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CHAPTER 5

Restlessness, Phantasy, and the Concept of Mind

Irrationality as a Psycho-Philosophical Problem

I have often wondered how different the history of philosophy would be if, at the last minute, Socrates had decided to cut and run. I imagine him in his cell, having just drunk the hemlock, reminiscing with satisfaction over the argument he has recently given to Crito that it is best for him to stay where he is and obey Athenian law. Suddenly his facial expression changes, and he throws up. *"Apeleuthomai euthus!"* he exclaims, which is roughly translated as "I'm out of here!" Of course, such is the stuff of a skit from Monty Python, not a dialogue from Plato; but if it were our paradigm, I wonder if the philosophical tradition would be so wedded to the idea that mind is rational.

Socrates famously argued that no one willingly commits bad acts.[1] For since everyone aims at what he or she takes to be a good outcome, the only way something bad can happen is if agents are mistaken in their beliefs about what constitutes a good outcome (or if the act somehow misfires). For

Socrates, an *akratic* (incontinent) act—the intentional performance of an act for which one believes one has less-good reasons than for another act—is not simply irrational; it is impossible. The argument purports to show that there is a presumption of rationality built into the very ideas of agency, action, and mind.[2] This is an important moment in the history of our life with the concept of mind, for ordinary psychological experience seems to demand room for the idea of an irrational act, yet Socrates' argument claims that no such space is available.

Akrasia is one type of a more general form of irrationality which I shall call *reflexive breakdown:* the inability to give a full or coherent account of what one is doing. Of course, this isn't the only form of human irrationality.[3] The terms "rational/irrational" are a contrasting pair which—like "subjective/objective," "real/unreal," "inner/outer"—can, in different circumstances, be used to delineate any one of a family of distinctions. But reflexive breakdown is an especially important form of irrationality, because humans distinguish themselves from the rest of nature by being self-interpreting animals. Pigs live within a normatively endowed environment, and we can watch them maximizing porcine utility. In this weak sense, we can see pigs "acting for reasons," and we can even see breakdowns and irrationality, as, say, when a pig starts to eat mud rather than rolling in it. But there is a stronger sense in which humans are capable of acting for reasons. Humans are able to think about what they want, to subject their desires and beliefs to self-conscious scrutiny, and to modify them in the light of criticism. Moreover, a person's actions *flow through* her understandings of what she is doing: her understandings shape and guide her action. Reflexive breakdown is important because it is a disruption of our capacity to be self-interpreting animals. And it represents a kind of irrationality, because what we are able to say or think about ourselves is contradicted by what we do.

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Ever since Socrates, philosophers have tried to make room for the idea of the irrational-mental, and though the approaches differ, they seem to agree that Socrates did succeed in showing that *some* presumption of rationality is built into the very ideas of mind and action. Roughly

speaking, there are two families of solutions. The first follows Aristotle, who accounts for the *apparent* fact of akrasia while agreeing with Socrates that a pure case of akrasia is impossible. In so-called akratic acts, the knowledge of the better alternative is somehow shut down. The akratic, by this picture, is like a drunk, whose judgment momentarily shuts down. At the moment of acting, therefore, the akratic is actually operating from a kind of ignorance.

The second family divides the mind into mindlike parts. Each mindlike part is itself rational (or quasi-rational), and irrationality occurs as a by-product of conflict or interaction between the parts. So, each mindlike part satisfies the Socratic constraints, though irrationality becomes a possibility for the mind, or agent, as a whole. On this schema, the unconscious mind would be conceived of as its own locus of rationality (or quasi-rationality)—perhaps even of strategizing and intentionality—and irrationality would come about through conflict between the conscious mind and unconscious mind.[4]

I am going to argue that this is not the best way to conceptualize unconscious mental functioning or to account for irrationality, but it is important to understand the temptation of the view. We think we see people acting on the basis of desires, fears, angers of which they are unaware; and to try to make sense of this we are naturally led to the idea of an Unconscious Mind: a locus of its own rationality and intentionality. For if we take the idea, say, of unconscious fear at face value, we have to locate that fear in a rationalizing web of beliefs and expectations. As Aristotle pointed out, the emotion of fear requires that an agent believe she is some danger.[5] Fear makes an implicit claim that it is a merited response to one's circumstances. Of course, an agent may be mistaken, but without a rationalizing belief, we lose grip on the idea that what the agent suffers from is fear (rather than, say, anxiety). Thus we are led to the idea that the agent must also have an unconscious belief that she is in danger and perhaps an unconscious desire to escape. (A similar argument applies to other self-regarding emotions like shame and guilt.) We are quickly led to the idea of The Unconscious as a mindlike structure with its own rationality.

And if we inquire into the nature of the unconscious belief and desire we are led even further in this direction. The very idea of an agent's having a particular belief (or desire) depends on that belief's (desire's) being located in a web of other beliefs and desires which both rationalize it and provide the structure in relation to which the belief has the particular content it has. So, for example, if a person is afraid because she fears she is about to be attacked by a wolf, she must also believe, say, that wolves are different from dinosaurs (otherwise, why isn't it a fear of dinosaurs?), that a wolf is about to be somewhere in her vicinity (or perhaps that this is a magical wolf that can specially operate across space and time), that this wolf will have it in for her (for reasons of its own), and so on. Beliefs and desires are not things we can intelligibly assign to people one at a time. And thus to assign a belief is at the same time to assign a mindlike structure of beliefs in which that belief is located.[6]

The idea that The Unconscious is itself a mindlike structure, itself a locus of its own rationality and intentionality, seems, then, not so much an empirical discovery as a conceptual requirement. It flows from taking both seriously *and at face value* the idea that people have unconscious fears, angers, desires, and beliefs. With so much rationality seemingly built into the very idea of mind, it's a wonder we can ever take an irrational breath. Literally. The problem with such a Two-Minds account of the mind is that while it purportedly makes room for irrationality, the account makes it mysterious just how it could occur. The Two-Minds schema is like the solution to a dyadic equation. It tries to solve simultaneously for two apparently conflicting demands which are implicit in the idea of *motivated irrationality*. To secure the idea that this irrationality is motivated, that is, a genuinely psychological phenomenon, we need to secure the mentality of the motivation.[7] Doing this seems to require locating the motivation in a mindlike structure with its own rationality. But to secure the irrationality of the phenomenon, the motivation must become *from outside* the mindlike structure in which the irrational phenomenon itself occurs. On the Two-Minds schema, the mentality of the cause is secured by being placed within a rational network of propositional attitudes in one part of the mind; yet irrationality is explained by allowing that cause to have nonrational effects in another part of the mind.

But this schema leaves unanswered just how that mental cause brings its irrational effect about. It does not adequately illuminate the mentality

of an irrational act. To make room for the concept of an irrational act, we must be able to account for "method in madness." We isolate something as an irrational act, as opposed to a meaningless outburst, because we see it or suspect it of having a strange logic of its own. *We want to capture the mentality of the cause not because we want to understand its rational place in this other part of the mind, but because we want to grasp the weird intelligibility it lends to the irrational phenomena it brings about.*[8] Obviously, the mental cause does not *rationalize* its irrational effect, but it does lend it a peculiar intelligibility. Method does not turn madness into sanity, but it does bequeath to madness its own intelligibility. As far as I can tell, the Two-Minds schema does not explain this *cunning of unreason.*[9]

I am tempted to say that the problem with the Two-Minds schema is that it is too conceptual a solution to a conceptual problem; but this cannot be quite right. If we follow the later Wittgenstein and Hegel in thinking that our concepts must be understood in the context of the life we live with them, then the problem with the Two-Minds solution is that it is not conceptual enough. We are not yet sufficiently at home with the concept of mind to understand the place of the irrational-mental. One sign of this, I think, is that both strategies for answering Socrates—Aristotle's and the Two-Minds schema—assume that Socrates is basically right: that the concept of mind requires rationality. By contrast, I want to argue that it is intrinsic to the very idea of mind that mind must be sometimes irrational. Rather than see irrationality as *coming from the outside* as from an Unconscious Mind which disrupts Conscious Mind, one should see irrational disruptions as themselves an inherent expression of mind. In a nutshell: mind has a tendency to disrupt its own rational functioning.

This isn't only an empirical discovery about the human mind—though it may also be that; it also comes to light when we think about what it is to be minded.[10] I can here only briefly mention two features, each of which expresses a fundamental aspect of what we take mindedness to be, and which together imply that it is part of our concept of mind that minds must be sometimes irrational. First, it is inherent to our very idea of mind that minds are restless. Minds are not mere algorithm-performing machines, and they do not merely follow out the logical consequences of an agent's beliefs and desires. Rather, it is part of the very idea of mind that a

mind must be able to make leaps, to make associations, to bring things together and divide them up in all sorts of strange ways. Creativity isn't simply an empirical blessing—though it is that; it is a conceptual requirement: a mind must have at least the potentiality for creativity. This in turn requires that there be certain *forms of restlessness* embedded in mental activity. Freud's discovery of primary-process mental functioning, his discovery of certain mental tropisms like projection and introjection, and his discovery that human sexuality is not merely a biological instinct but a drive with great plasticity in its aim and object—all this can be seen as the discovery of certain forms of restlessness in the human mind. Freud took himself to have made an empirical discovery, arrived at through his attempts to interpret dreams. He was relatively unaware of the *logical* flow of his argument. So, for example, as soon as one approaches a dream as something that requires interpretation—that is, as something whose meaning is not immediately transparent, but which nevertheless has a meaning—one needs to account both for the opacity and for the meaning. How could mind be making a meaning it doesn't understand? To be making a meaning, it must be making certain associations among ideas, engaging in symbolization, however elementary; yet those associations must be opaque to conscious, rational-thinking mind. And once we recognize that mind has to be capable of making (what from the perspective of secondary process appear to be) strange leaps and associations, we see that a mind has to have something like displacement and condensation as forms of mental activity. For displacement is the bare making of associations by linking ideas; condensation is the bare making of associations by superimposing them. These activities both discover and create similarities, and together they provide forms of restlessness needed for mind to express creativity and imagination.

Second, minds must be embodied. Embodiment is here a formal requirement: it is part of the idea of mind that a mind is part of a living organism over which the mind has incomplete control and that it helps the organism to live in an environment over which the organism has incomplete control. Of course, much important philosophical work has been done, notably by Aristotle, Heidegger, and the later Wittgenstein, to illuminate the mind's necessary embodiment, but one can gain some insight

by reflecting on the idea that a mind cannot be omnipotent. In our analytic work with neurotics we regularly hear echoes of omnipotent and magical thinking. In work with psychotics we see the mind in fast-forward toward flagrant forms of omnipotence. But what can be so distressing in such work is that as they approach full-blown delusions of omnipotence, we see them *lose their minds*. In omnipotence, there is no longer a distinction between mentality and reality; there is no longer anything for mind to operate on or in relation to. We cannot make coherent sense of such a mind (and neither can the poor wretches whose minds are falling apart). The authors of both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Bible implicitly grasped this. For although it might at first seem that the idea of God is the idea of an omnipotent mind, the authors of the Hebrew Bible portray God as in a regular state of frustration, disappointment, sadness, anger, and jealousy with respect to his chosen people. For the Hebrew Bible, the Israelites are God's body. In the Christian Bible, of course, divinity is humanly incarnated in Jesus Christ, and whatever lip service might be given to God's omnipotence, there is no serious suggestion that God could have offered humans the possibility of salvation by taking some shortcut. From a Christian perspective, Jesus had to come into the world; he had to experience human resistance and sin in order to forgive it and redeem humankind. That is, it is human sin and recalcitrance which serves as the Christian God's body.

Once we can see mind as necessarily embodied and restless, there is much else about it which can come to light. For starters, we can see that the philosophical tradition's approach to irrationality has occurred, for the most part, at the wrong level. Previous attempts to make room for irrationality within the concept of mind have failed in roughly the same way that the propositional calculus fails to illuminate the concept of mathematical proof. For previous attempts have it in common that they examine neither the inner structure of the contents of the propositional attitudes nor the various possible mental operations on that inner structure. Rather, they try to account for irrationality in terms of an irrational configuration of propositional attitudes, while leaving the internal structure of those attitudes unexamined. In akrasia, for example, a reason causes me to act in a certain way in spite of

the fact that I supposedly have a stronger reason to act in some other way.[11] That is, akrasia is displayed as a structure of propositional attitudes leading to an action. But what this structure does not explain is the fact of irrationality itself: in this case, why the better reason did not engage.[12] That is one reason why such structures lend a static air to the irrational: even though the structure gives us the motivation for the irrational outcome, we cannot see it coming into being.

Freud's discovery of the elemental forms of mental restlessness suggests that if we are to understand the myriad phenomena of motivated irrationality, we have to understand how the mind effects transformations *on the inner contents* of propositional attitudes and other meaningful bits. Psychoanalysis is of philosophical interest not merely because it provides a fascinating picture of human motivation, but because it intimates how one might construct, as it were, *a predicate calculus of irrationality*.[13] In general, philosophical accounts of irrationality tend to fail to capture either the *immanence* or the possible *disruptiveness* of the irrational. Partitioning the mind along the fault-lines of reason, for example, fails to capture the immanence of human irrationality. Irrationality is treated as a *by-product* of the mind's being a composite of two quasi-minds. And displaying irrational outcomes, like akrasia, as organized structures of propositional attitudes makes mysterious how the mind can, on occasion, disrupt itself. I shall argue, in contrast to the philosophical tradition, that the problem with akrasia is posed not by its irrationality, but by the fact that it is *too rational* to capture the phenomena it is often used to describe.

Of course, unconscious mental functioning is not everywhere disruptive: it can infuse one's conscious, emotional life with joy and creativity. But we also need to account for the fact that it can disrupt life in untold ways. And to capture the immanence of the irrational, we should see this disruption not as coming from outside the mind, or from Another Mind (The Unconscious as a locus of its own rationality and intentionality), but as inherent in the mind's own activity. So, while Socrates may be right that the system of propositional attitudes and actions they bring about show the mind to be inherently rational, Freud is right that the disruptions of this system show the mind also to be inherently irrational. Within

a single human mind there are heterogeneous forms of mental activity, not all of which are rational.

One significant form of such mental activity, from a psychoanalytic point of view, is what Freud calls the "drive" *(Trieb)*—and he again took himself to have made an empirical discovery. But if we think about what a mind must be like if it is to be embodied and restless, we can see that it must engage in something like drive-activity. An embodied mind of an organism living a directed life in an environment must be in the business of trying to represent to the organism its basic needs and direction. As Freud so neatly put it,

> By a "drive" [*Trieb*] is provisionally to be understood the *psychical representative* of an endosomatic continuously flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a "stimulus," which is set up by *single* excitations coming from *without*. The concept of a drive is thus one of *those lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical.*[14]

A drive, then, is one of the primordial ways in which mind represents its body to itself: namely, in its elemental forms of directedness and motivation. The idea of a drive thus lends content to the idea of a mind embodied in a nonomnipotent organism which must interact with an environment to satisfy its needs. It helps us to understand what it is to be an embodied mind. And if we also take mind's restlessness into consideration, we can see why this elemental form of motivation is *a drive* rather than what Freud called an *Instinkt*.[15] An *Instinkt*, for Freud, is a rigid, innate behavioral pattern, such as the innate pressure on and ability of a bird to build a nest. A drive, by contrast, has a certain plasticity: it can be shaped not only by experience but also by various forms of intrapsychic transformations. To put it metaphorically, a drive is what happens to an instinct when it takes up residence in a restless mind. To put it conceptually, once we recognize that mind must be restless—*that we need the concept of mind precisely when we need to account* for an organism which isn't just rigidly performing instinctual behavior—we can see that that restlessness must express itself in even the most elemental forms of mental activity. Otherwise we wouldn't need the concept of mind at this level; we would just have rigid, instinctual behavior. Freud's discovery that human sexuality is a drive rather than an *Instinkt* is precisely the discovery that sexuality is the primordial expression of restless, embod-

ied mentality. Freud called it a "fact which we have been in danger of overlooking," namely, that "the sexual drive and the sexual object are merely soldered together."[16] Restlessness expresses itself at the joints.

