New Keywords

A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society

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In later histories, the values invested in the home have been creatively reworked in the process of being translated from their C19 Euro-American white and middle-class origins across a range of class and racial divides. The home, and women's place within it, played an important role in nurturing the development of Indian nationalism as an inner sanctum in which a distinctive culture and identity were preserved from violation by the colonizer. ''In the world, imitation of and adaptation to Western norms was a necessity; at home they were tantamount to annihilation of one's very identity'' (Chatterjee, 1993: 121). Home often played the same role in histories of slavery and racial oppression: ''one's homeplace was the one site where one could freely confront the issues of humanization, where one could resist'' (hooks, 1990b: 42).

The ambiguity of the values that are attached to the place of home are evident in the literature that has emerged in the context of feminist, gay, and lesbian critiques. Donna Haraway summarizes how home values are now contested:

> *Home*: Women-headed households, serial monogamy, flight of men, old women alone, technology of domestic work, paid homework, re-emergence of home sweat shops, home-based businesses and telecommuting, electronic cottage, urban homelessness, migration, module architecture, reinforced (simulated) nuclear family, intense domestic violence. (Haraway, 1985: 194)

Yet home can also remain a haven in a heartless world, a place to which the true self can retreat and find expression: ''not ever being *your whole self* except obviously *in the home*'' (Stacey, English lesbian, *cit*. Johnson and Valentine, 1995: 108).

The relations between home – whether understood as place of domicile, hometown, or home country – rest, settlement, belonging, and movement are also being revised in light of new ways of living associated with increased labor mobility and migration. In place of home as ''a fixed point in space, a firm position from which we 'proceed' . . . and to which we return'' (Heller, 1981: 239), new uses (home as ''a mobile, symbolic habitat, a performative way of life and of doing things in which one makes one's home while in movement [Morley, 2000: 47]), encompass a broader and more fluid set of relationships between traveling and dwelling.

Tony Bennett

See: ***COUNTRY, NATION, PRIVATE, PUBLIC.***

Human

Human evolved in English from *humay* and *humain*, and was distinguished from the later *humane* in the eC18. In common English usage it designates members (**human beings**) of a specific race (the **human race**) or species (collectively referred to as

humanity), or refers to the characteristics of the race. Hence, it marks or distinguishes **the human** from other creatures and things, often ''lower'' animals, machinery, and objects. Evaluating the significance of this designation has been a complex matter which has spawned considerable controversy, as well as derivative terms.

When ''nature'' is attached to the adjective ''human,'' the attribution of characteristics may take on further significance. In everyday usage, labeling any activity or trait as a matter of **human nature** may simply be a shorthand way of indicating empathy (implying that it is understandable), but it may also indicate that it is inevitable or unchangeable, and/or beyond reproach. While terms such as ''instinctive'' and ''innate'' may indicate essential characteristics, it is not always clear that these are distinctly human. Moreover, there has been considerable philosophical and political debate about whether human traits and capacities are given by nature or evolve in culture (sometimes framed as ''nature vs. nurture'' or ''nature vs. culture''). There has been much controversy in modern Western societies both about whether there are ''species-typical characteristics shared by all human beings qua human beings'' (Fukuyama, 2002: 101) constituting human nature and, if such characteristics exist, about what they might be.

The invocation of the term ''human'' in descriptions can be evaluative, alluding to the best characteristics of the human race, often linked to virtues such as decency or to understanding or rationality. The related and original substitute term ''humane'' denotes benevolence or compassion. Strikingly, in the contemporary context, the label ''human'' may also be used empathetically to suggest limitation, vulnerability, and weakness, as in **he's *only* human** and **we are all human** in commentaries about failure, weakness, or misbehavior. The prefixes ''sub-'' and ''super-'' attached to ''human'' may be a further way of designating standards and achievement. **Subhuman** pertains to situations or conditions considered unfitting or demeaning for human beings. **Superhuman** refers to some activity which is seen as extraordinary or transcending normal human capacities (as in ''superhuman effort''). **Humanitarian** implies an activity, person, or institution contributing to collective **human welfare**. However, its currency has come into some disrepute because of skepticism about the benevolence of some interventions so labeled. **Humanist** may be a synonym for humanitarian, although it may also refer to someone who is a student of human affairs or who pursues the studies of the **humanities.** Moral reprobation, in turn, can be registered through related negative nomenclature – **inhuman** and **inhumanity**. A less judgmental but more specific employment of the term ''human'' implies personal, subjective or individual appeal, as in **human interest**: this is used to identify a particular style of storytelling or presentation of information, especially in media news coverage.

Humanism (in its various manifestations) constitutes one of the most enduring answers to the question: what is the human position in the world? Its origins can be traced to a philosophical and literary movement which emerged in lC14 Italy, revolving around the recovery and rehabilitation of classical Gk and L texts and the reforming of education accordingly. This movement was the mainspring of the European Renaissance. The coining

of the term **humanism** (meaning education based on the Gk and L classics) is attributed to the eC19 German educator F. J. Niethammer (Monfasani, 1998: 533). The related term ''humanities'' is now used to refer not as originally to this classical program of study, but to a broad range of learning and literature (including languages, history, and literature) and related educational programs. Meanwhile, the predominant contemporary usage of the term ''humanism'' is more generalized, denoting a focus on human agents as the dominant and central actors in the world. Thus, **Renaissance humanism** was an early phase in a much more long-term prioritization of the place and role of human beings in the world order, which sustained the Enlightenment and continued to be influential from the C19 to the eC21 in the West.

Humanism originally constituted a secular realignment, asserting both the significance of humanity rather than God and the human domination of nature. However, power relations among **humans** became increasingly important within this tradition, and since the lC18 the concept of **human rights** has been crucial in political struggles and negotiations in the Western world. The term registers a set of conditions for social and political life that are regarded as universally applicable. *The rights of man* (Paine, 1969 [1791]) articulated this, but the gender specificity of the referent (''man'') and the appearance hot on its heels of Mary Wollstonecraft's *A vindication of the rights of woman* (1975 [1792]) indicated problems around the claims to universalism embedded in the concept of human rights. Various emancipatory struggles – including C19 anti-slavery protest; C19 and C20 suffrage struggles; the campaigns for political, social, and legal rights for women, blacks, homosexuals, and indigenous populations; and campaigns against colonialist regimes in the C19 and C20 – are frequently characterized today as **human rights campaigns**. The United Nations' *Declaration of human rights* (1948) is the key C20 document which attempted to establish a universal legal and political framework for conceptualizing rights, a framework within which professional organizations,such as Amnesty International later characterized their transnational activities as human rights work.

Between the lC18 and the lC20, challenges (in the form of social protests and movements, as well as philosophical critiques) to social injustice were often launched in the name of humanism, to realize human rights for specific groups and individuals. Nevertheless, some critics have been suspicious of the patterns of differentiation and hierarchization associated with humanism. For example, Simone de Beauvoir's 1949 *Second sex* (1973) ''pioneered feminist scrutiny of the credentials of humanism'' (Elliot, 1996: 249). She and other critics have argued that the human – the autonomous rational actor instantiated by humanism, and often referred to as ''the liberal subject'' – is highly specific and that humanism is oriented toward the interests of white, bourgeois, European men. In the lC20, generalized unease about humanism was intensified and honed with reference to poststructuralism and postmodernism, feminist and postcolonial theory, the intensification of ecological concerns, and developments in biomedical and information technology. In different ways each of these movements or developments raised questions about the category ''human.'' This included

questioning ''master narratives about humanity'' (Halberstam and Livingston, 1995: 4), asking whether humans could or should dominate the natural world, and wondering about the distinctions between humans and other creatures and entities.

In the lC20 challenges to humanism and to assumptions about the human subject sometimes coalesced around the concept of **posthumanism** and its affiliated terms – **posthumanist**, **posthuman**, and **posthumanity**. These terms may denote stances and orientations against humanism. They may also suggest conditions of existence in a world in which humanism is no longer the dominant worldview. However, they sometimes more specifically designate technological capacities which are seen to transcend human abilities and potential. In these different senses, the posthuman is a substitute figure who operates outside the parameters of human existence.

The term ''posthuman'' is sometimes used very specifically to designate particular technological developments and their consequences (Fukuyama, 2002). Developments in technology, of which artificial intelligence, cybernetics, neuropharmacology, xenotransplanation, cloning, nanotechnology, genetic manipulation, robotics, prosthetics, and neural-computer integration are only some instances, have been crucial in this regard. However, **transhuman** and **transhumanism** are more specific labels adopted by researchers who use new technology in explicit attempts to transcend human life and form.

Thus, posthumanism involves reassessment and reconceptualization of the significance of the designation ''human.'' The coining of this term in the lC20 signals a break from and, some would claim , even a transcendence of humanist frameworks. Posthumanism indicates a shift in orientation toward human relations with **non-humans**, particularly other animate beings (especially animals) and machines. Associated with this term are questions about the power, autonomy, distinctiveness, and identity of the human and about the desire to ''absolutize the difference between the human and the nonhuman'' (Halberstam and Livingston, 1995: 10).

It may be too sweeping to claim that ''people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines'' (Haraway, 1991: 294), not least because concerted defenses of humanism have been mounted (Fukuyama, 2002). Nevertheless, since the lC20, demarcation and differentiation of the human figure have become more difficult with the common use of medical technologies such as pace-makers, personality-transforming drugs, and the transfer of organs and genes across species. Technology, however, has not been the only avenue for the exploration of the ''joint kinship'' to which Haraway alludes, or the only site associated with posthumanism. In Western film and fiction of the lC20 and eC21 there has been a proliferation of figures (monsters, vampires, chimeras, cyborgs) which transcend or disturb the boundaries between humans and other creatures or machines (Hayles, 1999).

