, it will be necessary to work on several fronts at the same time: training to increase skills, research and publications to produce knowledge, and networking to enhance the visibility and empower the voice of the region. The challenge is to carry out these tasks while not losing sight of, and promoting, established centres of social science teaching and research.

On the institutional level, we should recognize the diversity of institutions engaged in social sciences, including universities, research centres and research-oriented NGOs. These have differing research capacities and access to resources. Furthermore, the obstacles they face may not only be financial, but also infrastructural and related to building a beneficial research environment. NGOs tend to receive much of the international funding for research, but given the pace and burdens of contract research, issues such as research ethics, methodology, critical discussion and publication are neglected. Finally, the research community across the region suffers from a lack of access to information, including both official information, such as statistical surveys, archival materials and documentation, and 'private' information and grey literature collected by consulting firms and contract research organizations. Researchers abroad often have better access to such sources than researchers within the region.

Finally, Arab elites and states generally share a distrust of research and a desire to manipulate it. An important challenge is to build trust with policy-makers, especially those who might positively influence research policy and resources for higher education, while at the same time maintaining the independence and integrity of research and freeing researchers from the control of Arab governments. It is also crucial for the public to understand the social sciences' role in analysing their problems and improving their lives. If they fail to identify themselves with the public interest and public good, the social sciences in the Arab region risk reinforcing the image of research as an unnecessary luxury.◡

Seteney Shami and Moushira Elgeziri

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Chapter 3

Social science research capacity in Asia

John Beaton for the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC) www.aassrec.org

The Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC) comprises fifteen member nations that enjoy differing degrees of social science research capacity. Some rapidly developing countries such as India and China have very large and well-funded social science resources, while others are developing capacity as their circumstances allow. Besides grossly inadequate funding, their comparative isolation from regional peers and wider-world associations also impedes the progress of some Asian nations in the social sciences.

For the purposes of this discussion, AASSREC and other Asia Pacific nations' social science research capacity (which includes its impact capacity) can be regarded as the sum of the following elements:

- Human capital: the numbers of educated, trained and employed social scientists plus the postgraduate and undergraduate social science student population who will provide a sustained national research effort.

- Infrastructure and research funding: the buildings, facilities, archives and libraries, support staff and information technology that provide researchers with space and facilities. Here infrastructure includes direct or indirect financial support from governmental or other agencies.

- Connectivity: social science research is an important part of enhancing the public good, and research results must be made public through dissemination in publications or by other means. Connectivity also includes direct and unimpeded access to collaboration with government agencies, public institutions, industry, private individuals and organizations, international peers and professional bodies for the purpose of sharing ideas and information.

The research capacity divide in Asia

By the research capacity divide, we mean the distance between the aspirations of social science practitioners and administrators, and the actual conditions under which they attempt to contribute to the national good. It can be thought of as the degree of disjuncture in the three points above, particularly how infrastructure and connectivity consistently lag behind human capital irrespective of the degree of national economic development. Asian nations vary widely in this regard. Some enjoy relatively large and well-developed support for social science research capacity from government, industry and an international network of collaborators. These tend to be large nations with strong economies. Others have very limited resources. But in all cases, the infrastructure and other support available to social science researchers are a fraction of those provided to scientific and technological researchers in spite of the various and very evident human and social problems facing these governments. While the research capacity of the combined AASSREC nations is marked, their governments' grasp of emerging issues is not. Social scientists in developed and developing nations are equally frustrated that their knowledge is not quickly translated into improved well-being for their people. Social scientists in small, less developed nations may struggle to have any effect at all.

Challenges in developing research capacity in Asia

The nature of the research capacity divide in the various Asia Pacific nations is varied, complex, and in some cases currently difficult to deal with. Considering the three general elements contributing to overall capacity – human, infrastructure and funding, and connectivity – it should be possible to conceive a simple but informative matrix for the AASSREC nations. Such a matrix would convey a capacity assessment of each country at the individual, organizational and research system levels. Some nations have exceptional scholars who suffer from pitiable infrastructure support and little connectivity. Other nations may have numerous researchers and sufficient infrastructure support, but lack the connectivity to remain informed about sophisticated research methodologies and advances in their international colleagues' thinking. India, China, New Zealand, Australia and Japan have well-developed social science linkages with Europe and the Americas. Yet social scientists in most other AASSREC nations mostly have impermanent individual relationships

or weak institutional arrangements overseas. A couple of AASSREC nations have almost no connections beyond their own borders.

The individual level

Higher education must provide young minds with informed and stimulating mentoring. There is a threshold size for a viable research community, whose members can only be provided by higher education institutions, or by government research units. Opportunities for employment and promotion in Asia correlate with a nation's population size and research infrastructure investment, thus disadvantaging smaller nations.

The organizational level

Organizations must provide social scientists with infrastructure and also with opportunities to make their contribution to the national interest. Research systems in Asia are improving the connectivity that researchers require to engage internally and internationally with others, through information technology but also by face-to-face meetings at which efficient and meaningful understanding is achieved. A rare good news story is that thanks to the information revolution, researchers will now have the opportunity to leapfrog the previous infrastructural limitations. This will particularly benefit those in small countries who have suffered a lack of research support materials. Ready electronic access to research communications, including current debates, publication opportunities and research findings, will be a watershed in capacity development. This advantage will greatly enhance opportunities for all social scientists in AASSREC nations and others, especially the previously disadvantaged smaller countries

The research system level

It is in the interests of regions, as well as countries, to support a well-networked system of collaborating scholars and practitioners in the social sciences. Economic, political, ethnic and other social issues are rarely, if ever, unique to a single country. In a globalizing world, issues and potential difficulties can spread across national boundaries with exceptional ease and speed. To some degree, all social scientists in Asian nations suffer from an inability to share, compare and analyse their data, experiences and thoughts

with their peers. Connecting organizations, such as AASSREC, provide nations with developing social science research capacity with the best opportunity to engage with their regional colleagues.

The challenge of understanding the bewildering complexity and interaction of social, economic and political systems in an ever-changing world has inspired social scientists in Asia and elsewhere to embrace the promising, but challenging, guiding principle that large-scale problems demand multi- and cross-disciplinary social science approaches. Furthermore, these problems require approaches that cross sectoral boundaries to the natural and physical sciences, engineering and the humanities.

India and China invest very significantly in publicly funded social research, while most other developing Asia Pacific nations are slowly improving their research capacities and are not well connected to international trends and developments in social science disciplines. Census and other macro-scale data is not generally well-supported and researchers may have limited access to data banks. This means that inter-regional comparative analyses suffer. Collaborative approaches by social scientists need greater and stronger opportunities to provide the knowledge that institutions and governments can use to help resolve difficult issues.

Most, but not all, Asia Pacific nations have peak associations for individual social science disciplines and collective organizations, such as social science research councils. Learned academies or discipline-based societies are numerous but not universal. A persistent problem in the region is the lack of meeting opportunities. The fifteen-member AASSREC convenes biennial conferences to promote mutuality and information exchange. These conferences reveal a commonality of social science issues, many of which focus on building harmonious societies characterized by equity, trust in institutions, meaningful employment, educational opportunities and access to health and social services. These issues are universal and there are opportunities for collaboration between Asia Pacific researchers and the developed social science institutions of Europe, the Americas and elsewhere.◡

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Social science capacity-building in Latin America

Alberto D. Cimadamore for the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) www.clacso.org

Promoting a way of thinking that is capable of relating social sciences to urgent social problems in Latin America requires an appropriate regional institutional environment. This goal has been one of the greatest challenges over the past forty years. One of CLACSO's central priorities is to empower centres from relatively less developed countries and areas by ensuring their social scientists' participation in the network, which itself contributes to capacity development.

Building capacity in social science can be an extended process. It involves the establishment, expansion and strengthening of institutional, operational and organizational resources capable of generating relevant knowledge for society at the local, national, regional and international level. This process tends to produce a greater understanding of the main problems that society or groups within it face by developing actions or policies to address them.

One of today's greatest challenges is to link social sciences and action. This need was explicitly acknowledged by UNESCO at its 2006 International Forum on the Social Science–Policy Nexus, which scientists and policy-makers from more than eighty countries attended. One of the main outcomes of the so-called Buenos Aires Forum was a call for the redefinition of the relationship ('nexus') between social science and action, which could be considered the primary goal of evaluating Latin American social sciences' capacity development. The question, still current, is: how is that goal to be achieved?

CLACSO was an active participant at the Forum. In striving to answer the question above, CLASCO aims at a redefinition of research design in social sciences. One aim of such a redefinition is to permit translatable results to be turned into policies serving the needs of progress and social change. In this regard, CLACSO's unchanging critical thought can be considered a crucial tool in the capacity-building process. This type of scientific thinking, which to some extent applies the critical theory approach, is intended partly to help understand or explain social reality, but also to identify the areas for improvement and the means to achieve it.

Promoting a way of thinking which is capable of relating social sciences to urgent social problems in Latin America

requires an appropriate regional institutional environment. This goal has been one of the greatest challenges taken up by CLACSO over the period since 1970. It has done so by forming the largest network of social science research institutes in the region. This network brings together 259 research and higher education centres from 25 countries, including the largest and best-known regional state universities and NGOs devoted to social science research. These knowledge production and dissemination centres operate in historically and geographically heterogeneous environments which shape their actions. So one of the network's central priorities is to empower centres from relatively less-developed countries and areas by ensuring their social scientists' participation in the network, which itself contributes to capacity development.

The capacity-building core includes a group of interrelated activities geared towards:

- financing social science research with a critical thinking approach

- linking such research to postgraduate education at the regional level

- facilitating information and scientific research availability and dissemination by means of new technologies

- promoting actions targeted at relatively less-developed social sciences areas in order to ensure full participation in the network of regional scientists.

These actions focus on social, economic and political interest issues. They address the major problems facing Latin American societies, such as inequality, poverty, education, culture, democracy, environment, social movements, labour, social conflict, development and regional integration. Specifically, a regional programme of

poverty and inequality research studies addresses the most important social, economic, political and ethical problems afflicting Latin American and the Caribbean countries. While it is true that this is a regional programme, it focuses on relatively less-developed countries and offers research funding for these issues by organizing international seminars and postgraduate courses, both face-to-face and by distance teaching, in which the participation of young scholars, social representatives and decision-makers is promoted.☞

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Why Kenyan academics do not publish in international refereed journals

Maureen Mweru

An examination of most of the highly ranked journals reveals that few, if any, articles are published by academics from sub-Saharan African universities. This is the case even when the article's main topic directly relates to issues relevant to sub-Saharan Africa. The study outlined here aimed at explaining why African, and specifically Kenyan, academics do not publish in international refereed journals, and at taking into account academics' own viewpoints on how to increase their number of publications in such journals.

Although publishing in international peer-reviewed journals can be viewed as a source of credibility and authority in an area of specialization, an examination of most of the highly ranked journals reveals that few, if any, articles are published by academics from sub-Saharan African universities. This is the case even when the article's main topic directly relates to issues relevant to sub-Saharan Africa. So it seemed appropriate to investigate this matter. Kenya was chosen as the country for our investigation. The study aimed at explaining why Kenyan academics do not publish in international refereed journals, taking into account academics' own viewpoints on how to increase their number of publications in international refereed journals.