One other feature of mind which comes to light when we consider it in its restless embodiment is that it must live with the permanent possibility of falling apart. By way of analogy, consider Plato's discussion of falling apart in the *Republic*. According to Socrates in the *Republic*, even when the human psyche is in the best of shape, even when the most basic form of political organization, the polis, is in the best of shape, each will have to struggle with internal as well as external threats to its integrity. There is always a tendency to come undone. Why should this be? Usually readers think that Plato is simply expressing what he takes to be a sad fact of human life, but that is because they read the *Republic* as a work of political philosophy and psychology. A deeper reading reveals it to be a work of logic: in the sense of revealing the logic, or logos, of a concept. The *Republic* would, I think, be more appropriately titled the *Constitution*, another acceptable translation of the Greek title, *Politeia*. For the book is an inquiry into the very idea of constitutionality. Socrates takes himself to be delineating the concept of justice—what justice is—but it soon becomes clear that what he is working out is the very idea of a differentiated unity, as that idea is instantiated in the human psyche and in the polis. The issue isn't merely that a particular instance of a differentiated unity, the human psyche, will, as a matter of empirical fact, have a hard time holding itself together, but that the very idea of differentiated unity has a hard time holding itself together. On the surface, at least, it is a paradoxical idea. How can we give the idea of differentiation its due without threatening unity? How can we give the idea of unity its due without threatening differentiation? Plato's answer is that we must understand a differentiated unity as existing in a state of tension and under conditions which perpetually threaten disintegration. The *idea* of a permanent possibility of falling apart is needed to keep the *idea* of a differentiated unity from itself falling apart. For Plato, as for Freud following him, the mind's inherent restlessness and its embodiment provide the perfect conditions for the needed threat to integrity.

From a philosophical point of view, what is exciting and significant about psychoanalysis is that it is the first working-out of a truly non-

Socratic approach to human irrationality. Rather than starting, as Socrates does, with an argument that mind must be rational, and then wondering how irrationality can be tacked on, psychoanalysis, when properly understood, begins with the idea that mind must be sometimes irrational. The possibility of disruption is built into the very idea of mindedness. This becomes especially clear if we think of the mind as a differentiated unity *capable of growth*. For how could a differentiated unity grow other than by disrupting itself and then, as it were, healing over that disruption? All of this is obscured by the Two-Minds interpretation of psychoanalysis by which The Unconscious is Another Mind. This is the Socratic reading of Freud, and it covers over Freud's most distinctive achievement: a truly non-Socratic answer to Socrates' challenge.

The Immanence of Irrationality

Consider, for example, this selection from Freud's description of the Rat Man's transference:

> Things soon reached a point at which, in his dreams, his waking phantasies, and his associations, he began heaping the grossest and filthiest abuse upon me and my family, though in his deliberate actions he never treated me with anything but the greatest respect. His demeanor as he repeated these insults to me was that of a man in despair. "How can a gentleman like you, sir," he used to ask, "let yourself be abused in this way by a low, good-for-nothing fellow like me? You ought to turn me out: that's all I deserve." While he talked like this, he would get up from the sofa and roam about the room,—a habit which he explained at first as being due to delicacy of feeling: he could not bring himself, he said, to utter such horrible things while he was lying there so comfortably. But *soon he himself found a more cogent explanation, namely, that he was avoiding my proximity for fear of my giving him a beating.* If he stayed on the sofa he behaved like someone in desperate terror trying to save himself from castigations of terrific violence; he would bury his head in his hands, cover his face with his arm, jump up suddenly and rush away, his features distorted with pain, and so on. He recalled that his father had had a passionate temper, and sometimes in his violence had not known where to stop.[17]

What is the Rat Man doing in cringing before Freud? Good question! The Rat Man himself doesn't immediately have an answer: he is momentarily

in a state of *reflexive breakdown*. Momentarily, he tries out the idea that he has got up from the couch out of delicacy of feeling, but he doesn't seem to be able to live with it. Then he hits upon "a more cogent explanation" and seals over the breakdown with this self-interpretation: he is afraid that Freud is going to give him a beating. And the interpretation does have this plausibility: first, the Rat Man has just expressed hostility toward Freud and is awaiting some kind of response; second, the outbreak of cringing is affectively laden—it is, one might say, a fearful response, and the cringing is itself a primitive, bodily expression of fear; third, the Rat Man quickly associates to past fear of his father. In short, it is tempting to follow the Rat Man's own interpretation and take the cringing to be an outburst of fear of which he has hitherto been unconscious. The Rat Man himself implicitly understands that if he is to interpret himself as afraid of Freud, he must at the same time come up with a reason for his fear. Thus he suggests that he is afraid that Freud is going to give him a beating. Now the Rat Man is interpreting himself as having not only an unconscious fear of Freud, but an unconscious belief about him. And when the Rat Man asks himself why he should believe that, he himself comes up with the thought that Freud reminds him of his violent father. The Rat Man is well on his way to interpreting himself as having an Unconscious Mind with its own beliefs and intentions.

Note that in this instance, at least, the pressure to posit an Unconscious Mind comes from the Rat Man's need to rationalize his cringe. Cringing has burst forth, and the Rat Man wants to make it intelligible to himself by giving it a reason. But consciously the Rat Man understands that he doesn't really have anything to fear from Freud. He knows that his doctor *is not going to beat him. So the reasons for the cringe must be Somewhere Else.* And the reason for the Somewhere Else is the felt need to give reasons for the cringe. In this interpretation, the Rat Man's cringing is a case of akrasia. The Rat Man himself knows that he doesn't have a good reason to fear a beating, yet the cringing is the outburst of an unconscious fear: it is happening for reasons of which the Rat Man has hitherto been unaware and for reasons which, once they are held up to conscious scrutiny, the Rat Man himself can recognize as not particularly persuasive. But somehow the less-good reasons (to fear) have over-

whelmed the better ones (not to fear), and what one sees is an akratic expression of fear.

Basically, this is the Rat Man's own interpretation—and it is important to keep in mind that the Rat Man is an obsessional. As anyone who has worked with them will know, obsessionals tend to interpret themselves as being more rational than they are. Rationalization is among the favorite forms of obsessional defense. Might this not be what is going on here? Obviously, I think the answer is yes. Let me state the thesis baldly and add nuance later: the Rat Man does not fear that Freud is going to give him a beating. And thus there is no need to posit an Unconscious Mind in which that fear is located and rationalized. In short, the Rat Man's cringing before Freud is not an expression of fear and thus not a case of akrasia. It is not a case in which a less-good reason to fear is triumphing over a better reason to remain calm. Whatever it is that the Rat Man is doing, he is not doing for a reason. It is not an expression of belief or desire: and thus it is not an action. It is what Freud called *acting out.*

In cringing, the Rat Man acts out fear. And, to put it paradoxically, acting out isn't a form of acting, it's an activity which isn't an action. It is the expression of phantasy. Why the *ph* rather than the familiar *f*-word? Psychoanalysts use the technical term "phantasy" to draw attention to unconscious aspects of our imaginative life. The ordinary English word "fantasy" is then used generically to cover a family of mental states and activities, but fantasies all have it in common that they are motivational, directed toward some kind of satisfaction, and either have some representational content, expressing a narrative, like a daydream, or express content. If there is a rationale for this distinction, it is that the power and shape of our imaginative life cannot be fully captured by attending only to the contents of our dreams and daydreams. Here I shall argue that *it is a peculiar type of mental activity,* rather than whether it is conscious or unconscious, which distinguishes phantasy. This mental activity will tend to enact a meaning or put some meaning on display, though it may also represent meaning in an imaginative scene. But phantasy will typically "show" a meaning where it does not "say"—and this is one way in which phantasy remains relatively cut off from conscious understanding. Phantasy may operate in relation to, but relatively free of, the rationalizing

constraints of logos—the holistic system of an agent's beliefs and desires, fears, angers, and other propositional attitudes. Indeed, it is this relative freedom from logos which helps to explain phantasy's power. The kind of "fearful" phantasy we see expressed in the Rat Man's cringe is preserved through time precisely because it doesn't have to interact with his beliefs—in this case with his belief that Freud is not going to hurt him. In this way, countervailing beliefs cannot tame or modify the reaction. Phantasies are experienced as powerful because there is no obvious or easy way to bring them into the domain of thought. Thus, however active the mind may be in creating these phantasies, it often experiences them passively, as though it is suffering an experience over which it has little control. Because phantasies can remain relatively unintegrated, the mind may regularly have to suffer its own activity.

But what is it about the phantasy which makes it "fearful"? I am using quotation marks to signal that we do not have a ready vocabulary to talk about these mental states. The very use of language to describe these mental states and activities tends to make them look more rational than they are. Just by giving these mental states a name, we make them seem already to be within the domain of logos, while what we are in fact trying to capture is their not (yet) being there. We need to strike a convincing balance. On the one side, we need to capture the idea that this cringing is not an expression of fear. Otherwise we will also need to supply the relevant beliefs and desires which will rationalize the fear, and we will then be well on our way toward postulating an Unconscious Mind with its own logos. On the other hand, we want the "fearful" expression to stand in some intelligible relation to fear. The cringing isn't merely meaningless behavior, and it is affectively laden: in cringing the Rat Man is in a highly charged state. How can we capture the "fearfulness" of the cringe without making it into an expression of fear?

My answer to this question takes two steps, one through Aristotle's metaphysics, one through Freud's account of the development of psychic structure. The first step is the most vulnerable to misinterpretation, because most people have the unfortunate fate of having to live with a preconscious misconception of Aristotle's metaphysics. Basically, I want to argue that in the cringe what we see is *the matter* of fear—as Aristotle

would put it, *that from which* fear is constituted.[18] What the cringe lacks is, in the literal sense of the term, *information*. It has not yet been fully formed, because it has not been taken up into logos and embedded in the web of beliefs, expectations, and desires which would help to constitute it as fear.

Let's get clear on what this claim is by getting clear on what it is not. The claim is not that the meaning or emotion *fear* is tacked on to what would otherwise be a meaningless cringe. Emotive texture and structure are being incorporated at every level of functioning from the most bodily to the most thoughtful. For Freud, even the most elemental psychological items, the drives—those basic impulsive forces which represent bodily needs—are incorporating information from the social environment for their very constitution.[19] Infants are capable of exhibiting fearful responses in response to fearful stimuli from the beginning of psychological life, and those responses incorporate ever more texture as a person develops. To say that the Rat Man's cringe is "fearful," but not fear, is not to deny any of this. The point is to draw attention to it. When we consider a functioning human being in a state of fear, we want to capture, on the one hand, that the fear reaches down to the most elemental bodily reactions—it expresses itself in structured forms of muscle clenching, constriction of veins, pulse, respiration—while, on the other, fear reaches out and offers a rationalizing orientation to the world. These are not *ingredients* of fear; they are two *aspects* of fear. Or, rather, they are aspects of a functioning whole: a person who is in fear.

The Rat Man's cringe is full of emotional texture and affective meaning, and yet it is only the matter of fear. How could this be? First, the distinction between matter and form is not absolute, but relative to the level of investigation.[20] Second, matter and form are not two ingredients which together make a composite whole; rather, they are two *aspects* by which we can understand the functioning of the whole. We don't tend to see them in isolation unless there has been some kind of a breakdown.

It is just such a breakdown which we see in the Rat Man's cringe. For although the cringe does have an emotional texture and structure of its own, because it is the expression of phantasy it has been kept from being integrated with the beliefs and other attitudes which would help to constitute it as fear. Many people assume that if the cringing is not an expression of fear, then it is "mere behavior"—and that formulation seems counterintuitive. But to move from "not fear" to "mere behavior" is to live in an impoverished universe of possibilities. The Rat Man's cringing is neither fear nor "mere behavior": it is affectively laden, it has texture and depth for the Rat Man, it is certainly an expression of anxiety.[21] But at the moment it appears it has not yet been taken up into the rationalizing structure of conscious and preconscious mental functioning. It is not (yet) constituted as fear, and thus it is, momentarily at least, unintelligible to the Rat Man. It is unintelligible not because the fear exists in some other part of the mind, The Unconscious, but because what is breaking through isn't fear; it is "fearful," and thus it has not yet assumed a form in which it can easily be thought.

Similarly, when we consider a full-fledged emotional reaction like fear, it is a mistake to think of it as composed of two independently existing ingredients, form and matter. Form permeates matter, and matter "embodies" form. We can mistake an aspect for an ingredient because in moments of functional breakdown it is possible to see the matter on its own—as when we see the Rat Man cringe. And if we do take the matter as an ingredient rather than as an aspect, we will tend to see the cringe as a "mere cringe," as mere bodily behavior (which of course it is not) and then look for the fear which informs it. When such a cringe is integrated into a person's expression of fear, it is as much an expression of fear as anything else. It is not as though we have a worked-out understanding of what the matter of fear is independently of observing various breakdowns and miscarriages of emotional response. The emotion of fear has its own developmental history, and breakdowns and fixation points can occur almost anywhere along the continuum. We discover the matter of fear by studying the Rat Man's cringe.

These reflections are of clinical significance. The Rat Man is himself puzzled by his behavior, and interprets it first as an expression of delicacy, then as an expression of fear: and in this way he interprets himself as more rational and mentally organized than he is. And that is so, even if the interpretation ultimately portrays the Rat Man as irrational. So, for example, the Rat Man may say that Freud reminds him of his father, and

he may once have had reason to fear his father. On this interpretation, the Rat Man may be irrational—he may have better reasons not to fear Freud—but at least he is acting for a reason. The Rat Man now has a sense of what he is doing. He purports to understand himself in terms of an organized structure of propositional attitudes. *And he may even form those attitudes.* That is, in response to the anxiety aroused by not knowing *what he is doing, he may actually form the belief that Freud is about to* beat him. But here it is not a reason which is causing an action; it is acting out and anxiety which are causing the formation of a reason. He may then even become afraid of Freud, but *now it is not that fear is being expressed in a cringe; the cringe is bringing about the fear.* Akrasia would then be occurring *as a defensive response to irrationality,* not as an originating instance of it. It would then facilitate a defensive misunderstanding of that irrationality.

Freud finds the Rat Man's self-interpretation of fear "a more cogent explanation." But that's the problem: it is *too* cogent. Similarly with the standard philosophical account of irrationality: it collaborates with the defense. For if the Rat Man's cringing is portrayed as akrasia, it may be irrational, but at least the Rat Man is acting from reasons. But this philosophical account enters too late to capture the distinctive grade of irrationality at play. For it enters at the level of the propositional attitudes, whereas by then we are already at the level of a defensive surface. At best, the interpretation of akrasia captures only the most superficial layer of this irrational activity.

