

CHAP. VII.

*Of Political or Civil Society.*

77. **G**OD having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into *Society*, as well as fitted him with Under-

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§ 77 *Chapter VII* All the evidence goes to show that this chapter formed a part of the original critique of Filmer; compare note on chapter VI, II, § 52. There are references to men who can only be Filmer and his followers (§ 90) and arguments

standing and Language to continue and enjoy it. The *first Society* 5  
was between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that between  
Parents and Children; to which, in time, that between Master and  
Servant came to be added: And though all these might, and  
commonly did meet together, and make up but one Family,  
wherein the Master or Mistress of it had some sort of Rule proper 10  
to a Family; each of these, or all together came short of *Political  
Society*, as we shall see, if we consider the different Ends, Tyes,  
and Bounds of each of these.

78. *Conjugal Society* is made by a voluntary Compact between  
Man and Woman: and tho' it consist chiefly in such a Communion  
and Right in one anothers Bodies, as is necessary to its chief End,  
Procreation; yet it draws with it mutual Support, and Assistance,  
and a Communion of Interest too, as necessary not only to unite 5  
their Care, and Affection, but also necessary to their common  
*Off-spring*, who have a Right to be nourished and maintained by  
them, till they are able to provide for themselves.

79. For the end of *conjunction between Male and Female*, being  
not barely Procreation, but the continuation of the Species, this  
conjunction betwixt Male and Female ought to last, even after  
Procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and sup-  
port of the young Ones, who are to be sustained by those that 5  
got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves.  
This Rule, which the infinite wise Maker hath set to the Works  
of his hands, we find the inferiour Creatures steadily obey. In  
those viviparous Animals which feed on Grass, the *conjunction*

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directly pointed at Filmer's text (§§ 92, 93): it is closely parallel to Tyrrell's discussion  
which was overtly directed against Filmer. There is no positive indication of inser-  
tions or revision in 1689, though the cross-reference in § 84, 3, may imply some  
revision at an earlier date.

§ 77 1-4 Compare the fourth *Essay on the Law of Nature*. Man 'feels himself...  
urged to enter into society by a certain propensity of nature, and to be prepared  
for the maintenance of society by the gift of speech and through the intercourse of  
language' (Von Leyden, 1954, 156-7).

2 Gen. ii. 18: 'God said, it is not good that the man should be alone.'

5-13 Compare II, § 2, and also Aristotle's *Politics*, I, especially 1252a and b.

§ 78 Compare Tyrrell, 1681, 14: 'Marriage, which is a mutual Compact between  
a Man and a Woman for their Cohabitation, the generation of Children, and their  
joint care and provision for them.'

§ 79 Natural history of this sort was a persistent pre-occupation of Locke's, and he  
possessed many of the standard works. The pre-Linnaean, pre-Darwinian system of  
classification comes out clearly here, as it does in the *First Treatise*.

Two Treatises of Government / John Locke; New York;  
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1960 (318 - 330f)

10 *between Male and Female* lasts no longer than the very Act of Copulation: because the Teat of the Dam being sufficient to nourish the Young, till it be able to feed on Grass, the Male only begets, but concerns not himself for the Female or Young, to whose Sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in Beasts of  
 15 Prey the *conjunction* lasts longer: because the Dam not being able well to subsist her self, and nourish her numerous Off-spring by her own Prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on Grass, the Assistance of the Male is necessary to the Maintenance of their common Family,  
 20 which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joynt Care of Male and Female. The same is to be observed in all Birds (except some domestick ones, where plenty of food excuses the Cock from feeding, and taking care of the young Brood) whose Young needing Food in the Nest, the Cock  
 25 and Hen continue Mates, till the Young are able to use their wing, and provide for themselves.

80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the Male and Female in Mankind are tyed to a longer conjunction than other Creatures, *viz.* because the Female is capable of conceiving, and *de facto* is commonly with Child again, and Brings  
 5 forth too a new Birth long before the former is out of a dependancy for support on his Parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his Parents: whereby the Father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an Obligation to continue in Conjugal Society with the  
 10 same Woman longer than other Creatures, whose Young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of Procreation returns again, the Conjugal Bond dissolves of it self, and they are at liberty, till *Hymen*, at his usual Anniversary Season, summons them again to chuse new Mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the  
 15 Wisdom of the great Creatour, who having given to Man foresight and an Ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that *Society of Man and Wife should be more lasting*, than of Male and Female amongst other  
 20 Creatures; that so their Industry might be encouraged, and their Interest better united, to make Provision, and lay up Goods for their common Issue, which uncertain mixture, or easie and frequent Solutions of Conjugal Society would mightily disturb.