The study site was one of Kenya's main public universities, located in Nairobi. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were organized to collect data from faculty members who had not yet published a journal article or who had only published one article in the past three years. There were five focus group discussions which brought together twenty-five faculty members teaching in five different university departments. Each focus group discussion consisted of five individuals, ranging in rank from tutorial fellow to professor. Interviews were also conducted with the five chairpersons of the five university departments. The notes made during the interviews were transcribed and transferred on to a document summary sheet. This information was then analysed according to themes.

Factors involved in limited publications

The following factors stand out in the data:
- lack of time and low salaries
- difficulties in obtaining recent and relevant books and journal articles
- negative reviews of submissions to journals
- the attitude of the university's administrative services
- the attitude of faculty.

Participants noted that the lack of time was a major contributing factor to the limited number of publications. Overcrowded lecture halls, an excessive number of exams to grade, numerous university meetings, and serving on various university committees were all cited as taking up any extra time that could otherwise have been used to write journal articles. Furthermore, senior faculty members complained about having to supervise up to twenty Masters' and doctoral students' projects and theses. Little time was left for research and publishing. In addition, those interviewed stated that if they did find some extra time, it was spent on teaching extra classes in private universities or colleges to supplement their incomes. Low faculty wages were therefore seen as a major hindrance to research and publication.

Low salaries were also mentioned in connection with research and fieldwork. In the absence of research funding and grants, academics use their own personal resources, which often results in less research time and thus fewer research findings to publish. Low salaries also mean that academics cannot afford journal access fees. They accused some journals of charging such exorbitant publishing fees – including for online access – that they could not keep up to date with current literature and research findings. A number of academics were unsure whether their research areas had already been covered, or of the latest research findings in their field.

In addition, the interviewed academics related the discouraging comments that they received from journal reviewers. In certain cases, reviewers suggested such major changes on the submitted articles that their authors simply did not take the trouble to resubmit them. Reviewers also called on the authors to read further and include more current literature, and as we have just seen, limited resources made it particularly difficult to do so. Certain participants also felt that the underlying reasons behind these reviews lay in a negative attitude towards sub-

Saharan-based scholars and their research, and a disregard for the issues that were addressed in the articles that were submitted. This is particularly interesting in view of the supposedly anonymous nature of articles when they are presented to reviewers.

University administrative services were accused of not doing enough to encourage publishing by faculty members. Academics who published in international journals, for instance, were not rewarded. Academics also felt that the administration did not place enough emphasis on the importance of publishing. Individuals needed to have pu-blished only three articles within a space of three years to be eligible for promotion from lecturer to senior lecturer. Many faculty members did not feel the need to do the extra work involved in publishing, and therefore stopped writing articles from the moment that they had published the necessary number of articles for promotion. A few of them argued that they were content and were not really interested in promotion, since the university employed them on a permanent basis. This air of resignation or fatalism could also be witnessed among junior faculty members, who pointed out that they had never been taught or guided on how to write journal articles.

How to increase the number of publications

A number of those interviewed felt that the university administration could support the effort needed for publishing by moderating class sizes as well as teaching and non-teaching assignments. Two suggestions were made in order to increase the quality and quantity of output: greater recognition for prolific academics, and a requirement that all faculty members publish at least one journal article per academic year.

Salary increases and the provision of research funds were regarded as potentially positive measures. They would mean that academics would no longer have to teach extra classes to increase their income. They could then spend a greater amount of time on research and publication. In addition, higher salaries would allow them to afford the publication fees demanded by certain journals. Differentiated journal access fees were also mentioned as a way of supporting and encouraging African and developing-country scholars, improving their access to current literature and existing research. Junior faculty members who gained greater access to peer-reviewed articles would get a clearer picture

of what a 'well-written' journal article looks like. Junior faculty members also pointed out that they needed better guidance from their superiors on how to write for scientific journals, notably by getting them involved in research projects and writing up research findings.

Concluding remarks

Several measures need to be taken in order for the number of publications to increase. The creation of a positive climate for research (as mentioned by Proctor, 1996) is one of them. Research has to be valued, and greater time and effort must be devoted to it. Universities in sub-Saharan Africa, including Kenya, ought to provide greater support to their faculty staff. Although many universities in resource-poor countries such as Kenya might not possess the necessary funds to subscribe to international journals, they could support their faculty by identifying and subscribing to a few key journals.

Research funding also represents a critical factor. It has been widely acknowledged that without funding, research cannot proceed adequately (Proctor, 1996). However, in the current context of global recession, academics in developing countries are not always able to rely on developed countries in order to gain access to the funds they need. Perhaps it is time for sub-Saharan-based scholars to seek alternative sources of funding for their research. Faculty members also need to take steps to help themselves and each other, for instance through self-help groups in which they can exchange advice and guidance, including feedback on drafts of articles. This could also reduce the number of harsh reports they receive from reviewers. Self-help groups have been found to increase scholarly outputs in countries such as the USA (Pottick, Adams and Faulkner, 1986).

If Kenya, and sub-Saharan Africa more generally, are to become active members of the global intellectual or scholarly community, they will have to take note of the findings reported here. I would therefore insist on the need to encourage more research and publications by academics from developing countries by outlining the positive and lasting impacts their research findings could have on society. Senior faculty members must fulfil their responsibilities as role models to their junior colleagues and students. In other words, they have to produce quality research and publish their findings in international, peer-reviewed journals.◡

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Chapter 3

3.2 Marketization of research

Introduction

The case of Kenya presented above highlighted how low incomes induce scholars to combine teaching at university and 'moonlighting', thus drastically diminishing their time for academic research and endangering the quality of their teaching. Funding scarcities in Africa and elsewhere often lead scholars to work as consultants and to stockpile short-term research contracts. Social sciences have gained visibility and some popular legitimacy as a result of these developments. But consultant-led research can nevertheless be problematic in problem-rich and resource-poor environments. Traditional university and institution-led research has various mechanisms in place to check the quality of the work produced. In contrast, consultancies are mainly responsive to the market and a specific client base. Quality control is often absent. Financial incentives encourage researchers to shift rapidly from one topic to another, a practice which increases the atomization of knowledge rather than thorough understanding of entire problematics (Richter and de Kadt).

In some regions, donor agencies have become the main source of research funding, with decisive outcomes for the kind of research undertaken. In the Arab East, for example, agencies finance research centres outside universities (such as NGOs and consultancy firms), in conformity with conceptions stressing the need to develop and empower civil society (Hanafi; Shami and Elgeziri). This has led to the formation of new elites, NGO leaders enjoying easier access to funding agencies. Again in line with international priorities, new research themes, such as gender, poverty, democracy and governance, have mobilized researchers. The research financed by agencies favours the collection of large data sets, privileging the production of quantitative indicators over qualitative and critical analyses, and over any understanding of the root causes of poverty (Hanafi).

The mushrooming of consultancy firms and NGOs drawing on a large number of social scientists amounts to an internal brain drain, which is no less problematic than the external brain drain, even if it is less talked about. How widespread these practices are, and how they impact on research, needs further attention. The first, paradoxical indications we have, however, suggest that the growth of these bodies does not result in as big an improvement of knowledge as might be expected. Instead of boosting research capacity and orienting quality knowledge production toward relevant policy issues, funding practices by agencies deplete them, by privileging short-term studies which do not facilitate the accumulation of knowledge and theorization.☻

The development of consultancies in South Africa

Linda Richter and Julia de Kadt

Although attractive because of its immediate relevance to real-world challenges, problem-oriented research has raised concerns about the empirical validity, conceptual strength and political susceptibility of its findings. Governments, intergovernmental organizations, aid agencies and donor groups insist increasingly on its use in shaping and evaluating development practice and policy. These growing demands for research are more and more often being met by independent consultants.

Social science has witnessed a surge in problem-oriented, context-specific and transdisciplinary research. Although this form of research is attractive because of its immediate relevance to real-world challenges and complex contemporary social problems, concerns have been raised about the empirical validity, conceptual strength and political susceptibility of its findings. Nonetheless, the popularization of this form of knowledge production has encouraged governments, intergovernmental organizations, aid agencies and donor groups, among others, to insist increasingly on its use in shaping and evaluating development practice and policy. These growing demands for research are increasingly being met by independent consultants.

Particularly during the 1990s, reductions in public funding for research in Africa crippled the capacity of academic institutions, rendering them incapable of responding to growing research demands. Instead academics, programme officers from aid and development agencies, and recent graduates were drawn by financial incentives to migrate increasingly towards problem-oriented research and to respond to requests for technical assistance by working on their own instead of via established institutions. Many of these individuals had relevant practical experience, but limited and fairly narrow research expertise (Waast, 2002). From the requisitioning agencies' point of view, stand-alone professionals can take on commissions at much lower prices than institutions with overhead costs, training commitments and the like. The resulting growing reliance on consultant-led research in the social sciences in Africa is now evident in professional associations and networks, particularly regarding monitoring and evaluation, and in the growing roles played by market research companies in the social policy and development domains.

Social science has certainly gained enormous visibility and popular legitimacy as a result of these developments, making findings more acceptable and the field more attractive to graduates. But the growing role of consultants creates problems at the same time, particularly regarding quality control and the development of a reliable body of knowledge. In order to become influential in universities and research institutions, researchers need doctoral degrees and multiple, peer-reviewed publications, criteria that help build skills and ensure quality. In contrast consultants, particularly in the African context, are not necessarily equipped with the training or inclination to review existing literature thoroughly and build on existing work. Peer review is not required, and consultants frequently move between topics, resulting in the atomization of knowledge. Finally, the growth of consultancy is primarily constrained by market responsiveness. If a consultant's work is valued by a client, additional and increasingly well-paid assignments are likely to follow. These incentives differ significantly from those that promote excellence in a traditional academic environment.

The combination of the practices and pressures shaping consultant-led research, its high visibility and its public legitimacy, all mean that it is particularly vulnerable to the generation and repetition of ill-formed and even incorrect ideas, often with substantial implications for policy and practice. This has been particularly well illustrated by the emergence and concentration of global attention on the 'AIDS orphan crisis'.

Paediatric HIV cases were documented in the earliest days of the epidemic, although it was only in the late 1980s that the care needs of children infected with or affected by the virus began to receive serious attention (Gurdin and

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Anderson, 1987; Beer, Rose and Touk, 1988). The focus shifted in 1997, when estimates suggested that there were millions of AIDS orphans (Hunter and Williamson, 1997; UNAIDS, UNICEF and USAID, 2002). As ideas evolved through the grey literature, such as meeting reports and consultancy reviews, the discussion of the impact of HIV and AIDS on children narrowed to an almost exclusive focus on orphans, understood as children who had lost their parents and were dependent on a charitable world for assistance. The interventions envisaged in response were mostly limited to the provision of psychosocial support for the affected children.

