Politics of Time: 'Primitives' and History-writing in a Colonial Society / Prathama Banerjee; New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006. (1-39, 119-157, 236-248 p)

Introduction

This book seeks to understand what it means for a colonial modern subject to write and make history. This is therefore a book about the politics of time, the politics through which colonial modern societies seek to make a time of their own, in negotiation with the time of modernity that permits the future only as a deferred, and only so different, replication of a present already played out elsewhere. In other words, this is a book about the predicament of colonial modern practice—practice being that which necessarily seeks to harness time, immediately, contingently, irreversibly, for the sake of a desired future—caught between dreams of modernity and desire for difference.

I argue here that modernity is centrally defined by the dominance of the historical, by which the historical tries to become not just one but the only way of acting for the future. And that it is precisely this dominance which constitutes time in such a way as to disallow political practices other than developmental and representational ones. I write about the specific context of late-nineteenth, early twentieth-century Bengal, which helps me draw directly on the works of Dipesh Chakrabarty and Ranajit Guha. Dipesh Chakrabarty's take on historicism as that which consigns the colonized forever to the waiting-room of history and Ranajit Guha's reading of Hegel which shows how world-time—punctuated by progressive stages of history—limits the possibilities, including linguistic possibilities, of history-writing, are by now well-known.[1] I move on from this prepared ground and look at the actual mechanisms, in the context of colonial Bengal, of the emerging dominance of the historical. And I believe that to do this it is not enough to merely write of the production of histories and historical subjectivities. One needs to understand the processes, both discursive and material, through which the non-historical is constituted.

Let me then begin by mapping the argument as it unfolds in this book. The argument moves on two registers. At one level, it analyses the constitution of the 'historical'—as discipline, practice, and imagination—in late nineteenth, early twentieth-century Bengal. At another, it analyses the making of a people called the Santals into a 'tribe', i.e. into an allegedly hardworking, sensuous, body-centric, archetypal 'primitive'. At times, these seem to be two distinct processes, leading—in colonial Bengal—to the construction of two different subjectivities—one historical and the other anthropological. I however argue that these two apparently autonomous processes actually work together to bring about the condition, which I call colonial modernity. I use the term colonial modernity deliberately. In a way, this introduction is an explanation of why I do so. I believe that a context such as that of Bengal shows up modernity for what it is: always already colonial modernity. Not only because crucial concepts and technologies of European modernity were worked out in colonial contexts and with colonial intentions—and there is a wealth of material that has recently demonstrated this[2]—but also because to be modern in any way—surely there are many ways of being modern—one must admit a temporality that becomes possible only with colonialism. To lay any claim at all to the label modern, one must admit to history and to the haunting shadow of what I call history's colonial-*anthropological imperative*.

Beginning from the understanding that modernity, if anything, is a temporal position (the modern is that which is definitionally ahead in time), I shall show that the 'primitive' (as an idea and as a concrete being) always already inhabits the regime of modern. I shall also show that it is this internal presence of the 'primitive', the non-modern, which inspires the imagination of temporality as chronology, i.e. as an abstract numerical series. Consequently it can be argued that it is the presence of the 'primitive' which makes historicality possible in the first instance. This creation of the 'primitive' on which modernity is predicated is demonstrable as a process both within modern Europe as well as in the colony. The context of the colony, however, shows this process up in particularly vivid terms—because the colonized, themselves constituted as backward, cannot quite externalize the 'primitive' in the anthropological mode in the way that the colonizer

seeks to do (not always successfully, I may add). A significant part of the book then is an analysis of the various ways, involving writing, exchange, travel, and politics, in which the colonized produce themselves as a modern historical nation, in negotiation with the discomfiting but inevitable presence of the 'primitive' within, just as at the same time 'primitives' are produced out of certain sections of the colonized population through various colonial modern technologies.

In the rest of the book, I analyse the implications of this. I go on to show how the making of the historical and the making of the 'primitive'—the two apparently distinct modes of subject formation—together determine the horizon of political possibilities in modernity by delineating, through a delineation of the thing called time, the oppositional categories of 'knowledge' and 'practice'. I argue that our modernity was centrally the creation of real-life 'primitives' and the pushing back of such peoples into the imagined realm of pure, sensuous practice. Just as the 'primitive' was defined as a purely practical mode of being, practice itself was reinvented as the 'primitive' other of thought, giving the principle of representational knowledge an unprecedented dominance in modernity. The emerging dominance of the historical, as the only mode of harnessing time, was based precisely on the emerging dominance of this representational mode over those not present, i.e. those in need of representation. Even today, history and knowledge itself, thrive on this contrary practical/'primitive' existence, which also, therefore, continues to serve as a limit to and a critique of the historical and the representational project. All this, I try to show, comes through once one foregrounds that apparently obvious yet ever intractable figure of modern imagination—*time*.

Time and the 'Primitive' in Modernity

Let me begin by stating the obvious—that in the regime of the 'modern', references to the thing called time become unprecedentedly common. After all, the term modernity itself indicates a purely temporal position, that what comes later is, despite some social costs, generally an improvement on what came earlier and that there is something not just about human history but about time itself which

makes it so. In modernity, the thing called time, thus, remains neither a philosophical irresoluble[3] nor that which is variously, contingently perpetuated in life practices. Time itself becomes the universal parameter of judgement—that is, of judging if a society, a people or an act is modern or 'primitive', advanced or backward, historical or timeless, distant from or contemporary to the subject-author of knowledge.[4]

In other words, in modernity, it appears as if the more 'advanced' a society the better it is as a choice of lifestyle—because the pile of time, experience and value that accrues to it is also greater. That is, modernity appears as a temporal competence, an advantage that the posterior possesses over the prior, exclusively because of the former's advanced position in time. This temporal competence is articulated as the possession by a subject of a monumental heap of time (as in accumulation and evolution), and at the same time as the possession by a subject of the advantage of hindsight (as in history and ethnology). In other words, in modernity, time appears as something which does not simply pass, nor as something articulated only in memory. Time remains always already available in the form of a cumulation of value and knowledge. If today it is said that 'time is money', it is not just because in capitalism value is articulated in terms of labour time, it is also because in modernity, time becomes the parameter that renders all acts and products, however different, commensurable to each other and therefore amenable to accumulation—both as undifferentiated capital and as universal, world-historical knowledge.

In this paradigm, it is not absurd to say that the modern always comes *after* the non-modern, historically and logically, even though they may coexist empirically in and at the same time. With modernity, thus, the world reappears in a strange and unprecedented way—as an agglomeration of co-existent yet non-contemporary beings. We know that, historically, this coincided with aggressive nationalisms in Europe and with the establishment of capitalism as a world system. As European nations sought to occupy other continents, the peoples there were transposed to the past so that they lost their presence, so to speak, in their own worlds.[5] At the same time, Europe claimed an unconditional modernity for itself by banishing its own internal antagonisms to distant lands.[6] The exile of convicts to 'aboriginal'

islands was the most literal instance of this export. As significant was the ethnologization of the poor and the vagrant of Europe, who were now administered as if they belonged to another 'primitive' nation, still subject to bodily passions and pre-modern irrationalities.[7] The Newtonian law that two bodies cannot exist in the same space at the same time, was in this way socialized as commonsense; if both the modern man and his other had to inhabit the same space, then the latter must be seen as inhabiting another time.

It was this political imperative—of defining some as modern and others as 'primitive'—which made time appear as an empty, common denominator, wherein different peoples could be positioned in successional terms. Time thus became the symmetrical other of space, cartographically represented as extension, as a series of numbers/stages. This time, being abstract, claimed to remain free of any contamination by the social location of the 'primitive' and the backward, who could now be harnessed to the metropolitan location of capital without it becoming a situation of contending histories and temporalities. It bears mentioning that this connection—between the invention of the 'primitive' and the invention of time as chronology—is clearly visible in the work of the foundational philosopher of European modernity, Hegel. Hegel founded his *Philosophy of History* on his 'knowledge' of other lands—Oriental and 'savage'—which lacked the requisite self-consciousness of the historical nation. In this scheme, the 'primitive' condition was a state where time was (mis)apprehended as an uninterrupted present, where the subject–object distinction had not yet emerged and therefore, where the mind was incapable of abstraction.[8] What is significant for us is not just that Hegel constructed modern historical subjectivity by contrasting it with such a 'primitive' but that, to do so, Hegel had to reconstitute the very nature of temporality.

This Hegel did by two philosophical strategies—one, by formulating time as the symmetrical other of space and two, by spatializing time itself. By arguing that 'history' was the development of the Spirit in time just as 'nature' was the development of the Idea in space, i.e. by formulating a clear equation between time and space, Hegel harnessed to Europe, as its own past, other continents. This allowed strange and unfamiliar lands to appear at least as knowable to the

historical subject as Europe's own past was. At the same time, Hegel spatialized temporality itself by conceptualizing time in terms of the *point*—the elusive instant, the ungraspable now, absolute negativity, as he called it. Hegel argued that if the point in space was an indifferent, immobile position, the point in time was the negative dialectical moment through which undifferentiated space became differentiated, its immobility overcome. In other words, by reducing the present to the idea of the point, position without magnitude, Hegel made it impossible to think time without expressing a geometrical-spatial intent. If time were admitted as differentiating, differentiation itself was reduced to a sense of spatial differentiation—making time, despite the unthinkable 'now', into a presence, paradoxically, identical to the non-temporal in time.[9] It can be said that this annulling of difference and differentiation, which Hegel effected by articulating temporality in terms of territoriality, was itself the founding moment of colonial modernity because it now produced the defining condition of an-other land appearing as primarily an-other time.