Maureen McNeil

See: ***BODY, CULTURE, ENVIRONMENT/ECOLOGY, GENDER, HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, RACE.***

Identity

Identity is to do with the imagined sameness of a person or of a social group at all times and in all circumstances; about a person or a group being, and being able to continue to be, itself and not someone or something else. Identity may be regarded as a fiction, intended to put an orderly pattern and narrative on the actual complexity and multitudinous nature of both psychological and social worlds. The question of identity centers on the assertion of principles of unity, as opposed to pluralism and diversity, and of continuity, as opposed to change and transformation.

In one respect, what is at issue is the cultivation and valuation of self-hood and **personal identity**, with a concern for the sameness and continuity of the individual. Interestingly, the OED shows the first uses of the concept of identity with respect to the individual to occur only in the C17. At this time, there came into existence what Stuart Hall calls the ''Enlightenment subject,'' based on ''the conception of the human person as a fully centered, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action . . . The essential center of the self was a person's identity'' (S. Hall, 1992b: 275).

The principle of rationality, the idea of personal identity as ''the Sameness of a rational being'' (Locke, 1690), has been attenuated through the C19 and C20, and the autobiographical self has tended to become organized around a range of other more cultural attributes, such as character, personality, experience, social position, or lifestyle. If there have been significant shifts in the criteria of individual distinction, however, the principles of autobiographical unity and coherence, and of consistency (even accumulation) through time, have remained central to the autobiographical project.

In another dimension, the question of identity concerns particular ways of imagining and instituting social groups and group belonging. In the case of **collective identity**, too, we may say that the principles of unity and continuity have been foregrounded. The logic of identity has worked in favor of integrity and coherence with reference to what came to be figured as the collective self. First, the group has been conceived as a unitary and homogeneous entity, a community of shared substance, and its internal complexity and diversity disavowed; the prevailing images were of a national family, a single body, shared blood, a common home(land). And, second, the group has sought to maintain its culture – its heritage, memories, values, character, particularity, and uniqueness – through time, and to deny the reality of historical change and discontinuity; positive value was placed on the continuity between generations and on the moral force of tradition.

The paradigm case for this particular conception of collective culture has been the nation state, and the ideal of what Benedict Anderson (1983) has famously called ''imagined community'' (again a relatively modern cultural invention). In this framework, the question of identity has been restricted to the dimension of belonging. Belonging to such a community – a culture in common – has been regarded as the fundamental condition for self-expression and self-fulfillment. As David Miller (1995: 175) puts it, such an identity ''helps to locate us in the world,'' ''tell[ing] us who we are, where we have come from, what we have done.'' If this suggests the meaning and appeal of collective identities for those who belong, we should also recognize the rationale for the collective unit with which they identify. For '' 'identities' are crucial tags by which state-makers keep track of their political subjects . . . The kind of self-consistent person who 'has' an 'identity' is a product of a specific historical process: the process of modern nation-state formation'' (Verdery, 1994: 37).

Dominant and conventional discourses on identity may be characterized as being essentialist. They make the assumption that the identity and distinctiveness of a person or a group is the expression of some inner essence or property. From such a perspective, identity is a ''natural'' and ''eternal'' quality emanating from within a self-same and self-contained individual or collective entity. More recent and critical accounts, however, have tended to adopt an anti-essentialist position, and to emphasize the socially constructed status of all identities. Identities are seen to be instituted in particular social and historical contexts, to be strategic fictions, having to react to changing circumstances, and therefore subject to continuous change and reconfiguration. What is also made clear is that identities cannot be self-sufficient: they are in fact instituted through the play of differences, constituted in and through their multiple relations to other identities. An identity, then, has no clear positive meaning, but derives its distinction from what it is not, from what it excludes, from its position in a field of differences. This may occur at a quite mundane and banal level, in terms of the narcissism of small differences (to use Freud's term), where Britain, say, distinguishes its identity from that of Germany, France, Italy, or Spain. But this logic of distinction may also work in more problematical ways, where

differentiation becomes polarization, with one identity positioned in radical opposition to another – to what is regarded as the fundamental alterity of its other. This is the case, for example, in the revitalized idea of civilizational difference, with its speculations about the escalating ''clash of civilizations.'' Here we should attend to the dark side of identity, to the manner in which, in its strategies of differentiation, identity depends on the creation of frontiers and borders in order to distance and protect itself from the imagined threat of other cultures. The resonant post-September 11 image of a world polarized between civilization (the West) and barbarism (the rest) spoke directly to such anxieties. We may say, then, that there is often fear in the soul of identity.

The question of identity – both individual and collective – has become increasingly salient over the last decade as a consequence of the social and cultural transformations associated with globalization. In the eyes of certain observers, the proliferation of transnational cultural flows (of people, of commodities, of media and information) has seemed to work to destabilize settled and established identities. It has been felt that the national frame, in which people have constructed their identities and made sense of their lives, has been significantly challenged. There has been the sense that societies are becoming more culturally fragmented, while at the same time being increasingly exposed to the homogenizing effects of global markets. It can seem as if older certainties and points of reference are being eroded, to be replaced by a superficial new world of consumer choice and off-the-peg identity options. Globalization is consequently seen as heralding an **identity crisis**. And the response of those who feel that their identities are being thus undermined has often been to hold on to and to reassert their familiar (''traditional'') cultures and identities. All around the world, we have seen new mobilizations of **ethnic, cultural, and religious identities**: neo-nationalisms in Eastern Europe, for example, or religious fundamentalisms, from India to the Middle East to the US. What this represents is a defense of the logic of *intégrisme* (to use the F), a militant hanging on to the principle of **identity as self-sameness**.

For other observers, however, global change has seemed to be about something quite different: about the loosening of old identities that had become restrictive and limiting, and about the opening up of new possibilities, involving more complex and variable identifications. From such a perspective, Stuart Hall has argued that we are seeing the emergence of new kinds of postmodern subjects and identities. The situation has become such that ''the subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent 'self'. Within us are contradictory identities, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are continuously being shifted about'' (S. Hall, 1992b: 277).

First, there is an emphasis on the multiplicity of possible identifications. Identities may involve national or religious allegiances, but may also be to do with consumer choices, lifestyles, and subcultures, with gender, generation, and sexuality, or with involvement in social movements (environmentalism, anti-globalization activities, hunting or anti-hunting

lobbies). Second, and perhaps more important, this more positive reading of the possibilities of global change draws attention to the different way in which we may now be implicated in social and cultural identities. **Ascribed identities** are seen to be giving way to new possibilities of identification involving choice and negotiation, and in which there is the accommodation of pluralism and diversity (in place of unity) and change and transformation (in place of continuity). The constructed nature of identity is acknowledged and accepted – for some, identity comes to be considered a kind of performance – and this disillusioning process is not regarded as at all problematical: it is possible to recognize that identity is a fiction, and then to live and work with this fiction. Globalization has expanded the repertoire of identity, then, but, more significantly, it has been working to change the basis of our relation to identity.

Kevin Robins

See: ***CIVILIZATION, DIFFERENCE, OTHER, SELF.***

Ideology

The term **ideology** (F *idéologie*) was invented by a group of French philosophers in the lC18 and eC19. These Enlightenment thinkers wanted to bring the new scientific method to an understanding of the mind by offering psychological answers to philosophical questions. Ideology, the science of the mind, was the study of the origin and development of ideas. In particular, these philosophers, known as **ideologues**, traced ideas back to empirical reality and more particularly, following John Locke, to sensations. ''Ideology'' first appeared in English in 1796 in a translation of the work of one of these philosophers, Destutt de Tracy.

It was taken over by Napoleon Bonaparte, who turned the term on its head, using it to attack the defenders of Enlightenment values (especially democracy) because they divorced the problem of governance from ''a knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history'' (R. Williams, 1976: 154). Ideology was abstract knowledge, not rooted in the realities of human life and self-interest. This pejorative use continued and expanded throughout the C19, when ''ideology'' was used, primarily by conservatives, to label any supposedly extreme or revolutionary political theory or platform, especially derived from theory rather than experience.

In a sense, Karl Marx (and Friedrich Engels) turned this Napoleonic use on its head (as well as turning Hegel's philosophy, which privileged the reality of ideas over material life and reality, on its head) in the mC19. They returned to the project of the ideologues, offering a theory of the origin and development of ideas, but they located the answers in history and social life. Marx and Engels argued that ideas were nothing but the expression of the material relationships of social life, material relationships ''grasped as ideas.'' There are two distinct **theories of ideology** in their work. In the first, they linked ideology directly to the uneven relations of power. And in the second, ''ideology'' described the

Individual

Individual comes from L *individuum*, meaning that which is indivisible or cannot be broken up further. In early English usage, it implied the inseparability of bonded elements, as in references to ''the hye and indyuyduall Trynyte'' (c.1425) and, later, ''*Indiuiduall*, not to bee parted, as man and wife'' (Cockeram, 1623). From the C17, however, a new and more atomizing conception of **the individual** emerges as a necessarily singular entity. An **individual item** is one that is separate from others. Every human being, who occupies a distinct and self-enclosed body, is **an individual**: ''Every man in his physical nature is one individual single agent'' (Butler, 1729). These changes of usage formed part of a profound change in the understanding of the person and their relations to society.

Human beings are born into particular families, castes, clans, religious communities, and the wider society. In tribal societies, their social status exhaustively defined their identity such that they identified themselves and were identified by others as sons and daughters of so and so, members of a particular caste, residents of a particular village, and followers of a particular religion. They rarely saw themselves as unique persons with lives and goals of their own. In the West, classical Athens and especially Rome saw the emergence of the idea of the person. Although their social status mattered much to them and defined part of their identity, individuals also saw themselves as unique persons, enjoying an area of life that was their own and in which they were answerable to none. Roman law embodied this view in its distinction between private and public spheres of life and its system of **individual rights**.