In retrospect, it is perplexing that a complex, long-term and global phenomenon, with multiple ramifications for children and families, could be reduced to such simplistic ideas. Children will obviously be affected by adult illness in the home long before the death of their parents, and by asset loss and destitution after it. Children are also affected by ambient conditions, such as poverty, dislocation and conflict. However, these complexities were lost in the sheer size of the projected orphan numbers. Data were recycled through reports, primarily produced by consultants, and concerns about child-headed households and skip-generation families flourished. These developments occurred within a context of dramatically increased financial resources. International funding for HIV/AIDS, excluding increasing resources specifically for research, shot up from US$1.2 billion in 2002 to US$7.7 billion in 2008, a great deal of it directed to the worst-affected countries in southern Africa (Kates and Lief, 2009). The very success of the AIDS orphan image in fundraising and advocacy, together with the near absence of stringent, discipline-informed research, resulted in increasingly rigid perceptions and practices. The idea of AIDS orphans as the primary face of the epidemic's impact on children, shaping the use of so much of this funding, became increasingly difficult to challenge.

It took nearly twenty years for these simplistic ideas to be questioned by systematic reviews of academic work (for example, Bray, 2003), critical appraisal of predicted outcomes (for instance, Meintjes and Giese, 2006), and careful re-examination of oft-quoted data (for example, Richter, 2008). This re-evaluation originated in academic contexts, and guided substantial revisions of the ideas that had long shaped policy, programmes and research on children affected by HIV and AIDS. It is now clear that children are affected in multiple ways by their experiences of HIV/AIDS, and by the impoverishing effects of the epidemic on their families and communities. We have also learned that children who lose parents are unlikely to become unsocialized threats to society. Furthermore, the vast majority of so-called AIDS orphans actually have a surviving parent. Therefore, to be effective, assistance needs to reach not only orphans, but many other affected children. Interventions need to target vulnerable families and address the poverty that lies at the heart of the deprivation associated with HIV and AIDS.

While the work of consultants helped bring children and AIDS into the public view, generating widespread interest and support, it also led to the acceptance of underdeveloped ideas and data, and caused resistance to change in response to new evidence. ☺

Linda Richter and Julia de Kadt

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Consultancies and NGO-based research in the Arab East: challenges arising from the new donor agendas

Sari Hanafi

Since the Washington consensus in 1989 and its recommendations for the support of civil society, the international community has contributed to the creation and subsidizing of research in centres outside national universities. The production of social-scientific knowledge in the Arab East (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territory and the Syrian Arab Republic) cannot be understood without reference to the genesis of social sciences in this region since the colonial era and the political economy of the aid system.

The growth of the number of research centres in the Arab East is related to the proliferation of NGOs. Within this area, almost 122 centres involved in research activities emerged in the context of the political transition in the Palestinian territory and Lebanon and the economic transition of Egypt and Jordan. This abundance of NGOs is not specific to this region, but is also found in any developing country where the international community provides aid for promoting local civil society.

This contribution focuses on the region's research structure and production. I raise the following questions: Why have consultancies and NGO-based research developed? What impact do they have on the quality of the produced research and knowledge?

Aid system and the emerging NGO research centres

In the region, research centres off university campuses – whether private profit-making consultancy firms or NGOs – are flourishing. There are two specific reasons for this: the promotion and implementation of the peace processes in Lebanon (after the 1989 Taif Agreement) and the Palestinian territory (after the 1993 Oslo Accords), and the advocating and monitoring of economic liberalization in Jordan and Egypt. The donor community's keyword in these processes was the 'empowerment' of civil society.

This transformation of the donor agenda was linked to three complex processes. First, since the early 1990s, a fundamental shift in favour of NGOs has occurred in the political economy of aid. Internationally, this moment coincided with a change in the sources of aid to NGOs. global Northern and Southern NGOs' mutual, solidarity-based support withered. This support was replaced by bilateral and multilateral relations between global Southern NGOs and governmental and development agencies. Regionally,

this period coincided with the 1991 Gulf War and the onset of the Madrid peace talks, which reconfigured Palestine's geopolitical status and recast the West Bank and Gaza Strip as sites of 'peace-making'.

Second, the new political economy of aid in favour of NGOs created new internal forms of social and political capital in the region. This led to the nurturing and founding of research centres at the expense of aid to universities, which were perceived as public institutions rather than as part of civil society. Although the international actors recognized the institutional pitfalls of moving research outside universities, they highlighted the benefits of supporting research within small-scale units which were unhampered by university bureaucracy and therefore more flexible and efficient. In respect of the Palestinian territory, they argued that these units could also sustain research when universities closed down as a result of internal political conflicts and curfews imposed by the Israeli occupation forces.

Third, local NGOs' entry into the aid channels led to the formation of a new elite. These were NGO leaders who positioned themselves locally within development channels and networked globally to become what Hanafi and Tabar (2005) call a 'globalized elite' who are familiar with the world of aid agencies. Intellectual entrepreneurs, expert sociologists and consultants emerged, becoming part of the donor agencies' networks and familiar with the cognitive code of donor agencies in the research field (Kabanji, 2005). Their actions were essentially based on debates, development paradigms and international standards not bound to their local context.

This new situation was marked by changes in aid policy, the emergence of NGO-funded research centres, and a three-dimensional crisis for national research systems

(financial, institutional and one of self-confidence) (Waast, 1996). New forms of knowledge production emerged. The consultancy firms and NGO research centres cherished by donors readily accepted the transfer of new activities and methodologies. They were supported by project funding, rather than by the long-term funding of coherent research programmes. This trend had serious negative consequences for the accumulation of knowledge and specialization, which is necessary to ensure good research.

New methods and areas of research

Since the 1990s, gender has become an important lens through which societies are studied in the Arab East, as in the rest of the world. Funding supports specifically favoured themes related to gender, such as the democratization of the Arab world, school curricula, the oral history of women's experience, and, more abstractly, patriarchal and semi-patriarchal domination. However, most of this research was not developed by undertaking a 'mainstream gender analysis', which is typical of research in the North and some parts of the South. Hence it remained somewhat superficial.

Funding organizations favoured fact-finding research projects based on unambiguous quantitative indicators. This 'fetishism of the quantitative' has been devoid of critical analysis and interpretation.

Eight research centres in the Palestinian territory and five in Jordan, for example, have been asked to centre their activities on the production of opinion polls on political issues and sample surveys on social issues. This is linked to the new notion of satisfying differentiated 'publics'. Citizens need to be satisfied with the government's actions and with donor interventions in the social and political spheres. Surveys and polls are used as scientific tools to measure and monitor the introduction of systems defined on the basis of preconceived models which are, in turn, based on experiences tested elsewhere, as well as to legitimize interventions (Bocco et al., 2006). NGOs' research centres in the region claim that the new citizens accept these monitoring, assessment and evaluation methods, thereby indicating the superiority of their analysis over universities' in-depth comparative analysis.

The study of poverty is another example. Poverty studies conducted in the Palestinian territory and Egypt have been directed towards surveying the 'poor', identifying where they live, so-called 'poverty mapping', and suggesting different measures of 'poverty alleviation'. Having discovered that the poor occupy certain neighbourhoods, specific interventions were proposed without examining why the poor live in these neighbourhoods or assessing the root causes of poverty, such as the role of the state in the distribution of resources and the negative impact of structural adjustment policies. Many of these studies have been carried out, sponsored and published by UN agencies, leading to action research and interventions that NGOs later implement. The sponsoring organizations often emphasize the collection of demographic data. The surveys that they sponsor are therefore descriptive in nature, based on assessing consumption and income levels, life expectancy, child mortality and literacy levels. A thorough analysis of this raw data and its interpretation on the basis of broader sociological, anthropological and historical studies is usually not on the agenda.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to discuss the problematic development of research in the social sciences in the Arab East as carried out with external funding in research centres outside universities. It is argued that even though social research has recently flourished in the region, the studies tend to lack critical depth. This kind of donor-driven research (in the sense of Bourdieu) is developed and carried out by competing research entrepreneurs seeking contracts, rather than being structured by researchers reflecting different sensibilities in terms of historical analysis, social class or ideology. Many such projects are nothing but a succession of one-year initiatives meant to produce policy research. These research projects lead to too much quantitative research, including opinion polls, and aimed at identifying research questions that are often conceived without theories to support them. Such research does not enable its readers, and other citizens, to be critical of their society.

The most salient issue in the changes discussed above is the kind of funding available to research. The scarcity of public funds, the lack of financial support from the (sometimes) wealthy local community and the exclusive reliance on foreign funding hinder the research centres' ability to accomplish long-term planning and to hire suitable personnel. The atomization of research sites makes them vulnerable to attacks by political and security authorities as well as by different political and religious groups.◡

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3.3 Brain drain or brain circulation?

Introduction

Brain drain is the term for the long-lasting migration of highly skilled people from a less to a more developed country. More than 5 million people cross a border every year to come and live in a more developed country (UNDP, 2009); what share of this number is made up of social scientists looking for better research capacities and incomes is unknown. Many smaller and poorer countries, although the phenomenon is not limited to them, express deep concern that their investments in educating and training social scientists benefit other countries instead. Africa is particularly concerned, as a high proportion of well-trained African scholars, including many of the best-known, have left their country (Olukoshi). Brain drain, like any migration, occurs mainly for economic and political reasons. It is exacerbated by students completing graduate and postgraduate degrees abroad, and integrating into research institutions there rather than returning home. How serious is the phenomenon as far as social scientists are concerned? Is the effect of brain drain essentially negative or can it have some positive effects?

The phenomenon of brain drain can be analysed from a historical point of view. European brain drains contributed largely to reshaping the social sciences in the USA and granting them a definite pre-eminence over other academic disciplines (Jeanpierre); a similar process occurred, though to a smaller extent, in Latin America (Didou Aupetit). It was again troubled political situations – dictatorships in the Southern Cone – that later led to the migration of Latin American social scientists (Vessuri and Sonsiré López in Chapter 2).

The migration of scientists can be analysed from the perspective of the receiving countries (brain gain) or of the sending countries (brain drain). Large numbers of researchers are still leaving their country every year, attracted by better working opportunities, income and research conditions. On the other side, competition exists to attract students and researchers from neighbouring or developing countries. Beside the USA – the largest receiving country today – and Europe, other poles of attraction have developed, and have resulted in new North/North, or South/South movements, as well as in circular flows (Jeanpierre).

Measuring brain drain and brain circulation is complex. Are social scientists migrating more or less than natural scientists? According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), students in social sciences are less mobile than students in other disciplines, and tend to return home in larger numbers (Jeanpierre). On the other hand, there are students who move out of social sciences to study business or management studies because they expect to increase their chances of finding a position abroad (Khadria).

Several countries are trying to reduce the negative impacts of brain drain, and put in place incentives to stimulate graduates to come back after they receive their degree in a foreign university. Such incentives can include the guarantee of a position (for example, China, Mexico), or the establishment of international networks and collaborations with national researchers working abroad (Argentina, Colombia, China, the Philippines). But the efficiency of these measures remains limited as long as working conditions do not improve significantly in the sending countries (Didou Aupetit).

The discussion over brain drains and their effects has shifted recently, from a perspective stressing their negative impacts for sending countries to one identifying positive outcomes. An increasing number of researchers and agencies speak of brain gain and brain circulation to underscore the positive outcomes of brain migrations for sending countries. The Philippines is one country that has known constant migration flows of professionals and scholars since the mid-1960s, but the effect of this migration is not considered negative. The diaspora is central in building cooperation with scholars in their country of origin, thus helping their integration into international research networks (Miralao). Brain circulation is in fact a component of the broader circulation of ideas (Didou Aupetit).