It must be clear already that here I am working with a singular, temporal definition of modernity. Of course, the modern has claimed to be many things in many contexts, in substantive and empirical terms. Postcolonial studies have shown how different modernities have evolved in different parts of the world, so much so that the very idea of a pure and originary, Western modernity has become rather difficult to sustain.[10] Yet the shared label 'modernity' does imply a shared temporal principle and perhaps therefore a shared predicament—the principle that alterity, any alterity, can be translated into temporal alterity, into non-contemporaneity. Modernity thus seeks to sanitize otherness, now wished away to another time as if it were another land altogether. If time in modernity is reconstituted as chronology, as a potentially empty extension like space, a point which two different entities cannot occupy simultaneously, it is precisely to produce this effect. In this time, only one can exist in the present—the truly modern. Others, with other histories and other temporalities, can no longer by themselves appear on the stage of world history to disrupt its script; being chronologically past, they have to be first re-*presented*. For purposes of this work, this is the defining trait of modernity—that it is a temporal regime in which

the non-modern are forced to become 'backward' and 'primitive', such that in order to even engage with the modern they must remain exclusively dependent on their reproduction by the modern subject of history as *non*-present yet *re*-presentable. People constituted as 'primitive' and 'backward', thus, are sought to be transformed in modernity from being subject-agents of different histories to being objects of representational knowledge.

This precisely was the complaint of the colonial Bengali literate classes, that they had been turned into objects of colonial knowledge and were being accused of never having produced any history of their own. Colonial histories were claiming that all the Bengalis had had was a past of passive victimhood, of being repeatedly conquered by outside powers, of whom the British were the latest and the best, because they forced a hitherto backward people into modernity, and therefore into history. As if the history of the colonized was always already determined from outside, and such a history, therefore, was best written by an outsider. As if, being 'backward' and not quite present to modernity, the colonized could only be re-*presented* by the truly modern. The colonized Bengalis responded to such accusations—of being 'backward', of lacking history, of lacking agency—with resonant claims of their own historicity. Much has been written about this historical agenda of nineteenth-century Bengalis, and I shall not go into the details.[11] What is important for me, however, is to note that, in order to write a history of their own, the colonized felt that they had to first deal with what appeared as their own 'backwardness' in time and, more importantly, with their everyday proximity with real-life 'primitives'. 'Tribes' like the Santals and the Paharias—who seemed to be, literally, survivors of another time—after all, could not quite be anthropologized in the colonial mode, for they were indubitably part of the nation and indispensable to Bengali society and economy. Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay—the central figure of the nineteenth-century historical agenda, who gave a call for all Bengalis to write their own histories—therefore, explicitly stated that the 'first question' of national (*jatiya*) historiography was to ask why there were two *jati*s in Bengal: one historical and the other 'primitive'.[12] The colonized nation's claim to history and therefore to modernity, thus, depended on a working out of this paradox of being pervaded, always already, by the 'primitive' principle.

In fact, the Bengali's effort at surmounting what appeared as his own temporal lag depended precisely on a thematization of this experience of the 'primitive within'. The first event of national history was therefore imagined as the foundational battle between the 'primordial' and the 'civilizational', the non-Aryans and the Aryans.[13] This original antagonism was then brought forward as a defining characteristic of the present. By arguing that Santals etc. were descendants of the 'originally' defeated non-Aryans, contemporary problems were thematized as reworkings of this inaugural historical counterpoise. National disunity was blamed on the eternal schism between the *arya* and the *anarya*. Economic backwardness was blamed on the 'primitive' mentality of some who were definitionally incapable of abstract thought, and therefore of financially predicting and managing the future. The first question of Bengali history, thus, was formulated not in terms of the national-colonial dichotomy, nor in terms of the Hindu-Muslim binary, but in terms of the struggle of the subject of history against the obstinate presence of the 'primitive' within.[14] To the colonized Bengali, therefore, the historical time of the nation seemed permanently split into two: the modern and the 'primitive'. In my first chapter, I explore the anxious historical subjectivity that emerges out of this temporal schizophrenia. I show how this anxiety gets articulated in contemporary caste-histories and biographies, which desperately seek to attribute to the nation a hierarchical unity like that of the body, and in peculiar experimental genres like dream-histories, in which the non-contemporaneity of the various peoples of the nation seems to get miraculously resolved.

In other words, the first chapter of the book is a detailing of the colonial experience of being pervaded by contradictory times, which could not quite be structured into a single narrative temporality. There was, to begin with, the new routines and new calendars in the colonial offices where many of the middle classes worked—an experience so poignantly essayed by Sumit Sarkar. There was then the temporal experience of the present as *kaliyuga*, an uncontrollable and evil epoch where misfortunes arrived without cause and reason. Sarkar shows how the new clockwork routine fed into this kaliyuga experience.[15] And then there was the new agenda for history-writing, as analysed by Ranajit Guha,[16] and a new imagination of a continuous historical

time of the progress of nations and civilizations. I show that out of these different temporalities, the sensibility of a continuous historical time becomes dominant by the second half of the nineteenth century, at the cost of temporal articulations like that of kaliyuga. The result was the defining paradox of the colonial condition. Once time became historical time, i.e. a continual and causal succession of moments/stages, the colonial present could no longer be formulated as undeserved, inexplicable, and contingent as it could have been in kaliyuga discourses. Historical explanation, by its very nature, required that the present fallen state of the colonized be explained in terms of causes in the colonized's own past, rather than in terms of the present political contingency of colonialism. The question now was—what lay in the nation's past that led to its present subordination. And the answer generally boiled down to that single 'fact' of history—the presence of the 'primitive', the non-Aryan, the *asabhya* within the nation. After all, Bankim said, if the Muslims had conquered Bengal in the medieval times, it were the 'aborigines' that they had really conquered, the Aryans from northern India not having yet reached the frontier region that Bengal was at that time.[17]

In the late nineteenth century, thus, in most Bengali texts, the 'primitive within' became the reason quoted for the fall of the Bengali/Indian/Hindu into colonial subordination. But since this was also to admit the 'primitive' as an undeniable part of the historical nation, an unprecedented problem emerged—of having to write a unitary historical narrative of a temporally fractured self. In the rest of my first chapter I write about the strategies that the literate middle classes fashioned in order to negotiate this split temporality. I show how these strategies operated at various levels: at the level of writing school books, which coupled history and geography in order to assign to historical time the apparent unity of territorial identity; at the level of negotiations by almanac writers, who constructed a new division between the time of inner, religious life and the time of external public life, and thus made space for the superiority of western systems of time-reckoning which allowed a negotiation of distances and so on. The point of the details is to show how all these strategies added up to the production of a new time as analogous to space, which was required to ground the new imagination of historical chronology. In other words, I argue that the spatialization of time into historical

chronology, which occurs in Bengal in the latter half of the nineteenth century, actually occurs through the articulation of the unprecedented experience of the colonized subject of being fraught with contradictory experiences of time.

I should pause here and admit that this troublesome experience of the 'primitive within' was, in a sense, as central to European modernity as it was to colonial contexts. Scholars have demonstrated, at one level, how the concepts of order and the ordering concepts of European modernity—law, culture, society, and even the market—were worked out in counterpoise to the idea of 'primitive' irrationalities and through ethnographic examples.[18] At another level, they have shown how within Europe, technologies of governance required the reformulation of the lower orders of society as wild and 'primitive', to be morally and physically disciplined in order to be brought into modernity.[19] In other words, while it might seem that Western modernity defined itself in counterpoise to an externally positioned 'primitive', synonymous to colonized lands and people, it nevertheless had to deal with a 'primitive' which seemed to be internal to its own modernity. The internal temporal mismatch that this led to was sought to be contained in the West by psychologizing the 'primitive', so to speak. The 'primitive', when invoked in European contexts, was invoked not in terms of the problematic of time and modernity, history and colonialism, but in terms of the age-old Christian problematic of the primordial and pre-fall human condition—of which the real-life 'primitive' was an accidental example that ethnographers, evangelists, and even political-economists of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could quote because their time coincided, accidentally, with the time of colonial encounters. That is, by allowing a slippage between the 'primitive' that was invented through colonial encounters and the 'primordial' that was a universal human concern, the 'primitive within' Europe became part of the problematic of pre-cultural passion, desire, sexuality, even freedom—moral-psychological issues which produced the issue of social versus anomic individuals a là Freud and Durkheim. This was the crucial difference between the colonial and the Western European experiences of the 'primitive within'; for the colonized, the 'primitive within' continued to appear as a set of concrete social groups whom it became impossible to

contemporanize to the historical-national subject, while in the West the 'primitive' appeared absorbed within the modern self, and pushed to the private realm of the individual's often violent struggle with him/herself, thus apparently freeing society of the problem of a split temporality.