Modernity marked the emergence of a new conception of the person. It destroyed many of the traditional social institutions and radically transformed others, freed men and later women from inherited or ascriptive identities, and defined them as naturally **free and self-determining individuals** who wished to make their own choices, shape their own lives, and form their own relationships with others (Popper, 1962). In the modern view – which, however, has traveled only slowly across racial and colonial boundaries – individuals are naturally equal, sovereign over themselves, bound by no ties or obligations to which they have not freely consented, and authors of their lives (J. S. Mill, 1989 [1859]). Their social identity does matter to them but it is contingent, subject to critical reflection, and revisable.

The modern conception of the person gave rise to two new words in the C19. **Individuality** refers to what distinguishes individuals and marks them out from others. It includes not so much the distinct physical features that all have by birth as their unique intellectual and moral achievements and the kind of person into which they have fashioned themselves. **Individualism** refers to the view that individuals alone are the ultimate social reality and that they are ends in themselves and the sole sources of moral values (Birnbbaum and Leca, 1990; Lukes, 1972; Macpherson, 1973). Society is nothing more than its members and their pattern of relationship, and has only an instrumental value.

Individualism has acquired somewhat different associations in different countries. Its English usage stresses **individual liberty**, minimum state intervention, free thinking, and religious nonconformity – as in John Stuart Mill's notion of the ''limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence'' (1989 [1859]). In France, where it became popular in the aftermath of the French Revolution, it tends to signify self-centeredness and a spirit of rebellion against social norms. In Germany, where it was closely associated with the rise of Romanticism, it tends to stress creativity and originality.

Individualism is not without its critics. For some it is basically a philosophy of selfishness, placing **individual self-interest** over that of others. This criticism rests on a serious confusion. Individualism asserts that all individuals are ends in themselves, not that only one of them is an end in his or her self. All human beings make claims on each other, and none may pursue his or her interest in disregard of that of others. Individualism therefore implies an ethic of reciprocity and mutual obligations, not of selfishness. Indeed nothing in the philosophy of individualism prevents an individual from sacrificing his or her interests for the sake of others.

Some other criticisms of individualism cut deeper. Hegel in the C19 and his contemporary communitarian followers, socialists, and others argue that human beings are profoundly shaped by their society, that their identity is culturally constituted, and that they are deeply enmeshed in a complex web of attachments and affections. The individualist account of the individual as a self-contained, trans-social, and freely self-determining agent is therefore a dangerous fiction. These critics are generally as committed to the individual and cherish individual liberty and independent thought as much as the individualist, but take a social and richer view of the individual.

Bhikhu Parekh

See: ***IDENTITY, MODERN, PERSON, PRIVATE, PUBLIC.***

Industry

In one of its senses **industry** has referred since the C14 to a particular quality of a person. Someone who was **industrious** demonstrated the virtue of persevering to perform a task. In the lC20 the meaning shifted, so that for a person to be described as industrious may now suggest that they are rather boring and lack sparkle – far better, it would seem, to be ''smart.'' Indeed, it is now common to invest non-humans with such a quality – hence ''smart machine.'' By a peculiar twist, this leads us back to the other meaning of ''industry,'' for historically it has often meant **manufacturing industry**, the place where machines were made and put to work. With the spread of capitalist social relations into more and more sectors we now have the **leisure industry**, the **entertainment industry**, and most recently, with the threatened further incursion of commodity relations

necessarily with that effect. Today the cell phone represents a synthesis of connectedness, efficiency, and freedom, a vision celebrated in film, TV, and advertising (where throwing it away signals a daring but temporary freedom from constraint). **Mobile phones** have transformed social and personal interactions and speeded up working conditions in many occupations. The miniaturization and digitalization of media have enhanced rapid capital accumulation, transnational expansion, financial speculation, and massive corporate failures. Digital telecommunications have created new sites for information and communication among alternative and dissident groups, while exacerbating privatization in everyday life and politics (Morley, 2000; Myerson, 2001).

Social mobility, **geographical mobility**, **physical mobility**, and the **mobility of capital**, **information**, and other commodities: each displays conflicting economic and cultural effects. Mobility is widely advocated as a positive attribute in the workforce, but it can diminish the autonomy of the employees, subjecting them to unwanted relocations that can disperse their personal roots. While capital and information are increasingly freed from spatial contexts, many employees remain stuck in poorly paid, hazardous jobs behind assembly lines or screens. The omnipresent mobile telephone allows people to converse from any location. Yet the mobile phone allows governments and corporations to use comprehensive surveillance methods to locate and acquire information about telephone users. In each of these cases the link between mobility and freedom turns back upon its users, or is ''reversed,'' in Marshall McLuhan's terminology (McLuhan and McLuhan, 1988), and exacerbates conflicts as well as links between mobility and autonomy. The commercial mainstream encourages us to embrace the increased mobility of data, objects, and people, but we should subject this idea to continuous critical scrutiny.

Jody Berland

See: ***COMMUNICATION, DISABILITY, MEDIA, SPACE.***

Modern

Commonly used to indicate a more or less recent phase of time, **modern** is also one of the most politically charged keywords circulating across languages in the **modern world**. Closely associated since the lC18 with the notions of ''progress'' and ''development'' attributed to the West, the attribute ''modern'' describes a wide range of historical phenomena characterized by continuous growth and change: in particular, science, technology, industry, secular government, bureaucracy, social mobility, city life, and an ''experimental'' or **modernist** approach in culture and the arts. However, when viewed as a distinctive quality emanating out of ''the West,'' or claimed as a property of particular social groups, **the modern** becomes a standard against which other customs or ways of life are judged **premodern**. A **modernization project** then prescribes a ''reform'' or a ''revolutionary change'' in accordance with that standard. So difficult is it now to disentangle the history

of the modern from the global impact of Western European colonialism that many people around the world regard their local word for ''modern'' as a translation of an ''original'' European word. In this way, the linguistic and social diversity of the world is often still measured against an imaginary norm of **modernity** equated with Western European historical experience.

The beginnings of ''modern'' were unremarkable. Entering English from lL *modernus* in C6, ''modern'' derives from the L adverb *modo* meaning ''just now.'' Raymond Williams (1976) points out that the earliest English uses were close to our casual use of ''contemporary'' to indicate that something exists at the time of speaking or writing: ''our maist gracious quene moderne'' (1555) is not necessarily a paragon of fashion but simply the queen of the time, and ''thy former as well as modern kindness'' (1700) means not that you are progressive in your treatment of others but that you have been kind to me lately as you have been in the past. Meanwhile, ''contemporary'' meant ''co-temporary'' or ''of the same period,'' and indicated things existing together, whether in the present or at periods in the past. In the usage of communities outside Western Europe, many of the terms used today to connote ''modern,'' such as *jindai* in literary Chinese, once meant something like the L *modo* and carried no special reference to ''the West'' – which did not exist in ''premodern'' times as a globally central model.

In **modern English**, the chronological sense of a ''period'' became attached to ''modern'' through the habit of contrasting **ancient** with **modern times** that emerged just before the Renaissance, becoming common from lC16 (''the writings of the auncient and moderne Geographers and Historiographers,'' 1585), and in C16 L a ''Middle Age'' or ''medieval period'' appeared (*media aetas, medium aevum*). During the C17 and C18 this periodizing use was sharpened, especially in the study of **modern languages**, to distinguish a past regarded as finished from a relatively recent time that could begin a good while ago and engulf the present: ''another Book overwritten in a small Modern Greek hand, about 150 years ago'' (1699); ''our English Tongue . . . may be said to equal, if not surpass all other Modern Languages'' (1706). As the sense of rivalry in the second example suggests, the consolidation of a comparative attitude within as well as toward the evaluation of historical periods began to endow ''the modern'' with its modern complications.

One of these is the emergence of a two-sided way of thinking about time. From the C17, ''modern'' could be used to establish both continuity over an extended present marked off from a long-ago past, and a sharp discontinuity between the present and the past. On the one hand, the expansive sense of a **modern age** long enough to dwarf the significance of ''now'' was reinforced through the natural sciences: ''if such species be termed modern, in comparison to races which preceded them, their remains, nevertheless, enter into submarine deposits many hundred miles in length'' (1830). This temporally capacious ''modern'' entered the vocabulary of English education, with **modern schools** from the mC19 offering subjects other than classical L and Gk; in the discipline of history the **early modern** period in Europe still begins just after medieval times. On the other hand, from the lC16 a more

discriminating use of ''modern'' began to highlight ''the novelty of the present as a break or rupture with the past'' (P. Osborne, 1996); ''Modern warre, is the new order of warre vsed in our age'' (1598). This stress on novelty could also organize an evaluative opposition between ''now'' and ''then'': ''the women of this Modern age had . . . need of amendment'' (1656).

A second complication is that this polemical use makes ''modern'' the keyword of a struggle over values presented as though it were a claim about historical time. An important precedent in lC17 French literary circles was the **Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns** (''Battle of the Books'' in eC18 Britain), when the Renaissance-based doctrine of the superiority of the classics (within which the word ''archaic'' could be a term of praise) was challenged by a Modern party aspiring, under the growing prestige of **modern science**, to surpass their achievements. This form of polemic persists in academic ''canon wars'' today, and ''Battle of the Books'' still works as a rubric to organize cultural disputes in the media. However, as Raymond Williams (1976: 208) points out, most pre-C19 English uses of ''modern,'' ''modernity,'' and ''modernist'' were, in comparative contexts, disparaging of the new or, in the case of **modernize** (first used with reference to buildings, spelling, and dress), apologetic about it: ''I have taken the liberty to modernize the language'' (1752); ''He scruples not to modernize a little'' (1753).

