

Geopsychanalysis:

“ . . . and the rest of the world”

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Before naming Latin America, I would like to open a parenthesis.

“ . . . and the rest of the world”—a quote, a *bon mot*, from the International Psycho-Analytic Association. The Association’s proposed Constitution of 1977, as ratified by the Thirtieth Congress in Jerusalem, contains a parenthetical sentence which attempts after a fashion to map the divisions of the psychoanalytic world:

(The Association’s main geographical areas are defined at this time as America north of the United States–Mexican border; all America south of that border; and the rest of the world.)

The formulation is far too tempting—the *bon mot* simply too good—not to take the said “rest” as a starting point. Basically the word denominates Europe, the native land and old mother country of psychoanalysis, a body tattooed all over with psychoanalytic institutions and apparatuses; but the self-same “rest of the world” also connotes all that virgin territory, all those parts of the world, where psychoanalysis, to put it bluntly, has never set foot. “The rest of the world,” for the IPA Constitution, is thus a title, a name and a location shared by the roots of psychoanalysis and everything which, since it lies beyond the boundaries of psychoanalysis, has yet to be opened up to it—all expectations in this regard being legitimate; a sort of Far West or no man’s land, then—but also a sort

of foreign body named, incorporated, and circumscribed ahead of time by an IPA Constitution rehearsing, as it were, the psychoanalytic colonization of a non-American rest-of-the-world, the conquest of a virginity parenthetically married to Europe.

I shall now close my own parenthesis, for the time being anyway, and proceed to the naming of Latin America. My only ambition for this morning is to name Latin America—and to do so in a manner that differs from that of the Constitution of the International Psycho-Analytic Association. For we must bear in mind from the outset the plain fact that this is an international meeting—and a psychoanalytic one, even if it bears the legitimating stamp of no international psychoanalytic association. It is almost as though this place were being haunted—and legitimated in advance—by the specter of another International.

So—I will now name Latin America. What is Latin America today? I will explain in a moment why in my view it has to be named. But, first, does it in fact exist, and if so what is it? Is it the name of something so sufficient unto itself—i.e., as a continent—as to have identity? Is it the name of a concept? And what could this concept have to do with psychoanalysis?

Well, my answer to this question, a question which I asked myself on my way here, is Yes. Yes, Latin America is indeed the name of a concept. I would even go so far as to say that it is the name, in the interwoven histories of humanity and of psychoanalysis, of a psychoanalytic concept.

I am sure it will come as no surprise to you that my speaking of "geopsychanalysis"—just as one speaks of geography or geopolitics—does not mean that I am going to propose a psychoanalysis of the earth of the sort that was put forward a few decades ago, when Bachelard evoked "The Earth and the Reveries of Rest" and "The Earth and the Reveries of the Will." But as inclined as I may be today to distance myself from such a psychoanalysis of the earth, as likewise from the more recent and more urgent theme of an anti-psychoanalysis of territorialization, it is nevertheless upon the earth that I wish to advance—upon what the psychoanalysis of today considers to be the earth.

For psychoanalysis has an earth, sole and singular. An earth that is to be distinguished from the world of psychoanalysis. It is not my purpose today to inquire how it goes with the psychoanalytic world, or whether psychoanalysis is a world, or even whether it is of this world, but to observe the figure which psychoanalysis in its becoming-a-world, in its ongoing worldification, inscribes upon the earth, upon the surface of mankind's earth, upon the body of the earth and of mankind.

More than likely this notion was suggested to me simply by reading the program of your conference: the idea that there should exist within the psychoanalytic *socius*

an entity called "Latin America," that a continental unit—an identity at once geographical (one might as well say "natural") and cultural, linguistic or historico-linguistic—should somehow be pertinent to the worldwide organization of psychoanalysis, does not seem like something to take for granted, and it raises several questions. It suggests that for psychoanalysis there are continents, semi-continents, peninsular entities—some of them peninsulas thickly settled by psychoanalysts and psychoanalysis, others as yet virgin, half-continents black or white; and that there is more or less one dark continent only, and one more or less dark—dark, that is, as uncleared or unexplored land is dark, black like femaleness, like a sex, like the skin of some people, like evil, like the unutterable horror of violence, torture, and extermination. All this made me wonder whether it might not be possible to adopt a sort of "map-reading" approach to psychoanalysis. Since in that event I should certainly not be utterly without any political axe to grind, this idea gained a certain momentum for me, a momentum which became almost impossible to resist when I read two fairly recent documents.

I have been asking myself whether I would dare tell you how ingenuously I approached these documents, with what freshness of mind, and out of what depth of ignorance I perused them.

But though I have asked myself that question, it has not exactly been my principal preoccupation. For in the first instance I wondered why I was being asked to come here, and what questions, exactly, people here wanted to ask me. Why was I being asked to speak, to be the first speaker of the morning, on the first morning, early in the morning? What was I to say, and to what purpose? To whom was I to speak?

Notice that I had no question as to my reason for accepting the invitation. That reason was quite simple: I accepted in order to try and understand the wherefore of the invitation. No doubt it is common enough to reply affirmatively to a question or invitation without knowing what one's interlocutor has in mind, and solely in order to discover what that intention might be, but it is certainly dangerous as a foreign policy. All the same, were such a policy never adopted, nothing would ever happen. How could an event be expected to take place if one responded only after having understood the question or invitation, only after having monitored the nature and meaning of the question, demand, or provocation?

My first hypothesis, formulated on the basis of personal experience, ran as follows: In this particular psychoanalytic world, here in Paris, there was a wish to listen as soon as possible, as early as possible, as early in the day as possible, without losing any time at all, to what this stranger—this "foreign body" belonging to no body, this non-member, in whatever capacity, of any of the psychoanalytic corporations of the world (or of the "rest of the world"), whether represented here

today or not, whether European or Latin American—might possibly have to say. I say "foreign body" for two reasons: first, in order to designate something that can be neither assimilated nor rejected, neither internalized nor—since it transcends the boundary between internal and external—foreclosed; and, second, in order to cite Freud. In the *New Introductory Lectures*, Freud speaks within the space of a few lines (Lectures XXX and XXXI) of a "foreign body" (*Fremdkörper*) and of that body which is the most "foreign" to the ego (*am Ichfremdesten*).

The first reference comes in a discussion of telepathy and *Gedankenübertragung* (thought-transference), and the precise context is the moment when the role played by a particular gold coin (*Goldstück*) defeats, and signals the limits of, an analysis. Interestingly enough, it was once again in connection with telepathy and thought-transference that Freud, in a letter to Jones, used the expression "foreign policy" in speaking of psychoanalysis as a global institution, as though this organization were a kind of state seeking to govern its relations with the rest of the world. Freud explains to Jones—who always had great difficulty following Freud in the matter of telepathic communication—that although up till now he has kept silent about his "conversion to telepathy" out of concern for "foreign policy," and in order to guard, as Jones has been asking him to, against the impression of obscurantism and the charges of occultism which such an avowal might generate in certain parts of the world, his conviction has now become so firm and so easily verifiable that it is no longer possible to respect the strategic and diplomatic needs of the psychoanalytic super-state.