Yet, even here, the 'primitive' often exceeded its containment within modernity's problematic of the aesthetic/moral individual. It was not accidental that s/he came to figure in the thoughts of the two most critical, ardent, anti-Hegel voices of European philosophy—namely, Heidegger and Marx. Heidegger critiqued the reduction of time to empty chronology by rejecting the notion of history as the Hegelian Spirit in progress. Instead, he offered a notion of the 'primordial', which he said should be rescued from the hands of ethnographers and historians, who, mired in everydayness, forgot their own 'primordiality' and through sciences of objectivity tried to discover the 'primordial' in 'exotic and alien cultures'.[20] This 'primordial' had to be repossessed through moves of 'mineness' or 'ownness', the other of other-ing, as it were, in a critique of dominant, rational epistemologies. And this 'primordiality', to Heidegger, was nothing other than temporality itself—authentic temporality, which was forgotten when *Dasein* 'fell' into everydayness and historicity, forgetting its own being for the sake of being-in-the-world.[21] It is important for our purposes to emphasise Heidegger's putting together of the 'primordial' and non-chronological time, because it explicitly recognizes the theoretical concurrence of the colonial category of the 'primitive' with the apparently universal notions of history and chronology in the constitution of what we know as modernity.

Heidegger's thought also shows up the impossibility of this task of owning up the 'primitive', from within modernity. After all, less than a decade after publishing *Being and Time*, in his *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935), faced with the apparently relentless historical march of the German nation-state, Heidegger invoked the Spirit almost in Hegelian terms—Spirit 'which accords with the tone of the origin [rather than primordiality]—and which is knowledge [rather than authentic Being]'—thus owning up that very epistemological mode which he had rejected in order to reclaim the 'primordial' and the phenomenological.[22] This precisely was the European location of

the temporal politics of colonial modernity, which had to produce at and out of the same (historical) time both a claim to proximity/authenticity (Heidegger's primordial) and a claim to universality (knowledge and history). And this was the contradiction—producing critique and complicity in the same textual move—that was ironically reproduced within anti-colonial nationalisms as well. In a strange coincidence, both twentieth-century Bengalis and Heidegger gave their political loyalty to historicism, even as they looked for an authentic, non-chronological temporality in a certain poetics, that of Trakl for Heidegger and Rabindranath for the Bengalis—as if poetry and history ordered the terrains of Being and of everyday practice respectively as separate and mutually compensatory disciplines.[23] This is not to ignore differences—evidently, Bengalis and Heidegger did not need to read each other. Rather, this is to argue that as much as the colonized Bengali, Heidegger too confronted the irony of having to both harness (in the name of difference) and refute (in the name of the progress) the force of temporality and the figure of the 'primordial'—of having to effect both change and sameness, both contradiction and identity in the same cognitive act of claiming the 'modern' as both national and universal.

Like Heidegger, Marx too found it necessary to deploy the 'primitive' against the conservative time of historicism. We know that, late in his life, Marx delved into empirical anthropology, as part of his perhaps unfinished agenda of working out a radical notion of temporality and change. Writing in context of Russian society, Marx stated that transcendence to communism was not a transition or succession—from capitalism to socialism—but a temporal leap from an 'archaic formation', the commune, into the society of the unprecedented future.[24] Marx's elaborate marginal notes on Maine, Lubbock, Phear, and other ethnologists of his time show that this was more than a comment on the local nature of Russian society.[25] 'Still-existing primitives' in the modern world demonstrated that transitions were not necessarily genealogical, nor successional—as the idea of chronology would have it.[26] In fact, Marx argued that 'just as each century has its own nature, so it produces its own primitives'[27] and that it was in the eighteenth century that the 'primitive' became a primary political category, because it allowed the political

imagination of non-statist collectivities in a modern society where all institutions other than those which led to the establishment of the State were seemingly becoming irrelevant.[28] It must be remembered that, unlike Heidegger who finally took recourse (as did most Western philosophers) in Greek antiquity for his imagination of the 'origin', Marx had to function with the knowledge that his exemplary moment (of revolution) was uncompromisingly in the future. It was not a moment of identity through repetition, nor of return to the 'originary', but a moment of almost inconceivable novelty that must be imagined and made credible. This lack of an exemplary past must have raised an unbreachable wall before his praxiological imagination, and Marx seemed to be seeking his answers in a detailed study of ethnology. In the last instance then, Marx's anthropological thoughts, which are seen as the least significant part of his *oeuvre*, emerge as the tentative basis of his own radicality. In order to imagine a radical transformative temporality, Marx had, in the last years of his life, to take recourse to a foregrounding of the 'primitive' in modernity, in order to demonstrate that succession (of moments, numbers, or social formations) was not necessarily the defining characteristic of temporality, as the chronological and/or evolutionary sensibility would have us believe.

Through this brief digression I am trying to make two related points. First, that the figure of the 'primitive', constructed through colonial encounters, was foundational to Europe's imagination not only of the world but also of itself, and to its own self-critiques. In this sense, there seems to be no modernity, European or otherwise, which is also not colonial modernity. For to see colonialism as just one offshoot of Western modernity or to see modernity as imaginable without admitting the colonial experience would be to render meaningless both modernity's self-definition and self-critique. Second, that it was the invention of the 'primitive' through colonial encounters which led to the defining trait of modernity, namely, the imperative to produce time as a linear, chronological extension, the ground for historicality as it were, in which nations could be serialized in progression, such that the non-modern no longer appeared as present and contemporary to modern historical subject. To say this is also to say that modernity's defining trait would be the relentless imperative

to *re*-present—that is, to imagine knowledge, and politics, as re-presentations of those not quite present in modernity, i.e. as re-presentations of those unable to act as contemporary agents in the current stage of world history. But to elaborate the point about representation, I must first return to the context of colonial Bengal, for it is here that we see the 'primitive' being invented—literally.

Money, Time, and the 'Primitive'

In eighteenth-century Bengal, Santals and Paharias were integral part of the economic and ecological systems of the region. It was only since the 1770s, with colonialism, that they began to be seen and administered as misfits in so-called mainstream Hindu society, for they were people who proved difficult to settle and harness in early colonial revenue arrangements. In my third chapter, I show how Santals and Paharias were physically and territorially fenced in by the colonial rulers, so that they could no longer interact directly with the rest of indigenous society. They were thus forced to give up unmediated economic and political relationships with so-called caste and peasant communities and became almost autarkic groups, which made them fit post facto the category of 'aborigines' or 'tribes'. I show that this was the material process by which some peoples were actually *made* 'primitive' in colonial modernity. Studies by Ajay Skaria and Sivaramakrishnan show up similar processes at work elsewhere in India more or less during the same time that I write about.[29] In fact, how deliberate this process was can further be proven by the fact that in the Jharkhand area, when colonial authorities found that the local hillmen or Paharias were a people who could not be easily made to fit the 'primitive' slot, they were replaced, literally through forced migration and official settlement policies, by another people, the Santals, who seemed more amenable to becoming the archetypal 'primitive' of the forest lands of the region.

The Bengali middle classes faced these newly invented 'primitives' with perturbation, because to admit to the category of the 'primitive', which their own claim to historicality made them do, was to also admit that the nation was not really one, but internally fractured and non-contemporaneous. No historical narrative, however imaginative, could weave together these contradictory times without jeopardizing its own historicity. The impossible task of gathering non-contemporary peoples into a single identity was then given over to concrete strategies of spatialization. This was the other side of the spatialization of time which I outline in the first chapter. In my second chapter I detail the material dynamics through which spatial unity was made to compensate the temporal fracturing of the nation. There were two apparently autonomous processes at work here. On the one hand, Bengali middle classes began to make the act of *travelling the nation* as a necessary surrogate to the act of history-writing—as if spatial tracing could integrate the temporality which historicization bifurcated. On the other hand, this was supplemented by the forced circulation of 'primitive' or *jungli* bodies as migrant labour, such that peoples like the Santals, outside national historical time, could experience the nation as an integrated expanse. It was through this practice of forced transportation, that 'primitives' were to be materially constituted as nothing but body-commodities, with no time other than that of circulation. Deprived of uses of time and culture, the 'primitive' thus seemed to lose some of its threatening alterity and become suitable for integration to the historical nation. In fact, as Kaushik Ghosh shows, the 'primitive' was perhaps created out of this process of its circulation as pure labouring bodies, much before it was produced through techniques of anthropologization.[30]

These two distinct processes came together around that singular technological gift of colonialism, the railways, which massively transformed lives and imaginations in Bengal in the mid-nineteenth century. It was not accidental that one of the earliest rail tracks laid in India in the 1850s linked Calcutta to the rich mining and forest regions of what is today called Jharkhand—opening up the 'primitive' interiors and making possible both middle-class travel writings and large-scale harnessing of 'tribal' labour. Also, as I argue in this chapter, even though the Calcutta middle classes vociferously criticized colonial policies of indenturing 'tribal' labour, they themselves shared in the colonial modern understanding of 'tribes' as primarily bodies, lacking culture, history, and location. After all, such atemporal entities were easier to spatially integrate into the nation than entities which represented a counter-temporality to the time of the modern man. Of course, it would be this very 'primitive' body which would reappear to haunt the Bengali middle classes as a potent critique of their own

civilizational state, which, after all, emerged, out of a loss of freedom and emaciation of the body and the person of the colonized.