The ''Western'' modern gathers complexity and force with the sense of a variable future that develops in the mC18 as the Christian vision of an inevitable Judgment Day was challenged by the optimistic, secular spirit of the Enlightenment, with its growing awareness of ''New Worlds'' thriving beyond Europe. For most C18 thinkers, a real or imaginary encounter with ''other'' peoples was a pretext for criticizing their own societies and imagining ways to reform them in a future now open to change by human action. However, modeled as it was on the custom of comparing the present unfavorably with the past, this more exploratory approach to comparison marks a third complication in the European history of ''modern'': cultural differences coexisting with each other in time could be evaluated as though some ways of life were more admirable because more archaic, elemental, and pristine than others. The romantic figure of the ''noble savage'' (1703, Baron de Lanton) emerges in this context. Initially a vision of what human moral life would be like in light of natural religion, ''the savage'' came to be contrasted favorably with ''civilized man'' in ways that rebuked the decadence of the latter at the cost of denying to the former a full participation and belongingness in present historical time (Fabian, 1983).

Rendered militant and self-consciously ''historic'' in the lC18 by the American and French Revolutions, ''modernity'' developed an affirmative sense of the times being ''other and better than what had gone before'' (P. Osborne, 1996: 348). It became a good thing to be modern and then, under the influence of new theories of evolution, a historically necessary thing: in the C19, a doctrine of the inevitability of ''progress'' was consolidated by the benefits brought to many in the West by the Industrial Revolution and an imperialism armed with a ''civilizing mission:'' ''gunpowder and printing,'' Thackeray

observed, ''tended to modernize the world'' (1860). By the time this global view of history became possible, ''the modern'' was opposed to the traditional, the backward, and the primitive everywhere, rather than compared with the ancient, classical, or medieval in Europe. The idea that some cultures existing in the present really belonged to a past stage of human development was, in a fourth complication, projected spatially on to the map of the world; the progression of time from the past to the future was equated with a movement from a geographic location outside **modern Western civilization** to another within it. Conversely, ''the rest'' of the world could be seen as suffering from time-lag: ''Nigeria needs to prove that it is stable, modern-minded and representative,'' opined the *Guardian* in 1970.

This geopolitical twist was profoundly consequential, especially as a cultural export of global European and, later, American imperialism. Not only did ''the modern'' and ''Western'' become indissociable, with the latter imagined as ''central'' to a process of world historical development believed to be universal, but people in many parts of the world began to map geopolitical directives on to their pasts and futures, ordering their destinies and desires accordingly. The prescriptive view that to modernize was to Westernize political institutions, social customs, and economic practices formed the basis of **modernization theory** in mC20 sociology, and in designated ''backward'' zones within the West, as well as in communist countries and in postcolonial nations established in the ''developing world,'' poor workers, women, native peoples, ''minority'' cultures, rural societies, peasant communities, and underclasses were targeted for redemption by the missionary force of the modern (Chakrabarty, 2000; Haebich, 1992).

In a lethal variant of this salvationism, underpinned from the lC19 by social Darwinist theories of racial selection, remnant people were ''doomed'' to disappear – a myth made into an agenda by C20 racist movements and state administrations (McGregor, 1997) and into a genocidal program by mC20 Nazism. The terror and complacency of progress had costs for its beneficiaries as well as its victims: if the Holocaust was a product of **modern bureaucratic rationality** (Bauman, 1989), fascism had and arguably still has a popular cultural appeal as an ostensibly **anti-modern** movement. As a promise of release not only from the great political and economic disasters of modern times but from both the relentless pace of change and the mundanity of **modern everyday life**, fascism shares a reactionary cultural impulse with nativist movements around the world that idealize whatever ''traditions'' they can cast as not-modern or non-Western – thereby reaffirming the latter's primacy (Sakai, 1997).

Nativist movements have joined both fascism and communism in condemning **artistic modernism** as ''foreign,'' ''decadent,'' ''bourgeois,'' ''elitist,'' or a combination of these. Narrowly referring to the experimental literature and art produced between the 1880s and 1940s – with phases of intensity in eC20 Europe, Russia, and East Asia and mC20 USA that attracted people from around the world to the modernist ''capital cities'' of Paris, Berlin, Shanghai, and New York – modernism is widely understood as a commitment to

discarding tradition and criticizing all conventions of representation. Yet even within **affirmative modernism**, a sense of loss and dissipation afflicts the modern from its inception: in Baudelaire's famous essay on "The painter of modern life" (1845), the best-known passages dwell on "the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent" and dream of an art to distil "the eternal from the transitory" (see P. Osborne, 1996). Arguably, the arts that most closely fulfilled this dream turned out to be those creations of **modern technology**, photography, and cinema – fully modern arts despised by many **modernist critics** for their mass-cultural accessibility and their links to the folk-based popular traditions of magic, the fair, vaudeville, and sensationalist narrative. Yet those links gave cinema in particular a critical force. One of the most enduring images from the late years of **high modernism** is that of the resilient "little man" caught up in the machinery of mass production – played by Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times* (1936).

Simple, pejorative uses of "modern" to imply deterioration have never lost their force. Complaints about the bad effects of modernity on females, for example, have proved durable, along with praise for the "old-fashioned girl" – "you . . . are not a modern woman; have neither wings to your shoulders, nor gad-fly in your cap; you love home" (1753). The **modern woman** has recurringly created scandal as a sign of social change: the lC19 suffragette, the eC20 flapper, the mC20 career girl wearing her New Look, and the lC20 liberated woman all aroused anxiety about the future in those predominantly white, Western, middle-class environments in which they first appeared. Another complication with "modern," then, is its capacity to represent what may well be slow, long-term processes of transformation as a series of sudden, sharp shocks – each one novel, yet repetitive of something that has happened before. Rendered banal as **modern fashion** in consumer culture, the modern's significance deflates until it becomes, as Raymond Williams (1976: 208) notes, "equivalent to IMPROVED," and thence a topic of irony: "Peace and Quiet poured down the sink, In exchange for a houseful of '**modern conveniences**'" (1937, Edna St Vincent Millay).

By the lC20, "modern" had largely lost its connotations of future shock and historical rupture, becoming in general usage a period term for an established stylistic tradition with its origins in the past (**modern architecture**, **modern dance**, **modern jazz**). However, "modernity" became a fertile ground for innovation in cultural history and theory (W. Benjamin, 1973; Berman, 1982; Kern, 1983), not least because **modern disciplines** such as anthropology and history were shaped by modernity's imperial adventurism and ideologies of time (Thomas, 1989). The problem of defining the modern was revived by debates about **postmodernism**, and criticism of "Western" historical narratives centered on white male protagonists paved the way for alternative accounts of **modern experience** as lived on the margins of those narratives by women (Felski, 1995) and enslaved and colonized people (Gilroy, 1993a; C. Hall, 2002), and in cities and cultural centers beyond the West (Baykam, 1994; Harootunian, 2002; Lee, 1999) where arguably the "shock" of **capitalist modernity** was and is at its most intense. In the eC21, perhaps the most fruitful

experiments in thinking about modernity are emerging in parts of the world where ''the modern'' retains its ambivalence – and thus something of its promise.

Meaghan Morris and Naoki Sakai

See: ***BUREAUCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, EVERYDAY, EVOLUTION, HOLOCAUST, WEST.***

Movements

Like many terms that acquire a special political meaning, **movement** has diverse general meanings: a part of a symphony, a switch, a change over space and time. This last sense, combined with the idea of strategy or intentionality, now means the coalescing of minority or dominated groups. Two world wars had reshaped political borders, democracy was on the rise, but still minority groups in countries in North America and Britain struggled to achieve the same rights and standard of living as the dominant social groups. ''Movement'' began to refer specifically to groups of people coming together to seek political, economic, cultural, but especially social change (Smelser, 1962). The US **civil rights**, **Black Power**, **anti-war**, **student**, **women's**, **ecology**, and **gay movements** prompted a new label: **social movements**. At the same time, colonized people, especially on the African continent, pursued dramatic political change as **people's revolutionary movements** (Andrews, 1983). Global media enabled both groups to learn of each other's activities and successes; postcolonial groups and minorities within large democracies soon identified with each other and envisioned a world-wide ''movement'' for the ''liberation'' of all subjected peoples.

The new ''movements'' differed from older campaigns aimed at expressing political dissent, using forms of speech that were daring and mediagenic, from profanity and selective violence to bra-burning and adoption of flamboyant forms of attire. The **new social movements** (Touraine, 1985) frequently rejected or offered revision to the political theories that predominated, especially liberalism, Cold War diplomacy, and rigid gender roles. Unlike older campaigns – for example, the quest for women's suffrage, which agreed with democratic ideals and wanted them extended equally to women – the new social movements had more generalized demands: for visibility, to do their own thing, to be freed from the constraints of gender tyranny, to be self-determining in every way. The target of the new social movements was as much prevailing mainstream attitudes as it was swaying the electorate or changing state administrative practices. Indeed, many observers and citizens did not accept the new social movements as appropriately political, either because their demands had more to do with seemingly ''private'' cultural and social issues (sexuality, ethnic styles, *feelings* of exclusion) or because their modes of address were seen as hostile, intentionally uncommunicative, and self-righteously vague.

It was unclear who movements represented and how such representation worked, and this was both a strength and weakness of the movements (Snow et al., 1986). Claiming to speak on behalf of those who could not speak for themselves, either because they were

and the public display of individual styles enable a deep sense of sharing in a world of exchange of goods. Indeed, those who lack the resources to participate in capitalist exchange often feel that they are left out of – not *sharing* in – this now-fundamental aspect of postmodern life. Feelings of social exclusion based on inability to participate in the economy now loom as significant as inability to participate in the democratic process.

Social scientists, journalists, and policy-makers use a related sense of participation. Despite the rise of positivism within the social sciences, in which researchers moved toward computer-based quantification of large bodies of information, many researchers argue that truly understanding social processes requires immersion in the social world. Like the political notions of participation, the social science method of **participant observation** implies that the scientist and their subject share common, basic elements of humanity. Although challenged as overly reliant on the subjective impressions of elite researchers who misunderstand other worlds, participant observation has also been used by minority or disadvantaged scholars to legitimate their research on their ''own'' group through use of this scientific method.