The second allusion to foreign bodies in the *New Introductory Lectures*, which occurs just a few lines after the first, defines the symptom as a body foreign, no more and no less, to the ego. The symptom is always a foreign body, and must be deciphered as such; and of course a foreign body is always a symptom, and behaves as a symptom in the body of the ego—it is a body foreign to the body of the ego. That is what I am doing here; I constitute a symptom, I am the symptom, I play that role—if not for each one of you separately, then at any rate for the ego, so to speak, of psychoanalysis as an institution. So the inclination to hear the outsider quickly, early in the morning, is perhaps also a way of banishing the symptom as fast as possible, of pigeonholing what it has to say without delay or, in other words, of consigning it to oblivion without further ado. What is more, the outsider's discourse will be classified and forgotten even more quickly, and be more easily categorized and less disturbing, if it is accorded a place of honor—that is, an honorary place in the sense in which honorary means insignificant. The ostracized foreign body is thus expelled politely, in accordance with the traditional form of protocol which makes an external and supposedly neutral agency responsible for opening an inauguration ceremony or for innocently pulling a paper out of a hat.

That is naturally what the symptom will now do, the outsider being only too happy to play the game. I am therefore going to speak to you of two papers that I might as well have pulled from a hat.

I am an outsider here not only by virtue of the fact that I have no psychoanalytic credentials, being neither an analyst, nor even an analyst in training, nor—as you say and as I now write, in one word or in one breath—"inanalysis." I am psychoanalytically irresponsible, and it is perhaps so that certain things might be said through the mouth of someone irresponsible that I have been summoned here. I have to answer for what I say to no psychoanalytic agency, whether Parisian, French, or international. I am also an outsider here, though, because I am neither an American—whether of the North or of the South—nor a European, Northern or Southern. I am not even really a Latin.

I was born in Africa, and I guarantee you that I retain something of that heritage. My reason for recalling this today is that there is practically no psychoanalysis in Africa, white or black, just as there is practically no psychoanalysis in Asia, or in the South Seas. These are among those parts of "the rest of the world" where psychoanalysis has never set foot, or in any case where it has never taken off its European shoes. I don't know whether you will find such considerations trivial or shocking. Naturally, there are outposts of your European or American psychoanalytic societies in these regions, notably in Africa, in particular places formerly or still under colonial or even neo-colonial rule. In Algeria, the country that I come from and that I only left for the first time at the age of nineteen, the institutions of psychiatry and, more embryonically, of psychoanalysis were, before the war of independence, merely emanations of what we used (how accurately!) to call "metropolitan" organizations. *De facto* and *de jure*. African psychoanalysis was European, structurally defined in the profoundest way by the colonial state apparatus. In order to contextualize the political problem to which I refer, I shall do no more than mention the name and the work of Frantz Fanon.

At that time and in that place it was altogether exceptional and untypical for psychoanalysts to raise the question of their own practice in its political, ethno-psychoanalytic, and socio-institutional dimensions. The laws, the deontology, the ethics of psychoanalysis, as laid down or simply taken for granted by the colonial societies or by the international psychoanalytic establishment were supposed to regulate practice and govern relations with state authorities on the one hand and medical authorities on the other. The Fanons were few and far between, marginal or marginalized; I say this merely in order to provide a well-known and painful point of reference, and not in any sense to establish a particular discourse—Fanon's own positions as a model beyond the reach of all discussion. The political geography of the world has changed since that time, and intercontinental balances

of power have been subject to much turbulence; this can hardly have failed, it seems to me, to have had an impact on the political geography of psychoanalysis.

What, then, are the two documents that I pulled from the hat so graciously held out to me? Of course you are people who do not believe in happenstance: before we have finished our session you will doubtless have mapped out the preprogrammed paths that were bound to lead me to having that particular hat held out to me by such and such and to choosing this particular exquisite corpse rather than some other one, and the writings of a corpse rather than anything else. Well, I too believe in happenstance as little as possible, though I should be hard put to it to say that I don't believe in it at all; in any case, my beliefs can be of little interest to you.

So let us say that, as chance would have it, being interested simultaneously in political-institutional questions and in postal matters (correspondence, letters and postcards, telecommunications, telepathy, computer networking, etc.)—being interested, therefore, in the very point of intersection of the institutional policies of psychoanalysis on the one hand and postal technology on the other—I happened upon my first document, to wit, the 144th Bulletin of the International Psycho-Analytic Association, there to find an account of the IPA's 31st Congress, held in New York. This was the second such congress to be held outside Europe, the first, which had voted on a proposed Constitution and Bylaws, having taken place in Jerusalem in 1977. My eye was first caught by details of a debate on a mail ballot. In a passage that I shall read you in a moment, the question of mail-in voting and of possible changes of opinion between a vote cast *in presentia* and a later one cast *in absentia* and mailed in, is oddly linked with an allusion to certain problems faced by Latin American societies and a reference to the upcoming 1981 Helsinki Congress. It is at that coming Congress that the aforementioned proposed Constitution and Bylaws are to be debated and voted upon.

Helsinki is a place whose name has for a number of years now been associated in our minds with the Olympic Games and with accords, governed by international law, on human rights, or at least on freedom of ideas and freedom of travel. And in Helsinki, then, in less than six months, the IPA will adopt its new Constitution and Bylaws. Still playing the symptom, I am going to pretend today to contribute—albeit in a brief, irresponsible and thoroughly illegitimate way—to the discussion that may be expected to precede the voting on that occasion. In the few lines that I am now about to read, however, what really gave me pause was a particular use of the word "geography" in association with the word "economy." It seemed to me that the formulation "geographical and economic circumstances" was standing in place of something that was not being said, and this distinctly not by reason of circumstances of a geographical or economic order. At the point in question, the discussion had been marking time for a while apropos of the vote on

the Constitution and the way in which that vote might be conducted (whether by mail or not, using registered mail or not, etc.). Then:

Dr. Gemma Jappe (Tübingen, W. Germany) suggested that in a situation where two votes were taken on an issue—one at the Business Meeting, and one some time later by mail ballot—the result might be complicated by the inevitable change of opinion that takes place over a period of time. She would like to suggest, therefore, that provision be made that if the result of the two votes is different, the issue need not be lost, but should come up again for discussion Dr. Carlos Mendilaharsu (Montevideo) spoke in favour of the mail ballot, pointing out that *geographical and economic circumstances made it difficult for the Latin American Societies* particularly to be adequately represented at the Business Meeting and Congresses. He felt, therefore, that the mail ballot would be an important innovation for his Latin American colleagues. [*My emphasis*—J.D.]

I certainly have no wish to play down the indubitable existence of "geographical and economic circumstances" which make it "difficult for the Latin American Societies particularly to be adequately represented." But inasmuch as comparable circumstances must necessarily confront other societies also, given the form of the planet and the distances that must be covered in order to reach the place of assembly of the entire psychoanalytic tribe, I concluded (not that I had to be a genius to do so) that this reference to the economico-geographical realm just prior to the vote on the new Constitution in Helsinki must be a replacement for something else that could not be named.