The following papers all stress either explicitly or implicitly how thin the databases are that could allow international comparisons of professional migrations in social sciences, and their outcomes in different countries. International data on brain drain and brain circulation in social sciences need further development.〜

Chapter 3

The international migration of social scientists

Laurent Jeanpierre

This paper describes recent efforts by national administrations, NGOs and international organizations to capture accurately the international mobility of students, scientists, engineers and highly skilled workers, and shows that the data vary considerably between regions and are not in an appropriate format for social science researchers. It also looks at some policies and initiatives developed to overcome the negative outcomes of brain drain.

It is estimated that between the 1960s and the 1990s, around 1 million scholars and students moved from developing countries to Western centres (Kallen, 1994). Global flows of scientists and highly skilled workers have since increased. In 2001, nearly one in ten tertiary educated adults in the developing world lived permanently in North America, Western Europe or Australia (Lowell, Findlay and Stewart, 2004). The figure is several times higher for some countries in Latin America, Africa and the Caribbean, as well as for the developing world's population of people trained in science and technology: 30 to 50 per cent of them live in the West (Meyer and Brown, 1999; Barré, 2003). In 2007, there were approximately 2.8 million international students studying abroad and, in principle, intending to return to their country of origin after completing their degrees. All these international migrations of highly skilled workers, researchers and students play an important role in the distribution of national research capacity. Under specific social conditions, they may also contribute to the internationalization of scientific disciplines. Nevertheless, given the current lack of consistent and comparable national and international data, it is impossible to weigh these two types of consequences and describe the overall flows of social scientists around the world.

A few national administrations (for instance, the US National Science Foundation), NGOs (for instance, the Institute of International Education) and international organizations (such as OECD, UNESCO, the International Organization for Migration [IOM] and the European Commission) have recently made efforts to accurately capture the international mobility of students, scientists, engineers and highly skilled workers, but these efforts do not offer a breakdown by field of study. The data also vary considerably between regions, and are not in an appropriate format for social science researchers.

Reasons for migrating are diverse. Scientists may flee political upheavals and wars in their home countries, or may be part of voluntary migration flows. Most of the scientific literature on the topic of scientific migration flows is concentrated on these human capital push and pull factors, and on their consequences for 'receiving' and 'sending' countries. This literature often offers more policy-oriented and normative, rather than descriptive, information, since keeping and attracting researchers and skilled workers have become an essential element of national economic policies.

Two patterns of migrations within a highly asymmetrical global structure

The history of the social sciences, however, gives us some indication of the international migration patterns of social scientists (Heilbron, Guilhot and Jeanpierre, 2008). Two directions are apparent in these transnational flows. Social scientists migrate from the main academic centres to the periphery in order to teach, export their skills, or do research and gather data. Franz Boas, who had left Germany for the USA in 1899, contributed to creating the first institutions of anthropological research in Mexico. French social scientists, like the historian Fernand Braudel, had some impact on the development of the social sciences in Brazil through their positions at the University of São Paulo during the interwar years. Favouring the entrance of foreign academics after 1954 helped Germany reintegrate with the international scientific community and become an important source of international co-authorship for the USA (Jöns, 2009).

In the opposite direction, talented young social scientists tend to leave a peripheral position for academic centres in order to be trained or work with the most eminent scholars. In anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski left Poland for London in 1910, and in 1938 left the London School of

Economics for Yale University. In the past, imperial and colonial political structures provided a highly asymmetrical framework for such voluntary migrations, reinforcing the scientific creativity and productivity of the centre at the expense of the periphery (Brisson, 2008). Yet these migrations are not always voluntary. They may also depend on the social and economic conditions of researchers, on the status of academic and research positions, and on political constraints on scientists' freedom of speech. After the 1960s, intellectual migrations of social scientists to the USA had more critical consequences. The new legitimacy of cultural studies, the renewed development of area studies, and current interest in transnational topics are doubtless an effect of some transnational trajectories of prominent intellectual exiles in the USA (such as Arjun Appadurai, Homi Bhabha and Edward Said).

Some academic centres in the social sciences also attract scholars on a regional scale, as is often the case with the most prestigious South African, Indian, Japanese and Mexican universities today. There is an important intraregional migration of the highly skilled in Europe, the Americas and Asia. However, transnational disciplinary spaces of exchange show a highly asymmetrical structure, where Western countries, primarily the USA, generally hold a hegemonic position.

The scientific hierarchy of academic centres and national traditions is not the only explanation for the direction of transnational migration. During the twentieth century, most of the migration flows of scholars from Europe to North America reflected the US job market's relative openness to productive foreign social scientists.

Since it often resulted in a long-lasting integration abroad, forced migration contributed more than the voluntary form to the world geography of social science research capacities in the twentieth century. The most important of these migrations took place after 1933, with the exile of professors and researchers – a majority of them Jewish – from Germany and occupied countries in Europe. Several hundred scholars who already were or eventually became professional social scientists emigrated from Europe to the USA between 1933 and 1942. Their intellectual impact has profoundly reshaped and 'denationalized' North American social science, and was an important factor in consolidating its long-lasting global supremacy in the twentieth century (Fleck, 2007).

The expression 'brain drain', that is, the long-lasting migration of highly trained people from some countries to wealthier ones, was coined in the early 1960s to describe the rapidly increasing numbers of scientists emigrating from Europe and from developing or 'emerging' countries to the USA. It has increased significantly over the past two or three decades (World Bank, 2006), and the differences between voluntary migrations and forced migrations are sometimes blurred. In Turkey, Morocco, Central America, a number of African countries and the Caribbean, one-third to two-thirds of university-educated citizens have left their home countries. More African scientists and engineers work in the USA than in their home continent. The leading countries of the so-called global knowledge society draw on human resources worldwide. This is, however, no longer a North/South phenomenon; it also alters North/North and South/South relations.

The contemporary migration of students

The international migration of students is one of the most important issues in the current international competition for human capital. The number of international students has doubled in the past twenty years and is still increasing rapidly. Their international migration is partly due to wider access to higher education worldwide but also to a voluntary policy of international exchanges, especially in Europe. It is related to bad or worsening working conditions for scholars and students in their home countries, a lack of university places, and their perceptions of better career opportunities. With 595,900 overseas students, 25 per cent of them from China and India (in 2005), the USA is the largest recipient country. The UK, Germany, France and Australia are the next most attractive countries for foreign students. It should be noted that countries in which English is not spoken but which still offer low tuition fees continue to play an important role as recipient countries. China, India, the Republic of Korea and Germany are the most important sending countries. The main destinations of Chinese overseas students are the UK, the USA, Australia, Germany, Canada, France, Japan and the Russian Federation. Asian students represent 45 per cent of the overseas students in OECD countries. Intra-European flows of students are the second largest in the world after the flows from Asia to the USA.

Host countries benefit from these inflows as stay rates are often high. In 2003, more than half of the temporary visa holders who had received science and engineering (S&E) doctorates from US universities in 1998 were still working in the USA (Finn, 2005). Stay rates depend on country of origin. Between 1990 and 1999, the average stay rates of foreign S&E Ph.D. graduates in the USA were high among students from China (87 per cent), India (82 per cent) and the UK (79 per cent) (OECD, 2002). European Ph.Ds have a much higher stay rate than their counterparts from the

Figure 3.1 — Distribution of tertiary enrolment by field of education and origin of students, 2007

Note : The graph illustrates: 1. mobile students in a given field of study as a share of all mobile students; 2. local students in a given field of study as a share of all local students. Local students are defined as students who are residents or citizens of the country in which they study. Source: UNESCO-UIS/OECD/Eurostat (UOE) and World Education Indicators Database (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009: 45).

Republic of Korea and Japan. According to China's Ministry of Education, 24.7 per cent of the 700,000 students and scholars who left the country between 1978 and 2003 returned. Within this general picture, stay rates in any country are generally lower for graduates in economics and other social sciences than in any other disciplines.

It also appears that social sciences are not the most attractive disciplines for mobile students (see Figure 3.1).

Less numerous among the mobile students, future social science degree holders are also more numerous among those returning to their home country. The use of natural instead of formal languages in the social sciences may partly explain the lower rate of international migration in these fields. In any case, it is fair to assume that the brain drain is less important in social sciences than it is in physical and life sciences, business and engineering. A closer analysis of the case of the USA seems to support this result.

The case of the USA

The USA is the first country of destination for mobile students and scholars, but is also the country whose researchers and students are the least mobile internationally. It is the only country with a positive (temporary and permanent), migration balance with all other countries. For all these reasons, it is the centre of today's world system of scientific migration. It is thus interesting to focus more specifically on its foreign social scientists, since there are specific data on this knowledge domain.

Of the immigrant scientists and engineers in the USA, 14.2 per cent arrive with their highest degree in the social and related sciences, compared with 21.6 per cent from the engineering sciences (Johnson and Regets, 1998). Between 1993 and 1999, the most important sending countries for students graduating in the USA with a highest degree in the social sciences were India (with almost 27,000 graduates), Germany, Canada, the UK, China, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Japan (with a little more than 12,000 graduates). Table 3.1 shows that foreign-born social science Ph.Ds from US universities are also less numerous than those from other fields.

Table 3.1 > USA: share of foreign-born doctorate holders in the national labour force by selected field, 2003 (per cent)

Field	%
All fields	34.6
Social sciences	16.9
Economics	31.5
Political science	24.2
Psychology	9.8
Sociology/anthropology	13.6

Note: These figures are underestimates.

Source: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resource Statistics, Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT), (2003). The data presented in this section came from NSF's SESTAT Integrated File database, which contains the results of three surveys conducted among people with college or graduate degrees living as permanent residents in the USA. http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c5/c5s2.htm

Among them, holders of doctorates in economics and political science are more often foreign than those from other social science disciplines.

Overcoming the brain drain: some policy responses

Despite this general structure of scientific migration flows, all is not lost for origin countries; in some cases, there are positive side-effects of the brain drain (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997; Meyer, Kaplan and Charum, 2001; Barré, 2003). Scientific socialization in one of the world centres has sometimes contributed to the reinforcement of national scholarship in the migrant's country of origin. For example, Florian Znaniecki was one of the pioneers of academic sociology in the USA but also one of the founders of sociology in his home country, Poland. The emigration of the highly skilled may also create an incentive for education in the sending country, and it may enhance international scientific collaboration. There is a positive correlation between the presence of foreign-born US Ph.Ds in the USA and the level of internationally co-authored articles with the USA (Regets, 2007). Indian diasporic scholars in the humanities and the social sciences have played an important role in the development of postcolonial studies, with positive effects for the humanities and the social sciences in their home country (Assayag and Bénéï,

2004). In the case of the Republic of Korea, the brain drain has been transformed into a 'brain gain'. In contrast, in countries where education policies favour techno-scientific knowledge over social-scientific knowledge, return rates are low among social science researchers.

In a number of countries, policies have been designed to improve the return rates of students and scientists (such as Austria, China, Germany, Finland, Canada, India, Japan and Singapore), or to promote immigrant and diasporic networks (for instance, in Colombia and South Africa). Policies have also been formulated to foster information flows between host and donor countries, and to build transnational intellectual networks. In 1999, 41 knowledge expatriate networks were identified (Meyer and Brown, 1999), their sizes varying from a few hundred to 2,000 members. NGOs and international organizations are also involved in similar initiatives (for example, the RQAN programme developed by the IOM to help African professionals to return to their home countries).