Cindy Patton

See: ***CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY, MOVEMENTS.***

Person

Person is one of the European world's most central yet fluid terms. We speak of ourselves as **persons** and of the **personal domain** as if this notion of an inner moral identity were self-evident. Yet this usage represents just one late line of development in a variegated history. In addition to the background meaning of individual human being, from medieval times ''person'' could also refer to the body or the body clothed and adorned, in which regard one possessed a fine person or, as we would say, **personal appearance**. ''Person'' could also mean **personage**, or person of social importance, and it was in this sense that Christ was said to be no respecter of persons. Finally there was an important series of ''dramaturgical'' meanings of person, signified via the original L word for person, *persona*, and clustered around the idea of **acting in the person of**. This series was dominant in late medieval and early modern times where the meaning of ''person'' was strongly tied to that of ''office,'' or the duty attached to a role. Here liberties and rights were personal in the pre-modern sense of belonging to the office held (Condren, 1997). ''Person'' in this sense was a role occupied by human individuals, but stretched beyond them to cover corporations, **legal persons** (which might include business enterprises, towns, and universities), and even the state. Thomas Hobbes captures this (to us) unfamiliar spread of meanings in his definitional comment that: '' 'A Person,' is he, *whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction*'' (Hobbes, 1991 [1651]: 111).

The dominant modern meaning, in which person is identified with an **inner moral personality** viewed as the source of rights and duties, derives from the history of Christian theology and forms of worship. In his classic essay on the history of the modern concept of the person, Marcel Mauss thus ties the eclipse of the earlier, pluralistic, ''dramaturgical'' use of ''person'' to the Christian doctrine of the soul and associated moral practices (Mauss, 1985). Mauss places particular emphasis on the early modern spread of practices of spiritual direction and self-scrutiny, through which individuals were impelled to unify their ''offices'' around an inner self for which they were morally responsible. The religious drive to unify roles and duties, and to locate judgment and responsibility in an **inner person**, is visible in the central doctrine of **Christ's two natures and one person**. Here the unity of Christ's human and divine natures is the condition of salvation and provides a powerful model for moral generation (Kobusch, 1997: 29–30). By transposing Christ's double nature onto humanity, Enlightenment moral philosophers such as Immanuel Kant could invoke the distinction between a higher self (rational humanity, **personhood**) and a lower one (visible man), thereby channeling into secular philosophy the aspiration to moral unity driven by the religious desire to elevate a lower self. By contrast with Hobbes's dramaturgical way of conceiving the person, in terms of a scattered plurality of offices, Kant thus offers a unified, intellectualist, and inward conception:

> Personhood, or humanity in my person, is conceived as an intelligible substance, the seat of all concepts, that which distinguishes man in his freedom from all objects under whose jurisdiction he stands in his visible nature. It is thought of, therefore, as a subject that is destined to give moral laws to man, and to determine him: as occupant of the body, to whose jurisdiction the control of all man's powers is subordinated. (Kant, 1997: 369)

Amelié Rorty has argued that the variety of moral, legal, political, and intellectual tasks performed by notions of person is simply too great for any single conception to function as a foundation for all the others (A. O. Rorty, 1988). Despite its familiarity to educated moderns, it would thus be inaccurate to regard the religious-philosophical model of a unified moral personality as simply replacing an earlier conception of person as the capacity in which one acts or bears rights and duties. Rather, the two understandings of person continue to exist in a largely unformulated and sometimes uncomfortable juxtaposition.

We can see this, for example, in the question of the fetus's status as a person, which is central to the intractable conflict over the legal availability of abortion. In Western legal systems the fetus has the status of a **legal person**. This means that its rights and entitlements are contingent – on being born alive – and conditional, typically on the health of the mother, so that the life of the fetus may be terminated should the mother's health be endangered. Many anti-abortion advocates, however, adopt the religious-philosophical conception of the person and view the fetus as a **moral person** possessing rights inherent

in a soul or conscience. For these people, who identify personhood with an inner moral being, termination is inherently immoral.

A similar dispute, albeit with a different political coloration, is visible in arguments over the **personal rights** of citizens in liberal democracies. Some writers regard civil and political rights as attached to the citizen as a **persona**, hence as contingent and conditional, usually on the overall purpose of the state, understood as providing security and civil peace. For these writers it is permissible for the state to suspend a range of civil and political rights under conditions – for example, terrorist threat – where this purpose is endangered. Other writers, however, locate civil and political rights not in a contingent persona but in an essential **moral personality**, usually identified with the capacities for reason and moral judgment. For these writers, it is never permissible to suspend such rights, as to do so is to injure the moral person whom they regard as the true end of the state. The different understandings of person bequeathed by history thus continue to play a profound and troubling role in modern life and thought.

Ian Hunter

See: ***BODY, HUMAN, INDIVIDUAL, SELF.***

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Place

The idea that people are defined by **place** saturates our language. We talk about ''taking a stand'' and ''knowing where she stands,'' or say that someone ''comes over to my way of thinking.'' People who defy social codes have **forgotten their place**, as opposed to those who **know their place**. A winner is given **pride of place** and a muddled person is **all over the place**. Possessing many uses, ''place'' designates some mediating ground between the human body and the arrangement of social life. The word derives from the more focused *plaza* (mE, F, Sp, C11) indicating an urban open space or **marketplace**. By the C16, ''place'' in English refers to foreign towns, an aristocrat's town residence, or a miscellaneous neighborhood.

To know one's place echoes an era when class or social difference was secured by spatial segregation. Peasants were not to enter the salons of the wealthy, immigrants or slaves to assert their rights, women to occupy men's roles. As nationalism emerged in the C18 and C19, the ''place'' of collective identity was simultaneously exaggerated and fragmented. One's being a ''German'' or a ''Spaniard'' encompassed not only territory but also language, religion, and ethnicity; as a citizen each had equal rights. In reality, inhabitants often differed in their religion, came from elsewhere, or found themselves disenfranchised by the national imaginary.

For many artists and thinkers, the C20 brought about a loss of the **sense of place**; the connection between self and place became fragile and arbitrary. Films and songs evoked the alienation of what the Beatles called *Nowhere Man* (Lennon, 1965). Movies, television,

that culture and modernity were always flawed, invariably predicated on violence and domination, the terms of seduction and conquest for colonization itself. Postcoloniality both embodies the promise of the West – the promise that flows from the enlightenment and the birth of nations – and reminds us that the promise is always flawed (Dirks, 1998).

Nicholas Dirks

See: ***COLONIALISM, ORIENTALISM.***

Postmodernism

Postmodern was first coined by the English painter John Watkins Chapman in around 1870 to describe what he called ''postmodern painting''; a style of painting which was supposedly more avant-garde than French impressionism (Best and Kellner, 1991). The term was then used to describe ''postmodern men'' (1917), ''postmodernism'' (1930s; Hassan, 1987), the ''post-modern house'' (1949), the ''post-Modern age'' (1946), the ''Post-Modern World'' (1957; Best and Kellner, 1991), the ''postmodern-period'' (1959), the ''postmodern mind'' (1961; Best and Kellner, 1991), ''post-Modernist literature'' (1965), ''post-Modernists'' (1966).

Contemporary understandings of ''postmodernism'' suggest different things depending on context and discourse. The term also signifies differently depending on whether it is used to refer to cultural texts, an historical period, or a mode of cultural theory. Therefore, perhaps the best way to understand the shifting meanings of the term is to distinguish between the overlapping terms which postmodernism embodies: **postmodernity**, **postmodern culture**, and **postmodern theory**.

''Postmodernity'' is commonly used as an historical term to indicate the period after modernity, which began with the Enlightenment and ended in the 1960s (Jameson, 1984) or the 1970s (Harvey, 1990). What these accounts have in common is an insistence that the cultural and social changes which have produced postmodernity are inextricably linked to changes in capitalism: from a primary focus on production to consumption (D. Bell, 1976); an historical shift in the West from societies based on the production of things to one based on the production of information and ''simulations'' (Baudrillard, 1983); from modern ''organized'' capitalism to postmodern ''disorganized'' capitalism (Lash and Urry, 1987); from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production (Harvey, 1990); from national to global, bringing about the advent of ''time-space compression,'' generated by the speeding up of both travel and telecommunications.

Another influential usage of ''postmodernism'' is to be found in cultural histories which seek to site postmodernism's birth in the cultural changes first noticed in the UK and US in the 1960s. According to this narrative, postmodernism first emerges as an avant-garde rejection of the certainties and social exclusivities of modernism. Susan Sontag (1966) described this rejection as the ''new sensibility.'' Sontag coined the term to describe

what she called the abandonment of "the Matthew Arnold notion of culture" as "the best that has been thought and known" (Arnold, 1971 [1869]: 56), claiming that the Arnoldian idea of culture was "historically and humanly obsolescent," and adding that "the distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture seems less and less meaningful" (1966: 302). It is this aspect of postmodernism which is most commonly intended (either positively or negatively) when the term is used in contemporary accounts of cultural production. For example, in architecture "postmodernism" signifies a new vernacular style, which mixes high and low, contemporary and historical – what is often referred to as "double coding" (Jenks, 1991). A similar form of eclecticism is also said to be a feature of postmodern fashions of dress (E. Wilson, 1998). In discussions of pop music culture, "postmodern" is most often used to identify the mixing of popular and art music (classical violinist Nigel Kennedy's album of songs by Jimi Hendrix; Luciano Pavarotti recording with U2; the commercial success of Laurie Anderson's performance piece "O Superman"; the aesthetic seriousness of Bob Dylan and the Beatles).