What exactly was being replaced here? What was it that must not be named? Had one had any doubts on this, an answer presented itself a very short distance away—by virtue of a sort of metonymic contiguity—on the page opposite, where we find a "Request from the Australian Psychoanalytical Society for Discussion of Alleged Violation of Human Rights." I quote once more:

Dr. Joseph introduced the discussion (I must say I like the fact all this came about under Dr. Joseph's chairmanship, but no connection should be inferred with my title, "Geopschoanalysis") of this item by saying that he had received a request from the Australian Society that the IPA look into rumours [*sic*] of alleged violation of human rights in Argentina. As the IPA did so, the issue became one of rumours and allegations and various kinds of evidence from and about many countries around the world. Accordingly, the Executive Council felt that to single out any one country could not in any way do justice to our concern. Nor, it became obvious, was it an issue which only concerned psychoanalysts, but all citizens in general. Accordingly, the Executive Council had asked him to read the following Statement to this Meeting.

Before reading this official statement of the IPA's on the subject of human rights violations, let me remind you that these words were uttered in New York at a time when, though Reagan had not yet assumed the presidency and Haig had yet to declare that the question of human rights would no longer, even in principle, be accorded top priority, actual violations of those rights in Argentina and elsewhere were no longer a matter of mere rumors or allegations. Discussion at the Congress had already in fact produced a naming of countries implicated, including Argentina; and the word "country" had been used in this connection—a word that designates something other and something more than a geographical entity, more, indeed, than a mere nation, for it also implies the existence of a political apparatus, a state, civil society—and psychoanalytic institutions.

Now, however, in the name of "doing justice," out of regard for the clearly incontestable fact that human rights are not violated solely in this or that particular country, all reference to any countries at all will, as we shall see, be eliminated from the official position, from the Council's resolution. Even the word "country" itself will be replaced by the politically neutral or hollow notion of "certain geographical areas." Any concern for justice would naturally impose the requirement that other human rights violations not be overlooked—including, for instance, those in "geographical areas" from which institutionalized psychoanalysis is quite absent. But such a concern is expressed here in a form whose moral, juridical, and universalizing rigor is on a par with its political neutrality and formal abstraction. The appeal to the geographical, to natural location, thus serves to erase any properly symbolic and political inscription of the violation upon or within the earth; erased too, as part of the same process, are the violation's concrete singularity, the irreplaceable body, and the unique site of the violent act in question. In other words, something of the earth is lost too. Geographical abstraction, which effectively neutralizes political discourse, also wipes out the earth itself by wiping out what links a country's name to a particular territory, to certain proper names, to specific policies, and especially, for my present purposes (and I shall return to this), to some psychoanalysis or other. Here is the text of the statement, with its preamble:

Along with various other international organizations, the International Psycho-Analytic Association has, of course, become aware of the violation of human rights which has occurred in certain geographical areas.

The Executive Council of the IPA has discussed these issues at length during its meetings in New York, as it did previously during the Jerusalem Congress. As a result of these discussions I have been asked to read the following official statement to this Business Meeting and to ask you to approve that this Statement be circulated

to various concerned international organizations, such as the World Federation for Mental Health, the World Health Organization, the International Psychiatric Association, Amnesty International, and so on, and to various national Governments, at the discretion of the President and Secretary. Members are invited to suggest to the Executive Council further appropriate recipients for this Statement, which is as follows:

"The International Psycho-Analytic Association wishes to express its opposition to the use of psychiatric or psychotherapeutic methods to deprive individuals of their legitimate freedom; to an individual's receiving psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatment based on political considerations; to the interference with professional *confidentiality for political purposes*. The IPA also condemns the violation of human rights of citizens in general, of scientists and of our colleagues in particular."

Dr. Walter Briebl (Los Angeles) then placed before the Meeting a proposal that a statement be made by the IPA specifically taking a stand about the situation in Argentina, rather than the issuing of the more generalized statement proposed by the Executive Council. The arguments for and against both the statement proposed by the Executive Council and that proposed by Dr. Briebl [unpublished] were discussed by many Members. Finally, the Members present were asked to give an expression of their opinion by voting on the two statements proposed. The result of this show of hands indicated that nearly 85% of members present were in favour of the Statement proposed by the Executive Council.

What Briebl's report had to say we do not know, nor, of course, do we have any idea what outcome of a vote cast according to some other procedure, such as a mail-in vote, might have produced.

That such a position should have thus been taken up is far from negligible nor is it in any way to be condemned. In view of all the pitfalls that assuredly had to be avoided, it is a position lacking neither in clarity, nor in dignity, nor in skillfulness. Coming as it does from a Western organization of liberal persuasion committed to human rights, to political pluralism, but also to its own formal neutrality, to its own survival, and to the prerequisites of its own unity, including whatever degree of noncommitment might be necessary to avoid its being rent apart by international conflicts, this declaration is certainly better than nothing, and I have no wish to go into all the possible reasons or justifications for its extreme cautiousness.

Which having been said, we come to the questions that do arise here. It is striking that the guardedness of this document depends for legitimacy solely upon its formal abstraction, or in other words upon its geographical schematism. What liberal institution in the West could not have made exactly the same declaration? The text bears not the slightest specifically psychoanalytic coloring—a fact that can hardly fail to arouse one's curiosity.

Let me deal right away with two possible objections. First of all, there is no denying that this protest statement does bear some fairly specific characteristics. It is aimed, we read, at a variety of worldwide health organizations; and it is concerned with psychotherapeutic methods which deprive individuals of their "legitimate freedom," with treatments "based on political considerations," or "the interference with professional confidentiality for political purposes."

But could not the same statement be made by any association of psychotherapists or psychiatrists, even one not even remotely affected by psychoanalysis? There is not a word in the resolution to suggest that the violation of the rights of man or of the citizen (concerning which "rumours and allegations" are said to be circulating) could conceivably have a special interest to psychoanalysis as compared with medicine or with classical psychiatry, nor that this interest might be understood not only in the sense of interest in an object of theoretical and clinical study, but also in the sense that psychoanalysis, that the psychoanalytic sphere, that psychoanalysts and their institutions are involved, implicated in one way or another, sometimes in active or passive complicity, sometimes in virtual or organized confrontation, with the forces that commit the aforesaid human rights violations, be these directly under the control of the state or no, and whether or not they exploit, manipulate, and persecute analysts and their analysands in some very specific way.

Others have already described, or may be relied upon to describe, better than I can the violent practices to which I am referring, practices which indeed come in a most singular way into conjunction with the agency of psychoanalysis. I am not thinking only of the most spectacular ways in which psychoanalytic authorities compromise with political or police authorities, nor, inversely, of the most terrifying forms of persecution of psychoanalysts and their patients; all such instances follow well-known and readily identifiable patterns in face of which positions may be taken up that are perfectly clear and equally valid for any professional, and in a general way for any citizen. For there are also more invisible abuses, ones more difficult to detect—whether in Europe or beyond its borders—and perhaps in some sense newer. Psychoanalysis may serve as a conduit for these new forms of violence; alternatively, it may constitute an irreplaceable means for deciphering them, and hence a prerequisite of their denunciation in specific terms—a necessary precondition, then, of a struggle and a transformation.