It is an ever-present danger of psychoanalytic technique that one unwittingly collaborates with a rationalizing defense. Sartre criticized psychoanalysis as a form of bad faith—and while the charge is unjustified as it stands, the charge does apply to certain misapplications of technique.[22] So, the Rat Man portrays himself as cringing before Freud because he is *already* in a state of fear; he portrays himself as suffering his own emotional states. This is a form of bad faith. And insofar as psychoanalytic interpretation corroborates such an outlook, it ends up reinforcing the resistance rather than analyzing it. If one were to interpret at this point at all, one ought, I think, to help the Rat Man recover his own sense of puzzlement at what he is doing: allow him, insofar as it is possible, to tolerate

his anxiety at not already knowing the answer. If he is able to live with the experience of a "fearful" reaction while recognizing that he actually isn't afraid of Freud, he may come to a more accurate sense of how his past and his inner world are making for an irrational present. Above all, the interpretation should not help him make too much sense of what he is doing.

Note that the problem with the Rat Man's interpretation is not simply that it is positing more psychological complexity than exists. Sometimes there is occasion for an interpretation which adds complexity to an emotional response. Here is one typical example: a person may regularly keep himself in a state of unawareness and psychological disorganization as he acts in anger or with aggression. To interpret the anger is not to point out a fully formed psychological state (and the interpretation ought not to imply that it is), but the interpretation may provide the concept needed for the analysand to organize his various angry feelings and acts—and thus become conscious of his anger. In this way, a good interpretation can *inform* the analysand's behavior and emotional responses.

Of course, as every practicing analyst knows, there are people whose anger is so well organized that all which seems to be missing is the name "anger" itself. What's in a name? Well, the ability to move from a highly organized preconscious state which nevertheless remains split off from conscious life to a state in which one can recognize and consciously tolerate one's anger and begin to integrate it into the rest of one's emotional life. *Here the angry responses may themselves have been well organized*—thus we designate the anger as preconscious—but the interpretation nevertheless facilitates an emotional development which does not yet exist.

By contrast, the problems with the Rat Man's interpretation are: first, insofar as it posits more psychological complexity than exists, it is not aware that it is doing so, and thus it promotes self-misunderstanding; second, it promotes "bad teleology": a tendency for the Rat Man to become afraid of Freud as a way of rationalizing his own behavior. In such a case, it is not that he is coming to understand his own emotional life; it is that his understanding is laying out the tracks along which his emotional life is being directed to run. Unlike the case of unconscious anger, in which an

analysand actively keeps himself from understanding his anger as a defense, and in which a proper interpretation can help analyze the defense, the Rat Man is not keeping himself from an awareness of his fear of Freud. Quite the contrary: his fear of Freud—insofar as he does become afraid—is itself the construction of a defense.

I SAID EARLIER that to understand the "fearfulness" of the Rat Man's cringe we need to take two steps, one through Aristotle's metaphysics, the other through Freud's account of the development of psychic structure. It is time for the second step. I shall only sketch a rough outline, and we must keep in mind that the interpretation is provisional: we have only a brief case history and notes to go on. But the point is not to reach absolute certainty about the Rat Man, but to get a clearer idea of how to understand a "fearful" cringe which is not an expression of fear.[33] In the end, it doesn't matter whether we are getting the Rat Man right; what matters is whether we are accurately identifying a serious occupational hazard of psychoanalytic technique.

First, the development of psychic structure, according to Freud, typically has a historical dimension. There is likely to have been an earlier time when the Rat Child did fear his father. His father may have been violent and given the child reason to fear him. He may also have seemed fearful as a result of various phantasies and conflicts. In response, the Rat Child *internalizes* the Rat Dad. Internalization is a nonrational mental activity which takes significant figures from the external world and places them inside the psyche. For Freud, psychic structure is formed around these internalizations. Once internalized, the Rat Dad is subject to phantastic distortions and primary-process associations. The Rat Child now has a punishing father figure inside him, and it acquires an intrapsychic role. Perhaps the original internalization was a defensive response: the point of the internalization was to contain and control a threatening figure in the environment. But now that the punishing father is inside, the psyche organizes itself around it.

The phantastic creation of a powerful, vindictive father may serve to inhibit public outbursts of rage. How so? Melanie Klein has argued that the

earliest internalizations occur via phantasies of physical incorporation.[34] In good-enough circumstances, the comfort, reassurance, and satisfaction which the child receives at the breast is taken in with mother's milk. That is, the milk itself becomes a concrete vehicle of meaning. Goodness is the meaning of the milk. As the warm milk enters the mouth, and the child can feel herself swallow it and feel the milk fill up her tummy, it is, for her, as though mother's goodness is now physically present inside her. Similarly, the child may begin to form a superego around a prohibitive utterance: for the Rat Child, it may have been the voice of the father saying, "Don't do that!" The utterance is itself the physical movement of meaning. The father's tongue has set the air around it vibrating, and a prohibitive meaning informs that vibrating air. That meaning reaches the Rat Child's ear via its concrete vehicle and triggers a chain of neurological reactions. One outcome is that the Rat Child can hear his father; another is that he can hear the prohibitive voice over and over "inside his head." The Rat Child experiences his own rage as tremendously powerful; and one way to deal with the anxiety it arouses is, in phantasy, to move it over to invest the father's voice. This isn't a thought or a judgment; it is the nonrational, phantastic movement of content. However, though the phantasy-movement of content is not itself rational, it may acquire a dynamic, intrapsychic function. Rage gains some expression, phantastically expressed over there, in the voice of the father, and it is used intrapsychically to inhibit outbursts of rage. And so the movement of meaning in phantasy helps to shape intrapsychic structure. The Rat Child begins to live a life which is to be understood in significant part as an extended cringe before the voice of the Rat Dad.

It is important to recognize that the internal Rat Dad is not a subject of propositional attitudes for the Rat Man. Much later, after psychoanalytic treatment, the Rat Man may form certain beliefs and desires about his superego: he may come to believe that his superego is too cruel, and he may want it to give him a break, and so on.[35] But at the time of its formation, the Rat Man's superego is not the kind of thing about which he is in a position to form any beliefs or desires: it is just a bit of his psychological makeup which is coming into being. Now as a result of repeated activities of introjection and projection, the internal Rat Dad stands in complex

psychological relations with the Rat Man's father, about whom the Rat Man does have beliefs, desires, hopes, loves, and hates. The Rat Man can continue to think about, fear, and love *his father*, and the internal Rat Dad is dynamically and phantastically linked to him. But the internal Rat Dad is not a character about whom the Rat Man is in a position to form even unconscious beliefs or emotions: he is, rather, a fixed point of psychic structure. This is one way in which phantasy arrogates to itself its tremendous power: because the internal Rat Dad cannot be thought about (in any obvious way), there is no obvious way in which the experience of its power can be modified by conscious thought.

The Rat Person grows up, his father dies: he no longer has reason to be afraid of his father, he no longer believes that his father might attack him, he no longer desires to avoid such an attack. Nevertheless, a structure has been laid down in phantasy which continues to have a profound effect on the way the Rat Man lives. We see a flagrant example in the transference. Anxiety is building up in the Rat Man, no doubt for all sorts of reasons, but one is that his aggression and hatred is gaining some expression in the analysis. Perhaps there is anxiety in relation to an impending attack by the internal Rat Dad. The Rat Man responds by projecting Rat Dad onto Freud. Note that the Rat Man does not *believe* that the Rat Dad is about to attack, nor does he *believe* that Freud is like his father, nor does he *believe* that Freud is about to beat him. We are not dealing with such thoughtfulness. Projection is a nonrational, though strategic, response to anxiety. The phantasy finds its target in Freud in part because the intrapsychic time is right—the Rat Man needs to find some target onto which to discharge his anxiety—in part because of some elemental, primary-process senses of similarity between father and Freud. *Indeed, the transference-projection may help to create the sense of similarity the Rat Man now experiences:* that is, it may not be because Freud reminds him of his father that he projects the Rat Dad onto him, but because he has projected the Rat Dad onto Freud that he now remembers that he used to be afraid of his father. The transference is thus not to be understood simply as a set of emotional reactions which are transferred from father to Freud. Rather there is, via internalization, a phantastic movement from father, to phantastically distorted internal Rat Dad, and then a subsequent projection of Rat Dad out onto Freud. The Rat Man does not have a

reason to do this, though there may be a strategic point to each of these elemental activities. In mental expulsion, the mind phantasizes getting rid of some unpleasant bit.[26] But of course that phantasy too has a fate, and what the external observer now sees is the Rat Man cringing before Freud. But the Rat Man is not here expressing his fear of Freud; he is putting on display the structure of his mind. Intrapsychic structure ends up being displayed in the social world.

No wonder that it is precisely here that the Rat Man reflexively breaks down: he cannot coherently *say* what he *shows*. He does not understand what he is doing, and he searches for some rationalizing explanation. It is not just that as a self-interpreting animal, the Rat Man wants to understand what he is doing; he wants to understand himself as a rational animal. He wants to see himself as acting for a reason. Thus he quickly constructs his more "cogent explanation." As we have seen, reason is used as a defense to cover over unreason.

WHAT MIGHT A NONDEFENSIVE USE of reason be like? As a first step, consider Wittgenstein's description of training an infant to express her pain in language.[27] The infant expresses her pain with a "primitive," "natural" outburst. The child does not need to be taught to cry, nor need the crying occur for a reason. And the prelinguistic infant will not be able to interpret or otherwise understand her own behavior. Yet the behavior will nevertheless have meaning for her parents, who, in effect, will offer the child an interpretation. Usually the interpretation will be offered as a form of comfort: "I know it hurts now, but it will go away"; "It's only a scrape, you'll be fine"; and so on. As Wittgenstein puts it, "words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation *and used in their place.*" That is, the child learns to express her pain in language. "The verbal expression of pain *replaces crying* and does not only describe it." In this way, a primitive, natural reaction of mind and body is brought within the domain of logos. The infant's outburst is not "mere behavior"; it is affectively laden, and it has meaning *for the parents*, who offer that meaning to the infant as one of many ways of inducting her into logos. The experience of pain, crying, the verbal expression of pain all come to

have meaning *for her*. The child can now not only express her pain in language; she also acquires the ability to represent her pain to herself, and she likewise acquires the ability to bring other thoughts to bear on her pain. She can now *tell herself* that it is really only a scrape, and so on. In subjecting her pain to rational consideration, in the light of her other understandings, she thereby gains a certain freedom with respect to it.

Now a cringe is also a "primitive," "natural" outburst, like crying, but unlike the prelinguistic infant, the Rat Man already lives within logos. He already knows the meaning of a cringe. A child who has already learned to express her pain in language may nevertheless burst out crying—because pain overwhelms her, or because she is strategically trying to elicit the sympathy of others, or because she is trying to fool others into thinking she is in pain. In each of these cases, the crying has itself become a vehicle of meaning. It expresses a meaning *for the child*. It might be thought that the Rat Man's cringe is something like that: the primitive expression of fear by someone who has already learned to express his fear in language. But this isn't quite right. Internalization, as we have seen, effectively isolates and withdraws the Rat Dad from the system of propositional attitudes. In this way, although the Rat Dad may continue to be transformed in phantasy, and continue to be subject to primary-process elaboration and distortion, "he" also remains a piece of the archaic past. "He" cannot be effectively or consciously thought—and thus cannot be transformed by thought. So when the Rat Man projects the Rat Dad out onto Freud, he responds with a cringe—*as though* it were relatively uninformed. Of course, the cringe isn't "mere behavior"—it is affectively laden, it is something which in a more integrated response would be woven into the expression of fear—and as he turns his attention to it, the Rat Man comes to see meaning in it. But unlike the linguistic child who immediately sees meaning in her crying, for the Rat Man there is a moment of not-knowing the meaning of his doings.

The cringe is, as it were, a blast from the past. And that is why the verbal expression of fear *cannot* (as yet) replace this cringe. Because of the vicissitudes of internalization and projection, it is as though an uninformed cringe gets preserved in intrapsychic amber. The cringe is "fearful," and when taken up into logos will help to constitute fear—but in its initial expression, it is like an outburst from the archaic past. What we get to see in this outburst of irrationality, in this moment of reflexive breakdown, is the "that from which," "matter," of fear. Of course, this moment of reflexive breakdown provokes its own anxiety, the anxiety which arises from not knowing what one is doing; and the defensive use of reason rushes to the meaning of cringing and tries to give a rationalizing explanation in terms of it: "I am afraid of Freud." And once the Rat Man has this interpretation, he may form the belief that he is afraid. That is, the interpretation may become self-fulfilling.

But even so, something important has gone missing. Cringing has become a vehicle of meaning for the Rat Man, and when he interprets it, he gives the *content* of this meaning, but he thereby remains oblivious to what he is *doing* with this meaning. He takes himself to be expressing this content in his cringe—that is, to be expressing fear—and remains unconscious of the phantasy activity which expresses itself in the cringe. He is, for example, unaware that he uses the cringe to break off the elaboration of a sadistic phantasy in which he heaps abuse on the Freud/Rat Dad, he is unaware that he is projecting an internal figure onto Freud, he is unaware that in his cringe he is displaying not fear but his own phantasized crouch, the very mode of his own inhibiting activity, and so on. So far, he can understand himself only in terms of the meanings on which the phantasy activity operates, but he cannot understand the phantasy activity itself. And that is why the cringe can be preserved through cycles of internalization, projection, and reinternalization. For even in moments when the cringe is acted out in social space, as in the transference, and even when the Rat Man interprets it, his interpretation has little transformative effect. This is because the interpretation ignores the real mental activity which is being expressed in the cringe—projection, phantasy activity—and focuses on content. The Rat Man concerns himself with what the cringe *says*, and is oblivious to what it *shows*.

And this gives a clue to what a nondefensive use of reason might be like. It is the process Freud called "working-through": the enduring attempt to give a meaning to the phantasy activity itself. Rather than simply stating the meaning of a cringe, the interpretation would try to state (in understandable terms) what the Rat Man is doing with that cringe. In

that way, the phantasy activity would itself come to have meaning for the Rat Man, come to be a possible object of thought, and thus gain some genuine integration into the rationality system. This is what it is for the Rat Man's cringing to acquire what Freud called a new "transference meaning."[28] In the transference, which is itself a form of phantasy activity, a figure in the Rat Man's mind has been projected onto Freud. But unlike his purely internal counterpart, Freud can offer an interpretation of his place in the Rat Man's intrapsychic structure. For the Rat Man, it is as though the punishing father can speak his own meaning, interpret his role in the phantasy activity. No other figure in the Rat Man's inner world can do this: all the other characters have relatively fixed roles, locked in certain dynamic struggles. But when the Rat Man comes to re-internalize the punishing father, he is, as it were, importing self-understanding into a previously unreflective world.[29] In this way, phantasy begins to be transformed into, or at least brought in relationship with, preconscious and conscious imagination. The effect is that intrapsychic structure gets loosened up—and a real possibility of psychic integration emerges. It comes to be influenced by conscious thought and the propositional attitudes. Ironically, the Rat Man may have spent his life alternating between phantasized attacks on and cringes before the punishing father—but all of this preserves the Rat Dad in a relatively fixed dynamic position. The one thing the punishing father cannot survive is an adequate interpretation of his role. With this new transference meaning, the cringing loses its automatic, compulsive quality. In Wittgenstein's terms, the verbal expression of phantasy comes to replace phantasy and not merely describe it. In Freud's terms, the cringing comes to be something which can be "remembered" and not merely "repeated."