81. But though these are Ties upon *Mankind*, which make the *Conjugal Bonds* more firm and lasting in Man, than the other Species of Animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this *Compact*, where Procreation and Education are secured, and Inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either  
 5 by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain Conditions, as well as any other voluntary *Compacts*, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for Life; I mean, to such as are under no Restraint of  
 10 any positive Law, which ordains all such *Contracts* to be perpetual.

82. But the Husband and Wife, though they have but one common Concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being  
 necessary, that the last Determination, *i.e.* the Rule, should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the Man's share, as the  
 5 abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common Interest and Property, leaves the Wife in the full and free possession of what by Contract is her peculiar Right, and gives the Husband no more power over her Life, than she has over his. The *Power of the Husband* being so far from that of  
 10 an absolute Monarch, that the *Wife* has, in many cases, a Liberty to separate from him; where natural Right, or their Contract allows it, whether that Contract be made by themselves in the state of Nature, or by the Customs or Laws of the Countrey they live in; and the Children upon such Separation fall to the Father  
 15 or Mother's Lot, as such Contract does determine.

83. For all the ends of *Marriage* being to be obtained under Politick Government, as well as in the state of Nature, the Civil Magistrate doth not abridge the Right, or Power of either naturally  
 necessary to those ends, *viz.* Procreation and mutual Support

§ 81 5-7 This guarded hint at the justifiability of divorce was too much for the clerical Elrington, who says: 'To make the conjugal union determinable by consent, is to introduce a promiscuous concubinage.' Locke was prepared to go much further than this, as is seen in the notes in his diary for 1678, 1679, 1680 under the heading *Atlantis*. He suggests that 'He that is already married may marry another woman with his left hand... The ties, duration and conditions of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is expressed in the contract of marriage between the parties' (*Diary*, 1678, 199). On Locke's *Atlantis*, see de Marchi, 1955.

§ 82 5 Elrington says that this implies that the right of the husband arises solely from superior power, as indeed it does in Hobbes's *Leviathan*, chapter 20, which Locke's discussion resembles to some extent.

5 and Assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any Controversie that may arise between Man and Wife about them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute *Sovereignty* and Power of Life and Death naturally belong'd to the Husband, and were necessary to the Society between Man and Wife, there could be no  
10 Matrimony in any of those Countries where the Husband is allowed no such absolute Authority. But the ends of Matrimony requiring no such Power in the Husband, the Condition of *Conjugal Society* put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that State. *Conjugal Society* could subsist and obtain its ends without it;  
15 nay, Community of Goods, and the Power over them, mutual Assistance, and Maintenance, and other things belonging to *Conjugal Society*, might be varied and regulated by that Contract, which unites Man and Wife in that Society, as far as may consist with Procreation and the bringing up of Children till they could shift  
20 for themselves; nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.

84. The Society betwixt Parents and Children, and the distinct Rights and Powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing Chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different  
5 from a Politick Society.

85. *Master* and *Servant* are Names as old as History, but given to those of far different condition; for a Free-man makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive:  
5 And though this commonly puts him into the Family of his Master, and under the ordinary Discipline thereof; yet it gives the Master but a Temporary Power over him, and no greater, than what is contained in the *Contract* between 'em. But there is another sort of Servants, which by a peculiar Name we call *Slaves*,  
10 who being Captives taken in a just War, are by the Right of Nature subjected to the Absolute Dominion and Arbitrary Power

§ 83 12-20 Passage rewritten for the 2nd edition: little difference of sense, except that 'Community of Goods' (line 15) is introduced.

§ 84 3 'foregoing Chapter'—chapter VI; see note on II, § 77 (chapter VII).

§ 85 8-16 On slavery compare II, § 24, 1-8 and references: here is added the claim that slaves are outside civil society. 'Servants' in this paragraph, we must not forget, covered many now classed as industrial or agricultural workers, and that Locke and all his contemporaries looked upon them as under domestic authority is significant of very different social assumptions; compare II, § 69, 6, 'Apprentice'.

of their Masters. These Men having, as I say, forfeited their Lives, and with it their Liberties, and lost their Estates; and being in the *State of Slavery*, not capable of any Property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of *Civil Society*; the chief end  
15 whereof is the preservation of Property.