Inasmuch, indeed, as psychoanalysis does not analyze, does not denounce, does not struggle, does not transform (and does not transform *itself* for these purposes), surely it is in danger of becoming nothing more than a perverse and sophisticated appropriation of violence, or at best merely a new weapon in the symbolic arsenal. Nor would this new weapon be at the disposal solely of what is confusedly referred

to as power—a power, that is, which is *external* to organized psychoanalysis, which can make use of that organization in myriad ways, even to the point of pressing certain effects or travesties of psychoanalytic knowledge into the service of the technology of torture. The panoply in question is just as liable to be deployed within the psychoanalytic institution as to surprise it from without: it may come into play inside the so-called analytic situation itself, whether between analyst and analysand or between analysts themselves, qualified or unqualified, in the process of becoming qualified, in control analysis, etc.; and it may equally well intervene between different analytic institutions, the "foreign policy" of which, to recall Freud's phrase, is governed by no specific law—not even, in some cases, by what is referred to in the rules of war as the law of nations.

I now turn to the second possible objection, the aim of which would be to justify the IPA declaration's formal character and the resulting elimination of any political reference, along with the consignment of Latin America to the realm of the unnamable. It is quite consistent with an appeal to human rights—the argument would run—that the IPA's statement of its position should make no mention of specific countries, specific political struggles, or even specific geographical areas (for such geographical generalization does not merely set aside all other, sociopolitical determinants, it also retains an indeterminateness of its own, concealing its own reality under the cloak of the purposely abstract "certain geographical areas"); nor should the text be any more specific, when it comes to psychoanalysis itself, apropos of that sphere where psychoanalysis may become either the agent or the object, whether directly or not, of human-rights violations of the most singular kind. Calls for human rights, it is felt, should always retain their formality, this being a necessary condition of their force as imperatives, of their claim to a universal and abstract purity transcending all concrete and empirical differences. To save time I shall refrain from recapitulating this well-known theme. Suffice it to say that its role in the present context would be to justify the IPA's geographical schematism, apoliticism, and even apsychoanalyticism in the name of a particular conception of human rights.

This is obviously a very serious problem, and no good purpose would be served by tackling it in great haste, under the pressure of the intimidation, whether virtual or actual, and more or less violent, which lies in wait for us whenever we approach such matters. It goes without saying that respect for human rights ought to be supported, and that any abuse of these rights, wherever it can be shown to occur as such, ought to be opposed. It is thus not merely a question of criticizing the IPA declaration. As I say, it is better than nothing, and, given the IPA's present state, why, every little bit helps, and the statement may very well have some positive effect here or there. In very specific situations it may very well serve to modify

actions, to indicate boundaries and reference points, to inspire ideas of resistance, or to give abstract expression to the ethical-political concerns of those who call themselves psychoanalysts in the world of today, and so on.

These provisos notwithstanding, our original question remains essentially unanswered. Why is the International Psycho-Analytic Association, founded seventy years ago by Freud, unable to take up a position on certain kinds of violence (which I hope to define more clearly in a moment) in any other terms than those of a pre-psychoanalytic and apsychoanalytic juridical discourse, even then adopting only the vaguest and most impoverished forms of that traditional legal idiom, forms deemed inadequate by modern human rights jurists and lobbyists themselves? Why can the IPA be no more specific than to evoke “the violation of human rights of citizens in general,” merely tagging on “of scientists and of our colleagues in particular”—a corporatist addendum which vitiates but in no way offsets the text’s universalizing abstractness? Why must it speak merely of the “legitimate freedom” of individuals?

Since this is the sole content assigned by the statement to what it understands of human rights, there is not even any need for us to refer back to the whole succession of developments that has occurred since 1776 or 1789 in the discourse of human rights. It is enough for us to refer to the most ancient form of the declaration of the rights of man, to the Magna Carta of 1215, brought to France by English émigrés, which concerns itself with the bare minimum of civil liberty. Even that charter had the merit of great precision in its treatment of the concrete situation of the period. The IPA’s Magna Carta, by contrast, is totally abstract and its one and only allusion to politics is an evocation of “treatment based on political considerations” and “the interference with professional confidentiality for political purposes” which fails to indicate either what this entails or where and how it happens, while at the same time assuming that such things could never *not* occur. We are back, are we not, at the prospect of a “map-reading” of psychoanalysis?

There is no time to refine the basic premises of our discussion, so I shall confine myself to the recapitulation of a few obvious facts. If facts they indeed are, as I believe, and if it has not been possible to take them into account, this can only mean that there is something obscure and terrifying in the joint history of mankind, of human rights and of what is known as psychoanalysis. The first obvious fact is that despite all the commotion over such issues as “psychoanalysis and politics,” despite the deluge of discussions on this kind of topic that we have witnessed over the last ten or twelve years at least, it has to be acknowledged—indeed all this agitation actually signals the fact—that at present there exists no approach to political problems, no code of political discourse, that has in any rigorous way incorporated the axiomatics of a possible psychoanalysis—assuming always that psychoanalysis is

possible. I hypothesize, therefore, that no such incorporation has occurred. If no ethical discourse has incorporated the axiomatics of psychoanalysis, no political discourse has done so either. I am speaking of discourses emanating from nonanalysts just as much as from those psychoanalysts or cryptoanalysts operating in the psychoanalytic milieu and using psychoanalytic terminology. And I do not refer solely to theoretical discourses concerned with the necessary preconditions of a politics or an ethics; I am thinking, rather, of discourse qua ethical-political action or behavior. The incorporation I have in mind would not be a kind of calm appropriation: it could not come about without a measure of distortion and transformation on both sides. This is why, paradoxically, the less psychoanalytic and ethical-political discourses become integrated in the strict sense to which I refer, the easier it is for some apparatuses to integrate or appropriate others—for political or police agencies to manipulate the psychoanalytic sphere, for the power of psychoanalysis to be abused, and so forth.

The implications of this cardinal fact, though overlapping, may be said to fall into three types.

The first type concerns the neutralization of ethics and of the political realm, an utter dissociation of the psychoanalytic sphere from the sphere of the citizen or moral subject in his or her public or private life. Why deny that this fracture line runs through our entire experience, sometimes clearly visible, sometimes less so, affecting all our judgments large or small, every day and every instant; and this whether we are analysts ourselves or merely nonanalysts concerned about psychoanalysis? This incredible dissociation is one of the most monstrous characteristics of the *homo psychoanalyticus* of our time. It is a ghastly deformity which gives us the aspect of mutants; sometimes it is terrifying, sometimes comical, and sometimes both at once.