The academic circulation of the term can be dated to the publication of Jean-François Lyotard's *The postmodern condition* (1984). In this influential account **the postmodern condition** is presented as a crisis in the status of knowledge in Western societies. This finds expression "as incredulity towards metanarratives" (p. xxiv), producing in turn "the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation," the supposed contemporary collapse or widespread rejection of all overarching and totalizing frameworks ("metanarratives"), which seek to tell universalist stories about the world in which we live.

Again mainly in academic circles, but sometimes more broadly, "postmodernism" is also used to describe a more general condition of contemporary society and its cultural production. Jean Baudrillard (1983), for example, claims that hyperrealism is the characteristic mode of postmodernity. In the realm of the hyperreal, the distinction between simulation and the "real" supposedly implodes; reality and simulation are experienced as without difference. Perhaps it is the case that people no longer mark the distinction between real and imaginary with quite the same degree of rigor as they may have done in the past, but it is difficult to find evidence to support the claim that people can no longer tell the difference. Nevertheless, Baudrillard is probably the best-known theorist of postmodernism, achieving almost cult status in some areas of cultural life.

In similar fashion, and again mostly in academic circles, "postmodernism" is also used to describe the cultural conditions of late capitalism. In this usage, postmodernism is "the cultural dominant of the logic of late capitalism" (Jameson, 1984: 78). Postmodernism, according to this argument, represents "the purest form of capital yet to have emerged, a prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas" (p. 78). As a result, "aesthetic production . . . has become integrated into commodity production generally" (p. 56). As a consequence, contemporary culture is claimed to be flat and superficial,

marked by nostalgia and pastiche. Moreover, culture is no longer ideological, disguising the economic activities of capitalist society; it is itself an economic activity, perhaps now the most important economic activity of all. In many ways this is a position which originates long before postmodernism became an intellectual concept circulating in academia. It is an argument with its roots in C19 accounts of the imposition of so-called mass culture on duped and manipulated masses. More specifically, it is a mode of analysis which is much influenced by (and little developed beyond) the work of the Frankfurt School.

The term ''postmodernism'' is also used to describe the media saturation of contemporary Western societies. In particular, it is deployed to draw attention to the fact that old cultural production is no longer simply replaced by the new, but is recycled for circulation together with the new (Collins, 1993). There can be little doubt that this is in part a result of the introduction of cable, satellite, and digital media, with their seemingly unrelenting demand for more and more programs to fill what seems like ever-increasing space in, say, television and radio schedules. Moreover, the promiscuous mixing of the old and new has produced in both audiences and producers what Jim Collins (1993: 250) calls a ''hyperconscious intertextuality,'' which both informs how audiences make sense of cultural texts (reading for intertextuality) and how cultural texts are made (the deployment of conscious intertextuality): for example, television programs such as *Twin Peaks*, *The Simpsons*, and *The Sopranos*; and films such as *Bladerunner*, *Blue Velvet*, and *Pulp Fiction*. The same postmodern play of quotations is also a feature of many music videos and television commercials. A similar self-reflexive intertextuality can be detected in the postmodern photography of Cindy Sherman and Barbara Kruger. This aspect of postmodernism was first identified in the 1960s to describe the self-reflexive work of writers such as Samuel Beckett, Jorge Luis Borges, and Thomas Pynchon and is used (for mostly the same reasons) to describe the contemporary fiction of writers such as Kathy Acker and Paul Auster (Hutcheon, 1988).

''Postmodernism'' is sometimes used to describe a specific mode of cultural theory, associated, in particular, with the work of Lyotard, Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Frederic Jameson (Best and Kellner, 1991). Sometimes this is characterized as a theory about the postmodern and sometimes it is the theory itself which is seen as postmodern (or as poststructuralist).

Like ''existentialism'' in the 1950s and ''structuralism'' in the 1960s, ''postmodernism'' (as both theory and practice) has, since the 1980s, crossed from the academy into discourses and practices of everyday life. But, unlike these other intellectual discourses, postmodernism has not yet become, and, moreover, shows little sign of becoming, a fixed and coherent body of work, with a clearly delimited range of ideas and practices; instead, it continues to mean different things depending on discourse and context of use. It may well have been the term's indeterminacy which both encouraged and facilitated the hoax carried out by New York University professor of physics Alan Sokal, who duped the

academic journal *Social Text* into publishing a spoof article on ''postmodern science'' (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998). For some cultural commentators (mostly hostile to postmodernism) this was itself a very **postmodern event**.

John Storey

See: ***KNOWLEDGE, MODERN, POPULAR, TASTE, WEST.***

Poverty

Most fundamentally, **poverty** is a condition of want, or scarcity, particularly of subsistence or material possessions, and it is economic development or the social redistribution of wealth that provides its proper solution. But poverty can also simply mean a lack or deficiency of any kind, such as the **poverty of the soul**, the **poverty of the soil**, the ''poverty of your understanding'' (Watts, 1741), or, in the title of a famous book, ''the poverty of theory'' (E. P. Thompson, 1978). Poverty is hence a negative term, opposed to wealth, abundance, fullness, fertility, and productiveness.

The want of the minimal means to survive is what C20 social scientists called **absolute poverty** rather than **relative poverty** or **relative deprivation**. The latter is defined as relative to the usual living standards and lifestyles of the bulk of the population within a country, community, or society (Townsend, 1979: 31). But this distinction would appear to be much older. One of the consequences of a focus on absolute poverty is to reduce the numbers of people thought to be **in poverty** and to suggest, as Thomas Malthus (1798) did, that ''almost all poverty is relative.'' Malthus is famous for his principle of population. Under this principle, the rate of growth of human population would exponentially outstrip the growth of the means for its subsistence, if left unchecked by ''vice and misery'' such as war and famine. Malthus thus proposed that humans were in a fundamental situation of want or scarcity and that poverty was a natural condition of humankind. One of the consequences of such a condition was that assistance to **the poor** should be strongly discouraged, if not abandoned, because such assistance encouraged the poor, as the greater part of humankind, to procreate without regard to their ability to care for their children. This fundamental linkage of poverty with population and with human reproduction was to have a long history that encompasses eugenics and studies of poverty and labor in the C19, and welfare reform and development discourses in the lC20 and eC21. While lC19 eugenicists and social thinkers might seek to curtail the right of various classes of the poor to reproduce (as Charles Booth did of the unemployables), welfare reformers and theorists of development argue that **poverty assistance** (in advanced or in developing countries) should only be provided in a way which increases industriousness, self-sufficiency, and disincentives to reproduction.

The idea of poverty as a natural condition is closely allied with the view that it is this fundamental condition of scarcity that impels humans to labor and to the civilization that

which statements are true because they get things done and cohere with other statements that do the same.) **Philosophical pragmatism** thus shares with ordinary pragmatism the premise that consequences are what really matter in the end, whether these are consequences of belief (as in philosophy) or consequences of action (in ordinary speech).

Michael Bérubé

See: ***EMPIRICAL, KNOWLEDGE, MATERIALISM, OBJECTIVITY, REASON, RELATIVISM.***

Private

In general, **private** is the opposite of public. This may signal protection from public gaze and regulation, or it may signal **privation**, and in particular the loss of the rights associated with public statuses, as a deposed king becomes merely a **private citizen**.

Classical Greek and Roman thought regarded freedom, creativity, and political rights as features of the public realm (Arendt, 1998). Women, children, and slaves were all consigned to the **private realm**, meaning that they had little existence beyond that dictated by material desire and necessity. They were accordingly seen as without substantial or important distinctions, a usage that survives in labeling an ordinary soldier who has not attained rank or distinction as **a private**. Development of full personhood was seen as an activity carried out in friendship, political participation, intellectual debate, military service, and other public roles (Weintraub and Kumar, 1997).

Early Christianity gave a greater role to the interior life of individuals, but the link between **privacy** and individual personhood developed most clearly as a core feature of modernity (C. Taylor, 1989). LC18 and eC19 Romanticism symbolizes the trend, but concern for the quality of **private life** was already reflected in early modern art with its multitude of portraits, family groups, and interior rooms. Pioneered especially by bourgeois families, this concern for the virtues and pleasures of domesticity spread widely. Closely related to the new moral emphasis on family life and ordinary affairs was increased awareness of interior experience, emotional life, and personal development. This placed new value on the **private spaces** (both literal and metaphorical) into which one withdrew for spiritual meditation, prayer, and self-examination. Such pursuits focused on self as well as God, and helped to give rise to modern psychology as well as to a more personal orientation to religion (celebrated notably in Protestantism).

This in turn was linked to a new understanding of the body as a properly **private possession**. Increasingly elaborate codes of manners and norms of bodily discipline arose, not least in relation to sexuality, health, and labor (Elias, 2000). A common feature was the treatment of the body as an object of mental control. Movements for hygiene and morality involved the body in new dynamics of shame and eroticism (Foucault, 1986; B. Turner, 1997). Sex organs became **private parts**. An ideology of feminine modesty generally removed women as well as sexuality from public life (though it defined a

countertype of immodest "public women" – prostitutes – whose properly **private selves** were publicly exchanged). On the other hand, a right to privacy could be construed as an important basis for ascribing to each person control over her or his body.

The logic of possession governed also in defining market exchange as private. **Private persons** enter markets to exchange their **private property**. Their rights to do so were conceptualized in the C17 by extension from the notion of individual labor in the appropriation of the common heritage of Creation or nature (though inheritance raised other questions). Human beings were reconceptualized as possessing individuals (Macpherson, 1962). They were also understood as the self-sufficient primary actors of the market so that privacy was no deprivation to them, but an affirmation of their essential autonomy. This was echoed in a host of secondary forms of privacy: **private homes**, **private offices**, **private clubs**, **private boxes** at sporting events, and even **private washrooms**. Those without private property, by contrast, were commonly without claims to personal privacy. Ironically, officers slept in their own bedrooms and private soldiers in barracks.