86. Let us therefore consider a *Master of a Family* with all these subordinate Relations of *Wife*, *Children*, *Servants* and *Slaves* united under the Domestick Rule of a Family; which what resemblance soever it may have in its Order, Offices, and Number too, with a little Common-wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its Con-  
5 stitution, Power and End: Or if it must be thought a Monarchy, and the *Paterfamilias* the absolute Monarch in it, absolute Monarchy will have but a very shattered and short Power, when 'tis plain, by what has been said before, That the *Master of the Family* has a very distinct and differently limited Power, both as to time and  
10 extent, over those several Persons that are in it; for excepting the Slave (and the Family is as much a Family, and his Power as *Paterfamilias* as great, whether there be any Slaves in his Family or no) he has no Legislative Power of Life and Death, over any of them, and none too but what a *Mistress of a Family* may have as  
15 well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute Power over the whole *Family*, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a *Family*, or any other Society of Men, differ from that, which is properly *Political Society*, we shall best see, by considering wherein *Political Society* it self  
20 consists.

87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the Rights and Priviledges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other Man, or Number of Men in the World, hath by Nature a Power, not only to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate,  
5 against the Injuries and Attempts of other Men; but to judge of,

§ 86 On this paragraph compare the *Third Letter for Toleration*, (*Works*, 1801, VI, 213). The domestic unit being described is readily recognizable as that which prevailed in Locke's day over the English-speaking world, see Laslett and Wall, 1972. It is not without interest that the presence of a slave was regarded as not an unusual feature of such familial groups.

87 'that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate'—compare this extended definition of property with I, § 9, 8-9; II §§ 57, 25; 59, 29-30; 85, 13; 123, 16 17; 131, 6; 135, 15; 137, 5; 171, 17; 173, 4-6; 209, 5-6; 221, 7; 222, 19-20; and see Introduction, 101. Contrast also, I, § 90, 13-18.



and punish the breaches of that Law in others, as he is perswaded the Offence deserves, even with Death it self, in Crimes where the heinousness of the Fact, in his Opinion, requires it. But because  
 10 no *Political Society* can be, nor subsist without having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in order thereunto punish the Offences of all those of that Society; there, and there only is  
*Political Society*, where every one of the Members hath quitted  
 15 this natural Power, resign'd it up into the hands of the Community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for Protection to the Law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties; and by Men having Authority from the  
 20 Community, for the execution of those Rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any Members of that Society, concerning any matter of right; and punishes those Offences, which any Member hath committed against the Society, with such Penalties as the Law has established: Whereby it is easie to discern  
 25 who are, and who are not, in *Political Society* together. Those who are united into one Body, and have a common establish'd Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish Offenders, *are in Civil Society* one with another: but those who have no such common Appeal,  
 30 I mean on Earth, are still in the state of Nature, each being, where there is no other, Judge for himself, and Executioner; which is, as I have before shew'd it, the perfect *state of Nature*.

88. And thus the Commonwealth comes by a Power to set down, what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the Members of that Society, (which is the *power of making Laws*) as well as it  
 5 has the power to punish any Injury done unto any of its Members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the *power of War and Peace*;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the Members of that Society, as far as is possible. But though every Man who has enter'd into civil Society, and is become a member of any  
 10 Commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish Offences against the Law of Nature, in prosecution of his own private

18-21 Passage rewritten for 2nd edition.

§ 88 4 and 6 Marks of sovereignty again hinted at; see II, § 11, 6-8 and references.

Judgment; yet with the Judgment of Offences which he has given up to the Legislative in all Cases, where he can Appeal to the Magistrate, he has given a right to the Commonwealth to employ  
 15 his force, for the Execution of the Judgments of the Commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own Judgments, they being made by himself, or his Representative. And herein we have the original of the *Legislative* and  
*Executive Power* of Civil Society, which is to judge by standing  
 20 Laws how far Offences are to be punished, when committed within the Commonwealth; and also to determin, by occasional Judgments founded on the present Circumstances of the Fact, how far Injuries from without are to be vindicated, and in both these to employ all the force of all the Members when there shall be need.

89. Where-ever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there only is a *Political, or Civil Society*. And this is done where-ever  
 5 any number of Men, in the state of Nature, enter into Society to make one People, one Body Politick under one Supreme Government, or else when any one joyns himself to, and incorporates with any Government already made. For hereby he authorizes  
 the Society, or which is all one, the Legislative thereof to make  
 10 Laws for him as the publick good of the Society shall require; to the Execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own Decrees) is due. And this *puts Men* out of a State of Nature *into* that  
 of a *Commonwealth*, by setting up a Judge on Earth, with Authority to determine all the Controversies, and redress the Injuries, that  
 15 may happen to any Member of the Commonwealth; which Judge is the Legislative, or Magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of Men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still *in the state of Nature*.

12 Elrington (1798) castigates this as leaving it optional that men should resign up their power to political authority.

14-18 Used by Kendall to demonstrate Locke's 'collectivism', along with II, § 120; see note there, and on II, § 151, 19, 22 for 'representative'.