The second type of implication—which may be superimposed upon the first—involves the retreat toward ethical-political positions whose neutrality is rivaled only by their seeming irreproachability; they lean, moreover, away from the political and toward the ethical (and here I shall deliberately leave this immense problem in suspense). It is in this context that a doctrine of human rights is evoked—a doctrine, what is more, itself ill-defined—that shelter is taken behind a language with no psychoanalytic content or pertinence, a language that takes no risks of a psychoanalytic nature and that should certainly satisfy no one present here today. What is an “individual”? What is a “legitimate freedom” from a psychoanalytic point of view? How is *habeas corpus* defined? What does it mean to exclude all political aims? What is a political aim? And so on. Even if it is not to be condemned—because it is better than nothing—falling back upon the appeal to human rights seems an inadequate response in at least three ways. I pass quickly

over the first, the most radical, which is bound up with the philosophy of law, its history, the problem of its relationships to ethics, politics, ontology, and the value of the person or even of the humanity of the human individual—the possibility (or impossibility) of forming the notion of a dignity (*Würdigkeit*), in the Kantian sense, which would transcend all values, all exchange, all equivalence, all *Marktpreis*, and perhaps even go beyond the idea of law itself, beyond judicial weighing-up: so many vast and pressing issues which the psychoanalytic problematic should no longer be able to evade and about which it ought to open a debate with Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, and several others, as well as with jurists and philosophers of law. A debate of this kind has never been more apropos, and when I say that psychoanalysis should no longer be able to evade it, this also implies, in my view, that psychoanalysis cannot itself in this respect be evaded.

The second inadequacy relates to the formality of the IPA's declaration. Let me make it quite clear right away that I have never subscribed *purely and simply* to the old critique of the formalism of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, as developed early on in Marxist circles. Not that that critique was without merit—indeed, the best proof of its merit lies in the fact that in countries flying the flag of socialism formal constitutions based on respect for the rights of man have never posed the slightest impediment (even when they are formally respected) to the most horrendous violence. Any careful reading of the Declaration of 1789 makes it clear that the worst tyrannies could come to terms with it, because every article includes an interpretation clause that can be bent in any way one wishes. The truth is that a measure of strict formality, rising above all individual transactions, is indispensable here. But there are degrees of formality, more or less rigid, more or less rigorously defined.

The IPA adopts the most relaxed set of rules possible. In the first place, the Association dispenses with any properly psychoanalytic reflection upon human rights, upon what the meaning of "right" might be in a world where psychoanalysis is a contemporary reality. Second, the IPA takes no account, either in its deliberations or in its reasons adduced, of the history of the human rights issues of which I have been speaking—no account, in other words, of all the thinking, whether classical or not, that has been done on the subject of human rights and on justice in general, the kind of thinking that is being pursued in very lively fashion today (for reasons that are only too obvious) within state agencies and, especially, independently of them. Reading the IPA statement, one is even at a loss to know which particular declaration of human rights it refers to. There have, after all, been several such declarations since the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights of the seventeenth century, the Declaration of Independence of 1776, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. Among these are the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, from the signing of which the USSR abstained on the grounds that it was too formal and still too close to the 1789 Declaration, the Convention for the Protection of Human and Fundamental Rights signed by the European powers in Rome in 1950, a proposed Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, etc.

All these efforts and their products, which have the form of traditional legal pronouncements, are doubtless not as subtle as they might be in their conceptualization, nor as speedy as they might be in their application. All the same, slowly but surely, the search continues for ways in giving ever more specific content to the formal structures and problematics of human rights principles. Since the last century, it is on the social side of things—and in what we may as well call the "socialist" approach to the social—that enrichment for this content has been sought. But is not this the very area—that of a *socius* no longer defined solely in terms of classic, i.e., socioeconomic, concepts—where a psychoanalytic contribution might be considered essential?

Furthermore, one of the legal themes being worked on at present is torture—the concept of which is, as it were, lagging behind the thing itself. What is that form of violence that we call torture? Where does it begin and end? What is the status of the suffering inflicted or undergone in torture? What is the substance of torture? The fantasy of torture? The symbol of torture? And so on. Even supposing that psychoanalysis can provide a rigorous basis for a discourse of nonviolence—or of nontorture (which seems to me more fundamental)—I should certainly not venture here, merely touching upon the subject, to remind an audience such as you that this is precisely the subject of your theory, your practice, and your institutions. You ought to have essential things to say—and to do—on the matter of torture. Especially on the matter of the particularly modern aspect of torture, in the context of a contemporary history that is also contemporary with psychoanalysis—a synchronicity that still needs to be examined in its many ramifications. At the very least, psychoanalysis ought to participate wherever it is present—and especially wherever it is present in its official manifestations, national or international—in all research undertaken on this subject. Does it do so? To the best of my knowledge, no—or at any rate in far too discreet a way. If I am ill-informed on this, which is quite possible, I shall be only too happy to be set right. At all events, no trace of any such concern is to be found in the discourse of the IPA.

Yet even in the most traditional of agencies—those most thoroughly alien, most thoroughly blind and deaf, to psychoanalysis—the urgency of these matters is felt to be such that in 1975–76 the General Assembly of the United Nations requested, apropos of "torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments," that various agencies establish new international norms. Surely

it is here that a properly psychoanalytic intervention should absolutely be set in motion—provided, of course, that there is such a thing as the “properly psychoanalytic” in this sphere. And if ever there were not, very grave conclusions would have to be drawn on all sides from that fact. Can one say that such an intervention, either direct or indirect, is occurring? I don’t think so, for the moment. Is it possible? I don’t know—I put the question to you. Are the causes of the difficulty inherent to the discourse of psychoanalysis, to its practice, to the institutional forms it requires and to the relations it is obliged to entertain with the dominant political forces? Or are things difficult for reasons which are neither essential nor general, but which derive from a particular dominant state of the theory, the practice or the institutional forms?

The question is still open, but one thing is already certain: if the dominant and representative forces of psychoanalysis in the world today have nothing specific to say or do, nothing original to say or contribute to the thinking and the struggle that are proceeding in connection with the concepts and the crude or refined realities of torture, then psychoanalysis, *at least within the dominant forces that have currently appropriated its representation*—I am trying to phrase things in as nuanced and prudent a fashion as possible—is nothing more and probably much less than those traditional medical health organizations to which the IPA distributes its principled protest, its visiting card or geographical chart, its *parva carta*, its little New York charter. For, when all is said and done, to whom was this card addressed, apart from governmental agencies, the selection of which was left up to the Association’s president—Dr. Joseph—and secretary? The answer is: the World Federation for Mental Health, the World Health Organization, the International Psychiatric Association, and Amnesty International. But what part has the IPA taken in the work of the Human Rights Commission? Or in that of the WHO, which has been invited to prepare a new code of medical ethics to protect individuals from “torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments.” As for Amnesty International, another recipient of the IPA’s little card, for its part it long ago declared the need to work out new international norms, and in 1976, for example, published a document entitled “Codes of Professional Ethics.” And Amnesty limits itself (if one may decently speak of limits in this connection) to the areas of detention and imprisonment. Torture knows no such bounds, however.