A central paradox in thought about private property was the social and often very large-scale character of its production and accumulation (Marx, 1976 [1867]). Money, business corporations, and a range of innovations in financial instruments made relations of property ever more abstract from both individual persons and physical goods produced by their labor. Most corporations are public companies in the sense that their stock is held relatively widely and traded on open markets; many are also created by government charter rather than only **private contract** – as distinct from family businesses. Confusingly, these are still considered part of the **private sector**. This publicness subjects them to levels of regulation not applied to private companies. What is at issue is private (individual) appropriation of the product of public (collective) labor. Understood as tied to the individual, **the private** is opposed to the collective. Understood as rightfully independent of state interference, private is opposed to government. But private property extends beyond the individual. At the same time, **private wealth** could be used for public purposes, as in philanthropic foundations and donations to not-for-profit organizations such as universities or hospitals (Powell and Clemens, 1998).

The liberal tradition combines this economic usage of private with a political meaning. The possessing individuals of market society are also possessors of political rights (and indeed, rights against politics). They hold these as **private persons** – not occupants of public statuses – but the **private rights** empower them to act in public. Indeed, political life is conceptualized in liberal thought as the coming together of **private individuals** to make collective decisions about matters of common interest – that is, the public good. While some features of the public good are essentially shared (for example, clean air is difficult to appropriate in an individually exclusive manner), most are conceptualized as aggregates of (and thus compromises among) **private goods**. This is given one of its most influential formulations in the Benthamite utilitarian slogan, "the greatest good for the greatest number."

The boundaries of the public are given, in this tradition, by family and intimate relations and by the market. Each is granted autonomy from intrusions of the public, which is understood primarily as the governmental. Of course, the conditions of family and market life may be highly unequal, not least in the support they give different individuals for action in public. Accordingly, each boundary has been the object of recurrent struggles – from workers' efforts to subject parts of the economy to state regulation through feminist efforts to make the personal political. Ironically, feminists have often treated the non-familial as indiscriminately public, and labor movements have often sought to defend the autonomy of the family from the market.

Also ironically, perhaps, liberal thought has given rise to the very language of rights used increasingly prominently to challenge the autonomy of putatively **private spheres**. Thus people claim rights to education, or jobs, or information about what goes on beyond the closed doors of business corporations. Rights are generally attributes of private individuals, in liberal usage, and conceived significantly as defenses against the intrusion of states. The defense of privacy remains a concern in just this sense, and indeed is renewed with regard to new technologies of surveillance. Yet private rights have become increasingly prominent bases for demands of government action, both domestically and internationally.

By contrast, other traditions emphasize the shared activity involved in creating public institutions. They stress that **private action** by individuals can account for only a fraction of the goods enjoyed by members of modern societies – and also that large corporations are not private in the same sense and often act in ways contrary to the interests of individuals. At the same time, they too would defend the need for individual privacy in relation to governmental surveillance. The idea of ''private'' remains contested.

Craig Calhoun

See: ***BODY, FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL, LIBERALISM, MARKET, PERSON, PUBLIC.***

Public

The concept of **public** derives from Greek and Roman conceptions of the rightful members of polities. Its philological roots lie in the L *poplicus*, of the people, which shifted to *publicus* apparently under the influence of its restriction to *pubes*, adult men. The shift makes clear the tension in the term between a general notion of open access and more specific understandings of who is entitled to membership in **the public**. This persists into modern usage, in which ''public'' is increasingly opposed to ''private,'' and denotes most prominently, and in varying combinations: (a) the people, interests, or activities which are structured by or pertain to a state; (b) anything which is open or accessible; (c) that which is shared, especially that which must be shared; (d) all that is outside the household; and (e) knowledge or opinion that is formed or circulated in communicative exchange, especially through oratory, texts, or other impersonal media (Calhoun, 2001).

Notions of **public good** and **public administration** both appeared in English by the lC15, reflecting simultaneously the rise of modern states and their concern for the public good (*res publica* or **public things** in L, and often ''commonwealth'' in English). Securing the public good was initially understood as the responsibility of the king, understood to have ''two bodies,'' one his ''private'' person and the other his ''public'' being as sovereign ruler (Kantorowicz, 1957). Kings consulted with other nobles whose **public roles** were ascribed, and often inherited, as specific rights and eventually with a growing number of commoners. Ideals of nobility implied an ability to rise above merely personal concerns, as did the notion of citizenship in a self-ruling **republic**.

Popular rule required **public deliberation**. By the lC18, the notion of a right to **assemble in public**, for example, was increasingly claimed for the citizenry as a whole, by contrast with the specific rights of nobles to assemble and petition the monarch. Instead of inherited position, the capacity to act in public was determined by a combination of character and material possession. The two were linked in the notion of independence, praised for example by Locke (1990), and equally a virtue of mind and a material condition predicated on private property. The capacity to be a **public person** thus reflected in two senses attributes of what would today be considered private persons: their psychology and their wealth.

The idea of public as the whole people or nation was closely related to the notion of public as ''open'' – like a **public park**. **Public spaces** make possible interaction that is not based on intimacy, but instead connects strangers – like walking down a city street, going to the theater, or participating in a political rally. The public person idealized in this usage is at ease amid the diversity and unfamiliarity typical of cities (Sennett, 1977). The urban analyst Jane Jacobs (1972) famously praised the public character of C19 cities – their sidewalks, cafés, human scale, and mixed-use neighborhoods – and deplored its loss in C20 transformations.

Newspapers and other media support **public discussion** as much as these physical spaces do. Informed **public debate** depends also on **public access** to information. Until the C19, the English Parliament refused to allow its debates to be published. Laws on **public secrets** still vary, as to regulations on how much information private businesses must disclose. The rise of **public-access television** and efforts to defend the openness of the Internet also reflect concern to provide citizens with means to participate in **public communication**.

The political elites that run governments are narrower than the broad publics affected by governments. The same is true of **public discourse**. Even when it is about matters that affect the whole public, only a smaller public is active in it – and this is often a matter of active exclusion, not just apathy. The right of women to speak in public was as much contested until the C20 as their right to vote. There is a distinction, thus, between the public capable of (or entitled to) political speech, and the public that is the object of such speech or its intended political effects.

Democracy centers on trying to give political power to those affected by political action, so democrats have always been committed to expanding political participation. But

democracy also depends on the public deliberating effectively about political choices, and enlargement of participation has often seemed to undermine the use of reason in public discourse, substituting techniques of persuasion based on money and mass media. Jürgen Habermas's (1989) famous phrase ''structural transformation of the public sphere'' refers to the process in which expansion of the **public sphere** achieved democratic enlargement at the expense of the rational quality of discussion (and thus its ability to identify the best policies for the **public interest**). The challenge is to get both at once.

The idea of public debate is not limited to politics. Science itself is often held to depend on its public character, as, for example, findings should be published and theories debated. But while public debate may help to reveal the truth, majority votes may still reflect error (Dewey, 1927). Nor is all public communication rational-critical debate; much is expressive or aesthetic activity, and efforts at persuasion also take other forms (Warner, 2001). And as Arendt (1998) stressed, public communication can include creative ''world-making,'' as, for example, the framers of constitutions help to make countries.

It is always possible for some to try to shape **public opinion** by controlling the availability of information instead of by open discussion. This may involve presenting only positive information, or attempting to restrict public awareness of negative information, or indeed spreading false information. Scientists occasionally fail to report negative results of experiments. Much more often, politicians, business corporations, and others hire **public relations** specialists to manage public opinion.

During the course of the C19 and eC20, the idea of public opinion stopped referring to opinion that had been adequately tested in public debate, and thus deserved the assent of informed citizens, and began to refer to whatever happened to be believed by the mass of people, regardless of the grounds for their beliefs (Habermas, 1989). Beliefs were treated as attributes of individuals, like private property, to be discovered objectively by asking questions separate from actual public discourse. Public opinion research thus focuses not on the forming of opinion through public discourse, but on the use of survey methods to identify the opinions of private persons. These are deemed to be public either because they can be aggregated statistically to represent the whole mass of persons, or because they are on topics of public interest. There is no implication, however, that such opinions have been formed in a public manner, let alone through open sharing of information and rational-critical debate rather than through the management of public relations. A different approach, ''deliberative polling,'' brings representative samples of citizens together for informed discussion, and then asks their opinions. This is designed to simulate some of the benefits of the classical notion of public debate for representative subsets of the large populations of modern states.

The transformation of the notion of public opinion into an aggregate of private opinions was influenced by the rise of liberal individualism and especially of market society and social theories derived from markets (Splichal, 2000). Classical political economy from the C18 on stressed the idea that free trade among a multitude of self-interested individ-

uals would produce **public benefits** (drawing on the older notion that private vices might produce **public goods** and thereby count as **public virtues**). It also suggested that a good market was itself a sort of public, since it worked best when maximally open and unrestricted, and when all participants had equal access to information. Traders thus serve the public; shops are open to the public – as indeed are pubs (**public houses**, which are important not only as businesses but as places for members of the public to meet). Buying, selling, and entering into contracts may be activities of private persons, but they have public effects through the aggregation accomplished by markets. In addition, a marketplace (whether physical or ''virtual'') is public. Entering into this market–public realm is thus contrasted with remaining in the private realm of non-monetarized exchanges of which the family is the paramount example. This usage would in the IC20 inform feminist theories which analyzed the ways in which women were excluded from public life, including economic activity as well as politics and public communication. How morally laden the distinction of public from private can be is evident in an C18 dictionary of vulgar terminology, which defined ''a woman's commodity'' as ''the private parts of a modest woman and the public parts of a prostitute.''