This 'primitive' body, in the imagination of Bengali literate classes, represented the excess and extravagance that defined the 'primitive' condition per se. It was argued that because 'aborigines' like Santals were nothing but bodies par excellence, they lacked the capacity for abstraction required to comprehend time beyond the immediate present. They lived in a state of perpetual feasts, festivities, sex, and therefore, debt. This was what made them without a temporality of their own, because they were incapable of thinking of the future in abstraction, either historically or financially. Many Bengali texts of this time openly argued on these lines, and some even claimed that it were Bengali merchants and moneylenders who could take civilization and history to the 'tribes', because it were they who could demonstrate to the 'primitive' the virtues of long-term and future-oriented thought, who could teach them the value of time, and money, as it were. This, I argue, was the crucial moment of the production of colonial modernity—the formulation that it was only the enforcement of money-rationality which could induce 'primitives' to simulate the future-oriented sensibility that historicality called for. I try to unpack the workings of this formulation in my third chapter, with the help of George Simmel's *Philosophy of Money*.[31]

Behind this formulation lay late eighteenth-century techniques of colonial economic administration. Sudipta Sen shows how early colonialism reconstructed the Bengal market, through political and coercive interventions, as a strictly economic domain, meant to function by a pure pecuniary rationality. He records the 'suppression' of *zamindari* rights by the East India Company over the passage of boats, pilgrims, and merchandise, such that the *zamindars* were forced to withdraw into the role of mere landed potentates, with rights only on agrarian produce, causing a clear 'de-commercialization' of their political power and influence.[32] This splitting of the economic and the political also marked 'tribal' areas, as Santal and Paharia regions were reproduced by colonial authorities as lands without money and trade. The Company soaked up liquidity from the area and invested it in its wars of annexation and Cornwallis' currency standardization policies diminished the general purchasing power of the people of this region. The region was then confirmed as 'primitive' indeed, because money seemed scarce here. The Company also sought to curtail all political relations between 'tribes' and zamindars, and then replace them in a purely economic exchange-relation, which inaugurated a new regime of indebtedness for the so-called 'primitive' peoples like Paharias and Santals. It was also in the same region of what will soon become known as the Santal Parganas, that the Company intervened in the passage of pilgrims to Deoghar and tried to control everyday wayside interactions between 'tribes' and Hindus. Thus, for the first time with colonialism, a certain political-economic rearrangement was effected, by which some peoples were reproduced as more 'primitive' than others, being incapable of managing either political relations or credit relations with other 'historical' peoples. No wonder then, the Bengali middle classes categorically formulated the 'primitive' condition of Santals as embodying a lack of financial and credit rationality. Behind this seemingly 'derivative' thought lay this long colonial process of material constitution of some peoples as eternally indebted and unable to comprehend the abstract time of history and interest.

In my third chapter, therefore, I show how the colonial production of the 'primitive' was not only a concrete process of severing all unmediated relationships between peoples like the Santals and Bengalis, but also a process of inserting money as the sole mediator between them. Beginning from the late eighteenth century, we find colonial administrative effort in the region largely concentrating on the settling of official markets in the 'tribal' area, and literally making illegal any exchange between Santals and Bengalis in places other than these official marketplaces. The argument behind this policy was clearly that historical-'primitive' relationships, which were not mediated by the rational and ordering device of money, would naturally degenerate into disorder. After all, Santals and Bengalis were not merely two cultures but also two temporalities, which could never meet without the work of a time machine. Money was seen precisely as that time machine. Being purely abstract, being the embodiment of reason as Simmel argued, money could travel across times, re-*present* non-contemporary times to each other, without itself being destroyed in the process. It was not accidental, therefore, that Simmel drew heavily

on ethnographic examples to demonstrate that modernity's greatest achievement was nothing other than money—that pure and abstract sign, which could work as the perfect representation of anything and everything, without any reference to what it was itself made of. The context of a colonial society shows us the mechanisms through which money achieved this status in the regime of modernity. These clearly were political mechanisms through which the world was materially divided up into non-contemporary peoples and money inserted between them and granted the role of mediating between antagonistic temporalities. In other words, money assumed primarily a representational function because with colonialism re-*presentation* became the only mode through which peoples, definitionally non-contemporary to each other, were allowed to interact.

It is here that I would like to use Tejaswini Niranjana's critical insight, that in colonial modernity, the colonized subject lives always already in a state of translation.[33] I would reclaim this insight to say, instead, that in colonial modernity the subject lives in a mode of constant re-presentation—where both translation and exchange appear as the temporal act of *re-presenting the non-present*. It was this centrality of the act of representation which made money, and Reason, acquire the status of mediators in the temporally fractured nation. The equivalence of money and Reason is repeatedly mentioned in contemporary Bengali texts, not just because colonialism was the ultimate lesson that rational knowledge and aggressive commerce could together generate unlimited power, but also because the mediating regimes of Reason and money seemed indispensable in exchanges across the non-contemporary times of the 'modern' and the 'backward'. As Dipesh Chakrabarty writes, non-colonial translations 'take barter for their model of exchange rather than that of a generalized exchange of commodities which always needs the mediation of a universal, homogenising middle term'.[34] To my mind, the need for this arbitrating middle term was precisely because translation had to be always done across times, and not just across languages and worlds. I shall, therefore, demonstrate in this book the mutual articulation of knowledge and monetary rationality in colonial Bengal, which reproduced time as the time of re-presentation, as a time that was singular, abstract, and cumulative, where inequivalent entities could be represented as numerically commensurable and then placed in exchange.

From the perspective of colonial modernity, then, one can argue that the transformation of time into a homogeneous, numerical series was a material process which can be described as follows: first, the material constitution and bounding of some peoples as 'primitive' and non-contemporary to other peoples; second, the putting of such 'primitives' in relations of exchange with the so-called 'historical' as if that, in principle, were the only relation possible amongst the non-contemporary; third, the theorization of money as the only mediator/translator possible in such exchanges because number, the signifier of both money and labour, remained unaffected by the practice of different social temporalities; and fourth, the concomitant transformation of temporality into a universal numerical scale (itself translatable as money) into which different times could be converted as relativized stages of the same time, and between which exchange could be instituted and numerically priced. In other words, the colonial modern constitution of the 'primitive' and the non-contemporary was the precondition for and the mode of the generalization of chronology and therefore, of both capitalism and historicism. For us, then, the question of the generalization of modernity's gift to the world—universal chronology—appears somewhat displaced from the work of philosophers like Giorgio Agamben and historians like E.P. Thompson, who see the genesis of modern, rectilinear, continuous time in the secularization of linear Christian time by the experience of modern manufacture and industry.[35]

Practice and the 'Primitive'

In the year 1855, Santals of Bengal and Bihar rebelled against colonial officials and Bengali moneylenders. A dramatic event—the *hul*—became part of not only Santal lore, but also of Bengali popular traditions and of innumerable books and memoirs written by the middle classes. Even today, the Santal hul remains part of the area's political traditions and of contemporary Bengali literature and films. It is through writing about the hul that I move on to what can be read as the second part of the book. The hul has been much written about,[36] and in my fourth chapter, I do not describe it as an event so much as write about the many ways in which the hul was written

about, right from 1855 to later times. The purpose is to understand the mechanisms by which the hul becomes constituted as an event of history. I show how from the very moment when the Santals rebelled, their own words—which claimed that the hul was an act against the transformation of time into a time of debt and interest—were used, against the very intention of their testimonies, as statements of 'causes'. It was through this reduction of practical reasoning into the structure of 'causes'—first by colonial officials in charge of suppression of the hul and then by historians—that the *act* of rebelling was transmuted into the *event* of rebellion. This was the first act of historicization, an administrative and inquisitorial act—this act of writing up an unprecedented and contingent *act* as a causated and therefore, ultimately predictable *event*, set to the continuous time of chronology. I then counterpoise these historicist efforts to certain other ways in which the hul became part of popular recollections of both Santals and others. Through the setting up of this contrast, I argue that a different understanding of this rebellion was developed in some Santal and local Bengali traditions by which the hul was seen as a discontinuous act, an act of interrupting and reshaping time, such that a recalcitrant context emerged where it was precisely causal and predictive reasoning which became impossible.

In a way, this is what the rest of this book is about, this critical move of nineteenth-century historical discourses of denying the contingent and irreversible time of practice and of reconstituting practice itself in the structure of knowledge. I begin this part with the essay on the hul because this Santal rebellion appeared to the literate classes as an impossible event—an event of the past rebelling against the present, as it were, in which 'primitives' sought to both fight and appropriate signs of modernity. Most contemporary Bengali texts expressed incredulity, because Santals had always appeared to be a happy-go-lucky people, who had no sense of the abstract time of the future and who, therefore, could not be expected to undertake a historic act of transformation. But then perhaps it was precisely this that made them rebel—the Santal lacked abstract, predictive rationality, and therefore the messy act of rebellion in the first place, many argued. In other words, the rebellion appeared as a thoughtless, purely practical act, definitionally 'primitive', constituting the prehistory of

true historical acts like that of history-writing and nation-building, acts which were informed by modern predictive and predicative knowledge. My argument is that this distinction—between pure practice, based on a misapprehension of time, and thoughtful practice, based on the understanding of time as history—was a distinction generated by the primary dichotomy of colonial modernity, namely, that between the 'primitive' and the historical.