What role has psychoanalysis played in such projects and campaigns? And what conclusions should be drawn should it be decided that this role has been meager, nonexistent, or potential rather than substantial? Please understand that I am not trying to drag something of the order of psychoanalysis or of its official representation before the court of the Rights of Man. I am merely concerned to point up a fact or a possibility the seriousness of which ought to precipitate thought and

action. This possibility has the character of a symptom, it indicates a state of psychoanalysis (as theory, practice, and institution) that should not be interpreted solely in terms of backwardness relative to the political struggles on the national, international, and supra state levels, about which I have just been talking. For this backwardness is also the price paid for a step forward by psychoanalysis, an advance which now impedes any translatability as between psychoanalytic concepts and those politico-judicial and ethico-judicial concepts, etc., by means of which such problems are voiced and such actions coordinated. This combination of backwardness and progress—the disjunction and inequality between the two—is not simply an anachronism of psychoanalysis. It is not just a matter of the relationship between two unsynchronized tendencies within a single linear evolutionary process, but also probably of an imbalance in the relationship of psychoanalysis to itself caused by some internal limitation, some occlusion or obstruction which at present shapes the analytic cause, analytic discourse, and analytic clinical and institutional practice. Not that this occlusion is essentially or wholly internal; indeed, the fact that it is unanalyzed means that for the moment, in current psychoanalytic terms, it is unanalytical in character. Yet it must necessarily give rise to some representation, must leave its mark, within the body of psychoanalysis. Shortly I shall suggest that Latin America is the name, the locus and material body of this trace, the surface most clearly marked by its inscription—and this on the very face of the earth itself.

I come now to the third type of implication, which, once again, may be read as overlapping the two earlier types. Something which seems like progress for psychoanalysis, namely the reevaluation of the basic concepts of the axiomatics of human rights and of traditional forms of political discourse, is actually merely the opening up of a void; while this process does train analytic sights upon concepts, values, and what I call the *sphere of transcended values* (e.g., the “dignity” of the individual in the Kantian sense—which is not a value and cannot be grasped by any value-grounded discourse), it does not in any way *replace* them. In this third category, then, are those theoretical constructs best able to bring out the conceptual inadequacy of the axiomatics of human rights and of Western political discourse, and to show the way in which these are rooted in deconstructible philosophemes. Now such theoretical constructs, as advanced as they may be, still constitute only negative discourses whose effect is to neutralize, and it is only in a hollow way that they indicate the necessity for a new ethics—not just for an ethics of psychoanalysis, which does not yet exist, but for another ethical discourse on ethics in general, another political discourse on politics in general, a discourse that would take into account deconstructive and psychoanalytic factors as well, if possible, as what may be interpreted as the truth of psychoanalysis—something, of course, which

always varies according to the places occupied by psychoanalysis on the earth today. So long as the area thus exposed resembles an empty crater, the very greatest need for thought, for the ethical and the political, must necessarily coexist, within this space, with the greatest imaginable *laissez-aller*, with pragmatic *laissez-faire*, with archaism, conformity, opportunism, and so forth.

Is this situation the result of chance, a provisional state of affairs, an empirical given? Or, alternatively, does the present condition of psychoanalysis, as manifested in its principle schools (and by "schools" I mean schools of thought as much as the organizations that train and turn out analysts), embody an element that is unanalyzed, although analyzable in principle—an occlusion, as I called it a moment ago, which effectively bars the emergence of an ethics or politics truly *contemporary* with psychoanalysis? Is it thinkable that psychoanalysis might be made, as it were, into *its own contemporary*? I am by no means unaware of the multifacetedness, and the undoubted richness—contradictions included—of the discourses already filed under the heading "Psychoanalysis and Politics." I base myself, however, on the fact that all these efforts have not succeeded in concealing the hollowness of what has been achieved—or, if you prefer, have succeeded *only* in concealing that hollowness. The question needs to be framed differently—although I am obliged to restrict myself here to its general form—for whichever school predominates in each of the various "geographical areas" of the earth (to use the IPA's terminology), for Latin America, and for the many empirical variants of Freudian orthodoxy just as much as for the Kleinian and Lacanian persuasions.

The distribution of forces, so to speak, that results from the occlusion in question is as follows. On the one hand, theoretical advance posts are established which are unable to support the institutions that could then incorporate them. Such advance posts prove inadequate, therefore, and hence essentially incapable of embodying any concept of their own limitations and the advantages attaching thereto. On the other hand, we see an empirical proliferation of discourses and practices, of micro-institutional affiliations, of ailing or triumphant marginalities—a world of improvisation governed solely by its own currents, by isolation, by the determining inscriptions of biography, history, politics, and so on. This is truer of Latin America than of anywhere else, although it holds increasingly for the "rest of the world." Finally, we are confronted by an official—national or international—representation whose role (despite the appearance it offers, which some tend to deride) is increasingly important in a historical period when the legitimization of psychoanalysis by more and more governments raises the stakes in a way that hardly needs underlining. The more official this representation is, the more thoroughly legitimized, public, and formally wide-ranging, right up to the highest level of the IPA, the less representative is it of the concrete situations in which psychoanalysis

finds itself on the ground, the less able is it to produce a specific discourse or lay down specific ethical-political principles. And the reason for this is not a kind of impoverishment or abstraction intensifying in proportion as the representation becomes more exalted, but that basic occlusion of which I have been speaking.

Perhaps some light might be cast on this by a reading of the proposed Constitution and Bylaws framed at the IPA's Thirtieth Congress, held in Jerusalem in 1977, these being the content of the second of the documents pulled, as it were, from the hat held out to me. Aside from mention of Freud's name, there is nothing at all in the Constitution that applies exclusively to something like psychoanalysis (if indeed such a thing exists), nothing at all that any number of associations of the Western type could not readily embrace. Without going so far as to include sports federations or associations of stamp or postcard collectors, it is certainly safe to say that any traditional institution whose goals are the search for knowledge, health, or mutual aid of a humanitarian kind could subscribe to these propositions. I repeat: with the sole exception of the evocation of the name of Freud, everything here reflects—sometimes indeed repeats exactly, in its hackneyed formulations—the most firmly established conventions of the framework of civil, administrative, and commercial law. Such is the perspective from which I wish to read the IPA's Constitution.

Let me now consider three specific aspects of that Constitution. These concern (1) dissolution (an issue destined to assume an ever greater topicality, and an issue from which one must always start out); (2) the institution proper, its performative establishment (an issue with which it is impossible either to begin or to end); and (3) geography and Latin America (the issue with which I wanted to begin and end today).

Dissolution

The Constitution's last article deals with the question of dissolution, and this is of interest to me in the first place because of the perspective I adopt. A perspective before which you too are placed historically, that of a radical transformation, already under way, which must sooner or later result in the dissolution of the IPA that Freud founded and its replacement by something else, something quite other, something with a fundamentally different structure, a different aspect, a different topography—in short, a different *chart*.