§ 89 1. 'Men are so united'—in 1st ed. active mood, 'Men so unite'.

6 'People': first occurrence of this word, cf. Polin, 1960, 156.

13-19 Here Locke talks of the Legislative where the Judiciary might be expected; compare II, § 88, 12-13, and Introduction, 118. The whole paragraph should be contrasted with Hobbes's *Leviathan*, chapter 18.

90. Hence it is evident, that *Absolute Monarchy*, which by some Men is counted the only Government in the World, is indeed *inconsistent with Civil Society*, and so can be no Form of Civil Government at all. For the *end of Civil Society*, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the State of Nature, which necessarily follow from every Man's being Judge in his own Case, by setting up a known Authority, to which every one of that Society may Appeal upon any Injury received, or Controversie that may arise, and which every one of the Society ought to obey;† where-ever any persons are, who have not such an Authority to Appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still *in the state of Nature*. And so is every *Absolute Prince* in respect of those who are under his *Dominion*.

91. For he being suppos'd to have all, both Legislative and Executive Power in himself alone, there is no Judge to be found, no Appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with Authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any Injury or Inconveniency, that may be suffered from the Prince or by his Order: So that such a Man, however intitled, *Czar*, or *Grand Signior*, or how you please, is as much *in the state of Nature*, with all under his Dominion, as he is with the rest of Mankind. For where-ever any two Men are, who have no standing Rule, and common Judge to Appeal to on Earth for the determination of Controversies of Right betwixt them, there they are still *in the state of Nature*, and under all the inconveniencies of it,‡ with only this woful difference to the

† The publick Power of all Society is above every Soul contained in the same Society; and the principal use of that power is to give Laws unto all that are under it, which Laws in such Cases we must obey, unless there be reason shew'd which may necessarily enforce, that the Law of Reason, or of God, doth injoyne the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. 1. Sect. 16.

‡ To take away all such mutual Grievances, Injuries and Wrongs, i.e. such as attend Men in the State of Nature. There was no way but only by growing into Composition and

§ 90 1-2 'some Men', that is Filmer and his followers, certainly not Hobbes to whom monarchy was decidedly not the only form of government. See II, § 77 (chapter VII).

10 Reference sign for Hooker quotation inserted by editor; see note on II, § 74, 15. Passage on p. 353 of Keble's *Hooker*, 1836, I, and Locke's 1676 edition 101-2, slightly modified in transcription here.

§ 91 13 Reference sign for Hooker quotation inserted by editor; see note on II, § 74, 15. See Keble's *Hooker*, 1836, I, 302, Locke's 1676 edition; 86, slightly modified. Compare English treatise 1660, and Abrams' note: Polin, 1961, 105.

Subject, or rather Slave of an Absolute Prince: That whereas, in the ordinary State of Nature, he has a liberty to judge of his Right, and according to the best of his Power, to maintain it; now when-ever his Property is invaded by the Will and Order of his Monarch, he has not only no Appeal, as those in Society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of Rational Creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his Right, and so is exposed to all the Misery and Inconveniencies that a Man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of Nature, is yet corrupted with Flattery, and armed with Power.

92. For he that thinks *absolute Power purifies Mens Bloods*, and corrects the baseness of Humane Nature, need read but the History of this, or any other Age to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the Woods of *America*, would not probably be much better in a Throne; where perhaps Learning and Religion shall be found out to justify all, that he shall do to his Subjects, and the Sword presently silence all those that dare question it. For what the *Protection of Absolute Monarchy* is, what kind of Fathers of their Countries it makes Princes to be, and to what a degree of Happiness and Security it carries Civil Society, where this sort of Government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late Relation of *Ceylon*, may easily see.

*Agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of Government publick, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted Authority to Rule and Govern, by them the Peace, Tranquility, and happy Estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where Force and Injury was offered, they might be Defenders of themselves; they knew that however Men may seek their own Commodity; yet if this were done with Injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all Men, and all good Means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no Man might in reason take upon him to determine his own Right, and according to his own Determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every Man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that Strifes and Troubles would be endless, except they gave their common Consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which Consent there would be no reason that one Man should take upon him to be Lord or Judge over another. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 1. Sect. 10.*

§ 92 7 'presently'—immediately. This condemnation of absolute power is often supposed to be directed against Hobbes (for example, *Leviathan*, chapter 18, 1904, 128), but it is as appropriate against Filmer and the phrase 'Fathers of their Countries' in line 9 confirms that it was Filmer's absolute, patriarchal monarch which was in Locke's mind.

12 'the late Relation of *Ceylon*'—*An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon* by Robert Knox, 1680, bought by Locke on 29 August 1681; see Introduction, 55.