We began this section with a temptation and a challenge. The temptation was to interpret the Rat Man's cringe as an expression of unconscious fear. To take that interpretation seriously, we have to rationalize that fear with unconscious beliefs and expectations: that is, we are led to posit the Unconscious as another mind, a locus of its own rationality and strategy. In this conceptualization, an irrational outburst like the cringe is the by-product of a conflict between two mindlike entities, The Conscious and The Unconscious. The challenge was to see if we could construct an alternative picture

in which irrationality is *immanent* to mind. By now it should be clear that the Rat Man's cringe is not an expression of fear and thus there is no need for an Unconscious Mind in which that fear is rationalized. Nor is there need to see the cringe as breaking through from another mind, The Unconscious. Just the opposite: *the mind is putting its own structure on display*. And thus the cringe, however irrational, is an immanent expression of mind.

A word of clinical warning: It is a mistake to use the thoughts in this essay surreptitiously to teach analysands a new theoretical vocabulary ("No, Johnny, it is not fear you are experiencing, it is 'fearful' . . ."). Rather, as clinicians, we need to make our own theoretical unconscious conscious and to do our best to continue analyzing defenses rather than unwittingly collaborate with them. I have tried to show how from such a simple and plausible step as interpreting the cringe as an expression of fear one can be led unawares to the idea that the unconscious must be Another Mind, its own center of rationality and intentionality. One can also be led to collaborate in an obsessional defense. But, having *worked through* the thoughts in this essay, it is fine by me if an analyst wants to stay close to the analysand's own vocabulary and call the cringe an expression of fear. Ironically, having come to see that it is not an expression of fear, we can say that it is! Because now we will be using the vocabulary of fear to capture the analysand's emotional life in his own vocabulary, yet we will also be trying to help the analysand tolerate the anxiety of not already knowing what he is doing, and we will also be helping the analysand to notice the defensive nature of his rush to interpretation. The point is not to create a new dogmatic vocabulary, but to make us sensitive to the ways in which the interpretation of emotions can be used to cover over psychic reality rather than reveal it. If you now want to call the cringe "fear," go for it![30]

The Disruptiveness of Phantasy

But even if phantasy can supply an immanent source of irrationality, how can mind disrupt itself? This question, as we have seen, is especially pressing for the philosophical tradition, which tends to portray irrationality as organized structures of propositional attitudes. The point is not to show that unconscious mental activity is everywhere disruptive or that phantasy is necessarily disruptive. They are not. Unconscious phantasy

can enrich and enliven conscious creative life. But phantasy can also disrupt, and it is important to grasp this disruption as coming not from outside the mind or from an Unconscious Mind but as part of the mind's own activity.

Consider, for example, this description of the Rat Man's protective prayers.

> At the time of the revival of his piety he made up prayers for himself which took up more and more time and eventually lasted for an hour and a half. The reason for this was that he found, like an inverted Balaam, that something always inserted itself into his pious phrases and turned them into their opposite. E.g., if he said "May God protect him," an evil spirit would hurriedly insinuate a "not." On one such occasion the idea occurred to him of cursing instead, for in that case, he thought, the contrary words would be sure to creep in. His original intention, which had been repressed by his praying, was forcing its way through in this last idea of his. In the end he found his way out of his embarrassment by giving up the prayers and replacing them by a short formula concocted out of the initial letters or syllables of various prayers. He then recited this formula so quickly that nothing could slip into it.[31]

Again, it is tempting to see the Rat Man bursting forth with a contradictory judgment from the one he consciously intends to utter. The utterance is then seen as a case of akrasia: although all things considered he wants to utter a protective prayer, an unconscious desire causes him to issue his contradictory prayer instead. But why should there be such a desire? How can we understand it other than as part of a rationalizing network of beliefs and desires of an Unconscious Mind? This unconscious desire makes sense if it is located in an Unconscious Mind which also hates the Rat Man's father, fears his revenge, and desires his own revenge. Here we again see that following out the plausible thought that this is a case of akrasia leads us to posit Another Mind, another locus of rationality and strategy.

But to interpret this as akrasia is again to attribute more rationality to the occurrence than is there. We are witnessing a mental activity too primitive to be understood as the outcome of belief and desire. The Rat Man is not uttering a contradictory judgment—and thus there is no need to posit a desire or intention to issue such a prayer anywhere in the mind.

What the Rat Man is doing is launching a phantasized attack on his own prayer-making activity. He is not asserting a prayer contradictory to the one he consciously intended; he is, rather, primitively attacking his attempt at prayer, breaking it up by forcibly inserting a "not." He is actively disrupting his own thought.

Of course, there are many ways in which a person may disrupt his thought activity which do not involve the creation of a new meaning: by stuttering or sneezing, by repeatedly getting up to go to the bathroom, by having intrusive thoughts which break in on one's train of thought, and so on. The Rat Man has hit on an ingenious form of disruption: one which creates a new public meaning, one to which he cannot remain oblivious. On the one hand, this is not just an accident; on the other hand, it is not the utterance of a contradictory prayer. How can there be any room in between? It is phantasy which preserves the possibility of elemental forms of mental activity which are themselves meaningful but are not themselves the formation of judgments or other propositional attitudes. We have already seen how the Rat Man lives out a cringe before the internal Rat Dad; he also sporadically lives out a "hateful" rebellion. I say "hateful" because what we see here is the matter of hate: the Rat Man's hostility has not been taken up into logos and embedded in the justifying beliefs and attitudes which would inform it as hate. Precisely because the Rat Dad has been internalized in phantasy, "he" is removed from the network of propositional attitudes—and thus cannot be worked over in thought. As a result, Rat Dad remains a fairly primitive phantastic figure who elicits fairly primitive phantastic responses. Primitive expressions of hostility thus survive, unintegrated into rational thought. Let us consider how this might work.

As we know from the case history, the Rat Man was himself tortured by phantasies of a rat-torture being inflicted on his father.[32] This phantasy is elaborated from a story a cruel captain told him when he was in the army. In the torture, rats burrowed into the anus of the victim and devoured him from the inside. No doubt the conscious phantasy that this was happening to his father was itself an expression of hostility, and through it, sadistic yearnings gained some gratification. In phantasy, the Rat Man's mind is working in an aura of omnipotence: for the Rat Man, it

is almost as though the torture is being carried out. This raises anxiety, and his mind leaps to a phantastic, magical gesture of undoing and reparation. There might be various such gestures, but one would be a prayer uttered under the same magical mist of omnipotence. In phantasy, the prayer has the power to protect his father—and there is a psychological truth which underlies this experience of omnipotence. Insofar as the Rat Man can concentrate on uttering a prayer, he will actually have succeeded in getting his mind to break off the elaboration of the phantasy of the rat-torture: and thus he will, at least for that moment, have brought the rat-torture to an end.

So he tries to utter a protective prayer, but at that point his hostility wells up, and he shoves a "not" into his utterance. The disruption occurs via a direct assault on a vehicle of meaning: the spoken sounds with which the Rat Man is trying to say a prayer. And the utterance is physically disrupted by the physical intrusion of another vehicle of meaning, an utterance of the word "not." That is, even as he is trying to protect his father from the rat-torture by uttering a prayer, *he reenacts the torture by shoving a "not" up the ass of his utterance.* The "not" intrudes inside the utterance and eats away at its meaning.

Such an act is a wondrous concoction of sophisticated and primitive forms of mental activity. The Rat Man is already in logos: he speaks and thinks in a natural language. (In his case it was German, but to avoid unnecessary complication, I shall simply treat him as English-speaking.) Thus he understands that "not" is a word typically used to form negations. And his phantasy activity is to some degree sensitive to the sophisticated fact that "not" has a negating meaning. But the phantasy activity itself puts this sophisticated vehicle of meaning to a primitive use. What this example shows is that the direct attack on vehicles of meaning can itself be meaningful. The Rat Man attacks his prayer-making activity, but he hears himself saying, "May God *not* protect him!" and this has a meaning for him, as for his audience. He has actively broken up his prayer, but he experiences himself as passive before the new injunction which he has ended up uttering. This is not the outcome of belief and desire. It is more like crying or cringing or bursting out: a primitive, natural expression—in this case, of aggression. But instead of crying with tears or bursting out in

a scream, the Rat Man bursts out with a concrete, sophisticated vehicle of meaning. In this way, he satisfies his aggressive wishes *by being aggressive,* and in the process he creates a new hostile piece of meaning. But it is not a judgment; it is the active disruption of the mind's own judging activity.[33]

Undoubtedly the Rat Man will himself try to understand what he is doing. He will probably take himself to be issuing a contradictory judgment: and thus it will become overwhelmingly plausible to the Rat Man himself that he has another part of his mind from which the contradictory judgment issues. But all of this is *post hoc:* it is part of a rationalizing defense. And it keeps the Rat Man in ignorance of what he is actually doing. In this way, postulation of The Unconscious as another mind, a locus of its own rationality, facilitates self-misunderstanding. And it collaborates with and expresses an obsessional outlook. Of course, once the Rat Man has taken himself to have uttered a contradictory judgment, that judgment will be taken up into the system of propositional attitudes, and its influence will begin to take on a certain life of its own. But this is not the incorporation of the phantasy into the domain of logos; it is the incorporation of a defensive misreading of that phantasy. For a genuine incorporation into logos, one needs the process of working-through. Only then can the verbal expression of aggression replace its enactment.

But until these doings are properly brought within logos, as genuinely understood, the Rat Man correctly portrays himself as somewhat passive in the face of the meaning his acts end up creating. He tries uttering a curse in the hope that a similar attack on judgment will leave him uttering a prayer. Finally, he stumbles on an ingenious, if temporary, solution: to try to create a meaningful assertion from nonmeaningful bits—that is, to try to make the formation of a judgment more like the formation of a single word. He concocts a code from the first letters of various words or sentences in the prayer and tries to say them so quickly that he cannot interrupt himself. The important point is not that he can say these letters quickly, but that any attack on the performance of this ritual, though it may disturb the ritual, cannot negate it. The interruption may prevent him from creating his meaning, but it will not thereby create another meaning which he will then have to endure. Of course, such a solution can last only so long: it is only a matter of time before each of the "letters"

takes on the meaning of a word, and some gesture or sound comes to mean negation.

The Power of Phantasy

One source of phantasy's power is that it can work both in and on meaning. One can see this by contrasting the efficacy of phantasy with the ways conscious imaginative activity like daydreaming works on us. (Of course, daydreams will themselves be expressions of phantasy, but I here want to concentrate on the conscious aspect.) In a typical masturbatory daydream, for example, it is a person's understanding of the unfolding sexual content which, in concert with physical masturbatory activity, will raise sexual excitement to an orgasm. Similarly, when we cry at a sad movie, our emotional reactions are following and responding to the content of the story. In contrast, phantasy can also work *directly* on the mind. It does so in part by working on the material vehicles in which the mind expresses itself. We have seen the Rat Man directly attack his attempt at prayer. He doesn't do this by operating purely at the level of sense, or meaning: he doesn't offer a contradictory judgment which negates the meaning of the original judgment. Rather, he materially attacks the concrete activity of judging—and in the process creates a new meaning.[34] It is important to see that similar acts can create the content of phantasies themselves. Consider, for example, Freud's description of the analytic session in which the Rat Man recounted the torture.

> At all the more important moments while he was telling his story his face took on a very strange, composite expression. I could only interpret it as one of *horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware.* He proceeded and with the greatest difficulty: *"At that moment the idea flashed through my mind that this was happening to a person who was very dear to me."* In answer to a direct question he said that it was not he himself who was carrying out the punishment, but that it was being carried out as it were impersonally. After a little prompting I learnt that the person to whom this "idea" of his related was the lady whom he admired.
>
> *He broke off his story in order to assure me that these thoughts were entirely foreign and repugnant to him,* and to tell me that everything which had followed in their train had passed through his mind with the most extraordinary rapidity.

> *Simultaneously with the idea there always appeared a "sanction,"* that is to say, the defensive measure which he was obliged to adopt in order to prevent the phantasy from being fulfilled. When the captain had spoken of this ghastly punishment, he went on, and these ideas had come into his head, *by employing his usual formulas (a "but" accompanied by a gesture of repudiation, and the phrase "whatever are you thinking of"?)* he had just succeeded in warding off *both* of them.
>
> The "both" took me aback, and it has not doubt also mystified the reader. For so far we have heard only of one idea—of the rat punishment being carried out upon the lady. He was now obliged to admit that *a second idea had occurred to him simultaneously, namely, the idea of the punishment also being applied to his father.* As his father had died many years previously, this obsessive fear was much more nonsensical even than the first, and accordingly it had attempted to escape being confessed to for a little while longer.[35]

The Rat Man is recounting the story of the rat-torture when, in phantasy, a representation of his lady friend is intruded into the story. The intrusion may be visual—an image of his lady put in the place of the victim—or it may be verbal—he hears himself saying or thinking "my friend" instead of "the victim," and so on; but in every such case the intrusion is more or less physical. This is an example of what Freud meant by displacement or condensation, paradigms of primary-process mental activity. And once this intrusion has occurred, there is now a new phantasy with which the Rat Man must contend: that of the rat-torture happening to his lady friend.[36] Here we see how the holistic content of the phantasy can be altered by an atomic perturbation: for example, the momentary insertion of an image of the lady friend. The overall meaning of the phantasy shifts in response to elementary transformations on concrete vehicles of meaning. Later, he has to admit that another idea has been superimposed on that of the victim and the lady: the torture is now happening to his father as well. This activity of superimposition is what Freud called condensation. The phantasy has been operated on directly, and it creates a new meaning.

The only way he knows how to protect himself from the force of this newly formed phantasy is to attack it directly. In the transference, he breaks the story. He interrupts himself to assure Freud that all this is repugnant to him. On the surface, this looks like a conscious reassurance—

and it is certainly that. But it is also a direct attack on his phantasy. He interrupts the flow of the phantasy (which is taking hold even as he recounts it in the analysis) by breaking it off (and reassuring Freud). And in phantasy activity, he breaks up the formation of this phantasy with a sanction. The Rat Man has formed a magical symbol of negation—exclaiming "but," followed by a certain gesture, probably one which imitates the physical gesture of pushing something away or erasing it, followed by "whatever are you thinking of?!"—which when appended to a phantasy serves to negate it. Of course, one can imagine the Rat Man attacking this gesture of repudiation, and so on. But in each case there is a direct, physical attack on a vehicle of meaning which ends up creating a new meaning.

One might wonder: why does the Rat Man think that uttering a sanction will somehow undo the malign power of his phantasy? Of course, if there were a rational answer to that question, we'd be within the domain of rationality, which we are not. But I think we can see here a certain method in the madness. The Rat Man is able to invest the sanction with magical powers because the sanction actually breaks up the formation of the torture phantasy. It does actually succeed in inhibiting or undoing the phantasy; not by magic—in this way the Rat Man misunderstands himself and the power of the sanction—but through a direct attack on the phantasy.

I have focused on examples in which one can see fairly clearly the direct efficacy of some phantasy activity. But once one grasps the model, one can see much of the Rat Man's life as dominated by this nonrational form of mental activity. At the time the Rat Man is plagued with these torture phantasies, the captain, who mistakenly thinks the Rat Man owes a certain Lieutenant A. money, comes up to him and tells him that he must repay the money. The Rat Man's life is then taken up with the most contorted and complicated attempts to repay the money—when all along he knows that he doesn't actually owe Lieutenant A. anything. Why does he do this? It is even more of a strain than usual to see this as a case of akrasia, for the Rat Man does not seem to have *any* reason to pay back the lieutenant. But if one wants to go that route, one can say that he *wants* to follow the captain's orders. We are then left with the dubious challenge of trying to explain at the level of beliefs and desires why the Rat Man

doesn't simply explain to the captain that no money is owed to Lieutenant A. Is it because he *fears* the captain will punish him before he gets his explanation out? But why does he *believe* that? Again, we are led to posit a whole other realm of beliefs, desires, emotions—an Unconscious—which would rationalize this one irrational act. And the basis for all of *this* structure is the irrational act we are trying to understand.