Whether these policies and initiatives will have the desired effect on the asymmetrical structure of national research capacities, and transform the directions and the importance of the flows of researchers and students in the social sciences, remains an open question.☺

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Passenger plane leaving Beirut
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Chapter 3

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From brain drain to the attraction of knowledge in Latin American social sciences

Sylvie Didou Aupetit

The heterogeneity of qualitative analyses of the brain drain from Latin America suggests that coherent information on this subject is hard to find. There is no consensus when it comes to defining the phenomenon: should it include graduates who have jobs in a different country from their place of origin? Should it only concern those who have a Ph.D? In this paper, we consider the latter. We shall try to demonstrate that, in the case of the Latin American scientific elites, the move abroad is just one aspect of a much larger phenomenon of international mobility.

Latin American and Caribbean academics in the United States of America: the invisible migration

Even though the flows of qualified migrants have diversified in terms of their actors and destinations, in Latin America they remain primarily oriented towards the USA. The USA offers numerous job opportunities, competitive wages, a high-quality research system and a good work environment. The existence of close-knit communities facilitates the integration of first-time arrivals. At the regional level, the USA is the most attractive centre for higher learning and graduation. In 2007, a total of 229 Mexicans, 180 Brazilians, 141 Argentinians and 121 Colombians obtained their Ph.D. in the USA.

The data also indicates that apart from Brazil, the doctoral apprenticeships of Latin American elites continue to be characterized by a high degree of international and bilateral dependence, in spite of the consolidation of national opportunities. This situation is particularly irritating for the countries of origin, because learning opportunities abroad tend to facilitate professional integration in the country of arrival. In addition, a number of those who work abroad have pursued their entire education in their country of origin. Governments in the global South increasingly feel that investment in the higher education system has been partially ineffective. This feeling is exacerbated by the fact that immigration rules are less restrictive for qualified individuals who wish to work in the most developed economies.

In 2003, naturalized and non-resident individuals constituted 19 per cent of the doctors and engineers employed in the USA and 16.7 per cent of those in the social sciences (Tsapogas, 2006). In the USA in 2001, 494,000 scientists and engineers of Latin American origin represented 15 per cent of the foreigners employed in the science and technology sector, including the social sciences. But among qualified migrants, proportionally more Latin Americans hold a Ph.D. or occupy research positions in the social sciences than is the case for international migrants as a whole. In the USA the social sciences, as a space of learning and professionalization, attract more Latin Americans than other nationals even though in certain disciplines, the USA competes with other developed countries (with France in sociology, for instance).

In the absence of more detailed data, it is difficult to answer two crucial questions regarding social legitimization and academic evaluation in the social sciences: have they a strong international component or do they continue to be closely anchored in their local territory? And has the brain drain altered their structures and agendas by encouraging deterritorialized research and foreign collaborations?

The internationalization of the social sciences in Latin America: from politicization to professionalization

In the twentieth century, Latin American universities attracted political refugees: Spanish Republicans, Jews from Germany and Eastern Europe, anti-Nazis, American victims of McCarthyism, and refugees fleeing military dictatorships in the Southern Cone. These new arrivals have contributed to the exchange of ideas and the advancement of knowledge. Today, these universities depend on the permanent or temporary return of researchers who have gone abroad, and on the transfer of knowledge through structured or informal networks. If we take into account the wider context (insecurity, violence, poverty) as well as the low university wages, poor working conditions and

heavy bureaucracy, it is no wonder that few people (in either the research community or government) believe in their capacities of attracting 'grey matter' into the region, especially in a context of increasing global competition (OECD, 2008).

In the 1990s, programmes aimed at encouraging the return of competencies were developed and strengthened through a series of complementary and targeted actions.[1] Systematic evaluations of the costs and benefits of these measures by country and by discipline are necessary. These evaluations will probably only produce significant changes if they are accompanied by a re-evaluation of research positions and better working conditions. This can be obtained through bilateral policies of research and staff capacity reinforcement, and by the simplification of project funding, management and evaluation procedures. The risk, if nothing is done, is of seeing the brain drain process continuing and getting worse.

Elite researchers in the social sciences in Mexico: from political exile to professionalization strategies

We do not know how many Latin American social science researchers are currently working abroad. In Mexico, the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) has estimated that between 1980 and 1991, approximately 12 per cent of students with diplomas in the social sciences and humanities and 5 per cent of those benefiting from a Master's or doctoral fellowship were studying abroad. These tentative statistics, however, have not been updated since (Remedi, 2009).

However, CONACYT's National System of Research (SNI) database makes it possible to measure the number of diplomas that have been obtained overseas in the overall current structure of academic elites. For 2009, for instance, the data shows that there was a double dynamic of mobility, which echoes past policies at the intra-regional and extra-regional levels. Mexico has had a long tradition of open doors to political refugees at the regional level. It has also had a policy of sending students abroad with fairly long-term scholarships, to countries such as the USA, the UK, Spain, France and Germany. In the social sciences, 41.2 per cent of Mexican or foreign members of the SNI obtained their most advanced diplomas abroad (the system-wide average is 36 per cent). The choice of universities or research institutes often reflects historic trends. For example, a large proportion of social science professors at the Autonomous Metropolitan University traditionally attend the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris.

We also notice that while only 35.7 per cent of re-searchers obtained their higher-level degrees abroad in the lowest category of the SNI, the proportion reaches 57.5 per cent in the highest category. When it comes to the internationalization of elite learning in the South, a similar tendency can be observed both in terms of destinations and of the similarities between research areas (Didou Aupetit and Gérard, 2009).

Conclusions

While Mexico is not representative of Latin America, an analysis of models of academic mobility there points to a growth in the number of short- and long-term multidirectional movements in the social sciences, and in other domains as well. The social sciences do not have irreducible particularities. As in other research areas, brain drain in the social sciences is just one aspect of a wider process that is characterized by a generalization of exchanges both physical and virtual. In order to understand this process, more multidisciplinary comparative and qualitative research will be necessary at the continental level.☺

1. Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama and Peru among others have set up repatriation and reintegration programmes for qualified individuals. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela have developed networks for talented individuals.

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Chapter 3

Brain drain and brain circulation in South Asia

Binod Khadria

Neither the debate nor the literature on brain drain and brain circulation has paid much attention to the question of how the shift from source-country determinants of migration to destination-country determinants impacts on social science research capability in South Asian countries. There is not enough data available. However, one significant point worth considering is how the shifts in the global labour market have distorted the educational and career choices of tertiary-level students in South Asian countries.

A little over forty years ago, the *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* (1968) carried an entry on 'migration' by Brinley Thomas. He wrote, 'The political, economic, and racial configuration of the US today is very much the outcome of three transoceanic migrations – the Pilgrim Fathers and their successors, the slaves from Africa, and European masses in the twentieth century.' Immediately thereafter, following the 1968 implementation of the landmark 1965 Amendments to the US Immigration and Nationality Act, a fourth wave of developing-country-born 'knowledge workers' began, which was the brain drain of the late twentieth century.

India, the largest country of the Indian subcontinent, which comprises the whole of South Asia, has contributed noticeably to the migration of social scientists – supposedly led by economists – to the USA. The following passage by Bryant Robey, cited in the *Immigration and Naturalization Service Yearbook 1990*, bears testimony to this:

> *America's immigrants… are not what they used to be.*
> *The farmers and laborers from Ireland and Italy*
> *who flocked to the shores*
> *early in the century have grown old.*
> *In their wake are physicians from the Philippines,*
> *economists from India,*
> *and entrepreneurs from Korea.*

By the end of the twentieth century even this picture became passé. These immigrants were replaced by a fifth wave of migrants from India: the IT professionals endowed with generic information technology skills. The high-skill exodus from India and also from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (the other major South Asian source countries) to the OECD countries is undergoing a silent change.

Although 80 per cent of highly qualified migrants from India have continued to choose the USA as their ultimate destination for more than a decade – as have most migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – Canada is the second choice in North America and a route to the USA. The post-9/11 restrictions on immigration to the USA have made a few EU countries preferred destinations, with the UK regaining some of its lost ground. Australia and New Zealand attract South Asians to the Pacific region.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, hordes of Indian IT professionals returned home when the IT bubble burst in the wake of the American recession. They were eventually absorbed by the emergence of business process outsourcing (BPO), which triggered a wave of return migration. However, unexpected events such as the present global meltdown, which caused a panic of layoffs in the BPO sector in India, bring into question the sustainability of return migration to India. The financial crisis of 2008 onwards could even trigger aspirations that might drive fresh waves of emigration from South Asia.

Underlying these transitions and counter-transitions, there has been a consistent shift from source-country determinants of migration to destination-country determinants. In the twenty-first century, migration flows could become compellingly demand-driven and worker-seeking due to the OECD's requirement for workers. This contrasts with South Asia's oversupply of workers during most of the twentieth century, which made its migration supply-driven and work-seeking. As a result, the migration of the highly skilled from these South Asian countries tends to be thought of as a one-sided game of loss or gain. It is seen as an exodus in the twentieth century which is later transformed into brain circulation when the migrants return

temporarily and then re-migrate, or a brain gain when they return permanently and stay in the home country in the twenty-first century.

Neither the debate nor the literature has paid much attention to the question of how these shifts impact on social science research capability in South Asian countries. There is simply not enough data available. However, one significant point worth considering is how the shifts in the global labour market have distorted the educational and career choices of tertiary-level students in South Asian countries. There is a visible move away from the social sciences (and to a lesser extent even from natural sciences) towards commerce, computer science and management-related studies beyond school level. This shift has been visible in the enrolment of school-leaving students, who, at the college level, have to choose one of three streams: arts, science or commerce. Colleges advertise the number of vacant places that remain unfilled in sciences and social sciences after certain cut-off dates.

The collective ranking of choices has also altered in line with this trend. Foreign universities hold regular education fairs to enrol potential students, while multinational firms fund placement cells and carry out campus visits to recruit trainees and entry-level managers. These attract students with the high salaries available on the global labour market. This gives rise to a silent brain drain of potential social scientists. It involves the diversion of individuals to alternative education specializations even before they arrive at university, thus eroding the social science research capacity of these countries of origin.

At the macro level, the push and the pull factor stereotypes have not necessarily been the true drivers of the transitions and counter-transitions between brain drain and brain gain in South Asian countries. Instead, the main factors steering highly skilled people's future migration need to be identified. Furthermore, these factors need to be grouped in a generic classification based on what I would like to call an 'economics of strategic interests', which replaces the traditional 'economics of cost–benefit analysis'. I have

grouped the strategic variables into three generic types: Age, Wage and Vintage.

The first, Age, involves neutralizing changes in age structure. This is being achieved in destination countries by attracting younger cohorts of temporary migrants, who replace the older cohorts that are sent back home.

Wage refers to the comparative advantage gained or lost by the country of destination or origin through the younger migrants being more cost-effective as they receive lower wages, perks and pensions, while the older returnees add to the cost of production.