The idea of market is recurrently problematic for the public–private dichotomy. It is based on private property, but it is also public in its openness and its effects. It might be left free from government interference because private, or made the object of government regulation because public. Both terminology and political values are confusing. But it is clear that though prices may be ''signals'' in markets, the integration of markets is based on objective effects rather than achieved through communicative agreements. Likewise, it is common to speak of **public ownership** or the **public sector** in ways that equate ''public'' with the state itself. **Public law** is thus the law that regulates the action of the state itself and its relations with citizens, as distinct from the other branches of law that regulate relations among citizens, or the creation of corporations as legal persons. At other times, government is distinguished from the public composed of people who may either resent or support it.

Markets based entirely on the self-interested actions of private actors systematically fail to provide certain sorts of goods, which is a crucial reason why governments intervene in economies on behalf of the public. These public goods are those which must be consumed in shared form (such as security, a clean environment, or indeed a sound money supply). Technical economic usage sometimes restricts the class of public goods to those that in their very nature must be shared, though law can require the sharing of goods which could in principle be privatized, such as public parks, **public schools**, **public television**, and **public beaches** or **public baths**. Governments act not only to provide public goods but to limit public nuisances (like pollution).

Governments are said to act on behalf of the public, but it is a challenge to reconcile the different views of many different groups each of which may engage in its own public communication. Some speak of **publics** and **counter-publics**, in which the latter are

simply publics organized in resistance to the **dominant public** or some of its norms – for example, one might speak of a **gay public,** a **radical feminist public**, or a **Christian evangelical public** (Fraser, 1992; Warner, 2001). At the same time, part of the idea of public is precisely that communication furthers integration across lines of difference.

Moreover, publics do not stop at the borders of states. There is growing reference to **international public spheres** – of Islam or Christendom, of human rights activists or global media. Likewise, the international law of states is understood to be a form of public law and a basis for establishing relations among states without merger or violation of sovereignty. Indeed, in the eC19 Europe's major powers (save France) signed a joint declaration proscribing Napoleon as a **public enemy**, with whom neither peace nor truce could be concluded. Similar arguments have been put forward in the eC21 with regard to Saddam Hussein and alleged terrorists.

In short, both the ideas of what the public is and what is in the public interest remain subject to public debate.

Craig Calhoun

See: ***FEMINISM, GOVERNMENT, MARKET, PRIVATE, STATE.***

the past several centuries, there has never been anything approaching consensus about what that method is (Rorty, 1991; Shapin, 2001).

Talk about ''the scientific method'' is predicated upon some version of the ''unity'' of science. In the early to mC20 many philosophers embraced a moral mission to formalize the bases of that unity, but, since T. S. Kuhn's (1970) *Structure of scientific revolutions* in 1962, the flourishing of a variety of ''disunity'' theories indexes the local appearance of a more relaxed and naturalistic mood (Cartwright, 1999; Dupré, 1993; Schaffer, 1997; Shweder, 2001). Disunity theorists doubt that there are any methodical procedures held in common by invertebrate zoology, seismology, microbial genetics, and any of the varieties of particle physics, which are *not* to be found in non-scientific forms of culture. How can the human sciences coherently either embrace or reject ''the natural science model'' when the natural sciences themselves display such conceptual and methodological heterogeneity? Yet, for all the localized academic fashionability of naturalism and pluralism about the nature of science, the outraged reactions to these tendencies which surfaced in the **science wars** of the 1990s testify to the remaining power of the idea of science as integral, special, even sacred in its integrity (Shapin, 2001). To dispute the coherent and distinct identity of science is to challenge its unique and coherent value as a normative resource, and that is one reason why the idea of a unitary science persists in the absence of any substantial consensus about what such a thing might be.

Steven Shapin

See: ***EMPIRICAL, KNOWLEDGE, OBJECTIVITY, THEORY.***

Self

The notion of **self** is one of the most ubiquitous in the lexicon of the modern West. We speak effortlessly of the difference between our **true self** and our **ordinary selves**, in a language where we **confide in ourselves**, experience **self-doubt**, and sometimes take **a good long look at ourselves**. We hear daily discussions of **self-esteem**, **self-talk**, and **self-empowerment**, coming from psychologists, counselors, talk-show hosts, advice columns, and a multitude of **self-help** books, videos, and on-line guides. Yet, in the opposite direction, a powerful stream of theory insists that **the self** is only the surface effect of impersonal or unconscious forces. The notion of self is now precariously poised between indispensability and non-existence.

Things were not always thus. Not all cultures have posited a self in the sense of a single inner source of conscience and consciousness dedicated to self-reflection. The Homeric Greeks invested the individual with multiple sources of thought and action, some of them being conduits for supra-human forces and gods transmitting the vagaries of fate and fortune directly into human agency and judgment (Dodds, 1973). In medieval English, ''self'' referred not to an inner personal identity but to the generic idea of sameness, whose

echo we can still hear in the idiomatic expression **the self same thing**. When the notion of an **inner self** did emerge in such cultures it was the product of **techniques of the self** – techniques for calling conduct and feeling into question, for relating to oneself as an object of ethical concern – through which an elite could be schooled in the rare and difficult task of cultivating a self (Foucault, 1986; Hadot, 1995).

In Marcel Mauss's classic account, the wider distribution of techniques of the self was driven by the Christian idea of the soul, and in particular by Reformation Protestantism, where techniques of **self-scrutiny** and **self-discipline** were transmitted via print to populations suspicious of the old collective rituals of salvation (Mauss, 1985). Certain of these techniques constituted the true self as an enigma, wrapped in layers of worldliness, hence in need of constant interpretive probing, using special forms of reading and writing (J. P. Hunter, 1966). The spread of print literacy and the growth of a commercial book trade during the C18 permitted these arts of self-concern and self-discovery to migrate from religious culture to the domain of private leisure, where, after surfacing in the aesthetic form of the novel, they would flow into Romantic self-cultivation. The pedagogical distribution of these techniques via the teaching of literature in C19 mass school systems then gave the capacity for aesthetic **self-questioning** and **self-revelation** an unprecedented dissemination in Western populations (I. Hunter, 1988).

The **religious-aesthetic self** – with its roots deep in the history of Western ethical culture – is not, however, the only pathway to modern subjectivity. Nikolas Rose provides a history of the distinctive **modern psychological self** (N. Rose, 1996). From the lC19, as a result of the interaction between the behavioral requirements of an array of disciplinary institutions (schools, hospitals, asylums, armies, factories) and the behavioral measures and norms of the emergent ''psy-'' disciplines (psychology, psychotherapy, educational psychology, psychological counseling and guidance), a new psychological interior was excavated. Finding its opening at the point where statistical deviation from an institutional norm could be accepted by an individual as a personal failing, this space was at first filled by abnormalities – feeble-mindedness and retardation, shirking and shell-shock – but soon became home to such normal capacities as intelligence and literacy. From here it was a short step to the appearance of personality in all its measurable glory, and an entire psychological lexicon through which individuals could formulate their own aspirations and anxieties in terms of the norms of the institutions they inhabited. It has thus become routine for us to articulate an inner self in such terms as the wish for job satisfaction, the fear of communication failure in our relationships, the concern for a child's low self-esteem, or the desire for self-empowerment. Whether consumed voluntarily in private or administered by human relations ''facilitators'' at work, the discourses and practices of the ''psy-complex'' now permeate public and private lives, allowing the norms governing conduct to be acknowledged as those by which we seek to govern ourselves.

Histories of the religious-aesthetic self and the modern psychological self do not treat the self as illusory. Things stand differently with the broad stream of modernist and

postmodernist theory dedicated to the ''formation of the subject,'' which seeks to show that the self is only a surface effect of thoroughly impersonal, non-conscious structures and forces (Foucault, 1971). Today an array of human sciences prefaced by the term ''critical'' – critical linguistics, sociology, psychoanalysis, Marxism, legal studies, cultural studies – equips those undergoing tertiary education with the capacity to problematize the self by recovering the discourses in which it is spoken, the social relations whose ideological reflection it is, or the unconscious drives it has been vainly called on to master. It remains to be seen whether these acts of deconstruction – carried out on a self rendered enigmatic by those trained in techniques of self-problematization – are something more than a variant of the techniques of the self that have been circulating in our cultures since early modernity.

Ian Hunter

See: ***HUMAN, INDIVIDUAL, NORMAL, PERSON.***

Sexuality

Sexuality suggests a host of meanings. On the one hand it appears to refer to one of the most basic features of human life, ''our sexuality,'' the most natural thing about us, the ''truth of our being,'' in Foucault's (1979) phrase. On the other, it is so heavily encrusted with historical myths and entrenched taboos, with culturally specific meanings, that sexuality appears more a product of history and the mind than of the body. Perhaps, as Vance (1984) once suggested, the most important human **sexual organ** is located between the ears. Sexuality as a concept is uneasily poised between the biological, the social, and the psychic. Even Freud confessed to the difficulty of agreeing on ''any generally recognized criterion of the sexual nature of a process'' (1963 [1917]: 323).

The earliest usage of the term **sex** in the C16 referred to the division of humanity into the male section and the female section; and to the quality of being male or female. The subsequent meaning, however, and one current since the eC19, refers to physical relations between **the sexes** – **to have sex**. What we know as masculinity and femininity, and what came to be labeled from the lC19 as **heterosexuality**, with **homosexuality** as the aberrant ''other,'' are thus inscribed into the meanings of sex from the start. **Sexual**, a word that can be traced back to the mC17, carries similar connotations: pertaining to sex, or the attributes of being male or female, is one given meaning. **Sexuality** emerged in the eC19 meaning the quality of being sexual, and it is this meaning that is carried forward and developed by the sexual theorists of the lC19.

Sexologists sought to discover the ''laws of nature,'' the true meaning of sexuality, by exploring its various guises and manifestations. They often disagreed with one another; they frequently contradicted themselves. But all concurred that sexuality was in some ways a basic quality or essence which underlay a range of activities and psychic dispensations