A better answer to the question "Why does he do this?" is: because it comes next. It is the temporal juxtaposition of the captain's order, coming just when the Rat Man was having torture phantasies, which allows the Rat Man to treat the order as a sanction which would negate the phantasy. It is plausible that the Rat Man also projected the internal Rat Dad out onto the captain, so that the Rat Man experiences the captain's utterance as the Rat Dad telling him what he has to do to prevent a retaliatory attack. Here we see how *the content of a phantasy can become quite sophisticated, but as the result of elementary mental activities.* There is nothing internal to the meaning of the rat-torture phantasy from which it unfolds that the Rat Man must pay back the lieutenant. The elaboration of the phantasy is not working through its meaning. Rather, the sophistication of the phantasy is parasitic on the sophistication of the captain's utterance. The utterance gains its power from the fact that the captain is the target of the Rat Man's projective phantasies and what he says comes next. In this way, meaning gets made from elementary mental operations and physical juxtapositions. One should thus view the entirety of the Rat Man's twisted attempts to pay back the money as an extended gesture of repudiation: a sanction which, appended to the torture phantasy, will magically undo it. Again, the rationality system may be wheeled in to formulate a rationalizing interpretation, and the Rat Man may even form beliefs to fall in line with his self-interpretation, but all of this is *post hoc* defensive surface.

It is important to note that rationality enters mainly as a defense. Consider this account of how the Rat Man sought help from Freud.

> His determination to consult a doctor was woven into his delirium in the following ingenious manner. He thought he would get a doctor to give him a certificate to the effect that it was necessary for him, in order to recover his health, to perform some such action as he had planned in connection with

> Lieutenant A. . . . The *chance* that one of my books happened to fall into his hands just at that moment directed his choice to me. There was no question of getting a certificate from me, however; all that he asked of me was, very reasonably, to be freed of his obsessions.[37]

It seems pretty clear that Freud is here taken in by the defense, and collaborates with the transference rather than analyzing it. From an obsessional perspective, there is no such thing as chance. A chance occurrence is in fact a physical juxtaposition of meanings. Freud's book comes to the Rat Man's attention just as he is experiencing difficulty in carrying out his sanctioning gesture. Thus it is taken by him as a sign: it points the way to how he is to continue his phantasized gesture of repudiation. Not to go into analysis would, from the Rat Man's phantasized perspective, have been tantamount to allowing the rat-torture to go ahead unimpeded by any repudiating gesture. When Freud says that there was no question of the Rat Man's getting a certificate, he is speaking from his own perspective, not the Rat Man's. And when he says that the only thing the Rat Man asked of him, "very reasonably," was to be freed of his obsessions, Freud is oblivious to the way that reason is being used to cover over unreason. From the perspective of phantasy, the Rat Man is trying to complete the gesture of repudiation. He seeks Freud's help, just as he sought to pay back Lieutenant A.: because it is the gesture which physically, and therefore meaningfully and magically, comes next. The appearance of rationality is used to disguise and rationalize essentially magical commands. Yet again, the rationalization may come to take on a life and truth of its own: the Rat Man may actually come to want and believe that Freud will help him. Even so, the rationalizing engagement remains eerily cut off from the deeper layers of phantasy which bring the Rat Man onto Freud's couch.

It is when this appearance of rationality is challenged that the Rat Man becomes positively philosophical. Why, Freud asks—and at some point the Rat Man asks himself—go through all this effort to protect your father from torture when, all along, you know he is dead? In response, the Rat Man offers a critique of the limits of human reason. What can one know about life in the afterworld? he wonders. And thus begins a phase of

skeptical doubt and critique. Kant is said to have offered a critique of reason to make room for faith; the Rat Man offers his critique to make room for phantasy.

Phantasy as Content, Phantasy as Activity

To understand its power, we have had to understand phantasy not merely in terms of its representational content, but as a motivated form of mental activity. So, for example, when the Rat Man hears himself utter his negative prayer, it is not merely the content of his malediction which disturbs him, but the violence of his own mental activity. Of course, some of the phantasy's power is running through its content. In phantasy, the Rat Man's mind is working in an aura of omnipotence, so that when he hears himself say "May God not protect him!" it is as though he has successfully ordered God off the scene. And this is horrifying to him. But that is only part of what is going on. It is also horrifying that he has been able to disturb directly his own mental functioning. He was able to attack his own intentional efforts to utter a prayer. Here we see that "phantasy" versus "reality" is a false dichotomy: this phantasized attack on the mind's attempt to form an intentional judgment is as real an attack as there can be.

Part of what is so shocking about this negative prayer for the Rat Man is that he experiences his mind as active, but not under his control. Phantasy is a form of mental activity—the Rat Man is shoving a "not" into his utterance—and yet this activity is not itself an intentional act. Phantasy operates around, in relation to, in the interstices of intentional action, but it is itself a form of mental activity which is not an intentional act. It might be tempting to think that either the Rat Man is (intentionally) doing something or something is happening to him: that is, that intentional acts are the only kind of activity there is, and that everything else must be a passive suffering. The phenomenon of phantasy shows that this is an impoverished universe of alternatives: phantasy is a form of mental activity which is not an action. In experiencing it as out of one's intentional control, one can feel passive with respect to it—for one's intentional system *is* then passive, as when the Rat Man's attempt at prayer is disrupted—but it is nevertheless a form of one's own mental activity, and

one can experience this too: the Rat Man can experience himself as disrupting himself, and this is part of what is so disturbing to him.

If we are to understand the efficacy of phantasy, we must recognize that the full meaning of a phantasy is not given by its representational content alone. We need to understand what the person is *doing* with that content. Imagine, for example, that the Rat Man came into a session and said that the night before he had a dream: in one room there was the most beautiful woman, dressed in white, lovingly beckoning him to come in; in another room there was a horrid woman, dressed in black, whom he hated. One might be tempted to say that the Rat Man is splitting idealized and hated images of his lady friend—and he may well be doing this. But as Freud pointed out, one cannot tell this from the content of the dream alone. Freud argued that certain phantasized representations of splitting are, in fact, the mind's first attempts at *recovery:* they are the first attempt to overcome splitting by forming a representation of what has happened.[38] From the content of the dream alone we cannot tell whether the Rat Man is holding the white lady and the dark lady apart or bringing them back together. Rather, we have to understand what the Rat Man is doing with that content: we have to understand that dreaming is fundamentally a form of mental activity, and inquire whether in that activity he is holding these images apart or bringing them together. This corresponds to Freud's own understanding of the dream as essentially a form of mental activity.

And once we take seriously the idea that phantasy is a form of mental activity, a certain mystery about its force evaporates. At first, one might wonder: how can a phantasy of splitting actually split the mind? This question seems pressing when one thinks of phantasy only in terms of its representational content. For how, one may well think, can an image of, say, a motorcycle driving through one's head actually serve to split the mind? If we think only of the imagistic content of this phantasy, there is no good answer to the question. But once one frees oneself from the assumption that phantasy is fully captured by its representational content, then there is the most beautifully simple answer to the question; *the phantasy of splitting just is the activity of splitting.*

Consider, for example, the Rat Man's stroll along a road on which he expects his lady friend's carriage soon to travel. He sees a boulder in the

road and clears it out of the way; a bit later he turns around, goes back to that spot, and replaces the boulder. How are we to understand this? By now it should be clear that if we try to interpret all this in terms of the Rat Man's beliefs and desires we will land in a familiar interpretive impasse. What the Rat Man is doing here is *acting out:* he is actively holding loved and hated representations of the lady friend apart, while in dynamic relation. He thereby holds apart, and expresses, affectionate and hostile responses in himself. This activity of holding apart *is* the phantasy. One doesn't then have to wonder how phantasy can be efficacious; phantasy just is a form of mental efficacy.

It follows that when we talk about the *content* of a phantasy, there is an important ambiguity. This is because phantasies are doings which themselves may have representational content which may be expressed in a material vehicle. So, first, the content of a phantasy may be its representational content: as when we have a conscious sexual daydream which itself provides some sexual excitement and gratification. Second, the content may be the appropriate interpretation of phantasy activity: as when we correctly *say* what the Rat Man is *showing* in his cringe. Here the interpretation allows the activity to be thought, and thus to be "remembered" rather than merely "repeated." Third, one may wish to refer to the particular material vehicle in which meaning is embedded: for example, the Rat Man's particular, concrete utterance of "May God . . ." For when one sees content concretely embedded in a material utterance one can see how phantasy activity can directly affect content—for example, by concretely shoving in a "not." One needs to keep these three distinct meanings of meaning clear if one is to understand how phantasy works.

Forms of Restlessness

I said at the beginning of this essay that it is part of our very idea of mind that mind is restless—and it is one of Freud's distinctive achievements to show us the basic forms of restlessness. It is this restlessness of mind which the philosophical tradition has by and large ignored. In brief, the psychoanalytic tradition has isolated three forms of restlessness: first, there are *mental tropisms,* of which projection and introjection are paradigms; second, there are *drives,* of which sexuality is a paradigm; third,

there is *primary-process mental activity*—displacement and condensation—which expresses a pure form of mental restlessness. I shall conclude by saying something about each.

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ONE CAN THINK of the Rat Man's own turn to philosophy as wishful: in becoming skeptical of our knowledge of the other world, he comes to believe that his father may be alive there. But how does this wishful formation of belief occur? The philosophical tradition has had little more to say than: it just does. And as Socrates has shown, if we stay at the level of propositional attitudes there is very little more one *can* say. One might then view the formation of this wishful belief as the outcome of a simple, nonrational movement of thought: the Rat Man just moves from anxiety that his father might not be all right to wishful belief that he is. A *mental tropism* is a subintentional, nonrational mental activity which has a strategic point: namely, relieving the mind of anxiety.[39] On this view, a conviction that *P* is the mind's response to its anxiety that, perhaps, *not-P*. But *how?* The very idea of a tropism might tempt one to think that if there is a causal bridge from anxiety to anxiety-reducing belief, that is all one needs to know: *the mind just does it*, subintentionally, nonrationally, and for a strategic purpose.[40] But it is an important fact about the human mind that for a wide range of cases, the mind doesn't just do it. And when one inquires what the mind does do, one sees that tropisms are at work below the level of propositional attitudes.

Consider, for example, the Rat Man's response to anxiety that his father is in trouble in the next world. He does not simply move from anxiety that his father is in trouble to wishful belief that he is fine. Rather, the psychic situation is more like this: in response to phantasies of the rat-torture being applied to his father, the Rat Man becomes anxious. His father may be in trouble in "the other world." Because he misunderstands his phantasy life, he mistakes a danger to the Rat Dad in his inner world for a danger to his deceased father in "the next world." In any case, he responds to this anxiety in a strategic way: he projects Rat Dad out of his inner world and onto the captain. This subpropositional activity, projection, is the tropism: the point of projection is to relieve the anxiety

around the Rat Dad. But one of Freud's great insights is that even a simple mental tropism like projection can have a fate. Now that the captain has taken on a paternal role, when he speaks it is as though the Rat Dad is telling him what he should do.

The Rat Man *may* thereby move from anxiety that his father is not okay, to wishful belief that if he pays back Lieutenant A. he will be okay. But this formation of wishful belief is not the fundamental mode of anxiety reduction. Paying back Lieutenant A. has now become a magical undoing of his previous hostile phantasy, which sent rats up his father's ass. So if the Rat Man *were* to form a wishful belief that paying back Lieutenant A. will help his father in the next world, it would be as a rationalizing defense of his acting out. It would not be that he was performing this act because he wishfully believed that it would help his father; rather, he would be forming the wishful belief in order to help himself understand what he is doing. The anxiety is no longer directly about his father, but about being in a state of reflexive breakdown.

This is what Freud called a "propositional reflection" of phantasy—and it serves to cover over the more elemental forms of tropistic activity.[41] One can see this if one reflects on the fact that the activity of trying to pay back the lieutenant generates as much anxiety as the original phantasy it is supposed to undo. This would be very odd if the tropism were working at the level of the propositional attitudes. But it makes perfect sense if the anxiety reduction is operating at the level of projecting the Rat Dad—to get him out—but with the accidental fate that the target then gives him an impossible task to perform.

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THOUGH HIS THEORY CHANGED, Freud always characterized the mind as operating under the influence of two contradictory principles. In his last theory, the mind operated under the sway of eros, a drive directed toward forming differentiated unities, and the death drive, an entropic force directed toward decomposition and undoing. His aim was to portray the mind as inevitably conflicted. But he also succeeded in portraying the mind as inherently restless. Restlessness is not itself a teleological goal of mind; it is the inevitable outcome of mind's operating under the influence

of conflicting teleological principles. At its best this restlessness expresses itself in creative associations, poetry, delightful wanderings of mind; at its worst, in mental discontent, irritability of mind, intrusive and dominating thoughts, traumatic associations. But this restlessness isn't a goal of mind; it's an expression of it.

It is in reflecting on such restlessness that Freud came to think that the most fundamental form of mental activity is what he called a drive *(Triebe)* rather than an instinct *(Instinkt)*—a rigid, innate pattern of behavior. One can think of psychoanalysis as beginning with Freud's recognition that human sexuality is not an instinct in this sense. And that is why a drive cannot be understood as a tropism. A mental tropism is "a characteristic pattern of causation between types of mental states, a pattern whose existence within the mind is no more surprising, given what it does for us, than a plant's turning toward the sun."[42] But the problem with understanding the vagaries of human sexuality, Freud came to realize, is not just that the *position* of the sun keeps changing, but *that what it is to be* the sun keeps changing. Indeed, *what it is* to move in a certain direction also keeps changing, so much so that the sexual drive may come to turn away from its sun. A drive, unlike an instinct, may change in all sorts of strange ways in its goal, object, aim, and characteristic form of activity.

To take a familiar example, sexual desire for another person can undergo a transformation of object and thus be replaced by desire for knowledge. As a result of what Freud called the overvaluation of the sexual object, a person may then form the wishful belief that knowledge is of overwhelming value—so much so, that it may cause anxiety and thus lead to the formation of a defense against acquiring it. Plato distinguishes the philosopher, the one who desires knowledge, from the sophist, the one who thinks he already has it. The philosopher thus gains his or her identity from the idea of pursuit—pursuit of an object which is portrayed as being as desirable as it is distant. But, as Freud pointed out, insistence on pursuit may become a reassurance that the supposedly desirable object will *never* be attained. Pursuit, ironically, becomes a means of keeping the object of pursuit at bay. At the grotesque limit, we have the figure of Casaubon, infinitely preparing to begin his great work unlocking the key

to all mysteries. In all these transformations, is there a reduction of anxiety or an expression of it?

The sexual drive and its object are, as Freud put it, merely soldered together. And once the sexual object is repressed it undergoes all sorts of primary-process transformations. It slips along a skein of associations which altogether expresses an archaic sense of similarity. Unlike a tropism or a drive, both of which are motivated forms of mental activity—one aimed at reduction of anxiety, the other at gratification—condensation and displacement are pure expressions of restlessness. And yet they perform an invaluable service, allowing the mind to function under conditions of repression. For conscious mind to function, certain ideas need to be repressed. But these are wishful ideas and phantasies—forms of motivation which seek satisfaction. Under conditions of repression, they undergo a series of primary-process transformations until they are sufficiently unlike the intolerable idea so as to escape repression, but sufficiently linked with it so as to provide some gratification.