'Primitiveness', as embodied in so-called 'tribes', stood in colonial modernity as the other of thought. It was a commonplace of texts of colonial modernity—whether Hegel's philosophy, missionary and ethnographic documents, colonial archives, or Bengali nationalist writings—that 'primitives' were defined by their incomprehension of abstract temporality. 'Primitives' were primitive because they were inherently incapable of conquering time, either by putting interest on accumulating temporal units, or by accelerating the arrival of modernity, or for that matter, by assuming the permanent presence of the thinking, historical subject. Of course, in this scheme of things, Bengali middle classes themselves faced time as a disadvantage. They seemed to lag behind the West, they lacked enough time of their own, being increasingly controlled by the routine of salaried office work or *chakuri*.[37] Time itself thus came across as a threatening other to the colonized. It was precisely in response to this time *as* the other, that the Bengali middle classes advised a withdrawal into *jnyan* (knowledge), in contrast to 'primitive' existences, mired in contingent practices and constrained by a colonized everyday. And it was as part of the very same response that late nineteenth-century Bengalis argued in favour of commerce, rather than salaried work. For commerce was the supreme conquest of time-the-other—embodying the principle of perfect prediction, perfect control over time, in which a grasp of the future, as Lyotard so succinctly put it, appeared as the precondition to present acts of accumulation and production.[38] Not surprisingly then the purely practical and presentist 'primitive' was written into modernity as a counterpoise to the future orientation of both knowledge-sense and money-sense—as a counterpoise to infinite, cumulative, abstract time.

In order to unpack the temporal politics of colonial modernity, then, the crucial theme that one must address is the production of the oppositional categories of 'knowledge' and 'practice'. I show in

my last chapter that this was a new kind of conceptual opposition, which appeared out of experiences of colonial subordination. It was new because it was produced out of the unprecedented experience of the colonized of being disaggregated into non-contemporary elements. This internal non-contemporaneity disallowed the coming face-to-face of peoples of the nation in practical negotiation, and led to a domination by a form of self-knowledge, which was necessarily representational, wherein the non-present had to be first represented by the modern subject-agent of history. I show that representational knowledge, from the second half of the nineteenth century, began to be explicitly theorized in Bengal in opposition to the fraught and untidy world of everyday practices, unlike earlier when, as Jitendra Mohanty shows, even the most esoteric of philosophies could admit, without much theoretical ado, instances from practical life as elements of proof and counterproof.[39] Modernity brought a new kind of chasm between knowledge and practice, experienced by a typical Bengali *bhadralok* as schizophrenic forms of everyday life, torn between 'tradition' and 'modernity'. In other words, with modernity, the colonized began to experience the heterogeneity of social practices as the traumatic form of a temporal schizophrenia and therefore, sought a mode of self-knowledge that was self-consciously, even aggressively at times, anti-practice and representational.

History played a critical role in the fashioning of this new knowledge. It must be remembered that, in the colonial context, historicality was formulated not only as identity and knowledge of that identity. Historicality was also enunciated as the *only* valid mode of transformative practice for the colonized, all other modes of practice being criticized as compromised, everyday and incapable of staking a claim to the time of world history and modernity. It was not for nothing that the first nationalist act that was imagined in nineteenth-century Bengal—by Bankimchandra and his contemporaries—was the act of history-writing itself, history-writing not just by the historian but by all and sundry who were part of the nation.[40] It is this domination by the historical mode that is in a way the problematic of this book—a domination that lies behind the predicament of colonial and postcolonial practice, which remains an impossible struggle for a politics of difference, and a different politics, capable of resisting the terrible

but alluring promise of eventual sameness offered by the agenda of development and modernization. To say this is not to diminish Homi Bhabha's insight into modernity as a differentiated and always already deferred formation.[41] Undoubtedly, Bhabha has given us an effective critique of the hegemonic vision of a world divided between an original European modernity and its dispersed corruptions, and offered us the vision of a world of incommensurable hybrid existences, where the dream of perfect modernity remains no less and no more than the life-giving Utopia of a Europe produced out of colonialism. This reformulation has indeed generated histories, which are now able to capture politics of difference for the first time—Gyan Prakash's book on science being a good example of histories of this kind.[42] However, what seems to escape this historiography are the traumas of everyday postcolonial politics, its inability to go beyond the developmental vision and its consequent dependence on statist paradigms. Nothing captures this political predicament better than the potent formulation offered by Rukmini Bhaya Nair when she describes postcolonial politics as the production of a form of power grounded in profound emotional, cultural, and institutional *indifference*, an indifference deemed both structurally and intellectually necessary in governing a still uncivic, practical world, fraught with what appear as pre-modern and primordial loyalties.[43] I read this constitutive indifference as nothing other than the curious and conceptual alienation of practice from theory, the continuous reproduction of practice as the contaminant of ideology, of knowledge, and of true history, whereby practice is transformed from being the home ground of politics to being the 'problem area' of politics.

In the last chapter of the book I try to understand the mechanisms through which the world of practice, both consciously political and everyday practice, becomes thus alienated from us. I show that in colonial Bengal, history and history-writing emerged through a rearticulation of the 'problem' of practice. This had two aspects to it. One was the restructuring of historical and, therefore, valid national practice in the epistemological modes of causality (karma) and discipline (*anusilan*).[44] The other was the representation of the so-called 'primitive' condition as a state of purely practical, and sensual existence—a state lacking not only theoretical acumen, but, lacking as it did the

sensibility of time as history, also meaningful practice. Through an analysis of these two aspects, I argue that time reappeared in colonial Bengal as a concept monopolized not just by history but, through the work of history, by the field of knowledge—the work of history being this double process of epistemologizing practice on one hand and ethnologizing practice on the other. Through this double move, the historical subject sought to reclaim time from the domain of life and turn it into causality and repetition, into pure succession and order, and thus claim to be able to synoptically grasp at a single moment of enlightenment—as historical knowledge and as knowledge of history—all that unfolded temporally in practice. In other words, I shall argue that in colonial Bengal, time was sought to be usurped by the domain of knowledge from the domain of contingent and irreversible practice and that this precisely was what colonial modernity was all about. For time became a historical-epistemological issue in colonial Bengal, because it was only through the synchronic vision of knowledge that the colonized could grasp the nation as a totality, a nation now configured as an agglomeration of non-contemporaneous beings and acts who could never appear practically in and at the same time.

In other words, by abandoning itself to history—as the only practical mode of salvation from simultaneous 'pre-modernity' and colonialism—the colonized literally abandoned the time of practice in favour of knowledge. As the Bengali middle classes ascribed to themselves the status of a pedagogical leadership, thought-knowledge appeared as the *a priori* of practice. Instead of thought being temporalized as one kind of practice, practice was de-temporalized as the lesser other of thought. Practice became the application of thought. The accuracy of thought was autonomously and theoretically verified. If some elements of thought failed to make sense of practical life, that did not necessarily discredit thought. After all, were not the universal claims of modern knowledge based on its indifference to exactly such resistant contexts? Bengali historiography, despite its potent critique of colonial historiography, shared with colonial-modern knowledge systems this self-consciously anti-practical form. Once time began to be monopolized by history, Bengali historiography, which imagined the nation as a historical practice as much as

a historical identity, ironically, ended up displacing what it considered valid practice from its own domain—that of time—to the realm of the other of time. It was this, which compelled the colonial intellectuals to make education their first historical agenda, for it was only education that could make everyday life conform to the a priori vindicated knowledge of the nation. The nation was thus constructed, not as a created and practical solidarity, but as the encompassing knowledge of a predetermined identity, and an infinite and disciplined repetition of that in practice. If this identity seemed to fall apart in practice, as during communal riots or 'primitive' rebellions or even routine assertions of contradiction and struggle, this was ascribed to the necessarily erroneous nature of unthinking and 'primordial' practice. For once the nation was accepted as historical, i.e. as always already present in time, the modern subject could no longer admit, except at the 'secondary' level of tactics, that the lack of practical solidarity could effectively disrupt identity and repetition across time.

It was precisely this other-ing and ordering of practice—and thus of time itself—by epistemology which informed the mutual complicity in colonial Bengal of the two seemingly non-convergent processes that I write about: on the one hand, the disciplining of historical knowledge and historical practice by the Bengali middle classes and on the other, the making of the Santals of Bengal Presidency into the ideal-typical 'primitive'. We know from Johannes Fabian's classic book, *Time and the Other*, how the sense of historical time in the West was founded on the anthropological invention of 'people without history'.[45] The colonial context further un-conceals the fraught history-anthropology relationship and moreover, reveals the political implications of it. Evidently for the colonized, anthropology could not appear an unproblematic mode of knowledge, for the colonized could never quite claim the requisite distance from the 'primitive' which the anthropologist's insight was, after all, based on.[46] We see in colonial Bengal, therefore, an interesting dynamics between the disciplines of history and anthropology, with anthropology offering the ethnologized figure of the 'primitive' back to the historical nation, as it were, literally as compensation for the losses engendered by historicity. In fact, many early twentieth-century anthropologists argued in Bengal that it was important that the colonized take advantage of his real-life proximity to 'primitives' like Santals, a proximity which

history sought to deny, because it was this very trait, the existence of the 'primitive within', which could be worked out as the colonized's radical difference from the West.