Vintage implies the accumulation or loss of state-of-the-art know-how and skills occurring in the countries of destination or origin respectively. These skills are embodied in the younger generations of tertiary-level student migrants with their access to the latest curricula.

Given these emerging scenarios, there could be an interesting array of social science research in South Asia on the subject. Surveys on various Indian Institutes of Technology suggest that the opportunity of jobs or study abroad influences the kind of studies that people undertake at the undergraduate level. This may affect social science research in South Asia up to the doctoral level, given that 65 per cent of the costs of tertiary education abroad that families bear need to be recouped once the students enter the labour market after their graduation.

Practically speaking, innovations in South–South co-operation can also further the overall social science research capacity of South Asian countries. Intra-South Asian cooperation in social science research can be fostered by migration and dual citizenship for South Asians in other Southern countries such as Brazil, China and South Africa. One prerequisite for such innovation would be for the countries to abandon their 'stereotype cocoons of sovereignty' and think about alternative forms of transnationality. The outcome of the 2009 G-20 summit at Pittsburgh could be indicative of progress in this area.☺

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Chapter 3

Rethinking the brain drain in the Philippines

Virginia A. Miralao

It was in the mid-1960s that brain drain came to be regarded as costly for the Philippines. It was seen to be draining human resources at a critical stage in the country's development, and wasting precious public investment in education and in citizens' skills formation. But evidence on the brain drain shows that it was less important, and for the social sciences in particular, than the public's perception of the phenomenon might suggest.

Concerns about the brain drain in the Philippines grew from the mid-1960s under the joint impact of new immigration policies in countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia, which opened their doors to highly skilled immigrants, and the imposition of martial law in the Philippines in 1972. The term 'Philippine diaspora' is used to describe the resulting outflow, estimated to stand presently at 8 to 9 million workers (or some 10 percent of the overall population) spread across more than 190 countries on all the continents.

Early concerns over brain drain

It was in the mid-1960s that brain drain came to be regarded as costly for the Philippines. It was seen to be draining human resources at a critical stage in the country's development, and wasting precious public investment in education and in citizens' skills formation. But evidence on the brain drain in the 1960s and in the next two or three decades shows that the brain drain was less important for the country as a whole, and for the Philippine social sciences in particular, than the public's perception of the phenomenon might suggest. Data is scarce on the number of experts living abroad. A 1967 study by the Institute of Philippine Culture concluded that the brain drain represented less than 18 percent of college graduates who went abroad to study, and was not causing a 'critical loss of personnel'. There are reasons to believe that at that time, the brain drain in the social sciences may have been even lower than these overall national estimates.

A 1987 paper by the Research Institute for Mindanao Culture identified the main constraints on the development of the social sciences as lying in insufficient capacity, low salaries, and inadequate libraries and research facilities, particularly in universities outside Metro Manila.

In the following decades, the shift in global labour market demand towards higher skilled and talented workers meant an increase in what is conventionally thought of as the brain drain, including in the social sciences. Although the statistics maintained by various government agencies do not provide sufficient information on the qualifications of migrants and do not allow good estimates of recent brain flows, many developments in the country's migration environment tend to negate the basic assumptions and interpretations of the brain drain.

Reinterpretation of brain drain in the 1990s

The first such development is the temporary nature of much contemporary migration. Most foreign fellowship programmes employ moral persuasion, or require a return-service contract, which helps ensure that foreign study fellowships lead to a 'brain gain'. A second development has to do with the responsiveness of Philippine colleges and universities to the demands of the global labour market. They are skilled at producing precisely the graduates whom other countries need. The brain drain assumption that outflows of skills and expertise create persistent local labour shortages seems even less true today than before. A third, related development has been the absence of a large domestic employment demand for the country's university graduates, and the role of the state in brokering their hiring and employment in countries where the demand for professional labour is high. Critics of government may find the state policy tantamount to encouraging a brain drain, but other groups may regard it as sound in terms of higher remittances and the possible transfers of knowledge via Filipinos returning from abroad. A fourth development has to do with the late return of known scholars who were studying abroad during the declaration of martial

law or left because of it. A fifth development concerns the growing number of Filipino professionals who divide their professional time and practice between their country of destination and the Philippines. And finally, we cannot ignore the role of associations such as the Philippine–American Academy of Science and Engineering (PAASE) and the International Conference on Philippine Studies (ICOPHIL) in developing exchanges. Quite a number of these exchanges result in collaborative research or projects between expatriate academics and their colleagues in the homeland. All these developments demonstrate how cross-border movements can potentially translate into a brain gain for the Philippines.

To conclude: contrary to the earlier talk of the Philippines' brain drain losses due to emigration, there is increasing reference today to the country's 'diasporic dividends', from remittances as well as from brain drain and gains. However, attempts to analyse and understand the evolving nature and consequences of Philippine social scientists' overseas migration are hampered by a lack of data. Filipino social scientists can lend their expertise to efforts to improve the country's migration databases and to research the many different impacts that the migration of highly skilled scientists, and specifically social scientists, have on research and development.◡

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3.4 Overcoming the capacity divide

Introduction

This section analyses strategies developed to overcome the capacity divide in large as well as in smaller countries. Different countries have used different strategies to build research capacity. Some common features include sending students abroad while capacity is built locally in selected universities, and providing support for institutions and researchers through a range of different networks.

If growing numbers of departments, Ph.D. graduates and publications are meaningful indicators of research capacity, Brazil and China are two cases of large countries that have succeeded in bolstering research capacity in social sciences. A comprehensive and well-resourced long-term policy, involving the implementation of postgraduate degrees in top-level universities, scholarships for studying abroad, programmes aiming at repatriating students with a degree from a foreign university, international fellowships allowing professors to spend sabbatical leave in foreign universities, as well as incentives to publish in international peer-reviewed journals, has been crucial in achieving this success in Brazil (Gusmão). In China a comparable voluntaristic policy was associated with a late 1970s change in economic policy in response to the social challenges then developing.

But small countries can also develop and sustain research capacity. Palestinian capacity in social science was built by training students abroad in some of the best universities and maintaining a vibrant community of researchers around the world. The diasporas and the internationalization of social science production explain the quality of Palestinian universities and research centres.

Other strategies, which are not referred to in the following papers, have to do with the new forms of distance education, such as e-learning and collaborative tools in digital social sciences. One such initiative built on new web technologies is provided by New Zealand's Building Research Capability in the Social Sciences (BRCSS) project, which is designed to increase inter-university collaboration by the use of audio-visual technologies (Peace, in Chapter 2).

Networking is another crucial component in developing capacity in social sciences. Several regional networks aim at promoting research and disseminating knowledge, drawing on some regional traditions of scholarship (Olukoshi; see also Shami and Elgeziri; Cimadamore; Beaton). Different networks of this kind exist in Africa, supported by international agencies. Regional initiatives aimed at improving research capacities in social sciences range from training and mentoring programmes to the production of joint teaching materials, enhancing connectivity and collaborations involving diaspora and local social scientists. Networks in the European Union play a similar role in enhancing collaboration between social scientists from Europe and other regions. National, regional or international disciplinary associations contribute similarly to the circulation of ideas and knowledge.

As Olukoshi makes clear, such networks and initiatives can only be successful if universities are strengthened.☙

Development of research capacities in the social sciences in Brazil

Regina Gusmão

The number of students in Masters and doctoral programmes at Brazilian universities has increased more than tenfold and the number of Masters and doctoral degrees granted per year nearly tripled in the past 10 years. Whereas the number of doctorates conferred in Brazil in the late 1980s had only been 3 per cent of those conferred in the USA, in 2005 Brazil was among the top ten countries in the world with regard to the number of Ph.Ds conferred.

The current structure of the Brazilian science, technology and innovation (ST&I) system is relatively new. Most of the higher education and research institutes now in existence, as well as most of the funding agencies, have emerged since the 1950s. Only in the mid-1980s did a complex, multi-institutional, consolidated structure begin to take shape; one capable of performing the tasks of coordinating, implementing and promoting government activities in the sphere of ST&I.

The systematic financing of ST&I dates back to 1951 and the creation of two federal agencies: the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and the Ministry of Education's executive agency for higher education training (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, CAPES) dedicated respectively to fostering scientific and technological research and to preparing human resources to undertake such research. In 1967, the National ST&I System was consolidated into the National Innovation Agency (FINEP), which stimulates innovation in both the academic and the productive sector and currently serves as the executive organ of the National Fund for Scientific & Technological Development (FNDCT).

In Brazil, the public sector has historically been the primary source of financing for ST&I. Since their foundation, CNPq, CAPES and FINEP have played key roles in creating and maintaining the country's research infrastructure. All three federal agencies work in close cooperation with the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT), which is responsible for defining national policy in conjunction with other ministries. These federal efforts are complemented by state efforts, especially in the more developed regions of South-east and southern Brazil, which have come to assume an increasingly important role in financing the sector (Landi and Gusmão, 2005).

Within this context over the past two decades, the stock of human ST&I resources has risen dramatically. The number of students in Masters and doctoral programmes at Brazilian universities has increased more than tenfold and the number of Masters and doctoral degrees granted per year nearly tripled in the past ten years, with a total of 33,360 M.As and 10,711 Ph.Ds conferred in all disciplines in 2008. Whereas the number of doctorates conferred in Brazil in the late 1980s had only been 3 per cent of those conferred in the USA – the world leader in this respect – this figure had risen to 21 per cent in 2005. In that year Brazil was among the ten top countries in the world with regard to the number of Ph.Ds conferred (Viotti, 2008).

The social sciences[1] currently account for 33 per cent of students working towards their Master's degrees and 26 per cent of those studying for doctoral degrees. The number of doctorates granted in these areas had climbed to 2,730 by 2008; this is more than three times the 1998 figure. Among the social science disciplines, education stands out (with about 660 Ph.Ds, or 24 per cent of the total), distantly followed by history, psychology, sociology and law (approximately 270 doctorates each). In the same period, the number of university professors at the postgraduate level in Brazil nearly doubled, reaching

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1. In accordance with the source consulted, the social sciences are taken to include the so-called applied social sciences (administration, architecture and urbanism, urban planning, information sciences, communications, law, demography, economics, social services and tourism) and the humanities (anthropology, archaeology, political science, education, philosophy, geography, history, psychology, sociology and theology). Note that languages, literature and the arts are not included in the universe covered by the analysis (CAPES, Higher Education Information System. See: http://www.capes.gov.br/estatisticas).

47,500[2] in 2008; of these, 25 per cent (approximately 12,000) were in the social sciences.