And precisely because we have these forms of restlessness, there is no need to conceive of an Unconscious Mind strategizing to get itself expressed in Conscious Mind. To see this, consider, by way of analogy, the change of outlook which Darwin's theory of natural selection occasioned. For thousands of years it was tempting to view the natural world as the product of Another Mind, God's, located outside it and making plans for it. It was Darwin who showed that the appearance of design can be mimicked by a crude form of censorship—death—along with certain forms of restlessness by which different genetic combinations are "tried out." One can think of a DNA molecule as an unconscious idea, a unit of genetic information which is struggling to get itself expressed. At the level of the molecule these ideas are transformed by a primary process—mutation, arbitrary syntactic transformations, and so on—until they finally find a form which evades censorship. That is, in sexual reproduction, two "unconscious ideas" are brought together to form a "conscious judgment"—a living member of the species who may or may not live to pass on his "ideas" to the next generation. Sexual reproduction would then form a kind of "secondary-process" transformation of genetic material. Similarly, though the emergence of unconscious material in conscious life can often

look stunningly apt—and thus display a kind of "reason in madness"—there is no need for an Unconscious Mind as the locus of that reason. All that is needed is censorship and unconscious forms of restless mental activity.

In this way, the forms of restlessness lend content to the drive. Freud took himself to have made an empirical discovery of the drives. But I think we can see the idea of something like drives as flowing from the idea of a restless mind. From Socrates and the ensuing philosophical tradition we have learned that a mind capable of propositional attitudes, such as belief, desire, hope, and fear, must be sensitive to the content of those attitudes in such ways as to maintain rational relations among them. This requires sensitivity to the inner structure of the contents of those attitudes, so that transformations of subject and predicate can be made which preserve the overall rationality of the system of propositional attitudes. But if the mind is to be restless, in the sense I want to capture, there must be systematic ways of disrupting that system, systematic ways of moving on. Some of those ways, like projection and introjection, are tropisms. Others, like sexuality, are drives. But others, like displacement and condensation, seem simply to be principles of mental activity. In their wake, meaning is created, and the associations may be put to various uses, but, strictly speaking, they have no purpose: they are just forms of restlessness. In the Rat Man's psyche, paying Lieutenant A. comes to express an idiosyncratic meaning; but it acquires this meaning, really, for no better reason than that it comes next. It is this restlessness which guarantees the immanence and disruptiveness of irrationality in our lives.

The Disappearing "We"

There is a model of transcendental arguments with which we are all familiar, which I shall call antiskeptical. A transcendental argument for a conclusion *x*, on the antiskeptical model, proceeds by arguing that for a condition *y* to be possible, *x* must be the case. Since the value of a transcendental argument is thought to consist in its ability to combat skepticism, *y* should be a condition the skeptic must accept and *x* a condition he calls into doubt. Some transcendental arguments let *y* be the condition of speaking a language and then argue that the skeptic's very ability to state his doubts about *x* show that *x* must be the case. The strongest form of transcendental argument is thought to let *y* be self-conscious experience. For no interesting skeptic can deny that we have such a mental life; so if the transcendental argument is valid, it is thought, the skeptic is genuinely undermined. The paradigm of a transcendental argument is thought to be Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the categories. However, had Kant thought that the Transcendental Deduction merely

showed that for experience to be possible it must conform to the categories, he would have considered his argument a failure.[1]

Indeed, before he even mentions the need for a Transcendental Deduction, Kant has already argued that all our thinking must conform to the categories. Kant argues, in the "Analytic of Concepts," that every act of the understanding is a judgment and every judgment must employ its associated category. So if self-conscious experience involves any thinking, it will have to employ the categories. The Transcendental Deduction, by contrast, aims to show that we are entitled to employ the concepts which Kant has already argued we must employ in any thinking. It is, of course, possible to see that the Transcendental Deduction is concerned with the legitimation of the categories, even if one construes Kant's argument along the lines of the antiskeptical model, but one will naturally misconstrue what the legitimation is. One will think the categories to be legitimated—and the skeptic answered—by showing that they are necessary for thought or experience.[2] But these words mean something different coming out of our mouths than they meant for Kant. First, Kant is not interested merely to show that the categories are necessary conditions of thought or experience. For Kant, the categories are also necessary in the sense that they are partially constitutive of both thought and experience; and, as necessary, they represent our contribution to experience. Second, Kant's notion of "experience" is much richer than ours. In contemporary discussions of transcendental arguments, "experience" is used, as I began to use it, in a minimal sense, to refer to the type of mental life which even a skeptic cannot interestingly deny we have. Kant, by contrast, defines "experience" as empirical knowledge.[3] Experience, for Kant, is a type of knowing.

It has often been thought that in the Transcendental Deduction Kant begins with the premise that we have experience in the minimal sense of self-consciousness and tries to work his way to the conclusion that we must therefore have experience in the rich sense of empirical knowledge. I cannot find evidence that this was Kant's strategy. He does seem to allow for two varieties of experience, but both are types of empirical knowledge. The paradigm of empirical knowledge is an explicit judgment

in which an object given in intuition is brought under a concept.[4] However, there is also a type of empirical knowledge which is not explicitly judgmental. If my intuition is genuinely of an object, it is empirical knowledge, even though it precedes all explicit thinking of the object.[5] Let us call such knowledge intuitive experience. As far as I can determine, Kant never suspends the belief that we have intuitive experience, though he does investigate the transcendental content of such experience.

The question of right arises over whether the concepts with which we must think, which are not themselves derived from experience, legitimately apply to objects given in intuition. To settle this question would be to establish that our explicit judgments could count as empirical knowledge. Kant thinks he can do this by showing "how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects."[6] In part, this is established by arguing that the categories "serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be . . . thought as an object in general."[7] The categories would be shown to be not merely an artifact of our subjective constitutions, but the formal conditions for thought of an object. But if intuitive experience is a type of knowing, and if objective validity can be secured by showing that the categories furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects, then the categories must already be at work in the constitution of our intuitive experience.

Self-consciousness plays a crucial role in the Transcendental Deduction but, perhaps surprisingly from a contemporary perspective, not as the ultimate *tu quoque* against the skeptic. It is cited in an explanation of what underlies experience of an object. The analytic unity of apperception—that it must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representations—implies a certain synthetic unity: I must be able to unite my various representations in one consciousness. Since in the bare "I think" "nothing manifold is given," the only way I can represent myself as a single consciousness is via a synthetic unity among the representations. From a transcendental perspective, the knowledge manifested in a given intuition "consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a

given intuition is united"; and thus "it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge."[8] So not only are the categories constitutive of the concept of an object; the synthetic unity of apperception constitutes our intuitive experience as experience of objects. Thought and intuitive experience must thus be harmonious. But this harmony is not preestablished; it is constituted.[9] That our representations are of an object is, as it were, a precipitate of the unity of consciousness, its objective correlate.[10] The point is not adequately made by saying that I must think in terms of objects—though that is so—nor by saying that I must experience a world of objects—though that is also true: for an object simply is that in which the manifold of our representations is united.[11]

Here we have carried out within the realm of pure reason the first stage of a "master-slave" dialectic. For although it is the synthetic unity of apperception which ultimately constitutes the relation of representations to an object, I am nevertheless dependent on my representations' being so united to be able to represent myself as a single consciousness. The unity of the act by which a determinate combination of a manifold is imposed "is at the same time the unity of consciousness."[12] I must constitute the objects of experience in order to "constitute" myself. Of course, the validity of this result is restricted to discursive intelligences, but it is only in relation to such intelligences that there could be such a thing as an object, and so one might say that the entire field of objective validity lies within this "restricted range."[13]

I do not intend to probe the details of Kant's argument here, only to suggest that if we go back to Kant we will find an alternative model for transcendental arguments to the antiskeptical model with which we are familiar. In homage to Kant, I shall simply call it *transcendental*. A transcendental argument for X is concerned with establishing the legitimacy of X, and this may of course have antiskeptical consequences, as indeed Kant's Transcendental Deduction did. But it will secure this legitimacy not by forcing the skeptic into some form of self-contradiction, but by revealing in its broadest and deepest context what it is to be X. It will an-

swer the question "How is *X* possible?" when that question is asked with a straight face rather than a skeptical sneer.[14] This is a potentially liberating shift of emphasis, for we are no longer constrained to begin our inquiry with premises the skeptic must accept. Ironically, once we abandon the overarching concern for "refuting the skeptic," we may at last be free to conduct a sufficiently broad inquiry that one outcome will be that skepticism no longer seems threatening. Ancient skeptics, at least, would have relished such a situation.

It has been suggested by Saul Kripke that one might read Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* as providing a skeptical solution to a skeptical paradox.[15] The skeptic argues that there is no fact about me which shows that I mean one thing rather than another by my utterances. A skeptical puzzle thus arises as to how any language is possible. Wittgenstein's solution is said to be broadly Humean in structure: it is conceded that the individual (event) considered in isolation cannot legitimately be said to mean (cause) anything, but it is argued that we can nevertheless say that he means (it causes) something by virtue of his (its) relation to the larger context of a community of regularities—a form of life (causation)—of which he (it) is part.

Though any interesting analogy runs the risk of obscuring important differences, I would nevertheless like to cast Wittgenstein as a post-Kantian rather than as a neo-Humean.[16] The *Investigations* as a whole forms an extended study of the multifarious relations between subjective and objective perspectives. One example of this is the relation between my inner experience of comprehension and my objective ability to use the word correctly. Wittgenstein's question is not the skeptical version of "How is language possible?" but its transcendental counterpart.

It is now common to approach the study of meaning from a purely third person perspective: we observe a group of "natives" speaking an unknown language and consider the requirements for interpreting their utterances.[17] Wittgenstein does occasionally confront us with a tribe, but this is not his primary approach: if there is a "problem about language" which haunts him throughout the *Investigations*, it is the indissoluble, necessary tension which exists between first and third person perspectives. On the one hand, the *Investigations* leads us to believe that the meaning of a word consists in the use we make of it. "But," on the other hand, "we

understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"[18] "Meaning is use" is a slogan used to sum up Wittgenstein's thoughts about language, but the problem Wittgenstein seems to be facing is that meaning isn't just use.

> When someone says the word "cube" to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?
>
> Well but on the other hand isn't the meaning determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp in a flash accord with a use, fit or fail to fit? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our minds in an instant, fit a use?[19]

For Kant, the need for a Transcendental Deduction arose from the apparent possibility that thought and intuitive experience might be disharmonious; for Wittgenstein, the alleged possibility of conflict which must be examined is between inner experience of comprehension and practical ability. Various mental items are canvassed as candidates for providing an explanation of the relation between inner experience and outer use—a mental picture, a method of projection, a formula, a rule—and all are rejected.[20] Surrogates both for the outer use—private mental objects—and for the inner experience—pure behavioral manifestation—are also proposed, only to be found inadequate.[21] The upshot is that an adequate account of language must include both a subjective and an objective aspect. And a question naturally arises as to how these two aspects fit together.

Among the various uses of the word "know," there are two which we characteristically employ when we speak of "knowing the meaning" of an expression: the use which expresses a practical ability, the mastery of a technique; and the use which signals an experience of comprehension: "Now I know!"[22] But when we consider the experience of comprehension and "try and see what makes its appearance here," there seems to be nothing more to be said.[23] From the first person perspective, we are acquainted with the experience of understanding. We should be loath to dismiss this experience as "unreal," but if this is a form of knowing, we should like to know more about it.

One reason Wittgenstein considers the apprehension of mental pictures, formulas, and rules as possible explanations of what knowing the meaning consists in is, I think, that they are all items which can plausibly be grasped in a flash. They would thus serve as a bridge between my inner experience and my practical ability. The same two criticisms continually recur. Viewed from the inside, the experience of understanding does not seem like the apprehension of a picture, formula, or rule. And, of course, none of these items is of any help in explaining the relation between my inner experience and my practical ability, for these items cannot explain how they themselves are to be used over time.

Though my experience of comprehension cannot be analyzed in terms of anything more tangible, it is not therefore to be dismissed. It is considered as one of a family of experiences which resist analysis when looked at "from sideways on."[24] We are tempted to say, for example, that in understanding an order "your mind flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one," but we can give no content to this picture.

> "It is as if we could grasp the whole use in a flash." Like what, e.g.?—Can't the use—in a certain sense—be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not?—The point is that it is as if we could "grasp it in a flash" in yet another and much more direct sense than that.—But have you a model for this? No. It is just that this expression suggests itself to us. As the result of crossing different pictures.[25]

Wittgenstein is not here impugning our experience of "grasping in a flash." *He is criticizing the description of that experience as grasping the* whole use in a flash. That is the result of crossing different pictures, a crossing which tempts us (illegitimately, but understandably) to posit an inner mental mechanism which explains our practical ability. This mental model not only promotes a false self-image—of ourselves as guided by some inner mental mechanism; it also suggests a false picture of what understanding an expression consists in.[26] If we forgo the temptation to picture the experience of comprehension as some form of mental encoding, Wittgenstein has no further objection.

> "But I don't mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense present."—But of course it is, "in some sense"! Really the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression "in a queer way." The rest is all right; and the sentence only seems queer when one imagines a different language-game for it from the one in which we actually use it . . .
>
> "It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash."—And that is just what we say we do. That is to say we sometimes describe what we do in these words. But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer about what happens. It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present.—For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other hand its meaning lies in its use.[27]

But if we can grasp the meaning in a flash and this grasping cannot be further analyzed, this presents a nonskeptical puzzle about the peculiar relation between inner experience and outer behavior. The sense in which I can be said to grasp a rule in a flash determines no course of action. Thus it cannot serve in an explanation of my practical ability to follow a rule. The distinct sense in which I can be said to grasp a rule, as exhibited in my behavior, seems to be unexplained. And it appears that my "inner" and "outer" graspings of a rule are mutually independent. Certainly their relationship is not what we might initially have expected: that of explanans to explanandum. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not the Humean one that the "relationship" is a fiction, but the Kantian one that a legitimation is required which could not consist in any empirical explanation.

Wittgenstein has thus far revealed the need for a legitimation of the inner experience of comprehension. Let us call any act of speaking or using a language with understanding a representation. This is not a mere play on words. Representations for Kant were (mental) acts. And, he argued, they were quasi-linguistic performances: one of the intended lessons of the Transcendental Deduction is that intuitive experience is conceptually saturated.[28] Here I am asking that we append the term, by analogy, to explicitly linguistic performances. Wittgenstein argues, roughly, that it must be possible for the "I understand" to accompany each of my representations. That is, for a piece of behavior to be my act of using an expression meaningfully, it must at least be possible to append

an "I understand" to it. I must be able to take conscious possession of it for it to be an act of mine. That the "I understand" must be able to accompany each of my representations is an analogue of the analytic unity of apperception. But from this principle, as Kant would say, "many consequences follow."[29] For the "analytic" principles of both Kant and Wittgenstein require a certain synthetic unity among my representations. For Kant, the disparate "I think"s which might be attached to various representations are in themselves diverse: they can express that the various representations are part of a single consciousness only insofar as the representations themselves possess sufficient order to be united in a single consciousness.[30] For Wittgenstein, as we have seen, in the experience of comprehension "nothing manifold is given." The experience becomes contentful only via the representations to which we are inclined to append an "I understand." But this requires that the representations themselves possess a certain synthetic unity:

> To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.[31]

There is an important analogy between the Kantian "I think" and the Wittgensteinian "I understand," and an important disanalogy. The disanalogy arises from what in the two cases we are willing to call representations. A Kantian ego need not venture out beyond its own experience to determine whether something to which it is inclined to append an "I think" is a representation. A Wittgensteinian representation, by contrast, is an act of using a language with understanding, and whether or not I am doing this may not be fully within my grasp. It must be possible for the "I understand" to accompany each of my representations, but there may also be some nonrepresentations to which I am also inclined to append an "I understand." If language is to be a means of communication, there must, Wittgenstein famously argued, be agreement in judgments, in form of life.[32] Let us say that a person is *minded* in a certain way if he shares the perceptions of salience, routes of interest, feelings of naturalness in following a rule which constitute being part of a form of life. Then if language is to be a means of communication, not only must I be able to attach an "I understand:" to each of my representations, but it must be

possible for the "We are so minded:" to accompany each of our representations. Thus our representations stand between two distinct claims: the "I understand" and the "We are so minded:."