This formulation about the 'primitive within' was intended as a self-consciously political argument in the colonial context, and not merely an ontological one which sought to recover 'primordiality'/authenticity from a realm beyond modernity. Significantly, this argument—that the 'primitive within' was the colonized's radical clue for enunciating difference—was being offered at the very time when history-writing in Bengal was being explicitly transformed into a scholarly discipline. Just when historians like Akshay Mitra began insisting that Bankim's agenda of history as national *practice* must now be replaced by the historian's agenda of history as specialized *knowledge*, anthropologists, poets, and many others began arguing that it was precisely this domination of history by representational knowledge that had resulted in the loss of senses of practice and time in Bengal. This critique offered, in the place of history, a 'primordial' time as articulated in acts of creation and destruction, a time explicitly defined as beyond historical chronology and progress. This was a temporality, it was argued, which could not be represented in *knowledge* but only invoked in future-oriented *acts* of imagination, acts both political and literary. This imagination—as the famous sociologist-philosopher Benoy Sarkar argued—was exactly what the Bengali middle classes had abdicated to the 'primitive' in their desire for historicality, and it was this practice of imagination, on which was based the practice of life itself, which needed to be owned up once more, by owning up the 'primitive' herself.

This attempt by the colonized Bengali at reclaiming practice and the 'primitive' in the same breath is the theme with which I end my book. Here I highlight that particular strand of early twentieth-century Bengali writings, which sought to self-consciously defy the abstract time of chronology by owning up the 'primitive'. In a way, this kind of writing appears analogous to the European romantic tradition, which Paul de Man analyses in terms of a harnessing of the 'primordial' against the 'temporal predicament' of the urban and alienated modern subject, suffering the tyranny of the universal and autonomous sign which emptied the mind of meaning and metaphor, as it were.[47] Of course the analogy is not accidental. The European, especially

the English, tradition of romantic poets and the Bengalis that I write about shared the languages of colonial modernity and the latter often read the former, just as we continue to do today in many of our schools. Yet the specificities of the Bengali context show us that the colonized Bengali's need for the 'primitive', and for a 'primordial' temporality, cannot be fully explained in terms of the ontological crisis of industrial-urban alienation. For in the colony, modernity produced a unique temporal predicament—that of temporal alienation between parts of the self/nation (between the Bengali and the Santal, for instance, or even within the Bengali individual self trying to be both 'modern' and 'traditional' at the same time). This was a temporal predicament, which above all disabled contemporaneous practice and the creation of identity. The colonized Bengali's desire for the 'primitive' was therefore a response, not to urban alienation but to this predicament of practice, a predicament clearly understood as not just ontological but also emphatically political. In trying to reclaim the 'primitive', therefore, many Bengali writers of the time were explicitly trying to reclaim the freedom of practice and practical imagination, free of the imperative to abstract and discipline time into structures of chronology and representational knowledge.

Needless to say, this was a failed attempt. Assertions of a non-chronological, creative time of practice failed to inform mainstream nationalist politics of the time. The poets of early twentieth-century Bengal, who sought to reclaim practice through their poetic invocations of the 'primitive', remained wary of the time of the everyday (in an uncanny reminder of the Heideggerian disavowal of everydayness for the sake of the 'primordial' and the authentic), an everyday which seemed inescapably mired in the colonial experience of unfreedom, an everyday where the struggles of the political and the contingent played out. The Bengali poet and his favourite figure of the sensuous and valorous Santal thus remained marginal to the historical time of modernization and reform, which promised progress by eternally postponing, in the face of the improvement of the present, the creative time of the unprecedented future. The poetic insight that the 'primordial' was the only location that was definitionally inappropriable by the colonizer, thus, never quite became a political lesson. I end the book by trying to come to grips with this failure.

The emerging domination of the 'historical' as the only mode of harnessing time, which I have chronicled above, had, by the late nineteenth century, effected fundamental changes in notions of subjectivity in Bengal. Colonial modernity had produced an impossible dream—the dream of a nation fully present to itself, fully contemporaneous and therefore fully undifferentiated, because, by the logic of colonial modernity itself, difference always seemed to appear as the curse of non-contemporaneity. History, therefore, sought out a very specific kind of unity, namely, the self-unity of a singular subject-agent who could claim to be the author/owner of history, as both text and agency. History, by its very form, was, after all, always a history 'of'—a prince, a state, a nation, or a class. It was this very need which, in modernity, reduced experiences of agency, as Michel de Certeau says in his *Writing of History*,[48] to the sensibility of ownership/authorship, as it were. The second half of the nineteenth century in Bengal was witness to the tremendous anxiety of people like Bankimchandra, trying to fix the singular authorship of texts like the Mahabharata, which had primarily evolved intertextually.[49]

In other words, in colonial modernity, the time of textualizations as practice became irrelevant before the chronologically fixed time of the original author. It was this claim of authorial subjectivity which plagued the early twentieth-century Bengali poets. Though the poetic/political time of creation and destruction was seen to superscribe the secondary temporality of progress and of chronology, yet in the typical mode of colonial modernity, the Indian/Hindu nation had to claim to be the 'ancient' author/owner of this temporal insight. The quest for a non-chronological time, therefore, was marred by this anxiety of having to historicize this time itself, of having to prove that such a temporality was the essential and patent trait of the historical nation, thus subsuming it to the very history whose limits it had desired to show up in the first place. This caused the subordination of the critical temporality of creative practice to the biography of the authornation, i.e. to the cumulative time of history and to the neutralized time of accumulating knowledge.

It can be shown that the Santals were emerging in nineteenth-century Bengal as a counterpoint to this very authorial and authorized time of history. Needless to say, this is no essentialist binary between

the 'primitive' and the historical. Indeed, the point of the book has been to show how this was a very recent binary, produced out of the discursive and governmental regimes of colonial modernity, which reconstituted peoples like the Santals into the 'primitive' other of thought-knowledge. Precisely therefore did the Santals come to represent the limits of modernity, so to speak, and it is this contingent and strategic counterposition, held by peoples like the Santals of colonial Bengal, that I seek to highlight here. Of course, one must admit that it is a difficult task to undertake from within the parameters of history-writing, for history acquired its disciplinary status precisely by excluding and opposing the 'primordial/primitive'. One cannot really expect to find adequate 'historical evidence' on Santal uses of memories and pasts, or on Santal social and practical temporalizations. Naturally, therefore, 'historical' studies on the Santals have mostly been studies of their rebellions, because rebellions could be seen to simulate the traits of the ideal-typical historical event and placed in the record of anti-colonial movements in India.[50] As events, rebellions could be appropriated by the chronological sensibility, in a way counter-temporalities could not be. Nevertheless, one thing that such historical studies have strongly demonstrated is that Santals of colonial Bengal lived and rebelled together with other peasants and subaltern groups, thus exploding once and for all the myth of 'tribal' exceptionalism. Anthropology, on its part, offers us ways to reconstruct autonomous social temporalities but different temporalities have been neutralized in this field often by their culturization, disallowing the possibility of temporal confrontations.[51] My analysis is surely constrained by these disciplinary limits. However, I try to read through all sorts of 'sources' in search for clues to contesting uses of time—revenue papers, files on emigration of labour, judicial files on Bengal, land settlement cases in Santal Parganas, Santal folk tales recorded by missionaries, currently circulating Santal poems and songs, and contemporary Santal reconstructions of the Santals' own pasts. If read in relation to Bengali tracts and colonial ethnographies, certain moments of temporal contest are illuminated, which enable us to see why and how the location of the Santal emerged—in colonial Bengal—as a possible location for a critique of historicism and of colonial-modern nationhood.

I argue in this book that Santal rebellions and Santal narrations are best understood when read as moments of practical temporalization. In other words, I avoid rendering the Santal-Bengali difference as a difference between myth and history, or orality and literacy. (After all, these antinomies—myth/history, orality/literacy—necessarily fall through, when used in reference to the experience of colonialism, a phenomenon of rupture in the narrative of transition, transition being the paradigm which gave rise to these categories of succession, in the first place.) Instead I find it more useful to interpret the Santal-Bengali difference as a reified and displaced form of the knowledge-practice distinction created by colonial modernity and its historical discourses. If the self-proclaimed political classes of Bengal represented the Santal as their practical and sensuous other, it is most meaningful to acknowledge the Santal, even if provisionally, as actually offering a practical interrogation of the nation, which was otherwise sought to be generalized as an uninterrupted and common 'idea'. The operative distinction in nineteenth-century Bengal was, therefore, not that between an oral and a literate tradition, nor that between a mythical and a historical consciousness. It was between practical and theoretical uses of the past—between an active temporalization of pasts and times as contingent and irrevocable, and a stabilizing historicization of pasts and chronologies as 'factual' and 'finished'.