I do not know if, once this transformation is complete, the idea of a charter or constitution, the idea, that is, of law, will still hold sway; equally doubtful is any continued adherence to a statelike international centralization (the suprastate level is of course still statelike in character). More likely we have to envisage something

quite different; what is happening here today already suggests as much. My interest in this article on dissolution has another dimension also—that of transference, or rather of transference in the particular sense of the transfer of an inheritance. When I say that the dissolution of the law which the IPA takes as its authority is already under way, it is not that I think it should be followed, or that it will in fact be followed, by a wild, lawless state of affairs. But there is inevitably a stage, in any transformation of a legal code, in which the new law (itself subject to later transformation) must appear from the standpoint of the earlier system as a condition of wildness: this is the stage of negotiation, of transition, and of the transfer of an inheritance.

Now, as I say, the final—and twelfth—article of the IPA Constitution envisages the Association's dissolution, and its terminology consists of formulas long used by associations of this type. It contemplates the "transfer" (the exact word used) of the IPA's property, i.e., the passing down of the only possible, perceptible, preservable legacy of the organization. To whom, then, is this legacy to be transferred? Were it not for fear of taking up too much of your time, I would have liked to undertake a thorough analysis of this last article concerned with death, this sort of proto-will which foresees the IPA's dissolution "by a resolution of which due notice has been given"—something you could prepare, say, between now and the Helsinki Congress. To become effective, such a resolution must be passed by a three-fourths majority of the members *present* at a duly convened business meeting. Thus the IPA cannot be dissolved by correspondence or by telegram even if a majority in favor exists, nor can it be dissolved by letter, postcard, telephone, satellite relay, or telepathy—Freud's self-acknowledged conversion of 1926–1930 to *Gedankenübertragung* or thought-transfer notwithstanding. This axiomatics of presence is extraordinarily revealing here. And this, not only for what it tells us of the ontological underpinnings of the IPA Constitution but also because it is a safe bet that those today who have the most to say, and do, in connection with the transformation of the psychoanalytic international will not be able to be present in Helsinki. Here, then, is the very last paragraph of the IPA Constitution:

If upon the dissolution of the Association there remains, after payment of all its debts and liabilities, any property whatsoever, the same shall not be paid or distributed among Members of the Association but shall be given or transferred to some other institution or institutions having objects similar to the objects of the Association. Such institution or institutions, to be determined by the Members of the Association at or before the time of dissolution, shall prohibit the distribution of its or their income and property among its or their members. If and so far as effect cannot be given to this provision, then such property shall be transferred to some charitable object.

I do not know into how many languages the word "charity" can be translated—barely into French, at any rate, but no matter. In any case, these arrangements suggest quite a number of different ideas. The mere notion of institutions with "similar objects" provides a vast topic for discussion, and the use of the idea of analogy in this context can teach us a very great deal about this self-representation of the IPA's. That the sole completely legitimate object of transfer should in the last analysis amount to a renunciation of assets under the banner of the Christian category of charity, of Christian love unassociated with exchange, reproduction, or investment, really makes one wonder about what exactly the end of the IPA is liable to usher in. As for the idea of "similar objects," the idea that there are analogous institutions, etc., this leads us to ask ourselves what the peculiar, unique, or incomparable properties of a psychoanalytic institution might be. The IPA Constitution designates this specificity by means of a single word, a single proper name—and this brings me to my second point.

The Institution Itself

This second point, as it happens, concerns the Constitution's second article. The first has named the organization "IPA"—a performative statement that is now explicated by Article 2 under the heading "Definition of Psycho-Analysis." Those of you who are familiar with this charter will recall that absolutely nothing is said there of the specificity of psychoanalysis except for the name of Freud. There is explicit mention of "specificity," yet the word is given no content, post Freud, except Freud's name. Here is the text:

Definition of Psycho-Analysis. The term *psychoanalysis* refers to a theory of personality structure and function, to the application of this theory to other branches of knowledge, and, finally, to a specific psychotherapeutic technique. This body of knowledge is based on and derived from the fundamental psychological discoveries made by Sigmund Freud.

This is a *hapax legomenon*. No institution of learning or of therapeutic practice has ever been founded on a proper name. The claim is so outlandish, and its outlandishness here made so basic to psychoanalysis that all the subsequent articles of this Constitution ought to have been undermined by its implications. In fact, as we have seen, nothing of the sort occurs, and aside from Freud's name one searches in vain for a single feature capable of marking this charter off from that of any other association established on the basis of problematical notions such as "personality," "psychotherapy," "branches of knowledge," and so on.

To save time, let me proceed directly to the most formal upshot of this, which

is that anyone who ceases to appeal *a priori*, as a matter of dogma, to the authority of Freud's name thereby relinquishes his right to membership in the Association. Let us leave aside for the moment the case—though it is certainly serious enough—of those people who request clarification of such terms as "personality structure and function," "technique," "psychotherapy," "branches of knowledge," "body of knowledge," etc., and confine ourselves to the consideration of those who, without even wishing to deny all debt to Freud, do come to wonder about the role of this proper name and its relationship to science, to thought, to the institution, to the legacy of psychoanalysis—those who become interested in the unique link between this name and its bearer, between this name and the psychoanalytic cause or movement, etc. Since this is something that occurs here or there ever more frequently, and always along paths that are essential to psychoanalysis, one is obliged to draw the following conclusion: All who are inclined to lay hold of the right and the means to develop questions of this kind, all who believe it necessary to accept the implications for the institution of the answers they find, must needs have a new psychoanalytic *socius* in view—a *socius* that would not necessarily have the structure of a central, national, or international organization, and that would certainly not remain solely a school of theory as impotent in its way as that League of Nations whose impotence and lack of autonomy Freud pointed up in 1932 in his letter to Einstein (*Why War?*)—without, however, proceeding to wonder whence a psychoanalytic league of nations might one day derive an autonomous force.

Nor, for that matter, where on the earth such an organization might exist. What about *place*?

Geography and Latin America

I have reached my third topic: geography and Latin America in the IPA's proposed Constitution (from Jerusalem to Helsinki via New York). The text is much concerned with attributions to places, and its whole topology is very interesting. I pass quickly over the location of the Association's office—namely, "the country of the President." This arrangement was envisaged by Freud himself, as he recalls in "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," and this as early as the first Congress and the presidency of Jung. Let us not forget that opposition to it was quite vigorous. As Freud himself acknowledges, there was fear of "censorship and restrictions on scientific freedom." Nor can the fact that this opposition centered around Adler serve either to validate or to invalidate it in the eyes of anyone who is not a dogmatist or a true believer. The president, then, has his own place—a place amidst the psychoanalytic organizations which divide the globe up among them.

The grand map of this partition might seem purely geographical in nature, but when we consider the complex historico-political motivations involved, which, once they have been painstakingly traced, emerge as a differentiated network of blazed trails, what we see is a highly meaning-laden *terra psychoanalytica*, as sketched in the parenthetical statement that I quoted at the beginning: "(The Association's main geographical areas are defined at this time as America north of the United States-Mexican border; all America south of that border; and the rest of the world.)" Three areas, then—a tricontinental triangle. But inasmuch as "the rest of the world" is further divided into two, it may be more accurate to say that there are in fact four areas. "The rest of the world" is divided into two: on the one hand, it covers Europe and all those places where analysis has taken firm root (broadly speaking, the cradle of psychoanalysis in the so-called democracies of the Old World); on the other hand, it also includes that immensity of territory where, for reasons of a particular kind but of great diversity, *Homo psychoanalyticus* is unknown or outlawed.