That the "We are so minded:" must be able to accompany each of our representations might, from one perspective, look like an analytic principle, defining what it is for something to be a representation of ours. But since it expresses "agreement in form of life" which constitutes our being so minded, it is ultimately synthetic. Language, one might say, is that in the concept of which the (open-ended) manifold of our representations is united.[33] While it is we, to use Kant's dynamic terminology, who unite our representations into a language, we are nevertheless dependent on our language, the unification of our representations, to represent the subject of these representations: ourselves. The "We are so minded:" by itself is empty; it gains content by what we (are so minded as to) place after the colon. Similarly, a concept is that in the concept of which a certain (open-ended) manifold of representations is united. (Or, to eliminate the word "concept" from the explication: a concept is a representation which unites a certain [open-ended] manifold of representations.)

I also said that there is an important analogy between the Kantian "I think" and the Wittgensteinian "I understand": when I append either to a representation, the representation is used and not mentioned. One reason that Kant's analytic principle seems acceptable is that when I think "I think *P*," I actually think *P*. Similarly, when I think or say "I understand *P*," I am not stepping outside of all of our representations and making a claim about one of them from a detached perspective: I am attempting to make another representation. "I understand *P*" is itself an (attempted) enactment in the form of life: and thus (if successful) it must itself be capable of accepting a "We are so minded:." Properly understood, the "I understand" shows our participation in a form of life; it does not say anything about a representation which is merely mentioned. Thus when someone says the word "cube" to me, my experience of comprehension is not legitimated by any feeling or other inner experience, for example to the whole use coming before my mind. My experience of comprehension is legitimated by my being like-minded with other "cube"-users: sharing certain perceptions of salience, volitions, and practical abilities to con-

tinue in certain sorts of ways, seeing the various uses of the concept cube as forming an (open-ended) unity. If the "We are so minded:" must be able to accompany each of our representations, the demand again arises that the representations themselves possess a synthetic unity. If language is to be a means of communication, the technique I must master must be not merely my technique, but our technique. There must be a synthetic unity not only among my representations but also among our representations. The analogue of the analytic unity of apperception—that I be able to attach an "I understand" to each of my representations—seems to demand a synthetic unity among our representations (if language is to be a means of communication).

But what if language isn't to be a means of communication? As far as I can determine, the *Investigations* does not consider this question. (The so-called private language argument is, I think, an examination of an illegitimate model of how language which is used for communication is endowed with meaning.) This silence would be surprising if Wittgenstein were trying to show that the individual considered in isolation cannot mean anything by his utterances. But the silence is to be expected if his inquiry is broadly transcendental: we find ourselves as speakers and understanders of language which is used both as a means of thought and of communication, and ask "What must be the case for this to be possible?"

One answer is that the representations to which I am able to append an "I understand" must also be capable of accepting a "We are so minded:." This is at least a first step in the legitimation of our experience of comprehension. The possibility of language which is used as a means of thought and communication requires that there be a harmony between inner experience and outer behavior. But this harmony does not eliminate the possibility of sour notes: a certain form of skepticism will always be possible. Language mastery consists in an irreducible inner aspect and an outer aspect. Given a speaker's utterance, we can ask "Did he understand what he said?" And of an utterance to which the "I understand" is legitimately applicable as opposed to a mere behavioral surrogate, we can say—as Wittgenstein said of the difference between pain behavior accompanied by pain and pain behavior without any pain—"What greater difference could there be?"[34] Speech behavior may occur even though totally incomprehensible to the being manifesting the behavior; conversely, a being may feel confidently "Now I understand!" and be shown to be wrong by his inability to use the expression correctly. However, if language is to be a means of communication, these cases in which subjective and objective come apart must be exceptional. If language is to be a means of communication, then it is a nontrivial a priori truth that there must be a regular relation between inner experience and outer manifestation. But this regular relation need hold only, as Aristotle would say, for the most part.[35]

A second step in the legitimation derives from a consideration of who, in the broadest of contexts, we are. The synthetic unity of our representations—our being so minded—has no empirical explanation: and thus there is no empirical explanation of who "we" are. In following a rule all I can do, ultimately, is to act blindly; and, similarly, that is all you can do.[36] Each of us acts ultimately without justification; our reasons have given out. Yet if language is to be a means of communication, each of us must follow rules blindly in the same way. (Of course, our acting in the same way is partially constituted by our seeing ourselves as acting in the same way.)

Nor, in this broad context, is there any alternative to the synthetic unity of our representations. Our various representations are an expression of our being so minded—there is a certain synthetic unity they possess—but we cannot make any sense of the possibility of being "other minded." In fact, how we are minded is in part revealed to us by what (we are so minded as to find) does and does not make sense. There can (for us) be no getting a glimpse of what it might be like to be "other minded," for as we try to pass beyond the bounds of our mindedness we lapse into what (for us) must be nonsense: that is, we lapse into nonsense.

One of the ways in which Kant tries to make us aware that the spatiotemporal world is, transcendentally speaking, an expression of mind is by making a series of contrasts. Arguing that space and time are merely forms of our sensible intuition, he is able to contrast the spatiotemporal world with the world as it is in itself. Diagnosing our consciousness as a

discursive intelligence whose sensible intuitions are spatiotemporal, he is able to contrast us both with discursive intelligences with alternative forms of sensible intuition and with a nondiscursive intelligence, an intellectual intuition.[37] Wittgenstein, however, is able to awaken us to the possibility that our form of life is partially constituted by our being so minded without making contrasts with "other perspectives."

That the "(for us)" ultimately cancels out is a key to understanding what it is to establish the objective validity of our representations: for we come to see that being one of "our" representations is all that there could be to being a representation. This is an example of what might literally be called a "groundless legitimation": a legitimation which does not consist in providing a foundation, groundwork, or justification of that which is legitimated. Many philosophers today believe that the most that a transcendental argument could show is that any form of life we could recognize must be like ours: that to interpret it as showing that all forms of life must be fundamentally alike is implicitly to assume a form of verificationism. This belief derives from the fact that certain specifically antiskeptical transcendental arguments did implicitly rely on some form of verificationism.[38] It does not follow that transcendental arguments generally must be verificationist: especially if we construe "transcendental arguments" broadly enough to include the investigations of Kant and Wittgenstein. For verificationism to be at play here, the following situation would have to hold: we would have a concept of being "other minded"—say, of constituting a form of life in which $7 + 5 = 13$ and Q does not follow from P and *If P, Q*—and, on the basis of verificationist scruples, we would dismiss as spurious the apparent possibility of its being satisfied. (Such a strategy notoriously invites skepticism about verificationism.) Wittgenstein's investigation takes a different route: we come to see that there is no concept of being "other minded." The concept of being minded in any way at all is that of being minded as we are.[39] To put it in Kantian terms: language is that in the concept of which the manifold of our representations is united. Wittgenstein's position thus stands to verificationism as transcendental idealism stands to its empirical counterpart.[40]

What emerges from these considerations is not the skeptical conclusion that an individual considered in isolation can mean nothing by his utterances, but rather its post-Kantian inversion: we cannot consider an individual in isolation. But perhaps one ought to distinguish something like an "empirical" and a "transcendental" sense of "considering an individual in isolation." In the "empirical" sense, one considers an individual in isolation when one considers a human being in abstraction from any particular group. It is in this sense that it has been alleged that an individual considered in isolation cannot be said to mean anything by his utterances. In a transcendental investigation, by contrast, one is inquiring into the conditions for the possibility of considering an individual in isolation (in the "empirical" sense). In this inquiry we discover that as soon as we consider an individual at all—select out part of the environment as a being who may or may not be following rules, depending on whether or not we consider him in isolation (in the "empirical" sense)—we are implicitly establishing a relationship between him—the object of our judgment—and ourselves—the subject of judgment.[41] To put it paradoxically: to consider an individual in isolation, we must be treating him as one of us.

But insofar as we can consider an individual in isolation—that is, in the "empirical" sense—Wittgenstein does not argue that it is not possible for him to mean anything by his utterances. He does argue that to obey a rule there must exist a regular use, a custom, a practice; but there is no argument that customs can occur only in communities.[42] Reference to the behavior of other speakers of a language needs to be made only when the question is whether the individual is speaking a particular shared language, say English, correctly or incorrectly. The question of whether a person uses, say, the word "plus" correctly can be treated as a question of whether he uses "plus" as other English speakers do only if we take him to be a (potential) English speaker. It is only when we consider an individual's subjective experience (of comprehension, confidence, grasping of a rule, and so on) in isolation from his practical ability that we can give no content to his meaning anything.[43] When Wittgenstein says that "to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule," he is not saying that the individual considered in isolation cannot follow a rule, but that his thinking does not constitute his obeying: that is what is meant by saying that he cannot obey a rule "privately."[44]

The individual's inner experience cannot endow his practical ability with normative content.[45] But it does not follow from this that we must

look to the community for norms: perhaps one could take his practical ability to be endowed with normative content as part of the given which is his form of life.[46] One should not thus equate his practical ability with a mere disposition to respond. So the question whether Robinson Crusoe can be said to speak a language not merely when he is physically isolated but also when he is considered in isolation could, conceivably, be answered affirmatively. The question we could not answer under such conditions is whether the practices and customs which regulate his behavior regulate the behavior of others.

It is only when we switch from an "empirical" to a "transcendental" reading that we discover, not that when considered in isolation he cannot be said to mean anything, but that we cannot consider him in isolation. Kripke, I think, switches between the "empirical" and "transcendental" readings in his discussion of Robinson Crusoe.[47] In setting up the skeptical paradox, Kripke uses the "empirical" reading of "considering an individual in isolation": we can consider an individual in isolation and then allegedly show that he cannot be said to mean anything by his utterances. Of Crusoe, however, he says, "if we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him." At first, this looks like a valid inference from what has allegedly already been established: if, when considered in isolation, *X* cannot be said to mean anything, then if *X* can be said to mean something, he is not being considered in isolation. To see that a switch has occurred, suppose that Crusoe is speaking an invented language in which he uses "plus" according to "quus-like" rules: that is, for any addition where the result is greater than 5, he just says "five." (Perhaps, being on his own, he has no interest in or use for larger numbers of things.) We can't establish whether he is following the rule correctly by reference to the behavior of other speakers, for there aren't any. We must simply observe whether his behavior accords with quus-like rules.

Of course, this requires implicit reference to our own standards of rule-following, but it is not this reference which transforms his behavior into rule-following. It is his practical ability which enables him to follow rules, even ones of his own invention. Reference to our rule-following procedures is needed only (1) when we try to characterize his behavior as a

bizarre way of reacting to the training we have all received and then obeying the order "Add 2"; (2) when we try to give our interpretation of the rule he is following.

If, by contrast, one accepts the skeptical paradox, it becomes mysterious how a bunch of non-rule followers (when considered in isolation) can be turned into rule followers simply by considering them together. Although there is an analogy with Hume's treatment of causation—one must look beyond an individual utterance to determine whether it is an act of speaking meaningfully—there is also an important disanalogy.[48] The general regularities in nature allow us to talk of causes, but one must abandon as fictitious the idea that there is agency to be found in them. We cannot similarly treat our meaning something by our utterances as an acceptable *façon de parler*.

Although the concept of a language cannot be fully understood without reference to a judging subject, the actual relation between subject and language remains mysterious. Much of the post-Kantian idealist tradition is devoted to showing that Kant's attempt at a purely formal philosophy was a failure—that the relation between subject and object is far less distinct than Kant thought. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, this issue emerges in a curious way. Before we engaged in philosophical reflection, we were disposed to make various assertions, for example, "7 + 5 must equal 12." As we study the *Investigations*, we come to assert, "We are so minded as to assert: 7 + 5 must equal 12." That is, as transcendental inquirers, we come to be aware that the "We are so minded:" must be able to accompany each of our representations. It is such an insight that, I think, led commentators to think that Wittgenstein denied the objectivity of logical or mathematical necessity.[49] However, after we realize that there is (for us) no alternative possibility of being "other minded"—that is, that there is no alternative possibility—we seem to come back to our original assertion: "7 + 5 must equal 12." Thus the strange case of the disappearing "we." For both Wittgenstein and Kant, the reflective understanding of the contribution of our mindedness to the necessity we find in the world is not meant to undermine the necessity, but to give us insight into it.

But then what position can Wittgenstein's philosophy occupy? If, on the one hand, the "we" does disappear, then it seems we are left investi-

gating the "conditions of thought" or "the way the world must be," having lost the insight of their essential relation to our mindedness: of our routes of interest, perceptions of salience, feelings of naturalness. If, on the other hand, we try to make the "we" vivid, then Wittgenstein's philosophy collapses into philosophical sociology, studying how one tribe among others goes on.

This, I suppose, boils down to the question of whether there is a stable middle position to be occupied between Kantian transcendental philosophy and some form of Hegelianism.[50] Wittgenstein abandoned the attempt to make manifest the structure of thought. Like Hegel, he no doubt would have regarded the Kantian project of providing a purely formal philosophy, of investigating the mind's organization in isolation, an impossible task. Thought, for both Hegel and the later Wittgenstein, should be seen as embedded in activities, projects, customs, and institutions. Hegel was willing to study particular historical and social communities, for he saw them as partial manifestations of *geist*, a relationship which could be appreciated from the absolute standpoint of philosophy. However, if one loses faith in an absolute standpoint, there seems to be nothing left to study but the belief and general goings-on of particular groups. There is no doubt that thinkers inspired by Wittgenstein have drawn just this lesson. But Wittgenstein's own philosophy is remarkably devoid of such inquiry. Occasionally the strange activities of some "tribe" are offered up for our consideration: for example, a people who pile lumber in heaps of arbitrary height and sell it at a price proportionate to the area covered.[51] Such a "group" is not studied in any detail; "it" is presented in abstraction, conjured up at a moment to make us aware, say, that the practice of measuring does not exist in a void, sealed off from the other interests, aims, projects, and practices of a community. Thought may have to be understood in the context of customs, practices, and institutions, but Wittgenstein seems indifferent to the study of any particular community. His thought seems to stand to sociology as Kant's was intended to stand to empirical psychology.

But can it? Some philosophers, encouraged by Wittgenstein's explicit remarks on the point of philosophy, try to turn their backs on this question by treating the request for reflective understanding as an illegitimate

appeal for a transcendent viewpoint. Wittgenstein's explicit remarks tend toward the therapeutic: proper philosophical activity cures the disease philosophy.[52] Thus it seems to be all right with him that we in some sense end up back where we started. But in what sense? Wittgenstein was a master in making us aware how philosophical perplexity can arise by asking questions in isolation from the normal contexts in which such questions get asked: it is then that "language goes on holiday."[53] Yet even if we grant that therapy is a valuable approach to certain philosophical problems, it does not follow that there are no legitimate philosophical questions to be asked; in particular, that there is no legitimate question of how we are to understand the therapeutic methods themselves.