That the Santals reclaimed their pasts as part of everyday activities, rather than in a state of suspension from the time of the everyday, made memory itself into a practice, dependent on work/performance and not on knowledge/information per se. Santal pasts, therefore, were not always ordered into a narrative form, but often existed as free-floating, unauthorized insights, amenable to changing configurations in changing times. It is significant that, when Santals rebelled, their act was represented by Bengali authors as resulting from a lack of 'rational' comprehension of the present—as if the Santals failed to grasp the logically explicable and chronologically inexorable triumph of colonial rule.[52] The rebellion therefore seemed a kind of 'madness' that resulted from a lack of knowledge, understanding and foresight. In contrast to this historicist position, it may be said, Santals, and many Bengali peasants too, found rebellion to be a viable option. This was because, to the Santals, the past was as unknown or as known as the future—the past had no particular privilege in terms of knowability, as it did for the self-aware historical subject. Neither was the past more originary, more 'authentic' and therefore more proximate than the colonial present, nor was the future particularly marked by 'otherness'. The past might have been better than the present time of inescapable indebtedness, but it was a sad time too. It was neither an ideal to be imitated nor fully determining the future. The Santal rebellion, therefore, did not seek to bring back a golden past, as nationalist history did, nor to effect a millennial end of history, as 'primitives' were supposed to do. The Santal rebellion sought to invoke the imperative of time itself, because to rebel was to admit that the future, like the past, was neither logically nor genealogically connected to the present. Both the past and the future had to be temporalized in portentous and perhaps risky practice.

Time and Practice

Before I end, however, a clarification about two crucial terms that I repeatedly invoke in this work—namely, time and practice. Also about why I say 'politics' of time rather than name time as idea, concept, or even cultural experience. Is time what the subjects and sources of this book name as time? Clearly, it cannot merely be that, for a central purpose here is also to show up the ways in which time is made to appear in modernity as either something other than time (e.g. as space or as number) or as a condition lacking in time (e.g. the 'primitive' or the 'practical'). Yet, the problem of such a formulation is that it requires a pure object out there (or an authentic Being), which is 'really' time, seen to be 'distorted' in modernity. History-writing itself is founded on such a problematic formulation. Even when historians seek to problematize the temporal by narrating ways in which time is constituted—say, by capitalism—they must admit as the basis of their narration the existence of an a priori time, which appears as unmediated, natural chronology. That is, history, when it seeks to historicize the idea of time, cannot quite acknowledge the resistance that time as an idea and experience offers to discourses of modernity, even as modernity seeks to gather all that is temporal under its regime of the historical. For is it not the lesson of modernity that the word 'time' does not have an agreed-upon referent at all; that from the

moment modern epistemology sought to order the world in terms of subjects and objects, time became something which defied categorization as either?

Since the time Hegel owned up Augustine's insight—that time was something which was known yet unsayable—the problem of un-sayability became a problem for the theorization/knowledge of time. That is, the question of temporality no longer remained a question of the human soul facing the mystery of the universe, a sensibility that could admit un-sayability and inexplicability as defining characteristics of the human condition. With Hegel, therefore, time became, in Western metaphysics, an impossibility before thought and representational knowledge. Is time the experience of death and passing away? Or the imagination of the other, who remains after the cessation of the self? Is time the subject's experience of change or is change something that happens in time? Is time about loss or about accretion, about amnesia or about memory? Is time the name for a lack, a poverty (never enough time) or a name for amassing, for capital (monumental time)? Is time eternity, infinity, or the ungraspable moment, the elusive now? It appears as if every usage of the word 'time', in modernity, foregrounds shades of meaning other than that intended, thus making time into something which ultimately makes referentiality impossible as a foundation for meaning. The question of truth or meaning cannot, therefore, be asked of it except, as Derrida shows, when a non-temporal entity (like Being or Spirit or destiny or motion) is made to stand in for time, as a presence which, in the name of time, erases temporality itself. And even then, just saying that 'time is' or 'time is not' is to appeal to the self-evidence of the verb's tenses, i.e. to a pre-formulation of time, which leaves the question of what time is unanswered and makes the question itself tautological.[53]

It becomes clear, then, that the very sensibilities of the temporal which define modernity also work as a limit to the theoretical reach of modernity. In modern European knowledge systems, time has been apprehended as either of the two: as a philosophical category or as a cultural experience. Philosophy has sought to understand temporality as a universal human/cosmological entity (or non-entity), which, lacking however a visualizable object form, is differentiated because it inevitably has to be articulated in language. Anthropology has sought to understand time as a particular experience, different for different people, which, tied as it is to human death and nature,

must however offer a hint of a universal temporality wherein the object and subject of knowledge could appear commensurable (and hierarchical). Philosophy has sought to problematize time as the problem of articulation—of something which is known yet impossible to enunciate adequately. Anthropology has sought to problematize time in terms of translation—of a cultural object as specific as any other, yet impossible to make sense of without an element of universality. In philosophy, time is grasped as the problem of representation—of that not fully present to vision and referentiality. In anthropology, time is grasped as the problem of narrativization—of that which is also the precondition of the narrative form. The problematic of time therefore—whether in philosophy or in anthropology—inevitably opens on to the problematic of language and meaning.

In modern philosophies and ethnologies, therefore, time appears as something which interrogates the competence of language and the production of meaning. Perhaps, it is this which helps us make sense of our everyday feelings that there are many experiences in life which cannot be put to language. Even though we know, philosophically and otherwise, that there is nothing pre-linguistic about the functioning of the 'mind', we also 'know', commonsensically, of the inadequacy of language, of the 'fact' that what is lived and felt is not always verbalizable. All that happens to us cannot be accounted for in discursive terms; nor can they all be smoothened into the narrative form. For the purposes of this book, it is in this terrain—in the impossibility of articulation—that I place time. For me, that which defies a stable articulation is the domain of time—time as that which begins where thought ends, as that which must be enunciated and negotiated in practice and solely in practice. I shall therefore write of time as neither a philosophical category nor a cultural concept, though I would have to show up practices of deploying time as either or both of these in the specific context of colonial Bengal.

This is also how I understand practice, as that mode, beyond the theoretical and the representational, in which we must engage with time. One finds suggestions of this understanding in the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau.[54] Bourdieu argues that the irreversibility of time in pratice is something that the synchronic

intent of knowledge (and we may add, the reconstructive intent of narratives) cannot acknowledge. Certeau, shows how the act of remembering interrupts and exits chronology, and how practice is about strategically seizing the right time to act, thus making the act spill beyond the present and subverting experiences of continuity. In other words, the realm of practice admits experiences of pure and unrelenting contingency. It is precisely this admission of contingency that I wish to reintroduce into our experiences of colonial modernity—by way of invoking both time and practice. After all, was not colonialism itself the most politically contingent of all events, written up, ironically, as the most inevitable of all, through the development and transition narratives on which we are brought up? For it is the recognition of contingency which makes experiences appear inessential and therefore provisional and subvertible. My reading of the Santal rebellion—and the inability of historiography to fully account for it—rests on precisely such an understanding of rebellious practices, as that which make the present appear contingent through effective practices of resistance. Only thus can we understand the Santals' claim that time was itself the inspiration for rebellion—for it was in time that the unimaginable and the unpredictable could occur.

This sense of the contingent—which surprises knowledge and anticipation—is very much part of everyday practical life. Yet this contingent is suppressed exactly at the moment when practice is theorized as deliberately political and ideological. For purposes of this work, we must readmit this sense of practical contingency into the notion of the political. Our history of nationalism shows, if anything, how the contingent is the very moment necessarily created out of the process of producing the collective—the 'subject-agent', which undertakes practice but never as a unitary entity. This collective is never fully known, apprehended, or theorized (the community or the nation differentiates as much as unites, is as uncanny as is predictable), and must of necessity be historicized with hindsight. And at the moment of its realization as an identity—as with the nation's 'freedom'—the collective must face its internal contradictions and the possibility of its own disintegration. In other words, it is in the work of the collective—nation or 'tribe' or humanity for that matter—that practice always brings forth a *different* subjectivity and a *different* future, i.e. *different* from that which knowledge permits and anticipates as logical and historical. What theory always explains as the failure of practice is what practice must be, as that which effects something other than what was foreseen. And time, thus, is that which brings forth—not merely the surety of death—but the limits of expectation, i.e. the promise of an-*other* future and an-*other* subjectivity. The mismatch between the idea of the nation and its materiality is therefore neither the incapacity of the idea nor the error of practice, but precisely the site where the nation's temporality is enunciated.

For the purposes of this work, therefore, time is seen to unfold in the unhistoricizable site between the historical discourses of the nation and its practical constitution through the thematization of the 'primitive within'. In this mismatch—between historicity and the temporal antagonisms it owned up to, between nationhood and the domain of the social that it sought to gather—emerged an untheorizable everyday. This everyday, picturized as a crowded and disorderly co-presence of the modern and the pre-modern, remains, even today, an everyday that resists description by the conventions of the historical narrative. For knowledge can do no more than gather everyday practices in a synchronic and encyclopaedic form, leaving to the practice of politics the impossible but creative task of negotiating the contingent and contrary experiences of national existence. In the last chapter of this book, I try to note precisely this disavowal of the everyday by the literate classes of Bengal and the creation, by default, of 'politics' as an autonomous, untheorizable, even corrupt terrain in colonial modernity, making it appear always already a moment of deferral and deference to, in fact a compromise with, 'real-life' practices.