Whatever the contours of the network of historical and political blazed (and unblazed) trails, however, the striking thing is that the map is not a triangle but a square—or, perhaps better, a framework or checkerwork—serving to mark out four zones, four types of territory, denominated in a geographically neutral manner, each of which is absolutely distinct from the standpoint of psychoanalysis. Though roughly coextensive with actual territorial areas, these four types are not fundamentally geographical in character, and where the overlap with territorial realities is not exact or perfect, this by no means compromises the typology, which I shall now try to define.

First come those areas of human settlement where psychoanalysis has made no inroads whatsoever—sometimes not even with the help of all the paraphernalia of colonization: almost all China, a good portion of Africa, the entire non-Judeo-Christian world—as also myriad enclaves in Europe and America. The size of these psychoanalytically virgin territories, in terms both of their physical extension and of their (present and future) demographics, as well as their cultural and religious foundations, means that they constitute a vast problem for the future of psychoanalysis. For that future is far from being structured like a space opening up ahead—a space yet to come, as it were, for psychoanalysis. This first zone is itself made up of two sectors: countries of European culture, such as those of the socialist world, where psychoanalysis is as yet unable to develop, and other countries. A comparable division exists from the point of view of human rights. Apropos of "the rest of the world," then, we ought to speak not of one kind of area but of two.

Another area—and another hemisphere—embraces all those places where psychoanalysis as an institution is firmly implanted (Western Europe, North America)

and of which—though human rights are not universally respected (far from it, in fact, as witness Amnesty International's reports on European and North American countries, not to mention those kinds of violence which fall outside Amnesty's purview)—it may at least be said that certain sorts of violence have not as yet, not in the period since World War II, been unleashed with the ferocity, whether state-supported or not, that is familiar at varying levels and in varying forms in so many Latin American countries. Some might say that this is a matter of degree only, yet the difference is so great, albeit quantitative, that a certain qualitative threshold is undoubtedly passed; likewise, another kind of coexistence comes to obtain between the organizational apparatus of psychoanalysis and the deployment of political violence, so giving rise to problems, controversies, sufferings, and dramatic events which are as yet without parallel elsewhere.

We must therefore speak in this connection of a *fourth* area, and discern another map lying beneath—beyond, or on the far side of—the one proposed by the IPA's Constitution. What I shall from now on call the Latin America of psychoanalysis is the only area in the world where there is a coexistence, whether actively adversarial or not, between a strong psychoanalytic institution on the one hand and a society on the other (civil society or State) that engages in torture on a scale and of a kind far surpassing the crude traditional forms familiar everywhere. As I feel sure others will testify in the coming days far more effectively than I ever could, the kinds of torture to which I refer sometimes appropriate what I suppose we may as well call psycho-symbolic techniques, thereby involving the citizen-psychoanalyst, as such, as an active participant either on one side or the other, or perhaps even on both sides at once, of these abuses. In any case, the medium of psychoanalysis is in consequence traversed by the violence in question, and this, whether directly or indirectly, inevitably leaves its mark on all its intra-institutional relationships, all its clinical practice, and all its dealings with civil society or with the State.

This is an area, then, where no relationship of the psychoanalytic sphere to itself can be conceived of that does not bear traces of internal and external violence of this kind. In short, the psychoanalytic medium no longer enjoys any simple interiority. We are obliged to acknowledge that this pattern—a dense psychoanalytic colonization and a strong psychoanalytic culture coupled with the highest possible intensity of modern military and police violence—is at once *without equivalent* and *exemplary* in character. To say that it is without equivalent implies that no one who is not blind to reality, or speaking in bad faith or out of political calculation, can refuse, as the IPA under the presidency of Dr. Joseph did, to name Latin America (in the event, Argentina) under the pretext that human rights are also violated in other places. From the point of view of psychoanalysis as institution and as historical movement, what is happening in Latin America can be com-

pared neither with the situation in all those parts of the world—or of “the rest the world”—where psychoanalysis does not take place, where it has not yet found a place, nor with the situation in those other parts of “the rest of the world” where psychoanalysis has put down roots and where human rights are no longer violated (a recent development), or not yet violated, in such a massive, spectacular and systematic fashion.

But while it is true that the pattern in Latin America is thus indeed without equivalent, thus indeed *incomparable* in this sense, and while no substitution of other names or other examples can thus be justified here, this is not to say that that which is without equivalent, that which is unique, cannot *serve as an example*. The unexampled may have an exemplary role for the ethical-political problems of psychoanalysis. What occurs on a massive scale, inscribed in large letters upon Latin America, may well serve to expose—by projecting it, as it were, onto a giant screen—what is written small, as a function of what might be described as the circulatory system and the stock of less easily decipherable small letters, upon the so-called liberal democracies of Europe and North America. (Let us not forget that the latter's intervention is one of the essential determinants of the Latin America situation.) There can be no substituting of Chinese, Russian, Afghan, or South African instances for what is written in large letters over there in Latin America, but on the other hand those large letters can help us understand what is happening, could happen, or will happen in the psychoanalytic Old World, here where we stand, in the relations of psychoanalysis with the rest of the world in its political dimension (civil society, State), with the European and North American continents in their entirety, and above all in the relations that obtain *within* the territory of institutional psychoanalysis. It happens (and it is no coincidence) that the dominant psychoanalytic schools in Latin America, apart from the orthodox empiricisms I alluded to earlier, are radically European tendencies, by which I mean to say that they remain firmly anchored to their British or French (Kleinian, Lacanian, etc.) roots. This is something which enlarges and turns face up a good many small letters awaiting decipherment.

Under given conditions, once a protocol has been established, *naming* can become a historical and political act responsibility for whose performance is inescapable. This is a responsibility that the IPA has ducked at a particularly grave moment in history—the history of psychoanalysis included. Henceforth, should psychoanalysis wish to take the measure of what is happening in Latin America, to measure itself against what the state of affairs down there reveals, to respond to what threatens, limits, defines, disfigures, or exposes it, then it will be necessary, at least, to do some *naming*. This is the first requirement for an appeal: a call to call that which has a name by its name. To call Latin America by its name, by what that

name seems to mean for psychoanalysis today. At least as a start. All I could hope to contribute to that appeal today was: the naming of Latin America.

ENDNOTE

This essay was the opening address to a French-Latin American meeting convened in Paris in February 1981 at the initiative of René Major. The proceedings of this event, which was devoted mainly to the institutions and politics of present-day psychoanalysis, were published under the same title as the meeting itself: *Confrontation* (Paris: Collection Vert et noir, 1981), and subtitled *Les souterrains de l'institution* (The Underground Corridors of the Institution). Translation first published in *American Imago* 48.2 (1991). Translation © 1991, 1996 by Donald Nicholson-Smith. All rights reserved.