In sum, thanks to the government having strengthened its efforts and investments in human resource development, the number of researchers in the social sciences nearly tripled in the 2000s. They now represent approximately 32 per cent of the researchers engaged in the national higher education and research system, or 37,500 from a total of 118,000.[3]

Evolution of Brazilian policy for the training of human resources and the enhancement of research capacity in the social sciences

The nationalistic ideal of turning Brazil into a world power – widely supported at the height of the military regime in the early 1970s – led the government to align its efforts with those of the scientific community to modernize the Brazilian university system and the national scientific and technological sector. The result was the definition of policies that had transformational effects. The large volume of resources made available through the new government funding agencies (CAPES, CNPq and FINEP) made it possible to professionalize the university system by allowing the full-time, exclusive dedication of teaching staff, as well as the implementation of a consistent postgraduate policy. The evolution of this policy is directly associated with the development of the National Postgraduate Programmes (PNPG) adopted in 1974 (Hostins, 2006).[4]

The objective of the First PNPG (for the period 1975–1979), which was linked to the First National Development Plan, was to structure the national postgraduate system and institutionalize it within the sphere of the university system, thus guaranteeing stable financing. Its outstanding features included the training of university professors, and an increase in the number of Masters and doctoral programmes and in the number of places on these programmes. In the Second PNPG (1982–1985), the emphasis was on the quality of higher education. The expansionist goals of the first plan gave way to the institutionalization of the system, which provided a framework for monitoring and evaluating programmes. Only in the Third PNPG (1986–1989) were postgraduate programmes first considered as being integrally linked to academic research activities. The Third PNPG therefore contained measures aimed at

strengthening the ties between the academic community, the national ST&I system and the productive sector. During the preparation of the Fourth PNPG, which for various reasons was never published (Hostins, 2006), discussion was focused on the need to diversify the model and incorporate professional training courses. Finally, the Fifth PNPG (2005–2010) proposes expansion of the system along four lines:

- the training of teachers for all educational levels, including basic education

- the training of staff and specialized professionals for non-academic markets

- networking to offset regional disequilibria in the supply of postgraduate courses and to meet the demands of new areas of knowledge

- stimulating universities to cooperate at the international level, including capturing resources from international agencies (CAPES, 2004).

In brief, the Brazilian postgraduate policy was from the outset based on an effective medium and long-term policy and planning guided by a strategic perspective and maintained by different governments. This approach appears to have been fruitful, as indicated by the results presented in the sections that follow.

Creation and expansion of postgraduate programmes

Whereas there were only 57 doctoral programmes in Brazil in 1970, there were more than 300 in 1985, in addition to approximately 800 at the Masters level. By 2008, the total number of Masters and doctoral programmes had risen to 2,568,[5] of which 54 per cent were federal, 26 per cent were state or municipal and 20 per cent were private. In social science, the number of postgraduate programmes has risen to 692, a figure 2.4 times higher than in 1998. However, 70 per cent are still offered at universities in the south and south-east of the country. At the doctoral level, this regional concentration is even more evident, with 53 per cent of the current 295 programmes in social science offered at universities located in only three of the 27 Brazilian states, all of which are in the south-east: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais.

Recently, efforts have been made to decentralize post-graduate education in the direction of the less-favoured regions of the country. These efforts have proven effective:

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2. Including permanent, visiting and contributing professors.
3. Data from CNPQ, Diretório Grupos de Pesquisa-Censo 2008 (see http://dgp.CNPQ.br/censos).
4. Hostins (2006) presents an interesting and complete analysis of the various plans formulated since the mid-1970s, as well as of their impact on the Brazilian postgraduate system.

5. This figure includes Masters, professional Masters and doctoral programmes in all disciplines. Data from CAPES, GeoCapes Portal (see http://www.capes.gov.br/estatisticas).

whereas more than 90 per cent of the Ph.Ds were granted in the south-east in 1998, the figure, though still high, had dropped to 69 per cent by 2008.

In Brazil, as in most Latin American countries, the postgraduate system remains essentially public. However, the number of programmes at private universities (mainly at the Masters level) has risen sharply in recent years. In the social sciences, these institutions now grant 35 per cent of all the Masters and doctoral degrees, with a significant concentration in three areas: administration, law and education.

Since the 1980s, Brazil has systematically evaluated the postgraduate programmes offered in the country. This has significantly contributed to raising the quality of the courses offered and strengthening the institutions involved. In addition, this evaluation has provided inputs for the selection of candidates and the distribution of postgraduate grants. Programme evaluations – rated on a scale from 1 to 7 – are conducted every three years according to the system set up and operated by CAPES. Furthermore, the evaluations are based primarily on the scientific output of the programmes' teaching staff, researchers and students. Programmes assigned ratings of 6 or 7 offer doctorates of excellent quality, equal to the degrees conferred by the most important centres of learning and research in the world, and are characterized by high levels of insertion into the international community. Conversely, programmes attributed ratings of 1 or 2 perform poorly, failing to meet the minimum standards required.[6] Under the terms of the legislation now in effect, programmes assigned ratings of 3 or higher will continue to be officially recognized by the National Council of Education for the next three-year period, but those receiving lower ratings will not.

In 2008, 17 per cent of the doctoral programmes in the social sciences received ratings of 6 or higher, and 58 per cent received ratings of 5 or higher. At the other end of the scale, only 2 per cent were assigned ratings of 3 or lower, whereas 10 per cent had been assigned such ratings in 1998.

The outcomes of a bold grant policy

The social sciences have traditionally received less funding from the federal agencies than other subjects. However, the situation regarding postgraduate grants, which are

offered directly to the approved candidates, began to change in the late 1970s and was wholly revised in the years that followed.

Of the grants for postgraduate studies offered by CNPQ in 1980, the social sciences received only 11 per cent for Masters studies and 13 per cent for doctoral studies. By 1991, the corresponding figures had risen to 34 and 25 per cent respectively. The other agency, CAPES, already directed 39 per cent of its grants for Masters studies and 32 per cent for doctoral studies to social science in the period 1980 to 1984 (Velho, 1997).

From 1998 to 2008, the number of grants offered by the two agencies for Masters, doctoral and postdoctoral studies in all areas increased by an average of 82 per cent (from approximately 33,000 to around 60,000 per year).[7] With respect to the social sciences, the number rose by 40 per cent over the brief period 2003 to 2008 to approximately 13,000 per year, 22 per cent of the total for all areas.

Sending students and professors abroad

The Brazilian policy on funding for research capacity development does not limit training to domestic programmes. Since the 1980s, major efforts have been made to send students abroad to study at different academic levels and in numerous fields of knowledge. During the 2000s, the number of grants the two agencies offer for postgraduate studies abroad rose by 75 per cent, from 2,100 in 1998 to 3,700 in 2008, with increasing emphasis on the postdoctoral level in recent years. In 2008 alone, 1,100 grants were granted to study social sciences abroad, mainly in France, the USA, Spain and the UK.

In the late 1990s, the scholarship grants for doctoral studies abroad also took the form of a sandwich programme, which allowed Brazilian Ph.D. students to take advantage of a more comprehensive cross-fertilization. These grants lasted from four to twelve months, with mandatory periods in Brazil before and after the period abroad, hence the 'sandwich'. The grantees have the status of visiting research scholars under the supervision of local researchers. Since 2005, the number of grants offered in sandwich programmes is higher than the number of full Ph.D. grants, and the gap is widening. Opportunities for sabbatical leave abroad for professors supported financially by the government were also developed.

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6. Programmes rated 5 have a 'high level of performance', which is the highest rating for programmes that offer only Masters degrees. A rating of 4 indicates that the programme has a 'good performance', while a rating of 3 means it has an 'average performance', or meets the minimum standards required.

7. Data from Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT), Indicadores Nacionais de Ciência e Tecnologia (see http://www.mct.gov.br).

Chapter 3

Impact of the new policy on the organization and productivity of research in the social sciences

This growing investment in research infrastructure and research-oriented human resources in various fields of knowledge has had a strong impact on the organization, development and dissemination of research in the country. According to the biannual survey conducted by CNPq, the number of active research groups in Brazil has increased fivefold over the fifteen years to 2008.[8] Between 2000 and 2008, the number in the social sciences alone rose from 2,600 to nearly 7,000, which is 31 per cent of the total. Of all the social sciences, education, with its 1,710 research groups – more than twice the number surveyed in any of the other areas – has the leading position.

The expansion and diversification of the active research groups, as well as the incentives associated with a good rating, are among the factors that have contributed to the progressive rise in Brazilian researchers' productivity. Within a ten-year period, Brazil has become one of the countries in the world with the most scientific publications. According to the Thomson ISI database, the country moved from twenty-third position in 1999 to fifteenth in 2008. This is an increase of 8 per cent per year (Bound, 2008).

The Brazilian publications in the World of Science database are concentrated in the areas of agriculture, biology, Earth sciences and space sciences. In contrast, articles concerning the social sciences represented only 3 per cent of the national output between 1997 and 2006. Since approximately 32 per cent of the researchers in the country are in the social sciences, it can be concluded (as have various authors) that unlike their counterparts in the hard sciences, Brazilian social scientists have yet to follow the world trend of publishing articles in English in internationally indexed periodicals. They continue to disseminate the greater part of their works in the form of theses or books written in Portuguese, which are not included in the ISI database. Indeed according to national databases (CNPq, 2008), social sciences articles represented 27 per cent of all the articles published in national specialized periodicals in

8. This figure excludes active research groups in private enterprises (from CNPq, Diretório Grupos de Pesquisa-Censo 2008, http://dgp.CNPq.br/censos).

2008, but only 4 per cent of those published in periodicals with an international circulation. Social sciences did, however, account for 49 per cent of the academic books and 41 per cent of the book chapters produced in Brazil. In absolute terms, social sciences output has evolved quite positively, and articles in both national and international periodicals increased more than fourfold between 2000 and 2008.

New context, new challenges

Brazilian postgraduate policy has successfully contributed to the formation of a great number of well-qualified professionals in a wider range of fields than before. However, this expansion was not guided by a real appreciation of the labour market's demands – in terms of neither specialization nor the academic level demanded. In the past, the postgraduate programmes themselves absorbed almost all of the newly formed professionals, but this is no longer true.

A full understanding is yet to be gained of the employability of those who hold an M.A. or Ph.D. A recent pioneering study charts the key employment characteristics of those who received Ph.Ds in Brazil between 1996 and 2003 (Viotti, 2008). It shows on a preliminary basis that in 2004, 66 per cent of those who received Ph.Ds were employed at educational institutions, while another 18 per cent were in public administration, national defence or social security. Only 1.2 per cent were employed by the manufacturing industries. The study shows that holders of doctorates in the so-called 'applied social sciences' had higher rates of formal employment, as well as higher average wages than the others. According to Viotti (2008), this may indicate that the labour market most values individuals with doctorates in law, administration and economics. These are among the fields in which postgraduate programmes in Brazil, especially in private universities, have expanded most rapidly in recent years.

The target of the National Postgraduate Plan 2005–2010 (CAPES, 2004) is to award 16,000 Ph.Ds in 2010. However, for this goal to be achieved and to have truly positive and lasting effects, in-depth knowledge of job characteristics and of the sectoral demand for doctorates would be useful.⌣

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Flash
Building sociology in China

The introduction of sociological studies in China in the late nineteenth century stimulated thinkers in this country to explore groups and society in new terms and with methodologies previously unknown to them. Significant studies were made, but the many wars in the following decades hampered the development of sociology. Then the reorganization of disciplines and faculties three years after the 1949 revolution abolished sociology, deemed 'erroneous science'. From then until 1978, when the policy of economic reforms led to its reintroduction, research and teaching in sociology vanished from universities.