Therapy would be useless against a cold: and in getting rid of a sneeze, we really do end up back where we started. Nor is lobotomy a form of therapy: after studying the later Wittgenstein we should not wander around stupefied, oblivious to the existence of any reflective questions. Postneurotic consciousness is fundamentally more complex than a healthy consciousness which has never suffered disease or cure.[54] Further, neurosis isn't just an embarrassing disease which some silly people who call themselves "philosophers" contract, only to be treated and ridiculed by others who also call themselves "philosophers." Neurosis is arguably an important product of civilization; in this case, of civilization's attempt to understand itself.[55] Thus it should not be surprising that both neurosis and cure should demand a fairly complex consciousness. It seems to me that we can both retain an appreciation of the importance of our being so minded to the form of life which we constitute and realize that in this broad context there are no alternative possibilities. How can we do this?

I cannot answer this question in any detail or with confidence. Perhaps a start can be made by pointing out that one ought to expect some such problem as that of the disappearing "we." If establishing the objective validity of our representations consists in showing that they are all there could be to being a representation, then one ought to expect that a certain type of reflective consciousness will have an evanescent quality. I do not yet know how to describe this quality without resorting to spatial metaphors. If our representations have objective validity, then one will not be able to continue looking down upon them: that sort of reflective

consciousness must ultimately evaporate. And with it goes the detached perspective on "our" representations. It is not obvious, however, that the "We are so minded:" must therefore disappear. Our ability to append the "We are so minded:" represents a permanent possibility of reflective consciousness. Yet the "We are so minded:" is, like the Kantian "I think," in an important sense empty: we gain insight into who "we" are by considering the representations to which we are willing to append a "We are so minded:"; or by considering which bits of the world we are willing to consider as representations. The "We are so minded:" must thus stand in an analogous "master-slave" relation to our form of life as the Kantian synthetic unity of apperception stands to the object of judgment.

To show how the "We are so minded:" does not disappear would be to describe a form of reflective consciousness which does not consist in looking down upon our representations. It seems impossible to describe such a consciousness, yet it also seems to be the consciousness we have. Perhaps it is impossible to describe; perhaps it can only make itself manifest: perhaps the *Philosophical Investigations* is just such a consciousness making itself manifest. That the "We are so minded:" does not disappear, that we can continue to attach it to each of our representations, makes us reflectively aware that our form of life is not some fixed, frozen entity existing totally independently of us. It is an expression of our routes of interest, perceptions of salience, and so on: it is (our) active mind. But this awareness can occur only from the inside. When we take it to be a way of observing our form of life from a detached perspective, the "We are so minded:" does evaporate. It was Hegel who argued against Kant that ultimately subject could not be separated from object, that there could be no purely formal philosophy, that—to use a phrase with a contemporary ring—there could be no firm distinction between organizing scheme (the mind) and unorganized content.[56] The "We are so minded:" and our form of life both, as Hegel would put it, find themselves in each other. This remains, of course, the barest of metaphors; however, metaphors are not bereft of value, even in philosophy.

28. Ibid.
29. There is an interesting analogy in Bernard Williams' discussion of a hypertraditional society in which reflection turns knowledge into belief; see *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 142–148, 158–159.
30. Loewald, "On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis," p. 249.

5. Restlessness, Phantasy, and the Concept of Mind

1. Plato, *Protagoras* 358.
2. This argument has been elaborated and defended in recent years most prominently by Donald Davidson: see his *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
3. See Sebastian Gardner, *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4. Here it is important to recognize that this schema is importantly different from such important psychological phenomena as splitting or isolation. So, for example, in splitting there is no presumption that each of the split-off bits of the mind are themselves mindlike structures. Indeed, this schema cannot even account for splitting, for it treats the mind as *already* divided into two mindlike structures, where what we want to understand is the mental activity which splits the mind apart.
5. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II.2.1378a31 ff. See also II.1.1377b1–1378a21. I discuss this in *Love and Its Place In Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis*, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 47–52.
6. This is, of course, a prominent line of thought in the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein (*Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe [Blackwell: Oxford, 1958]) and Donald Davidson *(Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation)*, even though their respective philosophies themselves differ in important ways.
7. See Donald Davidson, "Paradoxes of Irrationality," in *Philosophical Essays on Freud*, ed. R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
8. For all I know, it is possible to change a person's mental state by subjecting his brain to an electrical volt. Now if that volt were also a belief or desire in one part of the mind, but changed a belief in another part of the mind, not in virtue of its content, but solely as an electrical volt, it would fit the general schema of being a mental item which was not a reason for what it caused, but its mentality would be irrelevant to its nonrational effect.
9. The closest Davidson comes to addressing this issue is in a footnote: "I should perhaps emphasize that phrases like 'partition of the mind,' 'part of the mind,' 'segment' etc. are misleading if they suggest that what belongs to one

division of the mind cannot belong to another. The picture I want is of overlapping territories"; "Paradoxes of Irrationality," p. 300n. But it is not clear what this picture of overlapping territories is; nor is it clear how such a picture would fit into the general schema of Davidson's solution. For, by hypothesis, each part of the mind is rational—that is the point of the partition—so if this territory is a part of each part it must be rational in both parts.

10. I am not making any claim about there being an interesting a priori science of the mind. Rather, following what I take to be the spirit of the later Wittgenstein, I merely want to say that we live with and among concepts, just as we live in and among many other things. And so, we can inquire not only into minds and what they are like, but also into the concept of mind and what it is like. If "a priori" means "independently of our life with concepts," then this is not an a priori concept. The inquiry is how the concept is used in life, not independently of it. Thus it is that by certain reflection on our empirical discoveries, for example, Freud's discovery that dreams are interpretable, that we can discover not just how our minds work, but also discover something about what it is to be a mind.
11. To take another philosopher's favorite: in self-deception, a wish or desire promotes a certain belief, whose function is to keep me from believing something I have better reason to believe. Again the irrationality is displayed as a structure of propositional attitudes.
12. This is what Gardner, in *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis*, calls the "special problem of irrationality": why the subject's mental life took an irrational rather than a rational course. This problem will arise whenever irrationality is described and explained by what Gardner calls a "propositionally transparent" structure of propositional attitudes. I discuss Gardner's account at length in "The Heterogeneity of the Mental," *Mind*, 1995.
13. In this context, see Freud's account of the transformations on syntactical structure in the Schreber case, "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (dementia paranoides)," *SE* 12: 62–65. See also the transformations Freud describes in "A Child Is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversion," *SE* 17: 177–204.
14. Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, *SE* 7: 168. I have emended the translation by using "drive" as a translation of *Trieb* rather than the *Standard Edition's* "instinct." The *Standard Edition* translates both *Trieb* and *Instinkt* as "instinct"; and, for reasons given in the text, it is important to distinguish these concepts. See Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), pp. 214–217; and Jean Laplanche, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 8–24.
15. See Laplanche, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 9–11; Bruno Bettelheim, *Freud and Man's Soul* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), pp. 103–112; Lear, *Love and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 123–125.

16. Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, *SE* 7: 147–148.
17. Freud, "Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," *SE* 10: 209.
18. "That from which" is a literal translation of one of the two Greek expressions Aristotle uses for matter. See, e.g., *Physics* II.7.194b24. I use this expression to describe archaic mental states in *Love and Its Place in Nature*, p. 85; and in Chapter 6, "The Introduction of Eros."
19. And so, even an infant's sexual drive is constituted, in part, by representing loved objects in the environment. See Hans Loewald, "On Motivation and Instinct Theory," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). I discuss this point in Chapter 6.
20. So while the liver, say, can be studied as enmattered form—principles of liver functioning in liverish material—if we are studying the entire functioning organism, the liver helps to constitute the matter of the living human being. I discuss this at greater length in *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chap. 2.
21. Anxiety is of great importance for psychoanalysis not merely because of its prominent role in human suffering, but also because it plays an important conceptual role. Anxiety can occur outside the domain of logos. It makes no claims to be merited, it lacks structure, and thus is capable of bursting forth in rather unformed ways. It lends the Rat Man's cringe affective power without the structural complexity required for fear.
22. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).
23. One advantage of an outline is that this account is to a large extent compatible with all the major developments of psychoanalysis since Freud: in particular, those of Melanie Klein, Jacques Lacan, Donald Winnicott, and Hans Loewald, and the ego psychology of Anna Freud and Paul Gray. However incompatible these accounts may be in other ways, the fact that this schema fits them all speaks in its favor.
24. See Hanna Segal, *Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein* (London: Hogarth Press, 1982); R. D. Hinshelwood, *Clinical Klein* (London: Free Association Books, 1994); Susan Isaacs, "The Nature and Function of Phantasy," in *Developments in Psychoanalysis*, ed. M. Klein, P. Heimann, S. Isaacs, and J. Riviere (London: Karnac, 1989).
25. But being able to form such propositional attitudes is a sophisticated psychological achievement. After watching one show of *Oprah*, a person may *think* he is forming a belief about his inner child; but it is unlikely he is doing any such thing. Rather, he is engaging in the phantasy of forming such a belief.
26. See Freud, "On Negation," *SE* 19: 235–239. This process is plausibly conceived of as projective identification: a phantasy of projecting a bit of oneself into another. (See, e.g., Hinschelwood, *Clinical Klein*.) Here I use the more generic

term "projection" to leave open the question of what precise type of projection was used.

27. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I.244.
28. See Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-through: Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psychoanalysis, II," *SE* 12: 147–156.
29. I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 4, "An Interpretation of Transference."
30. For Wittgenstein, philosophy itself is a kind of therapy, and it consists in working through the "bad" philosophy with which one already lives unconsciously. The aim is not to advance any particular theses or information but to help one become aware of and work through certain phantasies one has about mind and meaning. So, for example, Wittgenstein helps us work through a pervasive phantasy of having "private" sensations, but once we have worked through that phantasy, we can go back to calling our sensations private. But we are no longer in the grip of a false picture of what that means. See *Philosophical Investigations*, I.243 ff.
31. Freud, "Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," *SE* 10: 193.
32. Ibid., 166–167.
33. In this context, I think we can better understand the pleasurable sadistic gratification to be found in the current fad for using the "Valley Girl" expression "Gee, that's a nice jacket you're wearing . . . Not!" Here the person is consciously issuing a contradicting judgment. But the pleasure in doing so is not just that of lulling the interlocutor into thinking he is receiving a compliment, only to take it away. There is also pleasure in the direct expression of aggression. Although this is a contradictory judgment, the activity of making it is drawing on wells of aggressive drive activity. The utterance of the "Not!" is also directly attacking and undoing the previous utterance. In the right mood, it feels good. Thus has the slang taken hold.
34. In this regard, see Wilfrid Bion's classic, "Attacks on Linking," in *Melanie Klein Today*, vol. 1: *Mainly Practice*, ed. Elizabeth Bott Spillius (London: Routledge, 1988).
35. Freud, "Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," *SE* 10: 166–167; some of the italics are Freud's; I have added others to emphasize my points.
36. See Freud's discussion of intrapsychic transference, *Interpretation of Dreams*, *SE* 5: 562–564, 589.
37. Freud, "Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," *SE* 10: 173.
38. See Freud, "The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," *SE* 19: 183–187; and the Schreber case, "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (dementia paranoides)," *SE* 12: 62–65.
39. This is the strategy in Mark Johnston's fascinating essay, "Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind," in *Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation*, ed. C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). One virtue of this account is that because this activity is subintentional it does not have to satisfy the rationality constraints which Socrates and the subsequent philosophical tradition have shown to be inherent in the concept of intentional mental activity. Thus it is able to do away with the schema of Another Mind as a way of making room for the possibility of the irrational-mental. And it thereby allows for the immanence of irrationality. A second virtue is that it shows how a mental activity which is irrational may nevertheless have a purpose. The mind can be understood as inherently directed towards the relief of its own anxiety.
40. This seems to be Johnston's suggestion; ibid., p. 437. He calls a tropism: "a characteristic, non-accidental and non-rational connection *between desire and belief*—a mental tropism or purpose-serving mental mechanism" (emphasis added).
41. The Rat Man's formation of a wishful belief about his father is of secondary importance. The Rat Man's turn to philosophy enables him above all to stay in some sort of touch, however distorted, with the contents of his own mind. For his father *is* alive in the "next world": only the next world is not heaven, but the internal world of phantasy. And the Rat Man is in some sense correct that if he can pay Lieutenant A., he will protect his father from harm, for this has become the phantasized requirement to ward off an internal attack. What he misunderstands is that this drama is about the goings-on in his own mind, not heaven. The formation of the philosophical belief that, for all we know, his father may be alive in the next world allows his beliefs and desires to stay in some sort of thoughtful contact with the structure of his own mind.
42. Johnston, "Self-Deception," p. 455.

6. The Introduction of Eros

1. See Hans Loewald, "On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 249.
2. Hans Loewald, "On Internalization," in *Papers*, p. 79. I have made a slight emendation to this and subsequent quotations from Loewald: Where Loewald uses the word "instinct," I have substituted the word "drive." The reason is as follows. When Loewald wrote, he used the vocabulary of the *Standard Edition*, which translates *Trieb* as "instinct." The problem with this translation, as we saw in the preceding chapter, is that it flattens the distinction, which Freud himself made, between a *Trieb* and an *Instinkt*. In order to respect this distinction, I have decided to follow a custom which has developed subsequently to the *Standard Edition* of translating Trieb as "drive" and Instinkt as "instinct." (See, e.g., Jean Laplanche, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985].) One consequence, to put the point in this vocabulary, is that when Loewald says "instinct" he means "drive." That is, he

28. *PI* I.69, 208, 210.
29. Here I am indebted to Richard Wollheim's fascinating discussion of psychotherapy in *The Thread of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
30. See Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), esp. essays 9, 10, 13–16; *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), esp. essay 11.
31. This dilemma is posed by Bernard Williams in "Wittgenstein and Idealism."
32. *PI* I.242.
33. *PI* I.81.
34. *PI* I.89.
35. *PI* I.94, 89.
36. *PI* I.81, Wittgenstin, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, V.40, 48.
37. *PI* I.108.
38. Cf. Manley Thompson, "On A Priori Truth," *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981).

12. The Disappearing "We"

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929) (hereafter cited as *CPR*); *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968). Cf., e.g., B167–168.
2. The most eloquent exponent of the antiskeptical interpretation is, I think, Barry Stroud. See, e.g., "Transcendental Arguments and Epistemological Naturalism," *Philosophical Studies* 31 (1977), esp. pp. 108, 109, 113; "Transcendental Arguments," *Journal of Philosophy* 65 (1968), esp. pp. 242, 252, 256.
3. *CPR* B147, B166, B218.
4. See, e.g., *CPR* B147.
5. See, e.g., *CPR* B137.
6. *CPR* A90/B122.
7. *CPR* A93/B125–B126. Cf. also A89/B122 ff., B137–140, B142, B165–168.
8. *CPR* B137. Cf. B158.
9. *CPR* B167–168.
10. See, e.g., *CPR* A94/B127, A89/B122–A92/B124, B168.
11. *CPR* B138.
12. *CPR* B138.
13. I cannot here discuss Kant's use of such expressions as "intelligible object" (noumenon), "transcendental object," or "thing in itself," but I do not think that the concept of an object is legitimately applicable to such "things." These expressions are *façons de parler*, which discursive intelligences find helpful when discussing that of which a different type of consciousness (an intellectual intuition) is conscious or that of which we discursive intelligences are considered independently of our modes of experience or thought.