93. In *Absolute Monarchies* indeed, as well as other Governments of the World, the Subjects have an Appeal to the Law, and Judges to decide any Controversies, and restrain any Violence that may happen betwixt the Subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared Enemy to Society and Mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true Love of Mankind and Society, and such a Charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt. For this is no more, than what every Man who loves his own Power, Profit, or Greatness, may, and naturally must do, keep those Animals from hurting or destroying one another who labour and drudge only for his Pleasure and Advantage, and so are taken care of, not out of any Love the Master has for them, but Love of himself, and the Profit they bring him. For if it be asked, what Security, *what Fence* is there in such a State, *against the Violence and Oppression of this Absolute Ruler?* The very Question can scarce be born. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves Death only to ask after Safety. Betwixt Subject and Subject, they will grant, there must be Measures, Laws, and Judges, for their mutual Peace and Security: But as for the *Ruler*, he ought to be *Absolute*, and is above all such Circumstances: because he has Power to do more hurt and wrong, 'tis right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the Voice of Faction and Rebellion. As if when Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by *Pole-Cats*, or *Foxes*, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by *Lions*.

§ 93 7-15 Compare 1, § 156 note and references.

32 This whole paragraph, and particularly this last statement (compare II, 1, 20-21), are often quoted as Locke's judgment on Hobbes; see, for example, Gough, 1950, 36. This is perhaps because of Hobbes's insistence that the claim that the sovereign was not under the law led to the dissolution of civil society; see *Leviathan*, chapter 29. But it seems much more likely to refer to Filmer, who repeatedly maintains that 'A King according to law makes no kind of government', Laslett's edition, 304. Locke makes a generally similar statement in his first *Essay on the Law of Nature*, Von Leyden, 1954, 118-19.

94. But whatever Flatterers may talk to amuze Peoples Understandings, it hinders not Men, from feeling: and when they perceive, that any Man, in what Station soever, is out of the Bounds of the Civil Society which they are of; and that they have no Appeal on Earth against any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature, in respect of him, whom they find to be so; and to take care as soon as they can, to have that *Safety and Security in Civil Society*, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this Discourse) some one good and excellent Man, having got a Preheminency amongst the rest, had this Deference paid to his Goodness and Vertue, as to a kind of Natural Authority, that the chief Rule, with Arbitration of their differences, by a tacit Consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his Uprightness and Wisdom: yet when time, giving Authority, and (as some Men would perswade us) Sacredness to Customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing Innocence of the first Ages began, had brought in Successors of another Stamp, the People finding their Properties not secure under the Government, as then it was, (whereas Government has no other end but the preservation of Property) could never be safe nor at rest, *nor think themselves in Civil Society*, till the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, Parliament, or what you

§ 94 1-9 This is the first mention of revolutionism; compare II, §§ 168, 210.

1 'amuze' = mislead.

11 Perhaps §§ 105-112 are meant (compare Seliger, 1968, 249), or even chapter XIV, 'Of Prerogative'.

22-3 This is Locke's strongest assertion of the preservation of property as the end of government, though it could be a later insertion: see the discussion in Introduction, especially p. 102 and references. Tyrrell, characteristically, puts his similar point in the context of previous discussion: 'I hope this great difficulty which hath puzzled some Divines, which is *prior in nature*, Propriety or civil Government is now cleared, since it is apparent, Propriety, understood either as the application of natural things to the uses of particular Men, or else as the general agreement of many men in the division of a Territory, or Kingdom, must be before Government, one main end of which is to maintain the Dominion or Property before agreed on' (1681, 2nd pagination, 116).

24 'Legislature'—changed by Locke from 'Legislative'. It means the power of law-making, not the law-making body; compare II, § 153, 16; § 154, 4.

26 Reference sign for Hooker quotation inserted by editor; see note on II, § 74, 15; Keble's *Hooker*, 1836, I, 304-5; Locke's 1676 edition, 86-7, coming a little after the passage given in the footnote to II, § 74. It is a remarkable fact that the same passage appears again in the footnote to II, § 111, 8.

please.† By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established: nor could any one, by his own Authority, avoid the force of the Law, when once  
30 made, nor by any pretence of Superiority, plead exemption, thereby to License his own, or the Miscarriages of any of his Dependants. *No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it.*‡ For if any Man may do, what he thinks fit, and there be no Appeal on Earth, for Redress or Security against any harm he shall do;  
35 I ask, Whether he be not perfectly still in the State of Nature, and so can be *no part or Member of that Civil Society*: unless any one will say, the State of Nature and Civil Society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a Patron of Anarchy as to affirm.