Let me end here by mentioning a Santal ancestor-story, recorded in the late nineteenth century, which admits to contingency and time in a way no historical narrative possibly does.[55] This story sees the passing of time not through the progressive unification of peoples into a community, but as the progressive—and above all, inexplicable and contingent—differentiation and estrangement of a people who were once one. The Santals called themselves *hor* or just 'human'. It was merely that in the course of time, 'humans' got scattered—almost as if that was a simple matter of the passing of time. Time did not neutralize differences, as the idea of modernization would have it.

Nor did time emerge out of an 'originary' difference between Santal and an other—as the idea of history would have it. Time merely differentiated. In this temporality, therefore, the other (or the self) was neither an essential/original being, nor another location in time and space, nor an unbreachable theoretical category. The other just appeared in time. As if, the alterity of the other was like the alterity of time itself. The other, like temporality, created estrangements and thus posited limits to collective practice. But like time itself, the other too had to be harnessed to the self in the practice for a desired future.

Notes

1. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, 2000; Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World History*, New York, 2003.
2. Ann Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*, Berkeley, 2002; David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, Berkeley, 1993; Uday Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, Chicago, 1999; Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge*, Chicago, 1997; Radhika Singha, *A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India*, Delhi, 1998; David Arnold, *Police Power and Colonial Rule, Madras 1859–1947*, Delhi, 1986 etc.
3. Time has been the most radical irresoluble in Western philosophy since St. Augustine, who is routinely quoted as having 'confessed' that though he 'knew' what time was, he could never 'say' it. See H. Gadamer, 'The Western View of the Inner Experience of Time and the Limits of Thought', in *Time and the Philosophies*, introduction by Paul Ricoeur, London, 1977, p. 35.
4. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, Hemel Hempstead, 1993, p. 47.
5. Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other*, New York, 1983, pp. 26–9.
6. O. Harris, 'Time and Difference in Anthropological Writing', in *Horizons of Understanding*, (eds), Jan Bremen *et al.* Leiden, 1996, p. 143.
7. K.D.M. Snell, *Annals of the Labouring Poor: Social Change and Agrarian England*, Cambridge, 1985; Donna Andrew, *Philanthropy and Police: London Charity in the Eighteenth Century*, Princeton, 1990; Susan Thorne, '"The Conversion of Englishmen and the Conversion of the World Inseparable": Missionary Imperialism and the Language of Class in Early Industrial Britain', in *Tensions of Empire*, Frederick Cooper and Ann Stole (ed.), Berkeley, 1997.
8. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, 1822, reprint, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 56–57, 180–81. Also see, Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination of Nineteenth Century Europe*, Baltimore, 1973.
9. "Negativity, as point, relates itself to space, in which it develops its determinations as line and plane; but in the sphere of self-externality, negativity is equally *for itself*, and so are its determinations; ...Negativity, thus posited for itself, is time. Time 'relifts' [*Aufheben*] space." Hegel, translated and quoted by Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago, 1982, p. 43. Also see, Herman Rapaport, *Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language*, Lincoln, 1989, p. 72.
10. Timothy Mitchell, *Questions of Modernity*, Minneapolis, 2000.
11. Ranajit Guha, *An Indian Historiography of India: A Nineteenth-century Agenda and its Implication*, Calcutta, 1988; Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, Princeton, 1993; Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Unhappy Consciousness, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India*, Delhi, 1995.
12. 'Bangalir Utpatti', *Bangadarshan*, *Poush*, 1880.
13. Thomas Trautman, *Aryans and British India*, Berkeley & London, 1997, p. 194.
14. The Bengali middle class was itself an internally divided group; cf. Sumanta Banerjee, *The Parlour and the Streets: Elite and Popular Culture in Nineteenth century Calcutta*, Calcutta, 1989. But whether Bankim's high literary essays or caste-histories written by displaced groups, whether texts written by *pandits* in the scholastic *mimamsa* tradition or popular plays or *natak*s, now being read in print as much as watched, whether the new genre of school books or the so-called vulgar and popular texts from the *battala* presses which satirized the newfangled airs of the Calcutta bhadralok—almost all the texts I came across took pains to distinguish the Bengali jati from asabhya or uncivilized jatis like the Santal. One can also show that the 'primitive'-historical binary was sometimes used to make sense of antagonisms internal to the middle class itself—the woman as 'wild' and therefore in need of domestication, for instance.
15. Sumit Sarkar, 'Colonial Times: Clocks and Kaliyuga', paper presented at the South Asia History Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 20 June 1996.
16. Ranajit Guha, *An Indian Historiography of India.*
17. Bankimchandra, 'Bange Brahmanadhikara', *Bangadarshan*, 1885.
18. Christopher Herbert, *Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1991.
19. Susan Thorne, '"The Conversion of Englishmen and the Conversion of the World Inseparable". For a study of the changing image of the 'primitive' in the history of Europe, see Roger Bartra, *The Artificial Savage: Modern Myths of the Wild Man*, Michigan, 1997.
20. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 1927, reprint, Oxford, 1995, p. 43.
21. Ibid., p. 383.
22. Quoted in Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit*, Chicago, 1989, pp. 66–7.
23. Ibid., pp. 89–91.
24. Marx, letter to Zasulich, 8 March 1881, in Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, E.J. Hobsbawm (ed.), London, 1964, p. 143.
25. *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, Lawrence Krader (ed.), Assen, 1974.
26. Ibid., introduction, pp. 15–16.
27. Marx Quoted in Krader, ibid. pp. 60–1.
28. Marx, letter to Engels, 25 March 1868, in Marx, *Pre-Capitalist*, p. 141.
29. Ajay Skaria, 'Shades of Wildness: Tribe, Caste and Gender in Western India', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 56(3), 1997; K. Sivaramakrishnan, 'British Imperium

and Forested Zones of Anomaly in Bengal, 1767–1833', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 33(3), 1996, pp. 243–82.

30. 'A Market for Aboriginality: Primitivism and Race Classification in the Indentured Labour Market of Colonial India', *Subaltern Studies X*, Gautam Bhadra, *et al.* (eds), Delhi, 1999, pp. 8–48.
31. Georg Simmel, *Philosophy of Money*, 1900, reprint, London, 1990.
32. Sudipta Sen, *Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace*, Philadelphia, 1998.
33. Tejaswini Niranjana, *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism and the Colonial Question*, Berkeley, 1992, p. 6.
34. Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'The Time of History and the Time of Gods', in *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital*, Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd (eds), London, 1997, p. 47.
35. Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience*, London & New York, 1993, p. 96; E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism', *Past and Present*, 38, 1967.
36. Dhirendranath Baske, *Saontal Ganasamgramer Itihas*, Calcutta, 1976; Tanika Sarkar, 'Jitu Santal's Movement in Malda, 1924–32' in *Subaltern Studies IV*, Ranajit Guha (ed.), Delhi, 1985; Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, Delhi, 1983; Michael Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion*, Cambridge, 1979. For the arbitrary construction of the category 'tribe', see Ajay Skaria, *Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers and Wildness in Western India*, Delhi, 1999.
37. Sumit Sarkar, 'Colonial Times: Clocks and Kaliyuga'.
38. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, Oxford, 1991, pp. 65–6.
39. Jitendra Mohanty, *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought*, Oxford, 1992.
40. 'Bangalir Itihas Sambandhe Kayekti Katha', *Bangadarshan, Agrahayan*, 1880.
41. Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London, 1994.
42. *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India*, Princeton, 1999.
43. *Lying on the Postcolonial Couch: The Idea of Indifference*, Delhi, 2002.
44. *Karma* and *anusilan* do not unproblematically translate as causality and discipline. The point is that the Bengali middle classes sought to reconstitute these terms as historical causality and discipline, so as to fit them into the new, universalist, epistemological paradigm being forged in late nineteenth-century Bengal.
45. Fabian, *Time and the Other*.
46. And by the early twentieth century, there was tremendous political resistance from within the nationalist mainstream to colonial 'protection' and isolation of the so-called non-Hindu 'aborigine', which was seen as a colonial strategy to deplete the ranks of Indians/Hindus at the height of the nationalist movement. This mainstream nationalist resistance was however largely tactical and did not claim an attitude towards the 'primitive' any different from just seeing them as the most 'backward' and impressionable.
47. Paul de Man, 'The Rhetoric of Temporality', in *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, London, 1993, pp. 187–92.
48. Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. Tom Conley, New York, 1988, pp. 342–3.

49. Kaviraj, *The Unhappy Consciousness*, p. 84.
50. See note 39.
51. For interpretations of time as a cultural particular, see Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, Oxford, 1940 and Clifford Geertz, 'Person, Time and Conduct in Bali', *The Interpretation of Culture*, New York, 1973. One could also refer to texts of comparative sociology like Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, London, 1954 and Akos Ostor, *Vessels of Time*, Delhi, 1993.
52. Digambar Chakravarty, *History of the Santal Hool*, p. 8.
53. Jacques Derrida, *'Ousia* and *Gramme*: Note on a note from *Being and Time*', in *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago, 1982, pp. 50–1; n. 32.
54. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*; Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley & London, 1984.
55. Kolean and Juggi Haram, *Horkoren Mare Hapramko Reak Katha [Traditions and Institutions of the Santals]*, L.O. Skefsrud (ed.), 1887, trans. by P.O. Bodding, Oslo, 1942.