After that date, however, the chairman of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping, underscored the necessity to train sociologists again. The new challenges facing Chinese society, such as modernization, rural development, worker migrations and the relations between cities and rural regions, had given rise to a need for studies in social sciences. The rapid creation of the Chinese Association of Sociological Research and of the Institute of Sociology, both headed by senior sociologist Fei Xiaotong, allowed the organization of

workshops in sociology. The first three gathered a total of about 100 participants who attended lectures by scholars from the USA and Hong Kong. The new, voluntaristic, policy toward social sciences in the early 1980s also led to the opening of departments of sociology in universities (eleven would be opened by the end of the decade), and some graduate programmes.

Research produced during this phase focused on the challenges facing Chinese society, but suffered from theoretical and scientific deficiencies. These gaps were filled progressively, and sociology in China improved remarkably from the 1990s onward, fostered by international exchanges, the sending abroad of promising graduate students and participation in international scientific dialogue. China's research capacity in social sciences was expanded to the point that the country counted 159 departments of sociology in higher learning institutions in 2007, with close to 2 million students. Today Chinese sociology enjoys an international reputation of its own.✎

Flash
Developing social science capacity in Palestine

The first research on Palestine was conducted by Palestinian agencies located outside the Palestinian territory. Generally associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), these research centres began operating in the 1960s from Jordan, Lebanon and New York. They were mostly staffed by Palestinian refugees from the diaspora who had no physical access to Palestine. In 1967, the Israeli invasion of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip triggered the foundation of local Palestinian universities in both these territories. Since Palestinian youths could not travel to other Arab universities or have access to Israeli universities, six Palestinian universities were set up in the Occupied Territories in the 1970s.

The first Palestinian social scientists had generally received their secondary education in English during the British Mandate. Their command of English – as well as their relative wealth – enabled them to join US universities in the post-1948 period after the creation of Israel. A number of them were the first to staff social science departments in the newly founded Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza. Subsequent generations of Palestinian social scientists received their secondary education in the Occupied Territories before going on to graduate from foreign, mostly Western, universities. Since none of the

Palestinian universities had, and they still do not have, a Ph.D. programme in the social sciences, and since a Ph.D. is mandatory in order to hold a professorship, there has been a noticeable internationalization of Palestinian social scientists.

Ten social science departments or faculties, and numerous other research centres, currently operate within the Occupied Territories. In 2007, they employed 68 Ph.Ds in sociology, political science and anthropology. Of these, 60 hold a Ph.D. from a Western university and only 8 from other Arab countries. These figures point towards an early and resilient dynamic of internationalization within the social sciences thanks to associations with eminent international scientific institutions which have allowed local coercion to be bypassed.✎

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The contribution of social science networks to capacity development in Africa

Adebayo Olukoshi

The all-round expansion that characterized African higher education in general, and the social sciences in particular, during the 1960s was interrupted at the end of the 1970s as African countries began to slide into a prolonged economic crisis. This crisis, and the responses fashioned to deal with it, led to an unrelenting decline for the higher education system of most African countries which persisted for nearly thirty years. In the face of the multiple problems thus created for the social sciences, the role of social science networks became critical.

Historical retrospective

The first decade of African independence witnessed a massive public resource investment in the development of a higher education system which incorporated universities, polytechnics, and an assortment of specialized research and training institutions. But the pattern of rapid growth and all-round expansion that characterized African higher education in general, and the social sciences in particular, during the 1960s and most of the 1970s was interrupted at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s as African countries began to slide into a prolonged economic crisis. This crisis, and the responses fashioned to deal with it, led to an unrelenting decline for the higher education system of most African countries which persisted for nearly thirty years. These decades spanned the years from the early 1980s to date.

Any hope that the cuts which African governments introduced in higher education funding as part of their homegrown economic crisis management strategy would be short-lived was dashed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank's introduction of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. The thrust of these programmes was essentially deflationary, which meant that public expenditure continued to be squeezed and the higher education system was to be the worse for it. This was all the more so as the Bank encouraged a policy preference for basic education in Africa. Matters were not helped by acute shortages of foreign exchange, which saw imports of books and equipment virtually dry up. An inflationary spiral also took hold and real incomes collapsed as prices were decontrolled, national currencies were submitted to repeated rounds of devaluation, subsidies were removed and public-sector wages were frozen.

The decline of the African higher education systems

The collapse of African libraries and laboratories threatened the infrastructure of the higher education community, and led to the decay of the environment for learning and research. The decline in the quality of instruction was compounded by the collapse of the tutorial system which, in turn, was a fallout from the collapse of many universities' internal academic staff development programmes. Student unrest became frequent and increasingly violent. Many universities experienced 'blank years' during the course of the 1980s and 1990s, shutting down for prolonged periods, which resulted in the cancellation of entire academic sessions. Associational life on most university campuses and in most countries also suffered a sharp decline when disciplinary networks for staff and students could no longer be sustained. Likewise, local scholarly journals and other scientific outlets fell on bad times. The stage was set for an exodus of qualified personnel from the higher education system. This exodus was further spurred by concurrent outbreaks of political repression and civil war in many African countries at different times between the 1980s and the first few years of the new millennium.

Brain drain hits Africa severely

The brain drain from the African higher education system occurred in waves and consisted of different elements. In the first instance, there was an exodus of senior and mid-career nationals who, unable to cope with the unending crises in the national economy and the higher education system, or the outbreak of political violence and civil war in some countries, exercised a variety of options. A number of them simply left the system in order to enter the local private sector where they felt they could both exercise

their talents and earn a better income. Many went into the financial services sector, which was experiencing a mini-bubble on the back of the privatization and liberalization measures that governments had introduced as part of the IMF or World Bank market reform programmes. Others opted to remain in the public sector, but left the university system to take up senior political or administrative posts in government, especially against the backdrop of civil service reforms that were being carried out and the restoration of multi-party politics that was underway.

A further component of the brain drain from the higher education system, and perhaps the most serious aspect, comprised the senior and mid-career scholars who left to pursue their careers outside Africa. They took up positions in the USA, Europe, and even the Middle East and Australia. Estimates from a variety of sources have suggested that an average of 20,000 highly qualified professionals left Africa annually from 1990 onwards as part of the brain drain. Nigerian academics working at universities and colleges in the USA alone numbered about 10,000 at the dawn of the new millennium. During the course of the 1990s, it was estimated that 35 out of every 100 Africans sent to study abroad did not return to the continent, and the number was rising (IOM, 2005; Mutume, 2003; UN, 2002; Teferra, 2000).

The difficult conditions with which the academics who remained on the continent – either by deliberate choice or otherwise – had to grapple meant that they had no option but to augment their incomes from outside sources. Such strategies continue to be practised, but they are not always conducive to the pursuit of academic excellence or the development of a longitudinal research interest. Moonlighting and consultancy activities disconnected from scientific endeavour may have provided an income supplement, but they were also energy-sapping and distracting. The licensing of private universities, which had begun in earnest in the 1990s and which expanded massively in the new millennium, gave scholars opportunities to be mobile and even to advance their careers. However, these private universities resorted to offering permanent employees of public universities part-time contracts to act as the bulk of their teaching staff. This raised concerns that fee-charging institutions were continuing the erosion of higher education, as they did not seem prepared to invest in their own staff development.

The brain drain from the African higher education system affected all disciplines. But it is also arguable that the social sciences were particularly badly hit, for a variety of reasons.

Among these was an incentives system which encouraged universities to generate income through consultancy services and executive degree programmes that did not favour the social sciences and the humanities. In turn, this resulted in higher education administrators deciding to rationalize courses. This saw the closure of some academic departments and the merger of others. Disciplines such as history, archaeology, philosophy, linguistics and classics were endangered in many countries. It was and still is not uncommon to find universities where social science and humanities departments have no professorial-level staff and are led by junior researchers, who sometimes only hold a Masters degree or have just obtained a doctorate.

The role of social science research networks

In the face of the multiple problems created for the social sciences by the brain drain in the higher education system, the role of social science networks became critical. This was especially true of those operating on a pan-African scale. The most prominent of these networks are CODESRIA in Dakar, the African Association of Universities (AAU) in Accra, the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) in Addis Ababa, and, to a lesser degree, the Kampala-based Centre for Basic Research (CBR), and the Africa–Arab Research Centre in Cairo. The African Association of Political Science (AAPS) in Harare and Pretoria and the Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust, which were active through the 1980s into the 1990s before they experienced a decline, must be added to these. Most of these networks were established to serve as sites and fora for the production and dissemination of advanced research knowledge, drawing on the best traditions of scholarship available on the African continent.

The regional social science networks also felt the effects of the discipline crises and the dearth of experienced scholars as the brain drain took its toll. The vitality of the regional networks and the kinds of activities they felt they could perform reflected the disciplines' state of health and the quality and experience of the researchers at the national and campus levels. In the 1980s, with senior and experienced staff leaving the higher education system in increasing numbers and the quality of instruction and training declining, it became clear that these regional networks could not presume that those who participated in their programmes were sufficiently drilled in the basic rules of scholarship to contribute effectively to their missions. This necessitated a revamping of the

programmes and activities of these networks to take cognizance of the changed context of research and training in African higher education.

The reform of these regional social science networks was designed to achieve a multiplicity of objectives. These centred on the upgrading of the skills of a new and inexperienced generation of scholars graduating from African universities and taking up positions, and were intended to keep the system running against a variety of odds. Embracing this new generation called for new approaches to research networking and knowledge production which took full cognizance of the conditions under which they had been trained and the circumstances in which they tried to work. It was a redefinition of strategy that focused on training in research skills, the creation of networking opportunities, the building of longitudinal research cultures, and the facilitation of interaction within and across various boundaries, whether national, disciplinary, gender, generational or linguistic. These were roles that the social science research networks assumed on an increasing scale from the mid-1980s onwards.

Key roles in capacity development and enhancement which the regional social science research networks have promoted since the mid-1980s have included:

■ supporting the mobility of African scholars within and outside their countries and campuses in a period of crisis

■ the promotion of multidisciplinary networking among African scholars

■ the provision of refresher training, particularly in quantitative, qualitative and comparative research methods and scholarly writing and publishing skills

■ the production of refereed journals that offer credible outlets for the publication of research findings

■ the financing of senior scholars to produce textbooks that could be used in teaching across the continent

■ the organization of a range of mentorship programmes targeted at younger scholars with an interest in remaining in the university system

■ the facilitation of scholar exchange programmes and individual fellowships whose recipients could spend dedicated time undertaking research projects or as understudies to an outstanding scholar

■ the organization of summer schools on social research themes that cover a range of conceptual and empirical concerns

■ the funding of field research and thesis writing for advanced postgraduates in African universities

■ the mobilization of diaspora African social scientists in local and regional initiatives designed to mentor and support junior scholars, rebuild library collections, teach core courses in visitors' programmes, and network senior scholars internationally.

These regional social science networks are critical for the generation of African researchers born and nurtured in the years of economic crisis and decay in the higher education system. And yet, the networks also understand that their role can only be a supportive one, complementing what must remain the duty of the quintessential university: offering high-quality instruction in a stimulating environment that enables students and staff to build and renew and enhance their capacities. This means that the struggle for the restoration of the African universities must continue. They are the essential element in long-term capacity development. It is in the strength and vitality of the universities that the social science networks will ultimately find the energy to make a decisive and targeted difference.☺

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Chapter 3